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Executive summary

Key findings

The research presented in this deliverable covers three types of approaches to mitigating corruption: electoral accountability, civil society mobilization (societal accountability), and top down efforts by a regime to deal with its own corruption. The main findings are:

- Corruption does not, in contrast to what previous research suggests, always depress electoral turnout, which allows for more optimism regarding the potential of elections to curtail corruption. When parties make corruption a campaign issue, and in so doing give voters a means to express their frustration, perceptions of corruption actually *enhance* turnout. Moreover, when a plurality of parties exist, giving voters ideologically comparable options, voters are more likely to punish parties charged with corruption. Given viable options and recourses, in other words, voters in Europe do punish corruption (Section 1).
- In addition, evidence suggests that new anti-corruption parties that gain power in Europe are by no means sinister opportunists who capitalized on popular discontent only to do nothing once in office. A number of new parties have been effective in curbing corruption, e.g. Res Publica in Estonia, New Era and Zatler's Reform Party in Latvia and to some extent NDSV in Bulgaria. The GERB in Bulgaria, Public Affairs and ANO in Slovakia have, however, done little to promote change (Section 1).
- Moreover, electoral accountability works well with respect to reducing corruption in the European contexts in the sense that increasing levels of corruption increase the electoral prospects of anti-corruption parties, as well as the removal of corrupt candidates and incumbents from the party lists of established parties. Incumbents who face corruption charges also lose vote shares compared to incumbents against whom no such charges are levelled, though the loss is seldom sufficient to trigger a change in government (Section 2).
- On civil society involvement, we find evidence of anti-corruption activism in a number of European countries. In depth case study evidence suggests that their impact is still rather limited overall, though the degree of movements' success varies considerably. Anti-corruption movements that have linked the issue to underlying issues of social justice and the distribution of power, such as the *Indignados* in Spain, and where the framing has been adopted by the political party *Podemos*, have enjoyed the greatest success. The strategy to graft the issue of corruption onto smaller and less enduring issues, such as in the case of Hungary, seems to have yielded less favourable results (Section 3).
- Studies from outside the European context show that anti-corruption incumbents do not, however, in all cases bring about substantive reductions in the prevalence of corruption in their own administrations. Parties and movements that rise to power with an anti-corruption message may enact meaningful legislation and institutional reform with one hand, while quietly undermining change on the other. The Morales administration in Bolivia provides a case in point, having put in place measures to increase access to information, expanded participatory opportunities, and strengthened institutions of horizontal accountability. At the same time, he has appointed political allies to enforcement bodies, which has led to de facto amnesty for political allies, and also given privileged access to participatory arenas at the exclusion of outsiders. Moreover, little effort has been made to change the values and sense of integrity

among government officials, a necessary component of meaningful change (Section 4).

Detailed summary

Section 1. Electoral accountability and corruption and a political issue

Andreas Bågenholm's research shows that corrupt incumbents are not systematically punished in European voters (Bågenholm, 2013) and under what conditions that is more likely to happen (Charron & Bågenholm, 2016), as well as the electoral success of parties that campaign on an anti-corruption platform (Bågenholm & Charron, 2014) and whether their entry into office triggers policy change (Bågenholm & Charron, 2015) and finally that the negative effect corruption on electoral turnout is mitigated and even reversed when a party exists that politicizes and spearheads and anti-corruption platform (Bågenholm, Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016).

These studies taken together thus examine the electoral impact of corruption as a political issue. Previous research, based primarily on case studies of a limited number of countries, has found a surprisingly high tolerance for corrupt politicians and parties, which only is marginally punished by voters. In a broad comparative study covering over 200 parliamentary elections in 32 European countries between 1981 and 2011, these findings are basically confirmed (Bågenholm, 2013). Incumbents that are accused of corruption lose vote shares somewhat more than incumbents that are not accused, but the loss is seldom sufficient to lead to governmental change, implying, in line with previous research, that they are only marginally punished.

That said, corruption can under certain circumstances affect electoral outcomes. In order to hold politicians accountable, voters naturally need to turn out and vote. Previous research has shown that corruption has a demobilizing effect on voters, but a recent study shows that the negative effect of perceiving high corruption on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized (Bågenholm, Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016). This is good news in terms of electoral accountability as political parties seem to be providing a constructive option for citizens' discontent, in contrast to situations where no such party exists.

The research also shows that different voters are differently inclined to punish corruption. According to results based on a large scale survey covering 24 countries, people defining themselves as extreme right or left wing are significantly more tolerant of corruption in their own party and indicate that they are willing to continue to support it even in the face of a corruption scandals (Charron & Bågenholm, 2016). However, as the number of viable party alternatives increases, the effect of ideology plays an increasingly smaller role. In systems with a large number of effective parties, the ideological effect abates since even fringe voters have the option to vote for cleaner but ideologically similar contenders. A larger number of parties thus seem to facilitate electoral accountability.

Anti-corruption as a campaign issue has previously received little attention. In contrast to the quite limited effect of corruption on electoral fortunes of incumbents, results show that politicization of corruption is a highly effective strategy and especially so for new parties and in countries with high levels of corruption (Bågenholm & Charron, 2014). The higher saliency of corruption in high corrupt societies and the stronger credibility of newly established parties, which enjoy the 'fresh face' advantage. Corruption thus has a stronger electoral effect on the "reward-side" than on the "punishment-side".

Are parties that politicize corruption serious in their attempts to actually curb corruption, if elected? In comparison to other niche parties, new Anti-Corruption Parties have been much more successful electorally and on many occasions they have managed to take part – and even led – governments. The success of these parties when it comes to curbing corruption is mixed, but mainly positive (Bågenholm & Charron, 2015). There are some examples, where ACPs have been exposed to corrupt dealings, but there is also evidence of substantial progress in terms of anti-corruption reforms, resulting in improved corruption scores, e.g. Res Publica in Estonia, New Era and Zatler's Reform Party in Latvia and to some extent NDSV in Bulgaria, whereas GERB in Bulgaria, Public Affairs and ANO in Slovakia have disappointed. Voters have thus good reasons to trust that new ACP's will perform better or as well (or badly) as established parties and that they by definition should not be dismissed as populists who cynically exploit voter frustration.

The finding that new parties and especially anti-corruption parties, which at times also are anti-establishment parties, enjoy greater success when corruption is more prevalent, suggests that measures to lower the barriers of entry for new parties might increase the likelihood that democracy will help to diminish corruption. Proportional systems and lower thresholds may be worth considering. The entry of new parties, and new candidates, when corruption allegations have been made, gives voters more options and invigorates competition. While in many respects positive, greater plurality and volatility both on the party landscape but also within parties may also entail risks, and reforms must therefore also anticipate the possible negative implications of instability in party systems.

Section 2: Imperfect storms: conditions that favour new parties, and how established parties deal with corruption internally

The partners from UCL have studied the political impact of corruption perception on party politics by looking at new party success and change within established political parties. Our analysis considers Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – a region of newly established democracies characterised by fluid party systems but also by diverse and changing levels of political corruption.

In the last two decades, CEE countries have seen remarkable breakthroughs of *new political parties*. Particularly striking has been the success of anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs), a new group of parties that combine moderate social and economic policies with anti-establishment appeals and a desire to change the way politics is conducted. We analyse the electoral breakthroughs of AERPs in the region where they have been most successful. Examples include the Simeon II National Movement, GERB (Bulgaria), Res Publica (Estonia), New Era (Latvia), TOP09 and Public Affairs (Czech Republic) and Positive Slovenia. An analysis of the determinants of AERP breakthroughs in 1997-2012 using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), reveals five sufficient causal paths, combining high or rising corruption, rising unemployment and party system instability in various configurations. Rising corruption or, to a lesser extent, simply high levels of corruption, is a key determinant of AERP breakthroughs while somewhat unexpectedly the breakthroughs are more closely associated with economically good times than bad ones. Hence, we find that rising levels of corruption perception carry a distinct potential for causing significant party system change. Six of the parties under study were so successful that their leaders became Prime Ministers of their countries in the wake of their first elections, sometimes less than one year after the parties had been formed.

We also analyse how *established parties* react to changing environment of corruption perception. We propose a new index of party change based on candidate turnover on electoral lists and analyse it in nine CEE countries using a specially compiled dataset on 61 elections

and nearly 200,000 candidacies. Existing studies have analysed the electoral impact of political corruption and effectiveness of elections in holding politicians to account. However, high levels of corruption or publicised cases of political malfeasance also impact on pre-election strategies of parties. While some have argued that political scandals decrease candidate renomination rates and electoral fortunes of incumbents, others suggest that parties stick to established candidates as corruption increases. We put these contrasting arguments to the test and formulate two competing hypotheses on the impact of corruption (perception) on candidate turnover: 1) rejuvenation, under which parties renew their candidate lists in response to corruption, and 2) renomination, under which parties opt for stability in the candidate pool. We find more support for the rejuvenation hypothesis as a deteriorating corruption situation leads to increased candidate turnover (but so do smaller party size, decreasing electoral support and economic downturn). However, the effect of corruption perception only applies for governing parties and it has no discernible impact on established opposition parties. Increasing levels of corruption may therefore destabilise not only party systems by fostering anti-establishment parties, but also by de-stabilising existing political actors.

Section 3: Civil society activism: divergent tactics and impacts

The research conducted by the team at Scuola Normale Superiore (between 2013 and 2015, at the European University Institute), and coordinated by Prof Donatella della Porta within the framework of the WP11, examined the mobilisation of anti-corruption collective actors in three countries: Hungary, Italy, and Spain. The analyses explore the recent history of struggles against corruption and organised crime in the three countries. Our research investigates how, and to what extent, social movements and civil society actors can contribute to the aspired goal of greater societal accountability in EU member states with high levels of perceived corruption. Taking a social movement perspective on the issue, our enquiry employed various research techniques, including contextual and discourse analyses, face-to-face interviews with prominent anti-corruption actors and activists, and survey data collected by means of computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI).

By comparing Hungary with Spain and Italy, we move beyond the still dominant tendency to focus either on post-communist or on Western Europe. Judging from the numbers and frequency of cases reported upon, corruption has turned into a permanent fixture of Hungarian politics. This has had a number of consequences not only for the anti-corruption struggle, but also for societal accountability. On the one hand, the political establishment (comprising both the governing Right-wing coalition and the mainstream Left) has shown little interest in tackling corruption and establishing a constructive dialogue with anti-corruption forces. On the other, the reach of corrupt practices has prompted a 'numbing effect' on public opinion, whose concerns about corruption have been usurped by other concerns such as poverty, unemployment, or the refugee crisis.

Due to these factors, the success of the movement in Hungary has been – at least, until recently – rather limited. While large-scale mobilisations have indeed occurred in Hungary, these primarily focused on other issues (e.g. taxation of Internet usage), and bore only a secondary anti-corruption component. This is clearly in line with public opinion cues, but also the same perceptions of activists, who at times recognised the poor mobilising value of standalone anti-corruption framing and politicking. As a result, anti-corruption stances mainly thrive at the margins of mainstream and institutional politics, and include a rather composite selection of actors. Libertarian and far-right 'movement parties' have virtually proven the only organisations elaborating on the issue at the party-political level. Although grassroots

activists strive to sustain attention through demonstrations and other contentious performances, notable developments in the anti-corruption struggle should be signalled in the field of investigative journalism. Journalist-activists have, in recent times, systematised and instilled consistency into the exposure of corrupt practices in Hungary.

Overall, activists and civil society actors were found linking anti-corruption to anti-government frames. Corruption is, in other words, deemed a direct consequence of state capture by the government of the day, thus affecting the Hungarian economic, social, and cultural spheres. We assume that this bridging mechanism on the part of anti-corruption actors better resonates with the public, and contributes to sustain a struggle which would be otherwise silenced in the public debate. Precisely in light of these unfavourable contextual conditions, the anti-corruption struggle has failed to achieve any policy goal, though related mobilisations such as the '100,000 against the Internet Tax' have contributed to make the government accountable and retreat contentious policy proposals. The impact of movement parties, activists, and other civil society actors should be better assessed at the level of dissemination, i.e. their systematic attempt to raise awareness about the issue of corruption and its detrimental effects for Hungarian society.

The Italian case substantially advanced knowledge on grassroots participation in the struggle against corruption. Despite the extent of corrupt practices in the country, very little research has focused on anti-corruption from below as an object of enquiry. After reconstructing the field of contention, we examined the impact of these mobilisations. While grassroots campaigns against corruption did take place in Italy during the past decade, attempts to develop a widespread and/or full-fledged social movement able to counter corrupt practices proved of limited success. This can be partly attributed to the rise of the 5 Star Movement, a new political party that tapped into the anti-establishment and anti-corruption attitudes of the larger public.

The lack of large-scale mobilisation against corruption can be also explained by making reference to the way the field of contention is structured. First, collective actors mobilising on the issue tend to act independently from one another, and with a rather narrow territorial scope; their coordination efforts at the national level are generally limited. Second, anti-corruption collective action often – though not exclusively – depends on external donations (e.g. from public institutions); either directly or indirectly, these procedures co-opt social movement and civil society actors, discouraging public protests and disruptive actions. Third, the anti-corruption struggle is predominantly framed in cultural terms; hence, political corruption is linked to the overall lack of legality in Italy and the detrimental effects caused by it. Taken together, these features constrain collective action geared towards the construction of public knowledge about the mechanisms of corruption and its consequences.

We observed a significant overlap between grassroots opposition to organised crime and corruption. The two contentious issues are deeply interrelated, both at the discursive and strategic levels. On the one hand, anti-mafia and anti-corruption frames are bridged in the discourse formation of social movements and civil society actors. On the other, many collective actors opposing criminal organisations are also practically involved in campaigns against corruption. As a case in point, the two national grassroots campaigns against corruption that took place in the last decade directly stemmed from the active engagement of anti-mafia activists. Finally, the Italian case illustrates that social movements and civil society actors deem their activities relevant in many respects, regardless of potential policy achievements in the national institutional arena. Grassroots activists consider the local level as their primary arena of mobilisation, and direct much of their efforts to the societal and cultural aspects of the anti-corruption struggle.

The Spanish case evidenced, on the other hand, a clear translation of the anti-corruption struggle into the institutional arena. The issue of corruption has been central to the mobilisation of the *Indignados* in 2011 – stances that were later taken up by *Podemos*, the political party that emerged from this movement. Evidence from surveys and interviews with grassroots activists shows that political corruption was one of the main issues taking them to the streets. While the *Indignados* also stood for free and secular education as well as a more proportional allocation of seats in parliament, corruption remained a central theme throughout. Spanish activists interpreted corruption as a threat to social justice and democracy, and sought to establish total political transparency, mechanisms of political accountability, and effective separation of powers. As a matter of fact, corruption has been often linked to the malfunctioning of representative institutions, and the slogan 'we are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers' aptly demonstrates this.

The institutionalisation of the movement started in January 2014, when *Podemos* decided to run for elections. On top of other socioeconomic concerns, corruption still plays a central role in the political discourse of the movement party. According to Podemos, the disproportionate role that economic elites play in the government of the country is in itself corruption. Collective action frames are constructed around the idea that corruption should be interpreted as a phenomenon affecting the legal, economic, and political spheres. Corruption is deemed a consequence of the collusion between the political and economic establishment, responsible for the growing inequalities within Spanish society. The collective actors involved in the struggle against corruption also managed to revive a class discourse, and the redistribution of power and economic resources lies at the core of this discourse.

Anti-corruption collective actors in Spain resort to different repertoires and strategies. These include investigative reports on instances of corruption at the local and national levels; assistance to citizens and groups denouncing corrupt practices; helping to set up legal cases; and interacting with left-wing administrations to tackle corruption. These strategies have often resulted in the legal prosecution of politicians and bankers. By placing emphasis on the publicity of these tactics, the anti-corruption struggle from below has raised awareness and catalysed public attention on the problems associated with corruption. Moreover, anti-corruption activists perceive themselves as part of a broader societal change, by having successfully translated their struggle from the protest to the electoral arena – not least, by eroding the consensus of traditional parties.

Across cases similarly affected by the reach of corruption, we identified multifaceted anti-corruption activities, undergoing different developmental stages and strategies. The different configurations of national contexts seem to have influenced the unfolding of strategies, the level of activity, and the frames employed by anti-corruption collective actors. When the institutionalisation of this dimension of conflict and the relevance of anti-corruption actors are taken into account, we could reasonably place Spain on one end and Hungary on the other, with Italy sitting somewhere in between. In terms of framing of the issue, the struggle against corruption and for societal accountability appears generally interwoven with the one against established politics and organised crime. Although forms of impact at the policy level were reported, the main contribution of anti-corruption from below rests in the production of knowledge and raising public awareness on cases of corruption and their consequences for society at large.

In sum, anti-corruption activism exists in a number of European countries, yet these movements differ considerably both in terms of strategies, the framing of the issue of corruption, but also in terms of impact. In depth comparative analyses of the movements in Spain, Italy and Hungary reveal that the movement in Spain, which has linked corruption to underlying issues of social justice and the distribution of power in the society, has enjoyed

considerable success, both in the shorter and longer term. The longer term success has entailed maintaining the issue in the public debate, and in the shorter term the movement has trained and assisted citizens in holding officials accountable through legal actions. In Italy, the issue was strongly linked to the issue of organized crime, and has actually lost momentum in conjunction with the emergence of an anti-corruption party. In Hungary, public interest in the issue has largely been usurped by other issues considered to be more pressing, and the movement has not succeeded in framing corruption as an integral component of these larger issues.

Section 4: Building integrity through compliance-based and values-based approaches

Research by the team at the University of Nottingham explored the practical implementation of integrity management systems in the case of Bolivia. Particular emphasis was placed on exploring the relationship between compliance-based and values-based approaches to anti-corruption and integrity promotion.

On being elected president of Bolivia in December 2005, Evo Morales committed his government to implementing a policy of 'zero tolerance towards corruption'. In 2009 a Ministry for Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption was established and enacted several legal reforms. This anti-corruption policy was part of a wider political mission to decolonize the state and establish a new social contract.

In his discourse, Morales blames corruption on colonization, neoliberalism and the white elites who previously governed the country, seeking instead to reincorporate indigenous cultures and values into the country's national consciousness. Despite the commitment to fighting corruption, surveys in Bolivia indicate that there has been an increase in negative perceptions of corruption. The case study argues that part of the reason for this is that the government has placed greater emphasis on a politically motivated use of regulatory codes and other compliance measures to combat corruption, at the expense of promoting the promised change in values and ethical behaviour.

Despite government discourse appearing to favour a values-based approach to tackling corruption and promoting integrity, in practice Bolivia's anticorruption policy has failed to reflect this approach. On the one hand, events to promote positive ethical values have been sporadic and inconsistent; on the other, the resources devoted to anti-corruption agencies have been inadequate to address the scale of the challenge they face.

Instead, Bolivia's government has been accused of instrumentalizing its anti-corruption policy for political purposes, and the anti-corruption laws have been rarely applied in cases that would implicate members of Morales' MAS political party. Moreover, the institutions in charge of combating corruption lack independence, as they are directly appointed by and accountable to the executive. In addition, so-called Transparency Units established within public institutions lack adequate resources to function effectively.

The practical implementation of various elements of the government's anti-corruption approach – notably initiatives to ensure accountability, transparency and access to information – has also called into question its commitment. Public accountability hearings, that all state institutions are obliged to hold, often reveal tensions between those social organizations that are closely allied to the government and those that are not, with the latter prevented from expressing opinions that are critical of the government.

Two further practices have contributed to concerns about the abuse of power by the government. First, the use of 'legal exceptions', especially in relation to public procurement, has contributed to a lack of transparency and information about alleged scandals involving state-run projects. Second, public appointments have been politicised. The lack of professionalization of the state bureaucracy has further reduced the level of citizen trust and belief in public officials and their public institutions.

The emphasis on compliance and regulatory frameworks appears likely to perpetuate existing behavioural patterns, since it relies on fear rather than the promotion of alternative values. In practice, that fear is not necessarily just of punishment for being corrupt, but – in a context in which bribes are a 'normalized' practice among public officials – it may equally derive from not wishing to stand out by disrupting standard patterns of behaviour within a corrupt network.

Section 1 (QoG)

Publication list

1. Bågenholm, Andreas; Dahlberg Stefan & Solevid, Maria (2016) "Does Party Politicization of Corruption Affect Voter Turnout?" *QoG Working Paper Series* 2016:16.
2. Charron, Nicholas & Bågenholm, Andreas (2014) "Voter Ideology, Party Systems and Corruption Voting in European Democracies". *QoG Working Paper* 2014:15 Later version published as: Charron Nicholas & Bågenholm, Andreas (2016) "Ideology, party systems and corruption voting in European Democracies."*Electoral Studies,* 41: 35-49.
3. Bågenholm, Andreas (2015) "Are Anti-Corruption Parties to be Trusted? Evidence from 13 cases in Central and Eastern Europe 1999-2014." Paper presented at the *111th APSA Annual Meeting* in San Francisco, 3-6 September 2015. Later version published as: Bågenholm, Andreas & Charron Nicholas (2015). "Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government", in *Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government* (eds. Carl Dahlström & Lena Wängnerud). Basingstoke: Palgrave, Macmillan.
4. Bågenholm, Andreas & Charron, Nicholas (2013) "Explaining the Choice and Success of Parties Politicizing Corruption in Electoral Politics in Europe", presented at the *MPSA 71st Annual Conference* in Chicago April 11-14, 2013. Later version published as: Bågenholm, Andreas & Charron Nicholas (2014). "Do Politics in Europe Benefit from Politicising Corruption?" *West European Politics.* 37 (5) s. 903-931.
5. Bågenholm, Andreas (2013) "Holding Politicians Accountable? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981-2011." Paper presented at the *ECPR General Conference* in Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013. Later version published as: Bågenholm, Andreas (2013) "Throwing the rascals out? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981-2011." *Crime Law and Social Change*, 60 (5) s. 595-609.)

1. Bågenholm, Andreas, Stefan Dahlberg and Maria Solevid. 2016. "Does Party Politicization of Corruption Affect Voter Turnout?"

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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be negative. We argue that voters' willingness to participate in elections will increase when parties politicize the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsiveness to voter concerns. We test this claim by using individual-level data from CSES coupled with unique context data on party politicization of corruption in campaigns. Our findings show that higher perceived levels of corruption are associated with lower voter turnout but that the negative effect of perceiving high corruption on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals' corruption perceptions exert a significant negative impact on turnout. By politicizing anti-corruption measures, political parties are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting voters' decision whether to vote or not.

Introduction

The negative effects of corruption on a number of policy outcomes are by now well-established knowledge (on economy, see Bentzen, 2012; on human well-being, see Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011 and Charron et al., 2014; and on social and economic inequalities, see Gupta et al. 2002; Jong-Sung & Khagram, 2005). It is also evident that corruption affects people's willingness to participate in politics. Even though there is no complete consensus on this matter, almost all country comparative studies at hand find that corruption negatively affects citizens' propensity to turn out to vote in elections (McCann and Dominguez, 1998; Davis et al., 2004; Chong et al., 2015; Simpser, 2012; Stockemer et al., 2013, Sundström and Stockemer, 2015; Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016), as it destroys the link and trust between decision makers and the people, which in turn corrodes the political system resulting in increasingly cynical, distrustful and apathetic voters (Andersen & Tverdova, 2003, Bauhr & Grimes, 2014; see also Kostadinova, 2009; Warren, 2004: 328).

In this article, we argue that the effects of corruption on voter turnout not necessarily have to be negative. Depending on how politicians handle the issue, the negative effects of corruption may be reduced. More specifically, we argue that people's willingness to participate in elections will increase when parties address the issue of corruption in electoral campaigns, as it indicates party responsiveness to voter concerns. Party politicization of corruption should thus have a mobilizing effect on voters because the awareness of the problem would reasonably increase, as well as the intensity in the campaigns and – not least - also by the fact that there are parties that actually promise to do something about a serious problem that concerns most voters (see Special Eurobarometer, 2012 & 2014). The presence of parties that

politicize corruption will thus increase the incentives to vote among voters who perceive high levels of corruption and moreover increase the likelihood that the problems with corruption will be solved or at least dealt with, in contrast to situations where no parties raise the issue, leaving voters with the impression that nobody cares. In the latter situation the motivation to vote is arguably severely dampened.

No studies have as far as we know of examined the potentially mobilizing effect of party politicization of corruption and hence our aim is to fill that gap in the previous literature, by investigating whether the negative effects of voters' perception of corruption on turnout is moderated when parties campaign on anti-corruption. By linking party politicization of salient – and sometime neglected – issues to voter mobilization, our study makes novel contributions to the research fields of different political and societal effects of corruption and what accounts to variations in voter turnout.

We apply multilevel modeling combining individual-level data and country-level data from 20 countries from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set and a unique data set on party politicization of the issue of corruption in election campaigns. We test two hypotheses and the findings suggest that higher perceived levels of corruption are associated with lower turnout (H1) but that there is a positive interaction effect, which indicates that that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a problem on turnout is reduced in an electoral context where corruption is politicized (H2). The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, individuals' corruption perceptions exert a significant negative effect on turnout. In this respect the political parties are important actors. By politicizing anti-corruption measures they are acting policy responsive and by that they are also affecting people's behavior in terms of whether to vote or not.

In the following section we define corruption and discuss previous findings regarding corruption and turnout. We then turn to the discussion about how party politicization of corruption should affect the relationship between corruption perceptions and voter turnout, i.e. the assumed mechanisms at work, followed by our hypotheses. We then discuss the data and the method applied, after which the analysis is presented. The final section concludes the findings and discusses ways to develop the research field further.

Corruption and turnout

In this article we are primarily interested in political corruption, which has been defined as the "manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth" (quote from Transparency International, 2013). Political corruption is then "the abuse of public office for private gains" as well as "all private misdeeds, such as excessive patronage, nepotism, secret party funding, and overtly close ties between politics

and business interests" (Stockemer et al., 2013:2). Thus, political corruption is rather grand than petty in nature.[1]

There is a strong consensus among scholars about the severe social and political consequences of corruption. The majority of studies on corruption and turnout also confirm these findings, but there are also studies reaching the opposite conclusion. Below, we discuss the previous findings.

Presence of corruption is argued to *decrease* turnout, because "[c]orruption /…/ breaks the link between collective decision-making and people's power to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy" (Warren, 2004: 328). Also in material terms corruption affects people negatively as the probability of inefficient delivery of what citizens are democratically entitled to, such as various public services, increases (Warren, 2004; Stockemer et al., 2013). According to this view, corruption thus corrodes the political system resulting in increasingly cynical, distrustful and apathetic voters (Andersen and Tverdova, 2003; Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Davies et al., 2004; see also Kostadinova, 2009).

In a study covering 72 countries between 1984 and 2009, Stockemer et al. (2013) found that countries with better control of corruption had higher turnout rates. On average, a one point increase in corruption control measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index was associated with two percentage points higher turnout when controlled for other factors such as compulsory voting, importance of the election, degree of proportionality in the electoral systems, size of the state, electoral competitiveness and GDP/capita. These findings were supported also in a regional level study, where Sundström and Stockemer (2015) analyzed turnout rates in 172 regions in Europe and found that high quality of government was associated with higher turnout. Thus, there is strong evidence that corruption, regardless if measured as control of corruption or as aggregated measures of individual's perceptions of quality of government, has a negative effect on voter turnout.

Also on the individual level, studies show that perceptions of electoral fraud have negative consequences for turnout (McCann and Dominquez, 1998; Birch, 2010, Davis et al, 2004). In Mexico, McCann and Domiquez found that only the opposition voters were less inclined to vote, whereas Simpser (2012) found a more general effect of decreasing turnout at the state level. Moreover, in a field experimental study in twelve Mexican municipalities, Chong et al. (2015) showed that information about corruption significantly decreased actual turnout. In a comparative study of Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, Davies et al. (2014) concluded that perceptions of corruption did not translate into voting for opposition parties, instead perceptions of corruption was associated with non-voting in all three countries. In a country comparative study, using CSES data, Birch (2010) found that voters who perceived the election as fair participated to a higher extent than those who perceived the election as unfair.

[1] Grand corruption exists at the highest level of government and refers to acts distorting the central functioning of the state. Petty corruption exists in the everyday encounter between public officials and citizens and refers to acts where public officials abuse their power when citizens try to access public services such as schools, hospitals and police departments (Transparency International).

Bågenholm & Charron (2016) have shown that the most likely response from voters - in 24 European countries - to a corruption scandal in their most preferred party, is to stay home in the next election. Studying Spanish local elections, Costas-Pérez (2014) found that while corruption scandals were associated with lower turnout overall there was a higher degree of abstention among independent voters. Strong partisans', i.e. voters who always support the same party, propensity to vote was not affected by corruption scandals. Going beyond malfeasance and fraud in the electoral process, Dahlberg & Solevid (2016) showed, when analyzing 26 countries using CSES data matched with system-level data from the Quality of Government Institute, that perceptions of corruption in general was associated with lower turnout rates, but only in low and medium corrupt countries. In the most corrupt countries, by contrast, no such association was found.

Why corruption would *increase* turnout has been explained by the fact that the expected gain by remaining in office is high in contexts where rent-seeking and misuse of public office through for example bribe taking and soliciting are prevalent. This in turn leads to increasing campaign spending for both incumbents and opposition, which mobilize the electorate and make them vote to a higher extent. Studies on county and gubernatorial elections in the US find that abuse of public office increases voter turnout (Karahan, Coats, and Shughart 2006, 2009 & Escaleras, Calcagno and Shughart, 2012). Escalereas et al. (2012) for example found that the higher the number of corruption convictions of public officials, the higher was the turnout rate in gubernatorial elections 1979-2005. Another reason for why corruption would increase turnout is found in the clientilisic relationship between politicians and voters in for example in some Latin American and African countries. When voters and politicians are connected in a clientlistic relationship or network, the provision of public goods is handled through these networks rather than through government agencies. As a consequence, to cast a vote is associated with personal benefits in terms of more access to public goods for the voter (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007).

In a study using both experimental design and survey data from the Afrobarometer, Imman & Andrews (2015) found that Senegalese voters are more prone to vote when they perceive the government as corrupt, but only among non-partisan voters. Kostadinova (2009) also finds a weak positive effect of perceived corruption on turnout in eight post-communist countries using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, but the effect is more or less washed out by the negative effect of corruption perceptions on political efficacy, which in turn suppress turnout.

Although previous research points in different directions in terms of the effects of corruption on voter turnout, all comparative large N-studies, both on the aggregate level (Stockemer et al., 2013, Sundström and Stockemer, 2015) and at the individual level (Birch, 2010, Dahlberg & Solevid, 2016), point in the same direction: corruption and malpractice tend to decrease voter turnout. We find it relevant to explicitly re-test this in a first hypothesis. In short,

H1: The higher perceived level of political corruption among voters, the lower the probability that they will vote.

Despite the rich number of studies explaining why turnout differs across voters and countries as well as the emerging research on the relationship between corruption and political behavior, no studies have to our knowledge examined the mobilizing effects of corruption politicization.[2] Hence, the main contribution of our study is to examine to what extent this presumed negative relationship between corruption and turnout is affected when political parties politicize the issue of corruption in election campaigns. The next section develops this argument further.

Politicization of corruption and its assumed impact on turnout

We consider politicization to occur when an issue is brought to the general knowledge of people and in this study party politicization thus refers to situations when political parties are publically debating specific issues during an election campaign. Party politicization of corruption can either occur when parties raise the issue and suggest ways to come to terms with corruption, without making any references to the other parties or politicians or when party representatives accuse one's political antagonists of being corrupt, implicitly meaning that such behavior would come to an end if the electorate votes for the party in question. For party politicization to occur, the issue must thus be brought up by political parties during the election campaign.[3]

But why would an increased focus (politicization) on an issue (corruption), that we know have a negative effect on turnout, have a reversed or moderating effect on the relationship between corruption perceptions and turnout? We argue that it is just because of the increased attention the issue of corruption gets when it is politicized which assumingly increases the party responsiveness in the eyes of the voters. In the absence of studies that look at the effects of politicization of previously neglected but important issues on turnout,[4] we instead draw on the findings on the effects of politicization on party choice, which show that corruption to some extent matters in terms of electoral accountability. From previous studies we know that anti-corruption rhetoric is a successful electoral strategy, especially for new parties that previously have not been involved in corruption scandals and which thus have more credibility than established ones (Bågenholm & Charron, 2014). From the reverse angle, most studies on corruption voting find that corrupt politicians and parties are punished by the electorate, but to a somewhat lesser extent than one would expect, given the graveness of the issue (see for

[2] Davis et al. (2004) analyze the extent to which opposition parties in three Latin American countries manage to mobilize dissatisfied voters on corruption issues. However, they only look at the voters perceptions of corruption and voters' party preferences and not if the parties actually politicize the issue of corruption in the electoral campaign.

[3] Other actors can naturally politicize the issue of corruption. Media is the main source of information when it comes to exposing corruption scandals. In order to have a mobilizing effect on turnout, we do however assume that it is party politicization that matters, because voters then would be encouraged to support those parties that promise to combat corruption, one way or another. If only the media politicizes the issue by for example revealing systematic corrupt dealings among one or several political parties, but with no parties picking up on the story, we would expect, in line with previous research, that this would lead to voter apathy and hence lower turnout. In this article, we are only looking at party politicization, however.

[4] As far as that strand of literature looks at the effect on voting behavior, it is party choice that is in focus, not whether it has a mobilizing effect and increases voter turnout.

example de Souza and Moriconi, 2013 for an overview). It has been suggested that this is more likely to occur when the incumbents are accused of being corrupt by other parties or actually been involved in corruption scandals (Bågenholm, 2013). We thus expect that it is only when voters are offered a trustworthy alternative, which seeks to remedy the problem of corruption, on an issue which voters find widespread and highly worrying, that the level of participation in order to "throw the rascals out" will increase.

By politicizing a previously neglected issue of great importance for the voters implies party responsiveness, which we think is one important mechanism at work here. Party responsiveness has mainly been used as the dependent variable in relation to voter turnout in previous research (see for example Besley & Burgess, 2001; Martin & Claibourn, 2013; Peters & Sanders, 2015), where higher turnout is associated with greater responsiveness from the parties, as the number of people who is thought to monitor the politicians is higher. We argue that this relationship is as likely to work the other way around, as the voters' apathy and resignation is turned into hope when they are presented with alternatives who promise to make a change. This is basically along the same lines as the argument why political efficacy would have a positive impact on turnout, i.e. "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process /…/ the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change" (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954: 187, quoted in Kittilson & Anderson, 2011, see also Kostadinova, 2009). In a context where there is "electoral supply" – in this case credible parties that politicize corruption – turnout is likely to increase (see Kittilson & Anderson, 2011) in part as a consequence of higher political efficacy.

It is also likely that voters would react similarly to corruption to that of negative campaigning, which has been defined as to criticize the "record of the opposing party or parties; questioning the judgment, experience and probity of opposing leaders; and generating fear about what the future might hold if the opposing party or parties were in power" (Sanders and Norris, 2005: 526). Negative campaigns have been shown to be mobilizing because they increase voters' attention and problem awareness, which increases the interest and feelings of excitement. As a consequence, voters perceive a closer electoral race. In addition, negative information might enhance information about the candidates. In short, negative campaigns make voters pay more attention to the electoral campaign, which makes them more inclined to vote (Martin, 2004; Brooks, 2006). Being accused of criminal activities, which corruption allegation implies, naturally sharpens the conflict and raises the stakes between the contestants and that in turn assumingly also increases the media attention and thus voter awareness of the problems and the alternatives.

Naturally, we cannot know exactly what sentiments the perceived presence of corruption causes to voters, but considering the fact that corruption is a criminal act which violates the norm of impartial and just handling of public matters, in combination with the fact that a majority of EU citizens both think it is a widespread phenomenon and a grave problem for their countries (Special Eurobarometer, 2012 & 2014), we find it likely that voters who

perceive high levels of corruption would be keen to correct for the injustices and harm they suffer by voting the rascals out.

There are thus two potentially adversary forces to take into account when hypothesizing about the effects of corruption and turnout. On the one hand, the demobilizing effect when perception of corruption is high, in line with hypothesis 1, and on the other hand, the mobilizing counterforce when politicization and increased party responsiveness occur. In short, we argue that whether the issue of corruption is politicized or not conditions the negative effects of the perception of corruption on turnout. To be more specific, we test whether the hypothesized negative effect of perceiving political corruption on turnout is reduced when corruption is politicized in the campaign. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Perceiving politicians as corrupt decreases turnout less in elections where parties politicize the issue of corruption compared to elections where they do not.

Data and measures

We use data from *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems* (CSES) module 2, collected during the period 2001-2006 in post-election surveys in 34 countries. In addition, we use a subset of a larger dataset on politicization of corruption in all 32 European democratic countries covering 215 parliamentary elections from 1981 to 2011 (see Bågenholm 2013 and Bågenholm & Charron, 2014).[5] For the purpose of our study, three non-European elections have also been coded (New Zealand 2002, Canada 2004 and Australia 2004). When we merge the CSES data with our politicization dataset, 20 countries remain. The information on politicization of corruption has been collected primarily from election reports in three political science journals: Electoral Studies (ES), West European Politics (WEP) and the European Journal of Political Research (EJPR). The goal has been to have every election covered by at least two of these journals and, in the case there has been only one report available, to look at additional sources, such as European Parties Elections & Referendums Network (EPERN), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and The Economist. The election reports have a common structure (background, electoral system, the contending parties, the electoral campaign, the results and the outcome), even though the contents and extent of the sections can vary somewhat. There is naturally a potential risk that the issue of anti-corruption has been under reported, especially if the issue was peripheral in the campaign and/or advocated by smaller parties. However, we consider the risk of missing cases in which corruption has been a prominent feature of the campaign to be rather small, i.e. the frequency of the issue is hardly overstated. The use of several sources for each election further diminishes that risk.[6]

[5] The dataset on politicization of corruption can be requested from the authors.

[6] Some studies use data from the Comparative Manifesto project to estimate how much an issue is highlighted in an election campaign. We find this strategy problematic because it cannot be assumed that issues in manifestoes actually are debated during the campaign, which in the case of the specific issue of corruption (see Bågenholm, 2009). If the issue is not publically debated, we do not consider it as politicized, as most voters do not read the party manifestoes.

The electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric, i.e. referring to the need to fight corruption in more general terms, and/or corruption allegations against other parties during the election campaign. While the word "corruption" has obviously been the main indicator of whether the issue has been present in the election campaign or not, in order to be coded as an instance of politicization, the "sender" must also be an identified political party, and not for example the media or any other actor. The coding was unproblematic in most cases and, in those reports where some ambiguities arose, the complementary sources were used to clarify any uncertainties. There are a few instances, however, where the word "corruption" was not used in the reports, but where it nevertheless was obvious that politicization of the issue is at hand, e.g. in some cases where scandals involving politicians taking bribes are described - but without explicitly stating that it is a "corruption scandal" - and where parties have been said to "take advantage" of that situation or having "attacked" their opponents for that reason, but again without the explicit use of the word corruption. In order not to miss these instances, it has therefore been important that the whole reports have been read thoroughly, rather than using the search functions to find the relevant sections.

Because of missing data for some of our key variables and due to the fact that we have restricted our analysis to countries that are categorized as Free according to the Freedom House index, our analyses are based on a total of 20 countries.[7]

Turnout

The dependent variable of turnout measures whether the respondent voted or not in the last national election. As with all survey questions on electoral participation, respondents consistently over-report their turnout rates as a result of memory flaws or social desirability bias (Belli et al., 1999; Dahlberg & Persson, 2014; Granberg & Holmberg, 1991; Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010). In our country sample, self-reported turnout is considerably higher than the official turnout in all countries and differences are particularly large (> 20 percentage points) in Canada, Romania, Ireland and Hungary (see figure 1 in Appendix 2). Since validated turnout measures do not exist at the individual level in the CSES data, we have constructed a weight variable at the system level based on the official turnout rates, which is used in the analysis in order to correct for the overestimated turnout levels within the countries included in the analysis.

Corruption perceptions

As mentioned, several previous studies estimating corruption effects on electoral turnout is carried out as aggregated country level studies since few data sets include both measures of individuals' corruption assessments and turnout measures. The CSES module 2, is one of few datasets that both includes individual turnout and a survey item measuring perceptions of *political* corruption. The question reads: *How widespread do you think corruption such as*

[7] *Freedom in the World.* Freedom House's annual global survey of political rights and civil liberties (www.freedomhouse.org).

bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread (coded as 4 in our analyses), quite widespread (3), not very widespread (2), it hardly happens at all (1)? Although political corruption is one of many ways to ask about corruption in a society, the above questions fits nicely with the definition of corruption we discussed earlier. Still, the survey question does not capture respondents' personal experience of corruption which could have been a valid measure as well.[8]

To validate our corruption measure, we have matched voters' corruption perceptions with corruption measures at the aggregate level. As already addressed in the theoretical section, we can expect some correlation between citizens' perceptions of corruption and global corruption as assessed by Transparency International (TI). Such a correlation at the aggregate level also indicates validity in our measures. Figure 2 in Appendix 2 illustrates the correlation between the country means in corruption perceptions based on the CSES data versus the mean placement in Transparency International's corruption perception index (both variables are here rescaled ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 is equivalent to a high degree of corruption). There is a strong relationship between the two (b=.55, R^2=.81), which simply means that, when corruption is widespread in a global sense according to TI, citizens also tend to judge political corruption as being widespread and vice versa. However, there are some exceptions to this rule, for example in Germany and Canada, where there is a difference between how TI judges the presence of corruption vis à vis how citizens perceive the same phenomenon.[9]

Corruption politicization

The politicization variable is coded as a dummy variable where 1 equals that corruption is politicized in the election and 0 that no such politicization took place. As mentioned earlier, the electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric, i.e. referring to the need to fight corruption in more general terms, and/or corruption allegations against other parties during the election campaign. Table 1 displays whether or not politicization of corruption took place in the election campaign among the 20 parliamentary democracies included in this study. Evidently, corruption politicization is more common in countries with less control of corruption. The 2002 Irish election and the 2004 Canadian election are exceptions to this pattern.

[8] The data can be sought from CSES Secretariat, www.cses.org, Centre for Political Studies. Institute for Social Research. The University of Michigan. The data can also be downloaded from: www.umich.edu/~cses.

[9] As illustrated in figure 3 in Appendix 2, there is both notable between-country variation in citizens' corruption perceptions as well as large within-country variation in terms of standard deviations from the mean.

Table 1. Politicization of corruption in the election campaign

Corruption politicized in the election campaign	**Corruption <u>not</u> politicized in the election campaign**
Bulgaria 2001	Australia 2004
Canada 2004	Belgium 2003
Czech Republic 2002	Finland 2003
Ireland 2002	Germany 2002
Italy 2006	United Kingdom 2005
Hungary 2002	Iceland 2003
Poland 2001	Netherlands 2002
Romania 2004	New Zealand 2002
	Norway 2001
	Portugal 2002/2005
	Spain 2004
	Sweden 2002

Control variables

Aside from corruption assessments, the remaining independent variables at the individual level are chosen to represent the most important explanations as to why turnout differs between voters. Among the *individual* level explanations, the most commonly used is the Civic Voluntarism Model (Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) distinguishing between voters' a) resources, such as socioeconomic position and cognitive capability, b) motivation, for example interest in politics, and c) mobilization, that is, to what extent the voter is part of a recruiting network. In short, studies investigating individual level explanations to turnout conclude that citizens with more economic and cognitive resources have a higher propensity to participate than citizens with fewer resources (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993, Franklin, 2004, Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995). In addition, another important conclusion is that citizens with more socioeconomic resources tend to have more cognitive skills and thus tend to be more motivated and are more likely to being asked to participate which altogether lead to a higher turnout (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995).

When we shift our attention to differences across individuals' propensity to turnout to differences in turnout across countries, the relative importance of individual level explanations to turnout diminishes. Instead, institutional explanations, such as features of the electoral system, are more important since they more directly modify the individual's costs of voting (Franklin, 2004). Of the *institutional* level explanations, countries with compulsory voting and PR systems have higher turnout. In addition, a higher voting age and facilities for postal voting and automatic registration also lower the cost of voting and leads to higher turnout (for an overview, see Blais, 2006).

All our individual level variables are based on the original variables included in the CSES module except for age, which is coded into seven categories. Education is based on the original eight categories. Marital status is coded as a dummy where 1 equals married or cohabitant and single or divorced equals 0. Income has four categories and is based on percentile values. Employment and party identification are also entered as dichotomous variables. Political knowledge is constructed as an additive index based on three information items included in the data (see the Appendix 1 for detailed coding instructions). To have voted in prior election and whether one was voting for an incumbent party or not in the prior election both enter as dichotomous variables. Unfortunately, social trust, being one of the key explanations to corruption perceptions, is not included as a question in CSES. However, following Kostadinova (2009), we are controlling for internal and external political efficacy, measured as people's belief in the system to be responsive to their needs as well as people's beliefs in themselves regarding their ability to change the political system (see Appendix 1 for summary statistics and additional information of the variables).

Regarding the system level variables, there are several factors that ideally should be accounted for according to prior research. When comparing turnout across countries, variables associated with the electoral system, such as proportionality, effective number of parties and compulsory voting are important to control for (Franklin, 2004; Blais, 2006). Population size, unicameralism and closeness in an election are three other factors that have been suggested to have an indirect effect on turnout. Regarding closeness, the idea is simply that if the race is expected to be close, the political parties and their representatives will increase their efforts to mobilize the voters (Franklin, 2004).

Corruption, politicization and turnout

Table 2 presents a multilevel regression model predicting voter turnout. Model 1 contains the corruption assessment variable together with the individual level variables known to affect turnout. In accordance with our first hypothesis, perceiving corruption as a problem is associated with lower electoral participation. Thus, for each step on the corruption assessment variable (which varies from "hardly happens" to "very widespread"), turnout decreases significantly with -.369. More substantially this means that under control for all other variables at the individual level, the probability of voting is .92 when corruption is seen as a minor problem while the predicted probability of voting is .82 when corruption is perceived as a major problem. Hence, the effect is small but significantly different from zero. Although the control variables are of less interest here, we find significant effects of almost all

individual level variables indicating that citizens who are female, older, highly educated, married, have higher income, high political knowledge, and identify themselves with a political party, have higher internal and external political efficacy have higher turnout compared to citizens who are male, younger, lower educated, single, have lower income, lower political knowledge, no party identification and lower efficacy. The strongest predictor of turnout in model 1 is by far to have voted in prior elections, which is not surprising since it for long has been argued that voting to a large extent is a process of socialization. All these variables are related to the standard explanations when it comes to predicting turnout. In this case this confirms that our data is valid and perhaps more importantly, that our main independent variable, corruption perceptions, is a valid additional explanatory factor.

Since we are restricted to a sample of 20 countries we cannot include all the suggested system level variables in the same model. In order to determine which variables that are of greatest importance to include, we have conducted a set of regression analyses where we incorporate all our variables pertaining to the individual level together with the politicization variable jointly with each of the system-related variables in subsequent order (i.e. one system control variable at a time). In this procedure the decision rule has been to only include variables that a) have a significant impact on the model by themselves, or b) have a substantial impact on the effect politicization of corruption (see Appendix 1 for coding rules, data sources and summary statistics of all system level variables and see table 1 in Appendix 3 for regression output).

These analyses left us with three variables for inclusion: our main independent variable, politicization of corruption, the global perception index from Transparency International and compulsory voting. However, the global corruption perception index and politicization of corruption are two variables that are highly correlated ($r = .78$), simply because fewer parties are trying to politicize on corruption where corruption is less of a problem. Nevertheless this means that if both variables are included simultaneously the effect from both variables cancels out due to multicollinearity. If we instead include the two variables one at a time in separate models, both factors exert a significant negative impact on turnout. Since we don't have enough data to include them both at the same time we have decided to primarily use politicization of corruption. Model 2 estimates the effect of the above-mentioned system level variable, compulsory voting, known to explain differences in turnout across countries as well as the effect of our variable measuring politicization of corruption. The result indicates a positive and significant turnout effect of compulsory voting (1.695) and a negative and significant impact of the politicization variable on turnout (-.974).

Table 2. **Corruption and turnout (unstandardized logistic coefficients, random effects models)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Corruption assessments	-.369***		-.360***	-.473***
	(.092)		(.092)	(.108)
Sex	.076		.076	.078*
	(.047)		(.047)	(.047)
Age	.490***		.491***	.493***
	(.093)		(.093)	(.093)
Education	.404***		.402***	.398***
	(.116)		(.116)	(.116)
Marital status	.180***		.180***	.179***
	(.051)		(.051)	(.051)
Employed	.064		.064	.065
	(.088)		(.088)	(.088)
Income	.296***		.297***	.296***
	(.088)		(.088)	(.088)
Political knowledge	.907***		.908***	.904***
	(.085)		(.085)	(.085)
Party identification	.664***		.663***	.664***
	(.051)		(.051)	(.051)
Voted in prior election	1.956***		1.954***	1.953***
	(.059)		(.059)	(.059)
Voted for incumbent in prior election	-.201***		-.200***	-.199***
	(.062)		(.062)	(.062)
Internal efficacy	-.470***		-.471***	-.471***
	(.077)		(.077)	(.077)
External efficacy	.647***		.648***	.649***
	(.080)		(.080)	(.080)
System level				
Compulsory voting		1.695**	1.255	1.267
		(.816)	(.810)	(.816)
Corruption politicized		-.974**	-.915**	-.941**
		(.453)	(.451)	(.454)
Corr. assessment.*Corr. politicized				.419**
				(.207)
Constant	-1.094***	2.383***	-.958***	-.973***
	(.289)	(.254)	(.294)	(.295)
Std.Dev. Intercept lev 2.	1.009	.81	.802	.809
Roh	.236	.166	.164	.166
	-	-	-	-
Log Likelihood	6451.0827	7952.6035	6447.7926	6445.7474
PRE	7.25	.00	7.51	7.54
Observations	26.650	26.650	26.650	26.650
Number of countries	20	20	20	20

Comment: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix 1 for coding of variables. For Portugal two election studies are included in the CSES module 2, which are for the elections of 2002 and 2005, but the results are unaffected by the time aspect. Turnout is weighted according to actual turnout rates in respective country. PRE is proportional reduction in error. It is the percentage reduction of the total error in prediction, knowing the model versus not knowing the model.

In model 3, the individual level variables and the system level variables are estimated at the same time as an additional control and the main finding is that very little happens. The

negative impact of individual perceptions of corruption remains and thus, H1 is confirmed.[10] It should be mentioned that the result also is stable and robust under the inclusion of additional control variables on the system level such as unicameralism, the effective number of parliamentary parties, global corruption and aggregated turnout. Although the direct effect of politicization is still negative, the main question is how the presence corruption politicization affects the relationship between corruption perceptions and voter turnout.

In model 4, we therefore include an interaction term between individual corruption assessments and the corruption politicization variable. In line with our second hypothesis, we obtain a positive and significant effect of .419. In terms of predicted probabilities this means that when corruption is perceived as being widespread but corruption is not politicized by a party, the probability of voting is .74. However, when corruption is politicized the probability of voting among those perceiving corruption to be widespread is .81. This result is good news since it implies that the initial negative and significant effect of corruption perceptions on individual turnout is disappearing when corruption is politicized by a party. However, the politicization of corruption does also mean that turnout is decreasing somewhat among those who do not perceive corruption to be a major problem, although not significantly so. The explanation for this is found in the fact that turnout is on average lower in countries where corruption is politicized (the average value of turnout is .77 when corruption is not politicized compared to .61 when it is being politicized). More importantly though is the fact that there is not a significant difference in turnout due to individual differences in perceptions of corruption when corruption is being politicized by a political party. These results are also robust when we include system measures of global corruption and aggregated turnout into the equation. The only difference is that none of the system related variables reach statistical significance when they all are included at the same time (the average correlation between compulsory voting, aggregated turnout, global corruption and politicization of corruption is roughly .60).

To further understand the interaction effect, figure 1 displays the marginal effect of voters' corruption assessments at different levels of politicization of corruption. The graph illustrates the average marginal effects on the probability to vote of perceiving political corruption when corruption is not politicized compared to when it is.

[10] Politicization of corruption has also been operationalized and measured based on a different data source (not included in table), which is the proportion of sentences in party manifestos related to corruption. The results in model 4 is confirmed also when this alternative operationalization is used and the interaction effect is in this case (.375).

Figure 1. Interaction effect, corruption assessments and politicization of corruption on turnout (predicted probabilities)



Comment: Corruption assessments=1 = It hardly happens at all. Corruption assessments= 4 = Very widespread. When comparing differences in means, confidence intervals of 84 percent should be used instead of the traditional 95 percent level since CI:s of 84 percent corresponds to p=.05 (Julious 2004).

As shown in the graph, the negative effect of corruption assessments on turnout disappears when corruption is politicized in the electoral campaign. Perceiving political corruption as a problem is associated with lower turnout only in countries with no politicization of the corruption issue. Thus, politicization of corruption in the election campaign removes the negative effect of perceiving political corruption on turnout.

Conclusions

The general aim of this article has been to contribute on the emerging research examining how the presence and perceptions of corruption affect voters' political behavior. Although previous studies reach different conclusions, the majority of the studies referred show evidence that perceiving corruption as a problem is associated with a lower propensity to vote. Departing from this negative relationship, the more specific aim of our study has been to test if the politicization of corruption by political parties in the election campaign affects the negative relationship between corruption and turnout. Being a first test of the politicization hypothesis, we used a measure of politicization defined in terms of whether a political party brought up corruption/clean government issues and/or accused their opponents for being corrupt in the election campaign.

In sum, the results presented indicate support for our first hypothesis, that is, levels of electoral participation in the 20 parliamentary democracies studied are lower when political corruption is perceived as widespread. However, and in line with our second hypothesis, party

politicization of corruption actually moderates this general negative impact of corruption. The positive interaction effect indicates that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a problem on turnout is reduced in an election context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, the individual corruption perceptions exert a significant negative effect on voting (i.e. if a voter perceives that there is corruption at the system level but no party is politicizing corruption, the probability to vote is significantly lower). On the other hand, if corruption is politicized by a party, there is no significant effect of individual corruption perceptions on voting (i.e. even if a voter perceives that corruption is occurring on a system level, it does not affect the probability to vote). Hence, the politicization of corruption on the system level reduces the negative effect of individual corruption perceptions on turnout.

Furthermore, our results suggest that political politicization of a neglected issue of great concern to the voters may have a mobilizing effect. Not only does politicization of corruption impact vote choice – as previous research has found – but also the extent to which people turn out to vote in the first place. We argue this happens because voters perceive both the political parties to be more responsive and also the efficacy to be stronger in such situations, i.e. a sense that the parties both have the willingness and intention to curb corruption. These results thus indicate that the relationship between responsiveness and turnout can go both ways. Not only do elected representatives enhance their responsiveness as a consequence of high turnout as suggested in previous studies, it is also the case that by focusing on neglected issues, the parties can affect the extent of voting intentions.

This is good news for the functioning of electoral accountability, which is one of the cornerstones of representative democracy. Needless to say, the presence of corruption is never a good thing nor is the perception of widespread corruption. But given that it is the case, it is arguably more conducive for enhancing mobilization to address the issue and suggest ways to remedy the problem than to avoid talking about it at all. It is when the issue is neglected or purposely swept under the carpet, that voters get demobilized and apathetic. Whether the parties actually will effectively combat corruption once in office is a different matter and whether they exploit the issue of corruption or not both affects voting behavior and party strategies in subsequent elections. Politicization of corruption can only be bad if there are no real intentions and just a strategy to win support in the short run. In such cases, voters' trust and engagement will most likely decrease and apathy will prevail.

To take this strand of research to the next step there are a couple of shortcomings which would preferably be remedied. One is that we cannot make use of the time series element in the politicization data since the comparative voter studies at hand are cross-sectional. If we were to expand our study in time, we would have to abandon the individual voter perspective, and the micro-macro approach used here and work with aggregated data only. Despite the downside of using aggregated data only, such a design would learn us more about how the over-time fluctuations in degree of politicization of corruption affect turnout. Furthermore, in an ideal situation the relationship between individual level assessments and party

politicization of corruption should also be more thoroughly elaborated with regard to levels of global corruption and aggregated turnout but today this cannot be conducted in a satisfactorily manner due to limitations in data availability. A further elaboration of the current study would moreover be to look into more detail to the extent corruption is politicized and – if data holds – test if it matters whether corruption is politicized through scandals and allegations or more as a political issue, such as a pledge to combat corruption as well as differentiate between credible and non-credible corruption fighters, by for example take the parties previous track record, i.e. involvement in corruption scandals, into consideration.

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Appendix 1. Coding of variables

Individual level variables

Voted (B3004_1): "In current election, did respondent cast a ballot?" (Voted=0) (Did not vote=1).

Corruption assessments (B3044): " How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, it hardly happens at all?" (Very widespread=4) (Quite widespread=3) (Not very widespread=2) (It hardly happens at all=1). The variable is centered around the mean in our analyses.

Sex (B2002): coded as (Male=1) (Female=2)

Age of respondent (B2001): coded as: (16/21=1) (22/30=2) (31/40=3) (41/50=4) (51/60=5) (61/70=6) (71/max=7)

Education (B2003): (Elementary school =1) (High school (2/3)=2) (Upper Secondary (4/6)=3) (University (7/8)=4). Original CSES coding: 1=None, 2 Incomplete primary; 3 Primary completed; 4=Incomplete secondary; 5=Secondary completed; 6=post-secondary trade/vocational school; 7=University undergraduate degree incomplete; 8= University undergraduate degree completed.)

Maritial Status (B2004): (0= Widowed, Divorced and Single) (1=Married or Cohabitant)

Employment (B2010): (5=0) (1/4=1) (6/12=1) (97/max=.) Original CSES coding: 1= Employed - full-time (32+ hours weekly); 2=Employed - part-time (15-32 hours weekly) 3=Employed less than 15 hours; 4=Helping family member; 5=Unemployed; 6=Student; 7=Retired; 8=Housewife/home duties; 9=Permanently disabled, 10=others (not in labor force).

Income (B2020): Original CSES coding employed, (1=Lowest Household Income to 5=Highest Household Income)

Political Knowledge: Additive index based on Political information items 1-3 (B3047_1; B3047_2; B3047_3) coded as: (Correct=1) (Incorrect=0).

Party identification (B3028): "Are you close to any political party?" (No=0) (Yes=1)

I control for external

Internal political efficacy (B3013): "Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that it makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power), where would you place yourself? (1=It makes a difference who is in power, 5= It doesn't make a difference who is in power).

External political efficacy (B3014): Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself? (1= Who people vote for won't make a difference, 5= Who people vote for can make a difference).

System level variables

Politicization of corruption. Coded 1 if corruption is brought up by a political party as an election issue or if corruption allegations against parties/representatives/incumbents occurred in the election campaign. Coded 0 if corruption is not mentioned in the election reports.

Global corruption perception is based on Transparency Internationals corruption perception index (CPI). The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). (see Transparency International 2012). The variable is reversed and centered around the mean in our some of our analyses.

Proportional Electoral System: is taken from "Database of Political Institutions" (Beck et al 2001)

Compulsory voting (0=non-compulsory Voting) (1=Compulsory voting).

Effective Number of Electoral Parties: is measured as the effective number of parliamentary parties calculated by the vote-shares using the index of Laakso and Taagepera, also known as Herfindahl's index of concentration (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as that: $H = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2$ where p_i is the population proportion for group i of votes and where 1/H then is the effective number of parties.

GPD growth/capita is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013) compiled by Teorell et. al. (2013).

GPD/capita is taken from World Development Indicators (World Bank WDI 2013) compiled by Teorell et. al. (2013).

Population (thousand) is taken from Maddison (2003)

Electoral Closeness in an election is here computed as 1- the difference in vote-shares of the two largest parties in each election.

Unicameralism is coded as a dummy based on information from Gerring et al (2005) and Johnson & Wallack (2006).

Table 1. Summary statistics of variables

Voted	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
overall	.862	.345	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.094	.603	.984	n = 20
within		.333	-.122	1.259	T-bar = 1154.75
Corruption assessments					
overall	.596	.302	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.188	.343	.855	n = 20
within		.247	-.259	1.252	T-bar = 1154.75
Sex					
overall	1.506	.500	1.000	2.000	N = 23095
between		.034	1.466	1.606	n = 20
within		.499	.900	2.040	T-bar = 1154.75
Age					
overall	.530	.275	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.039	.438	.597	n = 20
within		.273	-.067	1.091	T-bar = 1154.75
Education					
overall	.585	.247	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.075	.476	.745	n = 20
within		.235	-.159	1.109	T-bar = 1154.75
Marital status					
overall	.678	.467	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.090	.568	1.000	n = 20
within		.459	-.072	1.109	T-bar = 1154.75
Employed					
overall	.946	.227	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.040	.815	.987	n = 20
within		.223	-.041	1.130	T-bar = 1154.75
Income					
overall	.489	.328	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.036	.432	.573	n = 20
within		.327	-.084	1.057	T-bar = 1154.75
Political knowledge					
overall	.583	.299	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.104	.387	.793	n = 20
within		.281	-.210	1.196	T-bar = 1154.75
Party identification					
overall	.481	.500	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.170	.303	.998	n = 20
within		.478	-.517	1.178	T-bar = 1154.75
Voted in prior election					
overall	.853	.354	.000	1.000	N = 26650
between		.077	.737	.977	n = 20
within		.348	-.124	1.116	T bar = 1332.5
Voted for incumbent in prior election					
overall	.339	.473	.000	1.000	N = 26650
between		.162	.000	.555	n = 20
within		.449	-.217	1.277	T bar = 1332.5

internal efficacy					
overall	.335	.321	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.097	.160	.501	n = 20
within		.308	-.166	1.175	T-bar = 1154.75
external efficacy					
overall	.690	.295	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.084	.559	.823	n = 20
within		.285	-.133	1.131	T-bar = 1154.75
global corruption perception index (ti)					
overall	-.255	.260	-.587	.332	N = 23095
between		.303	-.587	.332	n = 20
within		.004	-.263	-.236	T-bar = 1154.75
compulsory voting					
overall	.082	.248	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.245	.000	1.000	n = 20
within		.000	.082	.082	T-bar = 1154.75
corruption politicized					
overall	.296	.457	.000	1.000	N = 23095
between		.489	.000	1.000	n = 20
within		.000	.296	.296	T-bar = 1154.75

Appendix 2

Figure 1. Self-reported turnout (CSES) compared with official turnout (r=.67)



Sources: CSES module 2; www.parties-and-elections.eu; www.aec.gov.ac; www.elections.ca and.electionresults.govt.nz.
Comment: For Portugal, the graph reports the mean turnout (both self-reported and official) of two elections. The correlation between official and self-reported turnout in CSES is .67.

Figure 2. Correlation between aggregated country means of corruption perceptions (CSES 2001-2006) and Corruption Perception Index (TI).



Source: CSES module 2 and Transparency International 2012, taken from Teorell et. al., 2013.
Comment: Portugal occurs twice in the graph since both the 2002 and 2005 election is included in the CSES dataset. The Portugal observation on the line is the 2002 election and the Portugal observation below the line is the 2005 election. Please note that the corruption perception variable has been reversed, i.e. high values = less perceived political corruption.

Figure 3. Corruption assessments by country (means and standard deviations, CSES)



Source: CSES module 2. *Comment:* Lower scores indicates less/no political corruption.

Appendix 3

Table 1. Corruption and turnout (unstandardized logistic coefficients, random effects models), test of different system level variables.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Corruption assessments	-0.359***	-0.359***	-0.368***	-0.370***	-0.369***	-0.372***	-0.374***	-0.360***	-0.368***	-0.369***
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Sex	0.077	0.077	0.076	0.076	0.077	0.076	0.077	0.076	0.076	0.076
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Age	0.491***	0.489***	0.489***	0.491***	0.489***	0.490***	0.487***	0.490***	0.490***	0.490***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Education	0.401***	0.397***	0.402***	0.404***	0.400***	0.404***	0.397***	0.401***	0.403***	0.404***
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Marital status	0.180***	0.181***	0.181***	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***	0.181***	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Employed	0.064	0.065	0.064	0.064	0.066	0.064	0.067	0.063	0.065	0.065
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Income	0.297***	0.297***	0.296***	0.296***	0.296***	0.295***	0.296***	0.297***	0.296***	0.295***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Political knowledge	0.909***	0.906***	0.908***	0.906***	0.906***	0.907***	0.903***	0.909***	0.907***	0.907***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Party identification	0.665***	0.666***	0.664***	0.662***	0.666***	0.664***	0.666***	0.666***	0.665***	0.664***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
	1.955***	1.956***	1.956***	1.955***	1.955***	1.956***	1.956***	1.955***	1.956***	1.956***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
	-0.202***	-0.202***	-0.202***	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.202***	-0.201***	-0.201***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Internal efficacy	-0.471***	-0.472***	-0.471***	-0.470***	-0.471***	-0.470***	-0.471***	-0.472***	-0.470***	-0.470***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
External efficacy	0.647***	0.645***	0.647***	0.649***	0.647***	0.648***	0.644***	0.647***	0.648***	0.647***

	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Corruption politicized	-1.071**									
	(0.479)									
Global corruption perception index (ti)		-1.479**								
		(0.692)								
Proportional electoral system			-0.754							
			(0.926)							
Compulsory voting				1.590*						
				(0.888)						
Effective number of parties					0.206					
					(0.143)					
Unicameralism						-0.498				
						(0.483)				
Electoral closeness							0.007			
							(0.009)			
GDP/capita								0.000**		
								(0.000)		
GDP/capita growth									-0.009	
									(0.016)	
Population (thousands)										0.000
										(0.000)
	-0.803***	-1.376***	-0.400	-1.236***	-1.977***	-0.864**	-1.151***	-2.435***	-0.990***	-1.176***
	(0.295)	(0.296)	(0.903)	(0.279)	(0.670)	(0.363)	(0.304)	(0.671)	(0.338)	(0.367)
	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650	26,650
	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.

2. Charron, Nicholas and Andreas Bågenholm. 2014. "Voter Ideology, Party Systems and Corruption Voting in European Democracies".

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Abstract

There is growing literature on an increasingly ubiquitous puzzle in many democratic countries: why do corrupt officials continue to be re-elected by voters? In this study we address this issue with a novel theory and newly collected original survey data for 24 European countries. The crux of the argument is that the ideological position of the voter together with the number of reasonable party alternatives explains why citizens would continue voting for their preferred party despite it being involved in a corruption scandal. Developing a theory of supply (number of effective parties) and demand (voters' acceptable alternatives to their preferred party in relation to their ideological position), we posit that there is a 'U-shaped' relationship between the likelihood of corruption voting and where voters place themselves on the left/right spectrum. However, as the number of viable party alternatives increases, the effect of ideology is expected to play a smaller role. The hypothesis implies a cross-level interaction for which we find strong and robust empirical evidence using hierarchical modeling. In addition, we provide empirical insight into how individual level ideology and country level party systems - among other factors - impact a voter's decision to switch parties or stay home in the face of their party being involved in a corruption scandal.

Introduction

In recent decades, the harmful effects of corruption on a society have been empirically established and are now considered indisputable. It is associated with less economic development, greater inequality, poorer health outcomes and environmental conditions, less generalized trust and less happy populations (Mauro 1995; Holmberg and Rothstein 2011; Welsch 2004; Gupta et al. 2002). According to democratic theory, one key mechanism through which citizens can combat corrupt elite behavior is electoral choice. Given that corruption is pervasive among incumbents or that a corruption scandal breaks prior to an election, rational voters who understand the costs of corruption will turn against the government in favor of a 'cleaner' challenger and 'throw the rascals out'. Yet the findings of the wave of recent empirical studies have shown that the accountability mechanisms are more ambiguous, as corrupt officials are in many cases re-elected or punished only marginally by voters (see for example Chang & Golden 2010; Eggers & Fisher 2011; Reed 1999; Peters & Welch 1980; Bågenholm 2013). Even though most studies find that the electorate actually punishes politicians and/or parties involved in corrupt dealings, there are still many exceptions to this rule, and many voters still stick to their preferred parties. Despite the

increasing literature in the field, the puzzle of why voters are willing to vote for public officials that they know to be corrupt is still not satisfactorily resolved.

Several explanations have been suggested as to why this may be the case. Some focus on societal factors, such as political institutions and what impact they may have for voters to hold politicians accountable (see for example Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Charon 2011; Tavits 2007; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Ferraz and Finan 2008). Other scholars have highlighted individual level factors. For some voters, it could simply be a function of rational calculation, as they personally benefit from the corrupt activity, for example in the form of clientelism (Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2013; Manzetti & Wilson 2007) or they may have strong loyalties to certain politicians or parties that cloud their vision and allow a form of 'cognitive dissonance' (see de Souza & Moriconi 2013: 486). It may also be the case that the government is perceived to be doing a good job in managing the economy and that voters reward them for that rather than punishing them for being corrupt (Choi & Woo 2010; Casey 2014).

This paper makes several contributions to this literature. Firstly, we put forth a novel theoretical model in which corruption voting can be understood, based on individual and system level factors, highlighting a previously unexplored cross-level interaction between ideology and party systems. In a sense, we make a market like argument of supply and demand. On the individual (demand) side, we propose an alternative factor that has been overlooked by this literature – the *voter's own ideological preference*, as opposed to party membership or party loyalty. On the macro (supply) side, we highlight the effects of the party system, i.e. the number of effective political parties ('ENPs'). We argue that how voters react to a corruption scandal in their party largely depends on the *ideological positions of the voters and the presence of reasonable alternatives*. Our main expectation is that ideology (which we measure as self-placement on a left-right scale) has a U-shaped relationship with the propensity to continue to vote for one's favorite party, despite the presence of corruption, given limited party alternatives – as voters' ideological preferences verge further out toward the extreme left and right, they simply have fewer choices on average to which to change their vote that credibly align with their interests. However, in a typical Downsian (1957) distribution of voter and party preferences (a normal curve agglomeration around the center), centrist voters have more acceptable choices for which to vote and thus their propensity (relative to more extreme voters) is to switch parties in the face of a corruption scandal in their otherwise preferred party. When the number of effective parties increases, however, the U-shaped curve is expected to flatten, as credible alternatives present themselves, even for more extreme voters, and they will thus assumingly switch parties to the same extent as centrist voters do. Nonetheless, in limited party systems (two to three ENPs), a U-shaped relationship is predicted.

Secondly, to test our theory, we employ an observational, comparative research design with newly collected survey data in 24 countries, of approximately 85 000 individuals in in 24 countries, which allows us to inquire directly about corruption voting in a cross-country framework, based on hierarchical data and modeling. Previous studies have looked at

corruption voting in the aggregate using cross-country comparison and/or panel data (Chang and Golden 2007; Tavits 2007; Persson and Tabellini 2003), or single country longitudinal studies (Welsh and Hibbing 1997) or at the individual level. Individual level studies have focused mainly on corruption voting in one country with experimental designs and using survey data (Rundquist et al. 1977; Wantchekon 2003; Konstantinidis & Xezonakis 2013; Anduiza, Galego and Muñoz 2013; Weiss-Shapiro 2008; Chong et al. 2015). Only a few studies have employed multi-level designs (individuals nested in countries). Yet, due to limitations in cross-country data, they have relied on less precise measures of the dependent variable, such as satisfaction with the government (Manzetti and Wilson 2007), rather than using a more direct measure of voting preferences and/or actual voting. Thus third, we also contribute to the literature by using a more direct measurement of both the dependent and independent variables - still with a large N – which allow us to actually examine the precise mechanisms of the impact of party systems on corruption voting.

In addition to the category of respondents who say that they will still vote for their preferred party even when exposed to its being corrupt, we also run multinomial logit models analyzing those respondents who say that they would vote for an alternative party or, as a third option, stay home. We find that the interaction between voter ideology and party system is indeed 'U-shaped' in continuing to vote for one's party when ENPs are low, but flattens as ENPs increase, and the interaction impacts the two other choices as well. In sum, we find that more centrist voters choose the option of 'staying home' in the face of a corruption scandal, and that this effect is strengthened in systems with a limited number of ENPs. Moreover, we find, consistent with our argument, that voters in systems with a greater number of ENPs are more likely to switch to another party. Further, in all systems, voters closest to the center are more likely to switch than are voters on the extreme ideological fringes. This is robust to several model specifications and controlling for several individual and country level factors as well as when outliers are removed.

In the remainder of the paper, we highlight past research on corruption voting and relevant findings. We then develop our theoretical argument. Next, we present the data and design we use to test our empirical claims. Results are then presented, and the study concludes with a discussion of the findings and suggestions for future research in this field.

Why Do Voters Vote for Corrupt Officials?

Given the dire consequences of corruption and the fact that European citizens have a distaste for such practices, it is somewhat puzzling why corrupt politicians and parties to a surprisingly large extent manage to maintain popular support and get re-elected (see Special Eurobarometer for corruption opinions in Europe). For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that most studies do find that corrupt politicians and parties actually lose support at times; however, this is less than one would expect and more often than not with only limited consequences for remaining in office (see for example Chang & Golden 2010; Eggers & Fisher 2011; Reed 1999; Peters & Welch 1980; Bågenholm 2013; de Sousa & Moriconi 2013). Why do voters support corrupt politicians?

Although several empirical studies have suggested ways to explain this paradox, the field of research remains limited. In spite of the fact that there are few systematic comparative studies, there are some interesting hypotheses and some results worth highlighting (see de Sousa and Moriconi 2013 for an extensive overview). On the macro level, political institutions that affect the possibilities for holding politicians and parties accountable have been much in focus. It should be noted however that the dependent variable in these studies is usually the level of corruption, implying that politicians will do a better job controlling corruption if there are well-functioning accountability mechanisms. Still, the results are a bit contradictory, as division of power, i.e. presidentialism, has been found to enhance accountability and reduce the level of corruption (Persson and Tabellini 2003); Gerring and Thacker (2004) on the other hand find that parliamentarism and unitarism are negatively correlated to corruption. Regarding electoral systems, several scholars have argued that majoritarian or plurality systems help voters to identify who is responsible for the outcomes, in contrast to PR systems where coalition governments make such distinctions more blurry (Rose-Ackerman 2005; Tavits 2007; Charron 2011). The scrutiny of candidates in single member districts is assumed to make it harder for corrupt politicians to go undetected, whereas candidates on party lists are more anonymous and not individually exposed to the same extent. In contrast, there is also some evidence that at least a moderate number of effective parties is conducive to reducing corruption, in contrast with one party dominance and excessive fragmentation. The point is that the elections should be competitive, implying the existence of some credible challengers that can replace the incumbents if they misbehave. If the challengers are too many and too scattered, however, coordination problems and information costs will reduce their potential as viable alternatives, and corruption will not be checked (see Schleiter & Voznaya 2011:12-14). Moreover, high barriers for new party entries are considered to be detrimental to effective accountability, as they reduce the alternatives and, above all, the opportunities for new parties, specifically focusing on anti-corruption, to challenge the established ones (see Bågenholm & Charron 2014). This implies that PR systems also enhance accountability, although in a different way, by increasing the number of relevant alternatives to voters.

While political institutions may enhance or reduce the possibilities for voter accountability, a prerequisite for that to occur in the first place is naturally that reliable information on corruption scandals is available and comes to the knowledge of the voters (Jiménez & Caínzos 2006: 194). Even if the extent of media coverage on scandals does not seem to affect the extent of electoral punishment, a free press is naturally a necessity in order for accountability to work (Ferraz and Finan 2008; de Souza and Moriconi 2013: 480). It is also the case that the electoral effects of corruption are dependent on whether or not the issue is politicized by the parties (Bågenholm 2013).

Turning to the micro level, information about corruption scandals or the graveness of the problem in general has to be filtered through a number of individual lenses, and the reactions to them may thus differ from one person to the next, depending on the evaluation made in terms of responsibility, saliency, trustworthiness and the alternatives (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006). Governments may get away with corrupt practices if they are perceived to manage the economy well, which is also in accordance with consistent findings in the economic voting

literature (see for example Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). The worse the government is perceived to handle the economy, the more corruption seems to matter, as corruption then becomes more salient. But if the government manages the economy well, corruption does not seem to matter at all (Choi and Woo, 2010; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). There is thus a type of rationality in the electorate. If people think that they will personally benefit, they will continue to support the incumbents. Several studies have shown that even outright corrupt practices, i.e. clientelism, may be approved of if people find that it is to their advantage (Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2013).

Another factor has to do with "home team" psychology. There is a tendency to disregard negative information about one's favorite party (see de Souza and Moriconi 2013: 486) or, if corrupt behavior is too obvious to deny, a tendency to think that the other parties are just as corrupt. Also, voters' personal perceptions and experiences of corruption can be highly relevant in their voting decision (Klasnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause 2014). Regarding individual factors such as age, gender and level of education, there is little consensus about their impact on the level of tolerance for corrupt politicians (de Souza and Moriconi 2013: 485-486).

In this paper we test related factors, but ones previously overlooked in the literature, namely the *ideological positions of the voters and how they are affected by the presence of reasonable alternatives.* We begin with the assumption that, in general, voters seek to best match their personal ideological preferences with the parties contesting an election. When a voter's first party choice is involved in some type of malfeasance, he or she must then make a strategic decision as to whether there is an alternative to vote for. However, alternatives are not just a matter of how many other parties there are to vote for, but also how many of those parties lie within a reasonably close ideological range, which in turn depends on where one places oneself on the left-right scale. All other things being equal, the more to the center you are, the greater the likelihood that you will have more alternatives to choose among, even in more limited party systems. On the other hand, the further a voter identifies with the ideological fringes, the more difficult it is to find a reasonable alternative to switch to, as it could be expected that those voters have strong opinions on matters which the rest of the parties take the opposite stand on, for example immigration, minority rights and issues regarding the state versus the free market. For more limited party systems, it will be more difficult to harbor two competing fringe parties, as they would split votes between them and hence be weakened. We therefore expect that voters in limited party systems are shaped much more by ideology, as strategic voting most likely plays a larger role due to limited choices (Cox 1997). We do not claim however that voters on the ideological fringes are different in their mindset concerning corruption than are voters more to the center - it is simply the lack of alternatives that make them behave differently and adopt different voting strategies when party systems are more limited. Therefore, as the number of effective parties decreases, we argue that it is more likely that such voters would vote according to their political ideology. However, this alternative hypothesis (that voters on the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum are simply less inclined to care enough about political corruption to punish their own party) is tested directly when the party system is taken into account. We argue that the demand an individual

has in voting for a party sufficiently close to her ideological preferences is mitigated by the supply of parties. Where party systems contain a high number of effective parties, the ideological differences at the individual level are expected to be washed out, as the likelihood of an alternative party choice increases. Yet, in limited party systems, given that corruption becomes pervasive in one's own party, we argue that the further to the right or left of the ideological spectrum one is, the more likely one will be to continue to vote for the same party, despite corruption being apparent. In light of this, we offer the following hypotheses:

H1: *At the individual level, the relationship between ideology and probability of corruption voting is U-shaped on average; the further out on the fringes that voters place themselves, the greater the likelihood that they will continue to support a party involved in a corruption scandal.*

H2: *The U-shaped relationship between individual ideology and probability of corruption voting is conditioned by the country's party system; as the number of parties increases, the U-shape is expected to flatten.*

Although our primary theoretical interest in this study is the choice to continue to vote for a party one knows to be corrupt, we put forth several other corollary expectations that are consistent with our expectations in H1 and H2. In addition to 'still voting' for one's party, we also track whether or not a respondent would simply 'stay home' or 'vote for an alternative party not involved in the corruption scandal', which we address further in the subsequent section. Since our argument is essentially one of supply and demand, we anticipate that the choice to 'vote for an alternative' will be positively related with the number of ENPs in the system, while 'staying home' will be negatively related with the number of ENPs. With respect to ideology, it is anticipated that the 'vote alternative' option will essentially be an 'inverse U', i.e. a mirror image of the 'still vote' option, with centrist voters most likely to switch parties. Finally, and also in accordance with the 'still vote' option, the effect of ideology on turnout is expected to increase as the party system gets larger and even voters on the extremes have more viable alternatives.

Sample, Data and Design

The data on corruption voting, ideology and demographic background information about citizens in this study are taken from the largest, multi-country survey specifically focusing on matters of governance and corruption – with a total sample of over 85 000 respondents in 24 European countries conducted by the authors, and it thus serves as an appropriate source for testing multi-level hypotheses.[11] Of the 30 plus questions included in the survey, several are of interest in this context.

[11]The survey, which was mainly concerned with European citizens' perceptions and attitudes on corruption, quality and impartiality of regional public service, was conducted between February and April 2013 and was funded by the EU Commission. The respondents were asked all questions in the majority language of their region or country and interviewed via telephone with a mix of landline and mobile contacts. A full list of countries and the number of observations is found in the appendix (source concealed for anonymity).

First, in constructing the dependent variable, we rely on two survey questions:

1. What political party would you vote for if the national parliamentary election were today?

2. Now imagine that that party was involved in a corruption scandal. Which of the following would be most likely? a) Still vote for preferred party b) Vote for an alternative party not involved in the corruption scandal c) Not vote at all.

Prior to these questions, the term corruption was defined for the respondents via the following description: "In this survey we define corruption to mean '*the abuse of entrusted public power for private gain'*. This abuse could be by any public employee or politician and the private gain might include money, gifts or other benefits." In all, 20.7 percent of all respondents answered that they would still vote for the same party despite its involvement in corruption, while 33.7 percent responded that they would vote for another, clean party and 38.6 percent that they would not vote at all. 6.9 percent responded 'don't know'.[12]

As we are most interested in the factors that explain why a voter would continue to vote for a candidate/party despite the presence of corruption, we begin the analysis by re-coding the variable '*still vote'* dichotomously, whereby a respondent is coded 1 if they would still vote for their preferred party and 0 if otherwise. In later models, we also look at the other two options, to 'vote for another party' and 'not vote at all', using multinomial logit. Proportions of each response by country are given in the appendix.[13]

[12] There are naturally shortcomings with questions like these. First, the magnitude of the scandal is not mentioned and, even if we had added "a major", we cannot be sure that respondents would think about it in the same way. In some countries it would certainly entail systemic corruption within the party, involving large amounts of money and several top politicians and a desire to protect the culprits from judicial proceedings, whereas in others respondents would think of it as an isolated event, involving relatively few, who would immediately be dismissed from their positions by the party leadership. The natural reaction in the former case would be to punish the party and in the latter to forgive it, which brings us to the second shortcoming, namely that it is the party that is said to be involved in a corruption scandal and not an individual candidate, which in systems of single member districts, such as the UK, we might assume the importance of the candidate to trump the party. Again, if people think that the party credibly handled a corruption scandal, they may find it unproblematic to vote for it. A third issue could be that people might behave differently in reality compared with how they express themselves in a survey. Naturally, we cannot remedy these shortcomings completely, since we cannot know how the respondents interpret the question, a problem we share with other observational, survey based studies. Yet, compared to other similar studies on corruption voting, we do think that our approach has several advantages, above all the combination of a cross-national sample with a large N with a direct and precise indicator of corruption voting, which we still think is adequately valid. Thus, to choose option a) should in our view most reasonably be interpreted as i) indifference to the issue or that it is less salient compared to other issues and ii) that there are no other parties that are close enough on those other salient issues to make the voter want to switch parties. Alternative interpretations are of course possible, but as far as we are concerned, less so.

[13] Even though almost 21% claim they would continue to support their preferred party, a potential issue with this measurement is the under-reporting of 'still vote' due to social desirability bias. Under-reporting itself would not cause bias if evenly distributed across individuals. However, this issue could of course bias the results if linked with one of the individual level variables (ideology for instance). Since we have no way of testing this directly, the results should be taken with a degree of caution.

A third question from the survey is taken as the primary explanatory variable of interest at the individual level - the *ideology* of the respondent. In this case, the variable is formulated using standard phrasing, asking respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale:

3. In politics, people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means the extreme left and 7 means the extreme right?

There are two potential problems with this measure. First, respondents may have difficulty knowing where to place themselves, as left and right may mean different things in different countries and be more or less relevant. Second and more importantly, the question may tap the strength of partisanship, i.e. a respondent who strongly identifies with for example the social democrats would place herself further to the left compared to a less ardent respondent who still supports the same party, which would impact the validity of our findings. Unfortunately, we have no question that asks 'how loyal' one is to the party one supports, but we can check whether self-placement of ideology is correlated with left-right ideology of their chosen parties and, if that correlation turns out to be strong, our measure can be considered valid in tracking ideology. To assess this, we test the measurement validity of this variable vis à vis question 1 (intended party vote). We collected data on each available party's left-right placement from the most recent Chapel Hill party data (Bakker et al. 2012). We take the measure of the overall left-right placement of each party (party_LR) and compare the self-placement ideology with the ideology of one's preferred party across the entire sample, as well as in each individual country. We find overall that there is a strong, positive correlation between the seven ideology groups and party_LR. Moreover, looking at this relationship within each country, we find a strongly significant and positive relationship between the two variables, which provides a high degree of discriminant validity for the self-placement ideology measure.[14] A summary of the results of this test is found in the appendix.

The left-right self-placement variable is re-scaled from 1-5 (far left, center left, center, center right and far right), where respondents who answered 1 and 2 are grouped in the 'far left' and those that answered 6 or 7 are grouped in the 'far right'. We do this because we find very little difference in party_LR between groups 1 and 2, and 6 and 7, and also in order to increase the number of observations per group, due to the fact that, in some countries (Ireland and Croatia in particular), less than 20 individuals placed themselves in the 1 or 7 categories. However, we re-test the results using the full 1-7 ideology measure, with 'Don't know' respondents coded as 0. The distribution is near-normal, with a slight skew to the right. Of the 85,157 respondents, 4.5 per cent and 21.7 per cent are far left and center left, respectively, while 6.2

[14] An alternative to ideology would be to simply use the ideology score of an individual's party instead. We choose not to do this for two main reasons. One, several countries and many parties even within available countries are missing from the Chapel Hill data as compared with the parties in our survey; thus our sample would be reduced by about 40,000 individuals and our country N would be cut by four. Two, our theory is mostly concerned with the perception of the individual's own ideology in relation to others – thus we would argue that the subjective measure of one's self-placement is a better match than the ideology of one's party in this case.

per cent and 22.2 per cent place themselves on the far and center right, respectively.[15] The modal response is 'center', with 36.2 per cent, and 9.2 per cent 'don't know'.

In addition to the primary variables of interest, we also include several other factors in the analysis that the literature has shown to be relevant. We control for standard demographic factors, such as gender, age, education, income, rural-urban location of the respondent and employment status. We also include the respondent's satisfaction with the economy, as this speaks to the idea of the respondent feeling that the status quo (status quo should be in italics) has benefitted her, thus making her more likely to vote for the incumbent. An individual's perception and/or experience of corruption could also impact his or her electoral decision making, as high levels of both perceived and experienced corruption indicate an awareness of the problem. Mixed evidence has been presented as to which 'matters more' in voting behavior, with Manzetti and Rosas' (2012) finding evidence that perception of societal corruption explains more variation in individual level voting patterns in Latin American countries, while Klašnja et al. (2012) find stronger evidence for direct experience of corruption influencing voting in two Eastern European states. Thus, we include two questions – the respondent's perception of societal corruption and their own direct experience (or lack thereof) of petty corruption – and we expect both to be negatively correlated with 'still vote'.

We combine the individual level data with country level factors. At the country level, our key variable is the number of effective parties (ENPs), taken from Gallagher (2014), and is averaged for the latest three electoral cycles for each country so as to the capture the general trend of the party system over the last decade.[16] Other institutions highlighted in the literature are the electoral system, the level of freedom of the press and presidentialism, which we also control for here. In addition, we include 'age of democracy', as Keefer (2007) argues it will be negatively related with the propensity for clientelistic relationships between parties and voters. Since we have both new and older democracies in the sample, we control for this factor, which we measure as the number of consecutive years coded as 6 or higher in the Polity IV data. Moreover, we include the level of economic development (PPP per capita, logged) and the overall quality of country level institutions, using the 'control of corruption' index from Kaufman, Kraay and Matruzzi (2011), as it is plausible that respondents in countries that have low levels of corruption systematically respond differently to political corruption than in countries where country wide corruption is more pervasive. A summary of all variables can be found in the appendix. The latter variables were taken from the QoG Institute's homepage (Teorell et al. 2011).

[15]Looking at the distribution of ideology within individual countries (minus 'don't know' responses), we find that the distribution is consistently normally distributed, although a slight skewedness to the right or left varies by country. Thus we reject the null hypothesis of the Shapiro–Wilk and Shapiro–Francia tests for normality (*sktest* in STATA).

[16] Since our theory and empirics focus on the voters' perceptions and intentions, we elect to include a broader picture of the party system over the past decade rather than just a one-year snapshot. We do this because, in cases of rapid party system volatility, in particular in Easterna d Central Europe (Tavitis 2008), some voters might not be 'up to date' with the latest round of relevant parties but have a good sense of the overall picture in the last few elections. Average ENPs for each country can be found in the appendix.

We begin the empirical tests by focusing on the 'still vote' outcome, employing a hierarchical design, whereby the cross-level interaction effects are tested directly. We find that country level differences in the dependent variable are present, and thus country level effects must be taken into account to avoid bias estimates.[17] Simply accounting for regional and/or country dummy variables for individual level variation in an OLS model can lead to problems because the error terms of the lowest level unit (individuals) within the same group will still be correlated. OLS models with regional or country dummies also assume that the second level variables have an equal effect on the dependent variable across all individuals, which is not always the case. Thus we elect to explain individual levels of trust in a hierarchical logit model with two levels, 'i' and 'j', to represent individual and country levels, respectively. The basic model used here is:

$$Stillvote_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_{01}x_{ij} + \beta_{10}z_{1j} + \beta_{11}z_{1j}x_{ij} + u_{1j} + u_{0j} + e_{0ij}$$

Where $Stillvote_{ij}$ is the log of the odds as a function of a set of individual level (x_{ij}) and country level (z_{1j}) fixed effects to estimate our model parameters (β). For random intercepts and random slope models (RIRSM), the parameter (u_{1j}) tests whether the slopes of the individual parameters (in our case, ideology) vary significantly by country, while u_{0j} is the random level intercepts for the country level and e_{0ij} is the error term. If we can reject the null hypothesis that the random slope for ideology is equal to '0', then this serves as the basis for testing our cross-level interaction term ($z_{1j}x_{ij}$)[18][19].

Our hypothesis implies that the slopes of ideology to vary by country, and the purpose of the interaction term is to directly test whether the country-level 'effective number of parties' explains the variations in the slopes of respondent ideology. In testing this, we run both a random intercepts model and a random coefficients model to test the extent to which our interaction explains the cross-country random effects of ideology on corruption voting, as it is recommended to test the very basis of the interaction term before modeling second level modifying variables (Aguinis et al. 2013). The random effects model (using country random intercepts and random slopes for ideology) tests the null hypothesis that the slope of ideology is consistent across all countries (e.g. model 4 in Table 1).

Are ideology and party systems linked with voting for corrupt incumbents?

[17]In addition, we estimate the country effects of the dependent variable with confidence intervals around the estimate in Figure 1 in the appendix.

[18]It is sometimes recommended that the individual level variable in the cross-level interaction term be 'centered' on a grand mean (Aguinis et al. 2013: 15). In our case, the ideology variable is treated (with?) essentially five dummy variables (0/1), and thus centering is unnecessary.

[19] Since the number of 2nd level observations (countries) is only 24, the sample thus somewhat violates the so-called '30/30 rule' (which advocates at least 30 cases at each level, (Maas and Hox 2005)), we thus check for the effects of outliers in each model and re-run the analyses removing one country at a time in subsequent models.

We follow the recommendations of Aguinis et al. (2013) and 'test up' by beginning with an 'empty model' in Table 1 to see whether the hierarchical model is appropriate[20]. The intercept is -1.49, which equates to 0.22 odds that the average person in the sample will 'still vote'. The null hypothesis is that the variance (σ^2) is equal to '0' (e.g. no significant cross-country differences), and this is rejected as the chi-square test statistic has a p-value of 0.0000. There is thus strong evidence that between-country variance is non-random, as one would expect given cross-country differences by response. The random effects sigma (σ_{u0}) tells us that, for a country, in the case of one standard deviation above the mean for 'still vote', the intercept is 0.31 greater than the intercept for the mean country value, -1.49.

Model 2 tests the bivariate relationship using only ideology as an explanatory factor. We find a 'U-shaped' relationship between ideology and 'still vote'[21]. We find that (without accounting for the interaction term or country level effects) respondents on the extreme left and right are almost twice as likely on average to still vote compared with centrist voters, while center left and right lie in between, and the 'U-shaped' relationship is highly significant.

[20]A complete table with estimates for all control variables is given in the appendix; for the sake of space, only the key variables are reported in Table 1.

[21] Observe that the variance (σ^2) changed little from the null model, meaning that the distribution of ideology is similar across countries in the sample, which confirms the individual country tests for a normal distribution of ideology.

Table 1. Estimates of Probability of 'Still Vote' of Key Variables and Cross-level Interaction

		1. Empty model		2. Ideology only		3. + Ind. level		4. + country level		5.x-level interaction	
		Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value
Level 1(individual)											
Intercept		-1.49	0.000	-2.39	0.000	-2.98	0.000	3.94	0.000	4.98	0.000
Ideology (d/k)	far left			1.33	0.000	1.22	0.000	1.27	0.000	1.80	0.000
	center left			1.05	0.000	0.88	0.000	0.93	0.000	1.36	0.000
	center			0.62	0.000	0.49	0.000	0.54	0.000	0.51	0.005
	center right			1.01	0.000	0.83	0.000	0.88	0.000	0.98	0.000
	far right			1.38	0.000	1.24	0.000	1.30	0.000	1.53	0.000
Level 2 (Country)											
ENPs								-0.07	0.54	-0.01	0.94
Cross-Level Interaction											
Ideology*ENPs	far left*ENPs									-0.15	0.003
	cen. left*ENPs									-0.12	0.01
	center*ENPs									0.004	0.93
	cen. right*ENPs									-0.03	0.49
	far right*ENPs									-0.07	0.12
Random Variance components											
	Randomintercept σ_{u0} (s.e.)	0.567	0.09	0.541	0.08	0.49	0.07	0.524	0.08	0.512	0.07
	RandomSlope σ_{z1} (s.e.)							0.075	0.01	0.070	0.01

Wald model test Pr(χ^2)	0.0000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	-42156	-41277	-38918	-39539	-39538
LR Test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
ind. obs (countries)	85157(25)	85157(25)	85157(25)	82675(23)	82675(23)

Note: Models estimated using hierarchical modeling with a binary dependent variable (xtmelogit). Models 3-5 include level 1 and level 2 controls (see appendix for full results). Models 1-3 control for random country intercepts, while 4-5 also include random slopes for ideology. Individual level controls (not shown) are gender, age, income, education, population, satisfaction with current economy, corruption perceptions and corruption experience. Country level controls are GDP per capita (logged), corruption (WGI), age of democracy, proportional representation and semi-presidentialism. Beta coefficients reported with p-values.

Model 3 adds fixed effects control variables at the individual level. Of the individual level factors of note, we find a strong gender effect – the odds of a female 'still voting' are about 24% less compared with a male respondent with otherwise similar demographic characteristics. Further, there is an age and (to some extent) education effect – younger and less educated respondents show a *lower* tolerance for corruption in voting than older and more educated people. Rural respondents are the least likely to still vote for their prior party/candidate, while satisfaction with the economy is strongly and positively linked to voting for their status quo party. Individual level experience and perceptions with corruption have only a small impact on the dependent variable.

Models 4 and 5 include country level variables – both with and without the interaction term (models 5 and 4, respectively). In model 4, we find that the random slope variance is more than seven times the standard error and the confidence interval around sigma does not include zero. We can thus reject the null hypothesis that the cross-country variance in slopes for ideology is equal to'0', thus giving us empirical justification for including the cross-level interaction, which we test in model 5. Interestingly, ENPs' direct effect on 'still vote' is insignificant (model 4)..

As significance levels for interaction terms in binary models can at times be misleading (Berry et al. 2010), we elect to show the marginal effects (predicted probabilities) of each ideological position on the 'still vote' at select levels of ENPs in Figure 1 for a clearer interpretation of the results.

Figure 1. Impact of Ideology on Still Vote Conditioned by the Effective Number of Parties



Note: The 'd/k' estimates not included; results from model 5 in Table 1. Estimates shown with all other control variables held at their mean levels.

Figure 1 highlights the two level interaction between respondent ideology and the country level 'effective number of parties' (ENPs). For the sake of parsimonious interpretation, we provide the predicted probability of 'still vote' as a function of the five ideological placements

over two, five and eight party systems. The results elucidate a clear interaction effect – in highly multiparty systems, one's ideological position makes little difference (e.g. the 'U-shaped' relationship disappears, and all confidence intervals overlap), yet ideological position becomes quite significant as the number of parties decreases and merges toward a two party system[22]. For instance, comparing the effects of ideology at the extremes, the probability that individuals on the far right 'still voting' increases by about 85% between an eight and two party system, while the probability of respondents on the extreme left 'still voting' more than doubles. Interestingly, the effect of ENPs on centrist voters is negligible – they are equally likely to 'still vote' in two party systems as they are in multi-party ones, while center left/right voters are somewhat impacted by the ENPs; this is in line with our expectations regarding supply and demand based on the ideology of the voter and the number of alternatives based on the ENPs

Modeling all three response outcomes

In this section, we broaden the analysis to include the other two responses and model the three together in a single logit model[23]. After testing whether the responses could be modeled in an ordered way, we find that we consistently violated the parallel odds assumption, and thus we elect to model the outcomes as non-ordered categories in a multinomial logit model[24]. We thus test for violations of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption in each model. We also re-run these estimates using general linear structural equations models (SEM) accounting for our hierarchical data[25]. Table 2 presents the findings for three models. Model 1 is a simple baseline with only ideology and country fixed effects. Model 2 shows the results of the interaction between ideology and ENPs, while Model 3 includes all individual and country level control variables from Table 1. The comparison baseline group for the three models in Table 2 is the 'stay home' outcome.

The baseline model, accounting only for country fixed effects, confirms again that voter ideology plays an important role in how a voter would respond to a corruption scandal in his

[22]While the model shows that there are significant random country effects, meaning that generalizing about a 'European wide probability' is not very fruitful, we can draw meaningful inferences about the effects of the ideological positions *relative to one another within countries*.

[23]The 'don't know' responses, which constitute 6.9% of the sample, are omitted from the analysis. We thus test to see if there are systematic relationships with the 'don't know' respondents from the dependent variable and the key independent variable. Cross-tab analysis with left-right self-placement shows that respondents that answer 'don't know' to the corruption scandal response, are about 3.5 times more likely to also answer 'don't' know' on the left-right self-placement as well (27.2% vs. 7.8%). However, the remaining left-right frequencies are more or less as normally distributed as among those that gave an answer, with the exception of a higher frequency of center voters in the 'don't know' corruption question response, as compared to those that answer one or our three outcomes (48% to 39%).

[24]For example, we attempted to order the outcomes around 'corruption tolerance', such that a '1' (still vote) is the most tolerant, a '2' (vote for an alternative party) and '3' can be seen as the least tolerant (stay home). After running both the baseline models and full control models, we find that the LR test, and the Brant test show that the responses cannot be ordered and thus multinomial logit is appropriate

[25]Although the LR test was significant for each model in Table 1, we find when we obtain the results using a standard logit model controlling for country level effects that the model produces remarkably similar estimates.

or her preferred party – corroborating our findings in Table 1. We observe however that, on average, there are significant differences between center voters and those on the left and the right. The predicted probability of a center voter staying home and not voting is roughly 0.10 (10%) greater than voters who identify themselves somewhere on the center left or center right. We find that the probability for center, center right and center left voters to 'vote for an alternative party' is quite similar – between roughly 37% and 39% likely to do so – while voters on the far left or far right are only approximately 30% likely to switch to another party. We find that, overall, the most likely outcome is that the voter simply 'stays home' – in particular, those in the center, who are roughly 45% likely to do so on average, which corroborates findings by Chong et al. (2015) that corruption leads to decreases in voter turnout. Model 2 includes all individual level controls and the interaction between party system and voter ideology, while model 3 adds all country level variables. To offer a more accessible interpretation, we provide Figure 2, a visual of the main effects of the key variables and their interaction in the three response outcomes, highlighting the predicted effects of ideology in 2 and 8 party systems across the three responses with all controls held at their mean value.

Table 2. Estimates of Multinomial Logit

		1. Baseline (f/e)	p-value	2. interaction	p-value	3. full model	p-value
outcome 1: 'Still Vote'							
Left-right ID							
	far left	1.31	0.000	2.69	0.000	2.39	0.000
	center left	1.30	0.000	1.63	0.000	1.03	0.000
	center	0.65	0.000	1.37	0.000	0.63	0.007
	center right	1.24	0.000	1.99	0.000	1.18	0.000
	far right	1.34	0.000	2.61	0.000	2.25	0.000
	ENPs			0.19	0.000	0.03	0.540
Left-right ID*ENPs							
	far left*ENP			-0.28	0.000	-0.23	0.000
	center left*ENP			-0.03	0.000	0.05	0.360
	center*ENP			-0.11	0.000	0.01	0.910
	center right*ENP			-0.12	0.000	0.01	0.790
	far right*ENP			-0.26	0.000	-0.19	0.000
	constant	-2.32	0.000	-2.640	0.000	8.140	0.000
outcome 2: 'Vote Alternative Party'							
Left-right ID							
	far left	0.44	0.000	-0.19	-0.37	0.04	0.89
	center left	0.85	0.000	0.06	0.71	-0.07	0.67
	center	0.53	0.000	0.28	0.063	0.04	0.81
	center right	0.75	0.000	23	0.13	0.13	0.43
	far right	0.39	0.000	0.11	0.59	0.38	0.08
	ENPs			-0.02	0.41	-0.03	0.32

Left-right ID*ENPs							
	far left*ENP			0.16	0.000	0.12	0.020
	center left*ENP			0.22	0.000	0.20	0.000
	center*ENP			0.09	0.003	0.11	0.001
	center right*ENP			0.16	0.000	0.15	0.000
	far right*ENP			0.09	0.050	0.04	0.440
	constant	-1.03	0.000	-0.81	0.000	4.43	0.000
model statistics							
	observations	79212		78890		72899	
	countries						
log likelihood intercept		-84563.86		-84239.65		-77994.4	
log likelihood model		-79654.96		-83839.4		-74530.8	
Prob>LR		0.000		0.000		0.000	
Psudo (??) R^2		0.058		0.020		0.036	
LR test of IIA	Gr. 1 - Gr. 2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
($p>\chi^2$)	Gr. 1 - Gr. 3	0.000		0.000		0.000	
	Gr. 2 - Gr. 3	0.000		0.000		0.000	

Note: beta coefficients reported from multinomial logit estimates for three nominal, categorical outcomes (comparison group is 'stay home'). Model 1 (baseline) includes country fixed effects. Comparison group for left-right self-placement is 'don't know'. Model 3 includes all individual level controls: gender, education, income, population of respondent's home town, unemployed, perceptions of corruption; and country level controls: consecutive years of democracy (Polity IV), country corruption (World Bank), PPP per capita (log), parliamentalism, proportional representation. Test of the IIA is a post-regression LR test (Chi2), where p-values are reported with a null hypothesis that the two groups compared have no distinction as per the regressors.

Figure 2.



Note: Estimates shown with all other control variables held at their mean levels.

Relative to hierarchical logit, results of multinomial logit and SEM models are admittedly more cumbersome to present. We thus summarize the most important findings. First, both the party system and an individual's ideological position on the left-right scale play a significant role in how one responds to political corruption in an election. However, voter ideology plays a much more defining role in limited party systems, in particular with regard to the choice between abstaining from voting and continuing to vote for one's preferred party despite a corruption scandal. The smallest effect of ideology is in fact on a voter's choice to switch to an alternative party – which the results show is a function of the number of viable alternatives. As the number of ENPs in a system increases, voters become more likely to switch parties, all things being equal.

As regards a voter's response to a corruption scandal in strong multiparty systems, we find that voters are on average most likely to switch to an alternative parliamentary party, followed by simply abstaining from voting. The alternative 'still vote' was the least likely outcome for voters across the ideological spectrum. The small ideological differences we find in multiparty systems are that, relative to others, center right and center left voters are (slightly) more inclined to continue to vote for their preferred party, albeit at only approximately a 24% probability, all things being equal. Still, mostly, we find the effects of ideology almost negligible in these party systems. One small difference we observe in the data is that voters on the far right are slightly more likely to 'stay home' than to switch parties, while all others are most likely to switch to an alternative party. Center left and center right respondents were on average equally likely to 'stay home' as they are to 'still vote' (roughly 25% each), while they are approximately 50% likely to switch parties. In Figure 3, we highlight these results re-running model 3 in Table 2 for Belgium, the country in our sample with the highest ENP, which exemplifies the aforementioned patterns.

Figure 3.



Note: Estimates shown with all other control variables held at their mean levels.

On the other hand, we find noticeably different patterns in countries with limited party systems. Here we find that voters in the ideological center, center right and center left are actually most likely to simply 'stay home', followed by switching to an alternative party. However, relative to the other two outcomes, voters on the far left and far right are *most likely* to continue voting for their preferred candidate despite a known corruption scandal, which lends support to our hypothesis. For example, we find that *ceteris paribus*, a voter on the far left is roughly 44% likely to 'still vote', while just 33% and 23% are likely to 'stay home' and 'vote for an alternative party', respectively. A voter on the far right is roughly 40% likely to 'still vote', compared with a 32% and 28% likelihood to 'stay home' or 'vote for an alternative', respectively. Interestingly, voters in the ideological center in limited party systems are the least likely to 'still vote', and, with respect to this response, (and that – why is "and that" needed?) the predicted probabilities for these voters are indistinguishable from estimates for center voters in strong multiparty systems, as well as far right and far left voters. Figure 4 highlights these effects in the country with the lowest ENPs in the sample, Hungary.

Figure 4.



Note: Estimates shown with all other control variables held at their mean levels.

Further Checks for Robustness

In addition to re-running the multinomial logit models as SEM accounting for multilevel data, for which we find no substantively different results, we have a relatively low number of second level observations (country level). Thus we run model 3 from Table 2 removing each country in our sample one at a time to test whether the results were driven by any one outlying country. We find that the results hold remarkably well in most all cases, with the 'U-shaped' relationship at low ENPs holding throughout, while the more or less 'flattened' effect of ideology holding at high levels of ENPs. The removal of two cases has some impact on the results, mainly on the probability of the far left on 'still vote' in limited party systems – Spain and Turkey. When Spanish observations are removed, we find that the probability of far left voters to 'still vote' increases to 55% while the far right drops slightly to a 38% likelihood when fixing ENP at '2'. When we remove Turkey, we find the opposite – the probability of the far right is indistinguishable from the main results, while the far left drops to a 32% probability. We also test whether altering our measure of ideology (using a seven point scale) and ENPs (taking only the most recent election year) impacts our results, for which we find has negligible effects. Finally, we re-run all hierarchical logit models from Table 1 and multinomial logit models in Table 2, weighting observations by country population from the 2013 Eurostat data[26]. We found no substantive differences in the results due to these changes.

Discussion

One of the key tenets of democratic theory is that elections serve as mechanisms of accountability against office holders that are inclined to abuse power for their own personal

[26] Multilevel logit (xtmelogit) in STATA does not allow for weights in Stata 12 version. Thus country fixed effects Logit was used as an alternative to account for weighted populations for robustness checks in Table 1.

gain. Yet many recent studies point to this mechanism breaking down, resulting in corrupt parties and politicians getting re-elected. In this emerging literature on corruption voting, we propose a new, multi-level theoretical framework to understand this dynamic. Our findings, which corroborate our theoretical expectations, show that certain voters, in certain contexts, will continue to vote for their preferred party even in the face of a corruption scandal if not supplied with a reasonable ideological alternative party. The results show that, in systems with a limited number of parties (converging on two), there is a strong U-shaped relationship between individual level ideology and the probability that a respondent will continue to vote for a party in the face of a corruption scandal, while voters in the center are more prone to switch parties or stay home. In strongly multi-party systems, however, this U-shaped relationship diminishes, as voters on the extremes are equally (un)likely to continue voting for their preferred party as are voters in the center. This finding is robust to the inclusion of several individual level factors, along with country level factors such as economic development, presidentialism, electoral system, age of democracy and the level of country wide perceived corruption.

In addition, we look at how one reacts given three alternatives – 'still vote for preferred party', 'vote for clean alternative' and 'stay home'. We find that, when controlling for a number of individual and country level factors, both our key individual level factors – ideology and country level factor party systems - play important roles in voter responses. First, ideology matters most in systems of limited ENPs. Voters on the extremes in these systems are most likely to 'still vote for their preferred party', while voters in the center, center left and center right are most likely to abstain from voting. Voting for an alternative in limited party systems often implies voting for a party on the other side of the spectrum due to a low supply of alternatives. That voters on the extreme right and left behave the way we observe suggests to us that there is an 'ideology/malfeasance trade-off' in that a corrupt party that is ideologically close is in fact preferred to a 'cleaner' alternative that is perceived to be too far away. Also, on average, the 'vote alternative' option was strongly and positively related to the number of ENPs in the system, which we argue is consistent with our market choice based argument. Second, in strong multiparty systems, the effects of ideology on all choices decrease, implying that, as a closer, more 'acceptable' choice is presented, all voters (save far right voters by a slight margin) become more likely to elect an existing alternative party not involved in a corruption scandal. In these systems, 'staying home' in fact becomes the least likely option on average, whereas we find that most voters (e.g. those in the center) become most likely to 'stay home' as ENPs decrease.

Two caveats from our findings should be highlighted however. One, our theory assumes that the limited number of alternatives when ENPs decrease implies that any alternative parties are sufficiently unacceptable ideologically from the voter's first preferences (in particular on the far left or right). Two, it is important to remember that roughly only 11% of the sample places themselves on the far left or right, meaning that, while some voters clearly choose to vote 'strategically' despite a corruption scandal in their preferred party, these voters might be a minority, most pronounced in limited party systems. However, as ENPs increase, we believe that this provides evidence against the counter hypothesis that voters in the center are more

concerned about corruption than those on the extremes: given the choice of a viable alternative, all respondents were more or less equally (un)likely to 'still vote'.

We make several contributions to this literature in this paper. One, we put forth a novel theoretical model in which to understand corruption voting, based on individual and system level factors, highlighting a previously unexplored cross-level interaction between ideology and party systems. Two, to test our theory, we employ an observational, comparative research design, which allows us to inquire directly about corruption voting in a cross-country framework based on hierarchical data, which best allows us to test our theory. Our measure of the dependent variable, although not perfect, is also a more direct measure than in previous comparative studies. In doing so, we present newly collected survey data from a sample that includes 24 European countries and roughly 85,000 individual responses. This is therefore one of the most comprehensive comparative studies on this topic to date and serves as an important complement to the majority of experimental, small N studies in this growing literature. Third, we make a clear empirical contribution to the literature. The empirical tests show remarkably strong and robust evidence to support our theoretical claim. In addition, we find that the party system is highly relevant in terms of whether respondents elect to abstain from voting or switch to a cleaner alternative party. In this way, we investigate one of the untested mechanisms in the debate over whether proportional or single member district electoral systems present voters with more opportunities to hold politicians and parties accountable for corruption. Our analysis shows that, in strong multi-party systems (often PR), voters are most prone to switch parties, while, in limited party systems, voters most often stay home or continue to vote for the corrupt party, which points to a potential benefit of the multi-party system in this regard.

Finally, we conclude with several salient implications of this research. Building on the previous point, which system is 'best equipped' to hold corrupt politicians accountable? Is a strong signal of 'abstention' and overall lower voter turnout in the face of a corruption scandal in a limited party system a 'better' way to react to political corruption than voting for an alternative, 'cleaner' choice, as we find in multiparty systems? One could argue that, because strong multi-party systems produce more 'party switching', this leads to greater accountability; yet this assumes that there is a non-corrupt, viable alternative. While our focus has been on the number of parties in the system, does the ideological distribution among the parties themselves (e.g. Clark and Leiter 2014) play a role in voters' choices? Is it preferred that voters behave similarly in reaction to corruption irrespective of ideology (as in multi-party systems) or that a degree of strategic voting occurs with some voters on the extremes, as in limited party systems? We leave these larger questions open for future research and debate.

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Appendix.

Table A1. Validity test of ideology: cross check with party ideology (party_lr)

	Ideology	mean Party_LR	s.d.	n
	0 (d/k)	5.41	2.11	1158
far left	1	3.52	1.89	2239
	2	3.38	1.59	3093
	3	4.07	1.77	8719
center	4	5.15	1.96	12933
	5	6.20	1.82	7504
	6	6.68	1.62	3430
far right	7	6.80	1.91	3276
	total	5.16	2.14	42352

Note: oneway anova test: F=2111.63 (p>F = 0.0000).

A posttest pairwise comparison of group means (Bonferroni) reveals each difference is significant at the 0.0000 level. A similar result is found using regression analysis with party_LR as the dependent variable (and country fixed effects)

Table A2. Total respondents, response to corruption voting, and Effective Number of Parties (ENP's) (averaged over last three elections, from Gallagher 2014), by Country and Totals

	still vote	vote alt.	stay home	d/k	Ave. ENP	total respondents
Austria	0.249	0.409	0.268	0.074	3.50	3600
Belgium	0.198	0.411	0.372	0.02	7.79	1208
Bulgaria	0.19	0.258	0.375	0.177	3.55	2402
Croatia	0.137	0.363	0.442	0.058	3.31	800
Czech Republic	0.281	0.32	0.35	0.05	3.75	3236
Denmark	0.219	0.557	0.14	0.084	5.07	2028
Finland	0.243	0.416	0.278	0.064	5.27	2000
France	0.242	0.195	0.538	0.025	2.52	10409
Germany	0.274	0.328	0.301	0.096	4.08	6400
Greece	0.05	0.493	0.443	0.014	2.67	1613
Hungary	0.257	0.226	0.462	0.055	2.2	1215
Ireland	0.169	0.465	0.329	0.038	3.31	800
Italy	0.196	0.365	0.375	0.064	3.86	8510
Netherlands	0.159	0.575	0.179	0.087	5.7	4822
Poland	0.139	0.295	0.451	0.115	2.78	6400
Portugal	0.099	0.278	0.505	0.118	2.87	2886
Romania	0.265	0.263	0.469	0.003	3.16	3200
Serbia	0.06	0.184	0.567	0.189	4.43	1615
Slovakia	0.186	0.376	0.394	0.044	4.44	1609
Spain	0.101	0.334	0.523	0.042	2.49	6800
Sweden	0.259	0.501	0.186	0.054	4.31	1295

Turkey	0.355	0.371	0.241	0.033	2.29	4800
UK	0.233	0.344	0.382	0.041	2.4	4800
Ukraine	0.26	0.203	0.321	0.217	3.78	2400
Total	***0.208***	***0.337***	***0.386***	***0.011***	***3.45***	***84848***

Table A3. Summary statistics

	mean	st. dev.	min	max	obs
individual level					
Left-right(5-scale & 0='d/k')	2.76	1.28	0	5	85157
female	0.53	0.5	0	1	85157
education	2.2	0.95	1	4	84862
age	2.47	0.99	1	4	85023
income	1.75	1.01	0	3	85157
unemployed	0.081	0.27	0	1	85157
econ. Satisfaction (higher=less sat.)	3.09	0.85	1	4	84682
paid bribe	0.076	0.26	0	1	85157
corruption perception	4.03	3.09	0	10	81149
population	2.02	0.94	1	4	83904
country level					
PPP p.c. (log)	9.93	0.54	8.37	10.47	85158
consec. yrs democracy (since 1950)	45.9	19.5	5	63	85158
Corruption (WGI)	1.02	0.91	-0.96	2.44	84757
parliamentary	0.73	0.44	0	1	85158
ENP's	4.5	1.08	2.2	7.8	84757

Table A4. Table 1 in main text with all estimates

		1. Empty model		2. Ideology only		3. Individual level		4. add country level		5. x-level interaction	
Individual Level		Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value
Ideology	far left			1.33	0.000	1.22	0.000	1.27	0.000	1.80	0.000
(d/k)	center left			1.05	0.000	0.88	0.000	0.93	0.000	1.36	0.000
	center			0.62	0.000	0.49	0.000	0.54	0.000	0.51	0.000
	center right			1.01	0.000	0.83	0.000	0.88	0.000	0.98	0.000
	far right			1.38	0.000	1.24	0.000	1.30	0.000	1.53	0.000
Gender	female					-0.27	0.000	-0.26	0.000	-0.25	0.000
age	18-29					0.38	0.140	0.35	0.29	0.34	0.34
(d/k)	30-44					0.40	0.100	0.37	0.22	0.35	0.19
	45-64					0.51	0.050	0.48	0.17	0.44	0.16
	65+					071	0.010	0.68	0.03	0.70	0.04
education	<secondary					0.25	0.180	0.22	0.31	0.22	0.33
(d/k)	seconday					0.34	0.070	0.30	0.09	0.31	0.10
	someuniversity					0.48	0.011	0.45	0.01	0.43	0.01
	>university					0.45	0.020	0.41	0.02	0.40	0.03
income	<10k					0.11	0.000	0.19	0.000	0.20	0.000
popualtion	10k-100k					0.21	0.005	0.25	0.003	0.26	0.003
(d/k)	100k-1m					0.25	0.001	0.28	0.001	0.28	0.001
	>1m					0.37	0.000	0.39	0.000	0.40	0.000
corruption	perceptions					0.02	0.000	-0.001	0.98	-0.003	0.91
	experience					0.05	0.090	0.04	0.10	0.06	0.08
econ. Sat.						-0.22	0.000	-0.22	0.000	-0.23	0.000

country level							
numberofparties				-0.07	0.54	-0.01	0.94
PPP p.c. (log)				-0.76	0.09	-0.81	0.10
age ofdemocracy				0.03	0.001	0.03	0.001
Presidentialism				-0.03	0.45	-0.01	0.59
PR				-0.12	0.000	-0.11	0.001
Corruption (WGI)				-0.12	0.60	-0.10	0.71
observations (countries)	85157 (25)	85157 (25)	85157(25)	82675(23)		82675(23)	

3. Bågenholm, Andreas. 2015. "Are Anti-Corruption Parties to be Trusted? Evidence from 13 cases in Central and Eastern Europe 1999-2014."

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Abstract

New parties in general and niche parties in particular have been increasingly successful during the last 30 years and have accordingly received a lot of scholarly attention. So far most focus have been put on green and radical right parties and to a more limited extent, regional parties. In this paper I analyze first and foremost the policy impact of another type of new parties, some of which can be considered as niche parties, namely those focusing on anti-corruption and which have been immensely successful during the last 15 years. The main question to be answered here is to what extent such parties have been able to influence anti-corruption reforms and to what extent those reforms have been successful. The study thus covers all new parties that campaigned on the issue of anti-corruption in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin wall until 2014 and which also became part of the government. The analysis is based on the Freedom House publication *Nation in Transit's* annual reports, in which one section deals with the efforts to curb corruption. The results are rather mixed, but indicate that the more influential positions the Anti-Corruption Parties (ACPs) have in government, the better are their anti-corruption performances. That implies that at least some of them are serious and competent enough to tackle those issues, despite their newness and lack of experience and that they should not by default be disregarded as shortsighted luck-seeking populists, who just exploit desperate people's desire for change.

Introduction

New parties have been exceptionally successful during the last decade and a half in Central and Eastern Europe. For example parliamentary elections in Bulgaria in 2001 and 2009, in Latvia in 2002, in Estonia in 2003, in Lithuania in 2004 and in Slovenia in 2014 were all won by genuinely new parties formed shortly before the elections. In another handful of cases new parties have been close to winning. A common feature for these and several other, slightly less successful new parties, is that they focus on fighting corruption and stress a self-image of honesty, integrity, competence, thereby making newness an asset rather than a liability (Bennich-Björkman et al., 2012; Sikk, 2011). Although not single-issue parties, most of them could arguably be described as niche parties, i.e. parties that focus on a limited number of non-economic issues (Wagner, 2012) and since their main issue happens to be anti-corruption they will henceforth be called "anti-corruption parties" or ACPs.

There is an extensive literature on above all two other types of niche parties, namely green parties, which emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and radical right parties, which emerged about the same time, but most of whom became electorally successful somewhat later, in the 1990s. However, studies focusing on what these parties actually have achieved in terms of policy change have not been particularly abundant, probably due to the fact that most of these parties never made it to the government and even fewer got important positions within it. Their potential policy impact is thus indirect at best. The ACPs in contrast have been considerably more successful and have participated in several governments and sometimes even governed alone. However, with a few exceptions, new ACPs have been an exclusively Central and East European phenomenon and successful ones, exclusively so. The emergence and large scale success of this new type of niche party, thus widens the scope for studies that seek to answer what policy influence niche parties potentially may have.

These parties have sometimes been denounced, not least by their opponents, but also from independent observers, as unserious populists, just trying to capitalize on the widespread distrust of the established political parties in general and on the voters' dislike of corruption in particular (see for example Pop-Eleches, 2010). Regardless of the seriousness of these new parties, it is a fact that corruption is a very serious phenomenon in the countries concerned and that the established parties not only have had at best limited success in curbing corruption, but also that several incumbent parties in Central and Eastern Europe have been involved or accused of being involved in corruption scandals themselves (Bågenholm, 2010). There are thus good reasons why voters to an increasing extent have turned their back at the established parties and instead thrown their lot with politically inexperienced newcomers with no previous track record. The new parties' elites did not lack relevant experience altogether however. In some cases their leaders had some previous political experience and in others, including the most successful cases, they had proven their skills and competence in other sectors, such as business and media or as public officials.[27]

Fighting corruption is easier said than done, however, and there is no recipe for a quick-fix to be found, regardless of the honesty and competence of the political actors. In contrast to many other issues, corruption has been assumed to be particularly difficult to tackle (Rothstein, 2011: 118-119). In order to influence policy, new parties moreover have to seek compromises with established parties. Thus, we cannot assume that corruption will be curbed even if the incumbents have an honest ambition to do so. But neither should we assume that ambitious actors are completely unable to make any difference just because of the collective action logic of corruption, which according to Persson, et al. makes the ones at the top highly unlikely anti-corruption fighters, as they are the ones who gain the most from a corrupt system (2013). And even if anti-corruption reforms were to be implemented, they argue that it is as unlikely that people would actually comply, unless they think that most other people would.

[27] For example Einars Repse from Latvian New Era was the former head of the Central Bank, Juhan Parts from the Estonian Res Publica was the former State Auditor and Simeon Sakskoburggotski was the former Bulgarian king and successful businessman, as was Andrej Babiš, founder of ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic. Miro Cerar who founded The Modern Centre Party (SMC) in Slovenia just six weeks before the elections in 2014, in which he won close to 35 percent of the votes, was a professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Ljubljana.

The political parties are obvious key players in fighting corruption and if the ones who have the skills, ambitions and administrative resources at their disposal fail, it is difficult to see how corruption could be reduced at all. Thus, the question whether Anti-Corruption Parties have any impact on curbing corruption, is an open one, which will be examined in this study.

The empirical analysis includes all new parties which campaigned on an anti-corruption agenda and that subsequently became part of the governments in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin wall until 2014 and aims at answering the question to what extent the ACPs managed to successfully implement effective anti-corruption reforms.

Previous research on niche parties

Understanding the relationship and interaction between voters and parties has a long history in political science. One of the more well-known hypotheses within this field is the freezing hypothesis, advanced by Lipset and Rokkan in the late 1960s (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Their main observation was that the party systems in Western democracies had more or less remained unchanged from the introduction of universal male suffrage in the early 20th century until the time of their writing in the late 1960s. Stability and predictability were key words, as the electorate tended to vote according to old cleavage structures and return more or less the same parties to parliament. During the 1970s and 1980s it became obvious that the party systems were becoming less stable, among other things because of changes in the old cleavage structures, leading to a decline in party identification (Mair, Müller & Plasser, 2004: 3-5) and in the class based voting (Lane & Ersson, 1994: 94). Not only did the voters become more volatile (Drummond, 2006; Pennings & Lane, 1998: 15), but also more prone to vote for new parties that tended to focus on single issues rather than offering a wholesale ideology (Hug, 2001: 2).

The two types of niche parties – or single issue parties[28] – that have received most scholarly attention are the green parties and the radical rights party. They became successful in the 1980s and 1990s in the sense that they managed to win parliamentary representation in a number of European countries, sometimes with more than 10 percent of the votes, which is quite an achievement for new parties. However, as they were usually shunned by the established parties they very rarely made it all the way to the government, which perhaps is why scholars have paid relatively little attention to the actual policy impact of these parties. As has been pointed out, incumbency is not a prerequisite for being influential, however (Minkenberg, 2001). A party may have an impact on the agenda setting and policy outcomes by forcing other parties to address the issue in question and move closer to the niche party's position (Meguid, 2008).

Green parties, emerging in the early 1980s from the environmental movements and the campaigns against the building of nuclear power plants, eventually won representation in a

[28] The difference between the two concepts is sometimes blurred, but according to Wagner, single issue parties should be regarded as a sub category of niche parties (2012: 7).

majority of the West European parliaments (Spain and United Kingdom being the two major exceptions) and, after 1990, also in a few Central European parliaments. While initially reluctant to cooperation with established parties – due to a fear that cooperation would merely "legitimise the continuation of Old Politics" (Pogunkte 2002: 134) – several Green parties did eventually chose to enter into government coalitions and various forms of organized cooperation, primarily with centre-left parties.

There are no comparative studies on Green parties' policy influences, only a couple of case studies that indirectly, through analyzing the governmental portfolios and parliamentary strength, measure their potential impact. Even if it is difficult to isolate the effects of a single party, and especially so if their impact is indirect, it seems that Green parties have had a modest policy impact at best (Rihoux & Rüdig, 2006: 16; Poguntke, 2002).

Radical right parties in contrast, have had much more visible policy impact (de Lange, 2008: 228). The responses toward these parties have differed, however. Although most established parties have officially condemned their critique against immigration as populist and xenophobic, it is only in Belgium that the strategy of forming a "cordon sanitaire" has been maintained. In Italy and Austria and more recently in Finland and Norway, anti-immigration parties have formed government coalitions with conservative parties, and in other countries they have been decisive in the government formation process.

In one of the few studies in this field, Minkenberg found that the established parties in four countries, Italy, Austria, Germany and France, adjusted their policies closer towards that of the radical right niche parties. In terms of direct policy impact, only the most successful of them, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), managed to influence legislation and curiously enough primarily during their term in opposition (Minkenberg, 2001: 13). It is quite obvious, however, that other radical right parties, for example the Danish People's Party, more recently have had influence on both policy outcome and on the way these issues have been treated in the public discourse (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2012: 416).

It thus seems that radical right parties have been more influential in all respects and the more so the more electorally successful they have been. Considering the fact that some anti-corruption parties were much more successful and obtained much more prominent positions in government in comparison to the two other types of niche parties discussed, we would expect at least the most successful ones to exert a substantial policy influence over anti-corruption legislation.

The recent successes of new and somewhat different types of parties in Europe have made party type or party family categorization more complicated and there is hence no consensus on neither what to call them nor what their most relevant defining features are. I have opted to label those parties that politicize anti-corruption issues in election campaign for Anti-Corruption Parties or ACPs, even though some of them also stress other issues. Thus, they are rarely single-issue parties, but some of them could arguably be described as niche parties, i.e. "parties that de-emphasise economic concerns and stress a small range of non-economic issues" (Wagner, 2012) or "heavily emphasize specific policies that (…) have been neglected

by rival parties" Miller & Meyer (2011: 22). A niche party does not have to be new, but it has been argued that it must be in opposition, which implies that as soon as it enters a government, it loses its niche party status (van de Wardt, 2014: 98). In this study I focus on new such parties only, which van de Wardt calls "Niche Party Challengers" or NPCs (van de Wardt, 2014: 98). I argue that it is more interesting to see how these politically inexperienced but verbally committed parties perform, rather than the established mainstream parties, which naturally also campaign on anti-corruption from time to time, but which have their main focus elsewhere.

An Anti-Corruption Party is defined as one that focus on fighting corruption in the election campaign, either by addressing the issue in general terms, i.e. that corruption is a serious problem that needs to be combated, or more specifically by accusing the opponents, i.e. the established parties for being corrupt. That does not mean, however, that these parties did not bring up other issues as well, only that anti-corruption was a prevalent feature of their campaigns. But it does imply that not all of them are to be considered as niche parties as anti-corruption was one of many issues raised in the campaigns.

Politicizing political corruption is assumingly a delicate matter, as it clearly signals to the voters that there are politicians that not only cannot be trusted, but who are in fact criminals. It gives the voters the impression – right or wrong - that politicians need tight monitoring to behave as we expect them to do. This is the main reason why this particular issue is different from other proposals put forward in the political debate. One would therefore assume that a party that accuses other parties or politicians, or the whole system, of being corrupt should find it hard to find acceptable cooperation partners and thus runs the risk of being left out of government coalitions.

That risk becomes smaller the bigger the ACPs get however. As will be shown below, new ACPs have been successful in most of the post-communist region, with parliamentary representation in nine of the eleven new EU-members (Romania and Croatia being the only exceptions) and governmental participation in eight (all the rest except Hungary), whereas they have been more or less absent in Western Europe,[29] where party politicization of corruption is much less common, due to generally lower levels of corruption (Bågenholm & Charron, 2014).

[29] The Five Star Movement which won more than 25 per cent of the votes in the Italian elections in 2013 is the main exception to this. Apart from them, only four new parties in Western Europe have used anti-corruption rhetoric since the late 1970s, namely Democratic Renewal Party in Portugal in 1985, Political Spring in Greece in 1993, BZÖ in Austria in 2006 and Citizens' Movement in Iceland in 2009 (see Bågenholm, 2010). None of the five abovementioned parties became part of the government and two of them went out of business within a decade after their formation. Thus, the phenomenon under study is primarily a Central and East European one, which can be attributed both to the newness of their party systems and to the generally higher levels of corruption.

Design, data and method

In this paper I analyze the performances of all new ACPs in the eleven EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe that have been successful enough to become part of the government up until 2014. A new party is defined as new if it is either "genuinely" new, i.e. having negligible previous organizational or personal ties to other parties (Sikk, 2011) or is a splinter, i.e. a break away from established ones. Mergers and electoral coalitions do not count as new, however.

As mentioned above, an anti-corruption party is one which focuses on anti-corruption in the election campaign, either in general terms or by accusing the opponents for being corrupt. The coding of the usage of anti-corruption rhetoric is based mainly on the election report section in Electoral Studies, West European Politics and European Journal of Political Research (for more details see Bågenholm, 2009).

As mentioned above, incumbency is considered a prerequisite for effectively influencing anti-corruption legislation and fight corruption. In seven of the countries new ACPs have spent a sufficient amount of time in government to make an analysis of their performance relevant, namely Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic. In Romania and Croatia, new ACPs have as yet not even won parliamentary representation and in Hungary, the only such party to win parliamentary representation was not included in the government in 2010. In Slovenia the Civic List received 8,4 percent of the votes in 2011, but the government fell after one year, which makes their time in office too short to analyze. The success of the abovementioned Modern Centre Party in Slovenia in 2014 is finally too recent to evaluate, as the SMC led government took office only in mid-September that year. Twelve new ACP's have been included in governments after their first election and another one (Law and Justice, PiS, in Poland) made it in their second attempt. In the analysis I also discuss the policy impact of some major established incumbent parties that campaigned on anti-corruption. The Citizens' Platform in Poland and SMER in Slovakia are two such examples (see appendix).

To accurately assess the precise impact of one particular party on a broad policy area such as anti-corruption is very difficult, and even more so when it comes to comparing outcomes in several countries. The assessments on the performance of the governments come from the Freedom House publication Nation in Transit, which are expert assessments on Central and East European governments' anti-corruption reform measures in terms of adoption, implementation and perceived results, measured on a scale from 1 (low corruption) to 7 (high corruption). In addition to the score, the written reports have been used to add some more detailed information on the governments' anti-corruption efforts and how successful they were. Even though these measurements are a bit crude it still gives a clear indication whether the ACP's make a difference in terms of anti-corruption legislation or not.

In order to find out the policy impact on anti-corruption performance of ACPs, I compare periods when new ACP's have been in government with those when they have not, rather than comparing across countries. In the tables below I have marked periods where new ACPs have

had the main governmental position with red and periods when they have been junior coalition partners with blue (periods without ACPs in government are in black) in order to facilitate the interpretation. It should also be noted that this is still a preliminary study, which will be complemented with more detailed analyses on the more precise efforts of each party, but I would still argue that it gives a good indication on both the general performance patterns as well as for the specific ACPs.

Findings

Table 1 contains the most relevant information of all 13 new ACPs that have been part of the government since re-democratization in the early 1990s.[30] The success of new ACPs is a recent and region wide phenomenon as all cases occurred during the last 15 years in all countries bar Romania and Croatia.[31] What is also astonishing is the magnitude of their vote shares, which in quite a few cases are above 20 percent, something that only Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement in Italy can match in Western Europe. Four of the parties also obtained the position of prime minister and thus the leading role in the government. The difference in comparison with the other two types of niche parties, i.e. greens and radical right parties, could not be greater.

Most parties seemed to lose their attraction over time, however, and only four of the parties managed to remain in office after their second election. The only parties with long term incumbencies are New Era (Latvia) and Res Publica (Estonia), but they both did so, however, by merging and going into an electoral alliances with other parties. It should also be noted that all parties except for Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, dropped their strong emphasis on anti-corruption in the second election, thereby making them much less different from the other established ones and in most cases not even ACPs, let alone niche parties any longer.[32] That only shows that the issue of anti-corruption is different from other issues in the sense that it is difficult to repeatedly use that strategy and especially so if the party has been incumbent, as the image of a credible and effective corruption fighter quickly vanishes if people do not perceive that any improvements have occurred. Finally, all parties but the Resurrection Party in Lithuania were in control of several important ministries and should thus be expected to have adequate resources to pursue their anti-corruption projects, if they wished to do so.

Table 1. New anti-corruption parties in government

		% of votes	

[30] In the appendix a table of all ACPs both new and old, incumbent and in opposition can be found.

[31] Considering the fact that Romania not only is the poorest of the ten, but also until recently considered being the most corrupt, this finding is somewhat surprising.

[32] If anti-corruption rhetoric is only used in one-off elections, one could naturally question to what extent these parties actually should be labeled as niche-parties. In contrast, neither the green nor the radical right parties have abandoned their niches, even though most of them have broadened their political program to other policy areas as well (Miller & Meyer, 2011: 7). If this pattern is to be repeated also by the most recent new ACPs**,** it seems reasonable to consider the issue of anti-corruption to be different from all other issues, as it only can be used successfully once and preferably by a new party.

Party	Years in office	(election year)	Status in government
National Movement Simon II, NDSV (Bulgaria)	2001-2005	42,1 (2001)	Main partner in two party majority coalition
National Movement Simon II, NDSV (Bulgaria)	2005-2009	19,9 (2005)	Junior partner in three party majority coalition
Alliance of a New Citizen, ANO (Slovakia)	2002-2006	8,0 (2002)	Junior partner in four party majority coalition. (Minority coalition after 2004).
Law and Justice, PiS (Poland)	2005-2007	27,0 (2005)	One party minority government. (From June 2006, three party majority coalition)
New Era, JL (Latvia)	2002-2004	23,9 (2002)	Main partner in four party majority coalition. (Resigned in February 2004)
New Era, JL (Latvia)	2004-2006	23,9 (2002)	Main partner in four party majority coalition (From December 2004. Resigned again April 2006
New Era, JL (Latvia)	2009-2010	16,4 (2006)	Main partner in five party majority coalition (From March 2009)
New Era, JL (Latvia)*	2010-2011	31,2 (2010)	Main partner in five party majority coalition
Unity, V (Latvia)	2011-2014	18,8 (2011)	Main partner in three party majority coalition
Zatler's Reform Party, ZRP(Latvia)	2011-2014	20,8 (2011)	Junior partner in three party coalition
Unity, V (Latvia)****	2014-	21,9 (2014)	Main partner in three party coalition
Res Publica (Estonia)	2003-2005	24,6 (2003)	Main partner in three party majority coalition. (Resigned in March 2005)
Res Publica** (Estonia)	2007-2011	17,9 (2003)	Partner in three party majority coalition. (Minority coalition from April 2009)
Fatherland and Res Publica Union, IRL (Estonia)	2011-2014	20,5 (2011)	Junior partner in two party majority coalition
Labour Party, DP (Lithuania)	2004-2006	28,4 (2004)	Main partner in four party majority coalition. (Resigned in mid 2006)
Labour Party, DP (Lithuania)	2012-	19,8 (2012)	Junior partner in four party majority coalition
National Resurrection Party, TPP (Lithuania)	2008-2012	15,1 (2008)	Junior in four majority party coalition
Citizens for European Development, GERB (Bulgaria)	2009-2013	39,7 (2009)	Single party minority government
Citizens for European Development, GERB (Bulgaria)	2014-	32,7	Main partner in a three party coalition

TOP 09 (Czech Republic)	2010-2013	16,7 (2010)	Junior partner in three party majority coalition
Public Affairs, VV (Czech Republic)	2010-2012***	10,9 (2010)	Junior partner in three party majority coalition
Freedom and Solidarity, SAS (Slovakia)	2010-2012	12,1 (2010)	Junior partner in four party majority coalition
YES, ANO (Czech Republic)	2013-	18,7 (2013)	Junior partner in three party majority coalition

*New Era contested the 2010 election together with three other parties. The number of seats refers to New Era only.

** Res Publica merged with Pro Patria before the 2007 elections.

***Left the government in 2012 after a corruption scandal.

****Includes also ZRP, which merged with Unity before the election.

Comment: The table includes all parties that entered government after using anti-corruption rhetoric in their first election campaign. The parties that did not repeat their anti-corruption rhetoric in the second and third elections (NDSV, New Era, Res Publica, GERB and Labour Party) are still included.

Source: Political Yearbooks, European Journal of Political Research.

The performances of Anti-Corruption Parties in government

Bulgaria

Bulgaria is evidently fertile soil for ACPs. The two most successful ACPs ever (and new parties in general) are Bulgarian and they have been in office since 2001. During eight of those years they have been the main or only incumbent party. In 2001, the former king Simeon Sakskoburggotski's newly founded NDSV, won a hefty 42,7 percent of the votes and controlled all relevant ministries in the coalition with the small Turkish minority party. In 2005 NDSV lost more than half of its vote share, but continued as junior partner in a socialist-led coalition and in 2009 it failed to pass the 4 percent threshold. In that election another ACP emerged, however; Citizens for European Development (GERB) created and led by a former bodyguard to abovementioned Simeon, Boyko Borisov. It won close to 40 percent and was able to form a one party minority government, which lasted for almost the whole election period. In March 2013 it resigned and went into opposition, a position it retained after the 2013 elections, in which it dropped to just above 30 percent. After another early election in the fall of 2014, GERB and Borisov returned to power winning 32,7 per cent of the votes. Thus for most of the period, there has been an ACP in government and for eight years with a presumed capacity to impact anti-corruption legislation and thus reduce the level of corruption.

Form the NiT score in Figure 1 it seems that NDSV was quite successful in implementing effective anti-corruption reforms, as the scores improve continuously from 2000 to 2007.

From the reports, it is also evident that the NDSV led government made significant anti-corruption efforts, implementing several important measures each year, such as the establishment of an Anti-corruption Commission for the coordination of anti-corruption efforts and the adoption of a National Strategy and Implementation Plan for fighting corruption in 2001 and 2002 respectively and the appointment of a National ombudsman in 2005. However, it is continuously pointed out that corruption and above all organized crime, is still a big problem and that implementation of legislation is not satisfactory, resulting in few prosecutions and even fewer convictions. The effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures was put into question in 2008, when major corruption scandals were revealed, that showed that the problem had become (or was) much more prevalent and which resulted in a lower score.

The GERB single minority government, taking office in 2009, did in contrast not managed to reduce the level of corruption, even though a number of initiatives were introduced, some of which had the intended effect, but most, only marginally so. The most serious critique in the reports is the lack of coordination and common goals between the different anti-corruption agencies, which made most efforts ineffective. There were also indications in the reports of corrupt dealings within the government and when GERB left office in 2013 it was again stated that "graft is still widespread […] organized crime remains powerful, and political appointment processes are largely nontransparent", with a still high number of acquittals in anti-corruption court cases. In sum, even though not a complete failure in terms of fighting corruption, the GERB government was evidently not as effective or perhaps competent as the NDSV, during their first years in office.

All in all, it seems reasonable to consider the early anti-corruption efforts taken by NDSV to be rather strong, even though the low starting points should be taken into consideration. When the influence of NDSV decreased after 2005 the level of corruption continued downwards for two more years, but then bounced back up again. The GERB led governments have been unable to improve the scores. The latest report gives a bleak picture of the situation: "Despite repeated promises by successive governments to eradicate corruption, graft is still widespread in Bulgaria, organized crime remains powerful, and political appointment processes are largely nontransparent. An overlap between politics and monopolistic businesses remained evident throughout 2014". Whether the new GERB government will be more successful than the previous ones remains to be seen.

Figure 1. Anti-corruption performance in Bulgaria 1999-2014



Comment: The Nation in Transit corruption score ranges between 1 (little or no corruption) and 7 (high corruption). The red lines indicate that an ACP had main governmental position, the blue that it had a junior position and the black that no ACP was in government. The dashed green line indicate shared responsibility for the score of that year.

Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on Bulgaria 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Latvia

In Latvia, ACP's have also been very successful and more persistently so than in Bulgaria. In 2002, New Era (JL), led by former head of the Central Bank, Einars Repse, won the parliamentary election with almost 24 per cent of the votes, after a campaign focused on anti-corruption, honesty and competence. After only 16 months JL left the government, only to return a few months later, but this time not as the leading party. In April 2006, before the term was up, JL again left the government and it was also left out at first after the 2006 elections, in which it received 16 per cent. In the midst of the financial crises in 2009 it was brought back however, and it remained in office until 2014, as the leading party, in different coalition constellations. In 2010 JL campaigned in an alliance with two smaller parties, together winning 31 per cent and in the early elections in 2011 they dropped to 19 per cent.[33] After the 2011 election Unity formed a coalition with another new ACP, Zatler's Reform Party (ZRP), which was led by the former president and which got almost 21 per cent of the votes. Before the 2014 elections, ZRS merged with Unity, which won almost 22 per cent of the votes and headed a three party coalition. The conditions for fighting corruption have thus been good in Latvia for most of the time since 2002 and especially so after the 2011 elections, when the government is dominated by two ACP's.

[33] This alliance was later established as a new party named Unity.

From the reports it is obvious that New Era made a jump start in the fight against corruption, after the 2002 elections, with the establishment of the Anti-corruption Bureau (KNAB) as one of the most important measures. The high ambitions of the new governments are lauded even though KNAB at first was criticized for not being properly organized. From 2005 on, the body was however praised for its efficiency and not least for its determination to investigate the big fish, which rarely had occurred before. Several measures to curb corruption were initiated, which resulted in continuously improved scores between 2002 and 2006, i.e. during the JL's first stints in government. Thereafter the score declined, also in 2010, when JL was back in office, which was due to the new KNAB director, appointed by the previous government and whose loyalties were said to lay with the countries oligarchs, leading to great internal conflicts. After the 2011 election the reform ambitions were resumed, however, and the new government was consistently praised for their initiatives and the progress made and the scores significantly improved. The KNAB director was replaced and a number of criminal proceedings took place, which eventually resulted in several convictions of leading politicians and so called oligarchs, whose influence was curbed by these actions. These revelations show, however, that corruption is still a big problem, but also that it is very risky to engage in such activities, as the number of convictions show. In 2014, the governments' efforts to build a strong legal anti-corruption framework, were rewarded by letting Latvia join the Anti-bribery Convention of the OECD.

Judging from the scores, it seems safe to say that New Era has made a highly positive anti-corruption mark in terms of both legislation, implementation and institution building, leading to improved scores during their terms in office and worse results during its time outside government. Thus, in Latvia ACP's seem to have been both effective and persistent.

Figure 2. Anti-corruption performance in Latvia 1999-2014



Comment: The Nation in Transit corruption score ranges between 1 (little or no corruption) and 7 (high corruption). The red lines indicate that an ACP had main governmental position, the blue that it had a junior position and the black that no ACP was in government.

Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on Latvia 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Slovakia

In contrast to the previous cases, Slovakia never had a big and dominant ACP. The Alliance of a New Citizen (ANO) won eight per cent of the votes in 2002 and its leader, Pavol Rusko, took up the position as Minster of Economy. Several relevant anti-corruption measures were adopted up until 2005, which resulted in slightly improved scores. In 2005 two high level corruption scandals were revealed, one in which Rusko was implicated and which forced him to resign. Even though the scandal hurt ANO's image as an ACP and led to its mere extinction in the next elections, the government continued its anti-corruption policies with some success. In the 2006 elections, SMER which had campaigned on anti-corruption 2002, but not in 2006, won. The reports are very critical towards the government's neglect of seriously fighting corruption. The ambitions were very low and accordingly neither new legislation nor an anti-corruption plan was adopted. The score accordingly worsened quite drastically in 2009.

In 2010 a new ACP, Freedom and Solidarity (SAS) became part of a new government, led by the Christian Democrats, after winning 12 per cent of the votes. The new government had a strong mandate to curb corruption and it immediately started to tackle these issues by declaring zero tolerance for corruption and making it a top priority. Laws on greater

transparency and freedom of information were adopted during 2011 and an ambitious Strategic Plan, scheduled for 2012 was approved. In October the government fell, due to internal disputes over EU matters, and in the new election in 2012, SMER triumphed once again. The efforts to curb corruption halted and the proposed legislation was criticized for rather increasing the opportunities for corruption, for example in public procurement and corruption scandals involving SMER were reported.

From the report it seems that ACP's, however relatively small, have matched their election rhetoric with concrete actions, even though the score has not improved accordingly. To what extent ANO should be credited for any improvements is also unclear. During the periods without any ACP's in government the scores have declined due to lack of both ambitions and progress.

Figure 3. Anti-corruption performance in Slovakia 1999-2014



Comment: The Nation in Transit corruption score ranges between 1 (little or no corruption) and 7 (high corruption). The red lines indicate that an ACP had main governmental position, the blue that it had a junior position and the black that no ACP was in government. The dashed green line indicates shared responsibility for the score that year.

Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on Slovakia 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Estonia

The Estonian case is quite similar to the Latvian one, in the sense that one big and persistent ACP has dominated the political life during the last decade. In 2003 Res Publica won the elections and a former state auditor became Prime Minister. Two years later Res Publica left the government and stayed in opposition until the next election in 2007, in which it won almost 18 per cent of the votes, after merging with the right wing Pro Patria, forming

Fatherland and Res Publica Union (IRL). The leader of the largest coalition partner, the Reform Party (RE), became prime minister. In 2011 IRL won 20,5 per cent and the coalition with RE continued until 2014, when IRL left the government.

Estonia is the least corrupt country in Central Europe, but the fact that Res Publica won the 2003 elections on an anti-corruption platform yet reveals that people thought that more could be done. In the report the new government was praised for its anti-corruption initiatives. It is noticeable that the years outside government did not harm the level of corruption, which shows in the quite flat curve. Nevertheless Estonia has had its fair share of corruption scandals, some of which have involved Res Publica and the reports point to the lax laws on party financing as one of the biggest problems and the reluctance to go after one's own people. In 2013 a new Anti-Corruption Act, a revised Civil Service Act and a comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy, which aimed at alleviating the outstanding problems, came into force, but it was by that year's end too early to tell how efficient they were. It clearly shows however, that keeping the level of corruption down was still a priority, despite some setbacks with corruption revelations. In 2014 several corruption scandals were revealed, involving high level politicians. A former minister was sentenced to six years in prison.

In conclusion, Res Publica has by and large been a successful and trustworthy corruption fighter, managing to attract a sufficiently large part of the voters in order to remain in office. It should be noted however, that also governments without Res Publica has been doing well in that respect.

Figure 4. Anti-corruption performance in Estonia 1999-2014



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Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on Estonia 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Lithuania

In Lithuania the breakthrough for new ACP's came in 2004, when the Labour Party (DP), led by multi-millionaire businessman Viktor Uspaskich, won 28 per cent of the votes. Despite being the largest party in parliament, a coalition partner took the position as prime minister and Uspaskic became Minister of Economy. Following a corruption scandal Uspaskich resigned already in June 2005 and the party left the coalition in 2006. In the 2008 elections DP dropped to nine per cent and was left outside the ruling coalition, but four years later it was once again the biggest party, winning close to 20 per cent of the votes and resumed its position in office, but again missing the position of prime minister. In 2008 the National Resurrection Party (TPP) led by a famous TV host won 15 per cent of the votes, but only got insignificant positions in the government. TPP merged with a center party in 2011, but did not manage to reenter parliament in 2012. Considering the short spells in power for DP and its involvement in scandals, one would expect the ACP's influence to be rather limited in Lithuania.

As Lithuania became a member of the EU, most of the anti-corruption legislative framework was already in place by 2004, but implementation lagged. Despite critical remarks from the European Commission, the score nevertheless improved due to new legislative initiatives. A number of high profiled corruption scandals emerged in 2004 and 2005, however, which demonstrated the shortcomings of the reforms and that much work remained. The score accordingly declined, reaching its worst levels ever in 2005 and 2006. During the right-wing government (2008-2012) the situation improved, but still on a relatively bad level. New anti-corruption plans were adopted, but implementation was scheduled until after the next elections, which made them difficult to evaluate and the reports did not find any real progress, despite promises to prioritize that issue. From the reports it is not possible to assess the TPP's influence over anti-corruption policies, but considering their portfolios, it was assumingly limited. The new government, which came into office late in 2012 made some progress on the reforms, but DP once again found itself involved in corruption scandals, which led to a four year prison sentence against Victor Uspaskich. Also local politicians were arrested as were a large number of officials working for the customs authorities. Even though the corruption level is considered to have decreased during the last couple of years, there are still several areas that are causes for concerns, such as the public procurement and in the health care sector. During 2014 several corruption investigations were launched against high ranking politicians, which indicates that the government is taking the problem of corruption seriously.

In sum, the overall Lithuanian anti-corruption efforts have been sluggish, and the progress made can hardly be credited to DP, whose leading representatives continuously were exposed being involved in shady dealings. DP has thus been a failure in these respects.

Figure 5. Anti-corruption performance in Lithuania 1999-2014



Comment: The Nation in Transit corruption score ranges between 1 (little or no corruption) and 7 (high corruption). The red lines indicate that an ACP had main governmental position, the blue that it had a junior position and the black that no ACP was in government.

Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on Lithuania 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Poland

In contrast to the other countries in the region, Poland saw a steady rise in the level of corruption, peaking in 2005, which was also the year when the first ACP made it into the government. Law and Justice (PiS) won parliamentary representation in their first election in 2001 on an anti-corruption agenda, winning 9,5 per cent, but was left outside the left of centre government. From the scores below, it is obvious that the left wing government's term in office (2001-05) was a huge failure in terms of fighting corruption as it was plagued by several corruption scandals in combination with inefficient legislation and poor implementation. It was perhaps not a big surprise then that PiS repeated its anti-corruption rhetoric and that it was much more successful, actually winning the 2005 elections with 27 per cent of the votes.

In 2005, as one of their first measures, the new PiS led coalition set up the Central Anti-corruption Agency and during the following year a number of legislative measures aimed at combatting corruption were adopted. Even though the implementation record did not fully match the intentions, it still shows that the PiS prioritized anti-corruption to a much higher extent than their predecessors. Thus, it seems that also the PiS was relatively successful in tackling corruption, even though the improvements continued also during the following government, which took office after the early election in 2007. Despite increasing its vote

share to 32 per cent, PiS still lost the election to its liberal rivals, the Civic Platform (PO). The same happened in 2011 elections, in which PiS dropped slightly to just under 30 per cent.

The assessment of the accomplishments of the PO led government, which had also campaigned on anti-corruption, is as shown positive. In the NiT reports not much progress is noted during these years, however. The relatively well functioning anti-corruption framework could not prevent a number of corruption scandals to erupt and the government was criticized for taking partisan stands in these matters. According to the reports, it seems that the quite brief positive period in Poland coincides with the ACP in power and the main efforts are also credited to PiS. This again shows that there are good reasons for people to take these new ACP's seriously, at least when it comes to fighting corruption.

Figure 6. Anti-corruption performance in Poland 1999-2014



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Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on Poland 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

The Czech Republic

The NiT scores in the Czech Republic have been relatively stable during the past 15 years. It was not until the 2010 elections that new ACP's were sufficiently successful to make it into the government, following a few years, during which very limited anti-corruption efforts were made. Instead the ODS led government (2006-2009), allowed business interests to increase

their role in the policy process and also the following expert government (2009-10) failed to deliver on these urgent matters and set the stage for the subsequent emergence and success of two new ACP's, TOP09 and Public Affairs (VV) winning 16,7 and 10,9 per cent respectively in 2010. They both entered a three party coalition together with the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), with an explicit focus to fight corruption.

After a slow start the new government picked up speed from the end of 2011 and adopted a number of anti-corruption measures. The anti-corruption legislation was drafted in cooperation with NGOs and was mainly praised by anti-corruption experts. In that respect the ACP's seemed to have had a positive impact, even though the scores remained unchanged during these years. However, several corruption scandals erupted at the same time, one of which involved the VV leadership and the defense minister and VV leader had to resign. Disgruntled VV MPs left the party and established LIDEM, which replaced VV in the government in 2012. Things got worse during 2013, when also ODS was implicated in corruption scandals and the government eventually resigned and new elections were called. As a consequence, several anti-corruption proposals were never adopted, although the new government, which incidentally also included a new ACP (ANO 2011 winning 18,7 per cent), promised to continue their predecessors work.

The picture is thus mixed when it comes to fighting corruption in the Czech Republic. On the one hand, there seems to be a genuine ambition and serious efforts to curb corruption and several very important pieces of legislation were adopted, but at the same time were high level politicians in the government and even in the leadership of one of the ACP's, involved in corrupt dealings. TOP09's reputation seems to have been less damaged, though and their role in anti-corruption efforts is explicitly mentioned in the reports. However, it is evident from the declining trend that not even TOP09 managed to improve the situation during their stint in power. In the 2013 elections TOP09 got 12 per cent of the votes, whereas neither VV nor LIDEM participated. The assessment for 2014 was quite negative, with only modest results, despite giving high priority to anti-corruption reforms. There were also indications that the civil service and state agencies became more politicized in the sense that several appointments were connected to ANO 2011 leader, multi-millionaire businessman Andrej Babiš's, enterprise. It is still a bit early though to evaluate ANO 2011's anti-corruption performance.

Figure 7. Anti-corruption performance in the Czech Republic 1999-2014



Comment: The Nation in Transit corruption score ranges between 1 (little or no corruption) and 7 (high corruption). The red lines indicate that an ACP had main governmental position, the blue that it had a junior position and the black that no ACP was in government.

Source: Nation in Transit, country reports on the Czech Republic 2000-2015 (www.freedomhouse.org).

Conclusions

The performances of new ACP's have been mixed, but mainly to the positive. There are some examples, where ACP's have been exposed to corrupt dealings, but there is also ample evidence of substantial progress in terms of anti-corruption reforms, resulting in improved scores, which was mainly attributed to the measures taken by the governments. That is in sharp contrast to several non-ACP governments which have either not made this a priority or failed to deliver. It is not easy to find a clear curt pattern explaining the outcomes. Among those ACP's that may be considered as niche parties, in the sense that they overwhelmingly focused on corruption, Res Publica, New Era, Zatler's Reform Party and to some extent NDSV are positive examples, whereas GERB, Public Affairs and ANO have disappointed. Also among the new ACP's that had a broader focus in their campaign, the outcome differs. Labour Party and SMER are two negative examples and Law and Justice a positive one. Also in terms of party strength and influence the outcome diverges, with small scale successes and failures such as Freedom and Solidarity and Public Affairs respectively. But the main finding is still that voters have good reasons to trust that new ACP's will perform better or as good (or bad) as the established parties and that they on a general level definitely not should be dismissed as simple and unserious populists who cynically exploit frustrated people.

As mentioned above it is naturally difficult to draw firm conclusions on the exact impact of ACPs and in particular in relation to other parties' influence. During the period under study, the European Union also put a substantial pressure on the applicant states to comply with the accession criteria, among which was the fight against corruption. Since the incumbency of most ACPs coincided with the final phase of the accession negotiations, it may very well be the case that any incumbent party would have been as successful. What speaks against that theory is the fact that the corruption situation actually got worse in several countries, such as Hungary and Poland (see appendix for Hungary). As shown in Figure 8 four out of ten countries have actually worsened their scores during the 15 year period between 1999 and 2014, whereas five have improved theirs and one stayed the same. With one or two exceptions, however, the changes have not been very dramatic, which means that most of the countries are still considered to have substantial problems with corruption. But it nevertheless seems that some of the ACPs made a difference, despite their complete lack of previous political experience.

Figure 8. Anti-corruption performances compared 1999 vs 2014



What is striking, however, is that only one of the parties repeated its anti-corruption strategy in the second election, which implies that the issue of corruption is difficult to exploit twice and in particular so if parties have been incumbent. Whatever the sustainability of the parties' anti-corruption strategies, I still think it is valid to speak of some of them in terms of niche parties, even if it is only in one election. Newly established parties tend to fill the vacuum, when the anti-corruption parties abandon their strategies and there are several cases that within a short while can be evaluated. The fact that ACPs change their focus does not necessarily mean that they abandon their anti-corruption ambitions, as has been obvious in the case of New Era and Res Publica.

Corruption is considered to be one of the most, if not the most important issue among the Central and Eastern European electorates. Corruption is moreover a wide spread phenomenon in all those countries, which makes the expectations on parties promising to eradicate

corruption extremely high. To root out corruption is unfortunately extremely difficult and there is no standard manual to consult. All this implies that ACPs are extremely vulnerable and naturally even more so if they have been given the chance in government, a position rarely obtained by green and anti-immigration parties. As the problem of corruption will still persist, the guess is that new waves of new ACPs will follow, rather than the resurrection of the old ones.

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Party	First election				Second election				Third election				Fourth election			
	Year	**%**	**Seats**	**Gov.**	**Year**	**%**	**Seats**	**Gov.**	**Year**	**%**	**Seats**	**Gov.**	**Year**	**%**	**Seats**	**Gov.**
Freedom Union (Czech Republic)	1998	8,6	19	No	2002	4,5*	9	Yes	2006	0,3	0	No	-	-	-	-
National Movement Simeon II (Bulgaria)	2001	42,7	120	YES	2005	19,9	53	Yes	2009	3,0	0	No	-	-	-	-
Law and Justice (Poland)	2001	9,5	44	No	2005	27,0	155	YES	2007	32,1	166	No	2011	29,9	157	No
New Era (Latvia)	2002	23,9	26	YES	2006	16,4	18	YES	2010	31,2**	12	YES	2011	18,8	20	YES
Alliance of a New Citizen (Slovakia)	2002	8,0	15	Yes	2006	1,4	0	No	2010	-	-	-	-	_	-	-
Direction (SMER) (Slovakia)	2002	13,5	25	No	2006	29,1	50	YES	2010	34,8	62	No	2012	44,4	83	YES
Res Publica (Estonia)	2003	24,6	28	YES	2007	17,9	19***	Yes	2011	20,5	23	Yes				
Labour Party (Lithuania)	2004	28,4	39	Yes	2008	9,0	10	No	2012	19,8	29	Yes				
Liberal Democratic Party (Lithuania)	2004	11,4	10	No	2008	12,7	15	No	2012	7,3	11	Yes				
Peasants' and New Democratic Party Union (Lithuania)	2004	6,	10	No	2008	3,7	3	No	2012	3,9	1	No				
National Resurrection Party (Lithuania)	2008	15,1	16	Yes	2012	-	-	-								
Citizens for European Development (Bulgaria)	2009	39,7	116	YES	2013	30,5	97	No	2014	32,7	84	YES				
Order, Lawfulness, Justice (Bulgaria)	2009	4,1	10	No	2013	1,7	0	No								

TOP 09 (Czech Republic.)	2010	16,7	41	Yes	2013	12,0	26	no					
Public Affairs (Czech Republic.)	2010	10,9	24	Yes	2013	-	-	-					
Politics Can Be Different (Hungary)	2010	7,5	16	No	2014	5,4	5	No					
Freedom and Solidarity (Slovakia)	2010	12,1	22	Yes	2012	5,9	11	No					
Reform Party (Latvia)	2011	20,8	22	Yes	****								
Civic List (Slovenia)	2011	8,4	8	Yes	2014	0,6	0	no					
Ordinary People (Slovakia)	2012	8,6	16	No									
ANO 2013	2013	18,7	47	Yes									
Unity (V) (Latvia)*****	2014	21,9	23	YES									
Modern Centre Party (SMC) (Slovenia)	2014	34,5	36	YES									

*The figure is the share of seats for the party, which contested the election in a coalition with three other parties.

** New Era contested the 2010 election together with three other parties. The number of seats refers to New Era only.

*** ResP merged with Pro Patria before the 2006 parliamentary election forming the Fatherland and Res Publica Union (IRL).

****The Reform Party merged with Unity and was dissolved in 2015.

*****Includes both New Era and Reform Party.

Comment: The parties included in the table are those who used anti-corruption rhetoric in their first contested election. Law and Justice is the only party which repeated that strategy in subsequent elections. Capital letters in the "Gov." column indicate that the party took the position as prime minister. Parties in bold are considered as niche parties.

Source: Bågenholm, 2009 & 2010; Political Yearbooks, European Journal of Political Research; Woldendorp et al, 1998; Müller-Rommel et all, 2004; www.parties-and-elections.eu

Anti-corruption performance in Romania



Anti-corruption performance in Slovenia



Anti-corruption performance in Hungary



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Abstract

In this paper, we highlight two unexplored trends in European electoral politics. One, using newly collected data by the authors, we track the politicization of corruption in electoral campaigns from 1981 to 2011, an electoral strategy which has been increasing over time in most European countries. Two, we then empirically test two aspects of this campaign strategy. First, what are the factors that are systematically associated with a party's decision to politicize corruption? Second, what are the electoral effects in terms of relative vote share for parties that politicize corruption? Using and original dataset that employs multilevel (parties nested in countries) the results demonstrate that one, that politicization of corruption occurs systematically more often by established parties from the main opposition along with new parties, and parties on the political right, and occurs as a function of country level corruption, several electoral institutions, such as district magnitude and public party financing. Two, main opposition and new parties that use such a campaign strategy make significant electoral gains relative to the previous election, yet gains are off-set in low-corrupt countries.

Introduction

In the parliamentary election in Bulgaria in 2001, NDSV, a party set up by the former Bulgarian king Simeon Sakskoburgotski just a few months earlier, won an astonishing victory, capturing 42,7 percent of the votes and 50 percent of the seats on the promise to fight corruption and establish a clean and competent administration. This extraordinary performance of a new party is however only the most spectacular of a number of similar successes that new parties campaigning on the issue of corruption have achieved during the 21st century, of which New Era and Zatlers' Reform Party in Latvia in 2002 and 2011 respectively, Res Publica in Estonia 2003, Labour Party in Lithuania 2004 and GERB in Bulgaria in 2009 are the most prominent. In all but one of these cases, the new parties either won the elections or managed to secure the positions of Prime Minister. In comparison to other types of parties focusing on single issues, these are exceptional achievements (Bågenholm, 2013). These events are arguably indications of changes taking place in party politics in at least the newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, in the sense that there seems to be a lot to be gained by exploiting a new niche or single issue that other parties apparently have either neglected or failed to handle in a satisfactory manner; namely *by politicizing corruption as a campaign issue*. But first, how often is corruption actually a salient issue in the election campaigns and which parties are campaigning on the promise to fight corruption and under what conditions is it employed? Second, and perhaps more interesting, under what conditions are these parties most successful? In this paper we seek to examine this so far under-researched area by addressing these two research questions; namely the extent and effects of parties politicizing corruption in election campaigns in Europe during the past three decades.

Corruption has recently become a central concept in both academic and policy circles and is therefore a salient concern in many European democracies today. This issue has implications for democracy-building and legitimacy among voters who place importance around this question via their vote. Just as environmental-green parties were a response to voters' concerns about issues such as nuclear power or climate change for example, one might look at anti-corruption politics as a response to voters concerned about the level of political corruption in their countries.[34]

Understanding the politics of corruption in electoral campaigns is admittedly complex, and to this point, has been studied primarily in particular country cases (for example, Della Porta and Vannucci 2007 in Italy; De Sousa 2001 in Portugal; Spendzharova and Vachudova 2012 in Bulgaria and Romania). In this analysis, we make two significant contributions to the literature on political parties in Europe. First, we attempt to make a more systematic analysis

[34] Some of the parties, especially the new ones, that politicize corruption have been argued to be considered as a new type of niche parties on par with Green or Radical right parties (see Bågenholm, 2013; for definition of nice parties see Miller and Meyer, 2011 and Wagner, 2012). In this paper we do not distinguish between Anti-Corruption niche parties per se and other parties that politicize corruption, however, as the exact boundary between the two categories is difficult to draw. We do distinguish between a number of other party characteristics however, such as incumbency, newness and left-right position.

in comparison to previous literature, and present several results from an original dataset for 32 European countries and over 220 elections from 1981 to the present. We show that although the politicization of corruption is a relatively new phenomenon, it has become increasingly frequent during the past 20 years, most commonly in the post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Bågenholm, 2009). When looking at the electoral outcomes of parties that have chosen this strategy, one observes wide variation. For example, parties politicizing corruption are now the electorally most successful new parties ever in post-war Europe, with two aforementioned extreme Bulgarian cases – National Movement for Simeon II in 2001 and Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria in 2009, winning 42.7 and 39.7 percent of the votes respectively – topping the list (See Bågenholm & Johansson Heinö, 2010).

Second, we perform two modest statistical analyses with the use of the newly collected data. First, using multi-level data at the party and country level, we elucidate several systematic factors that are associated with a party's choice to politicize corruption. In sum, at the country level, parties that politicize corruption are most likely to be found – albeit not exclusively – in the newer democracies of Europe that have higher levels of perceived corruption and more inclusive electoral institutions. On the party level, new parties campaigning in their first election and the main opposition party to the government along are the most likely to politicize corruption, with the party holding the Prime Minister post least likely to do so. In addition, we find that parties on the political right are on average more prone to using this tactic as compared with center or left parties. Second, in terms of the electoral effects of politicizing corruption, we find that even when controlling for a country's level of corruption, unemployment, inflation, electoral institutions and history with democracy, when this tactic is used by new parties or parties in the main opposition, it leads to greater vote share as compared with the previous election. However, interestingly, politicizing corruption does not favor the left, right or center parties in any systematic way in terms of vote share relative to the previous election. In the final section, we offer a brief discussion of the implications of this research for future scholarship.

The issue of anti-corruption

In a representative democracy, the political parties play a pivotal role in terms of identifying and acting on societal problems of different kinds. Parties are hence supposed to respond to the concerns and demands of the voters (Pennings, 1998: 393). Naturally they do so in different ways depending on the issue at hand and on their ideological positions (Ibid.: XX). However, some issues are more sensitive than others, for example immigration, which sometimes make parties opt for a more passive role or even ignoring them altogether, simply because they do not think they have much to win by politicising them (Meguid, 2008: 28). Thus, parties make strategic calculations about if and how they should respond to societal problems and voter concerns and demands.

There is little doubt that corruption is a sufficiently important problem and of sufficiently great concern for the voters in most countries, that the political parties could afford not to address the issue publically (See Special Eurobarometer 2011: 12). On the contrary one

would expect all parties with parliamentary ambitions to have a pronounced opinion on how to fight corruption. The issue of corruption is a very delicate one, however, and especially so when it comes to political corruption, i.e. when politicians are directly involved. First, for this tactic to be effective, it must be delivered by a credible messenger. It is presumably rather difficult to convince the electorate that a party which has been deeply involved in corruption scandals is the most trustworthy when it comes to fight corruption, and thus will be likely very seldom employed by sitting government parties, in particular those holding the post of Prime Minister. Previous policy failures will of course damage a party's trustworthiness regardless of the policy area, but there is assumingly a big difference between being ineffective in fighting unemployment and not being able to prevent corrupt behaviour among the party elite. The incentives for parties to politicize corruption should therefore vary, depending on the salience of the issue among the electorate and the parties' perceived trustworthiness (Meguid, 2008: 24-27). It would accordingly be more tempting to exploit the issue if one has a clean record – or even a new party altogether - and if the opponents are tainted by corruption scandals, but only if one thinks that the electorate would care about it. In a situation where all major parties are deeply corrupt and all benefit from the system while taking turns in office, the likelihood that anyone would challenge the current order by making a fuss about corruption is of course quite small.

A final aspect with bringing anti-corruption on the electoral agenda and even more so if it is done by accusing one's opponents of being corrupt, is the fact that corruption is often something illegal or at least morally very doubtful. Accusing opponents of having the wrong prescriptions to fight unemployment or being ineffective in fighting crime is a natural part of the political game, which necessarily does not rule out future cooperation. But accusing someone of being corrupt is another matter, as it in effect implies a public criminal charge, which should be much more difficult to overcome in the near future. Thus, as accusing other parties of being corrupt may result in isolation and lack of influence, parties will have to think twice before they unleash that particular strategy. Moreover, anti-corruption rhetoric may also back-fire in the sense that parties emphasising moral and honesty will be more strictly evaluated by the voters and in case they fail to improve the situation or, even worse, pick up the same corrupt behaviour once in office, the peoples' judgement will most likely be harsh. In short, there may be short term gains, but even more devastating long term losses by politicising corruption. By studying how this two edged issue is politicized we can gain new insights on how parties act strategically in different corruption contexts.

Key Concepts

Corruption can exist and even be rampant in a society, without being politicized. Moreover, even in societies where politics are perceived to be 'clean', parties can, and have, politicized this issue, and the tactic has been used by parties in countries like Finland, Iceland or Austria. Politicians may turn a blind eye to the problem, knowing that they all benefit from it or that they cannot do anything about it even if they tried. In order to speak of politicization, it is not enough that the problem is of main concern for the citizens and that the media reveals corruption scandals. The issue of corruption must also be brought up on the political agenda

by representatives from the political parties and the debate and the standpoints taken must moreover be brought to the knowledge of the voters. Politicization of corruption is thus at hand only when representatives from the political parties bring up the issue on the public agenda.

The politicization of corruption can be done in two different ways. Firstly it can be dealt with in general terms, which means that the parties raise the issue and suggest ways to come to terms with the problem, without making any references to the other parties or politicians. Secondly, corruption may be politicized in more specific terms, namely by accusing one's political adversaries of being corrupt; implicitly meaning that such behaviour would come to an end if the electorate votes for the party in question. In this paper we do not distinguish between the two types of politicization, however, which means that all forms of corruption rhetoric from parties in the election campaign are counted as politicization of the issue. Turning to the other main concept, there are many different aspects of corruption. The standard definition of corruption is "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International) and entails politics, business and everyday life.

In this study all references made to corruption are included. Anti-corruption rhetoric could naturally be about any type of corruption that is considered a problem in the society, whereas corruption allegation by definition is about the political aspects of it. Political corruption is at hand when politicians are taking advantage of their position in order to win financial favours, either personally, for friends and relatives or seeking advantages for the party they represent (Huberts, 1995: 10). Thus, political corruption implies that the people that are supposed to represent the interest of the citizens violate the mandate given to them by furthering their own narrow interests instead. Thus, political corruption is not only morally questionable, but in most cases outright criminal.

Parties Politicizing Corruption

As noted, the choice to politicize corruption can be costly, as the accused party might reciprocate in the subsequent election against the accuser or the simple fact that a party is discussing corruption might 'drag it down in the mud' in the eyes of the voters. We see moreover that even when corruption is rampant in a country, that many parties choose not to politicize the issue in an election campaign. However, systematic empirical studies of parties politicizing corruption to our knowledge have gone un-investigated in both the literature on political parties and corruption studies in general. In subsequent sections of this study, we intend to shed light on this new electoral strategy. Namely, we are interested in analyzing several related empirical trends surrounding the choice to politicize corruption. First, what are the factors that can explain the choice to politicize corruption during an election campaign? Second, does the choice to politicize corruption 'pay off' electorally in terms of comparative vote-share with the prior election? Thus we are interested in analyzing the choice to politicize corruption as both the dependent variable (first question) and independent variable (second question). In analyzing these questions we employ multi-level data using the party-election-year as the unit of analysis so as to elucidate both country-level (such as the rate of

unemployment) and party-specific (such as ideology, or if the party is in the opposition) factors.

Why do Parties Politicizing Corruption?

To our knowledge, there is little direct empirical literature from which to draw on the factors – either party-level or country-level characteristics – that lead to the strategy of politicizing corruption. We thus infer several factors from related literatures and introduce several of our own. On the first question, we are interested in understanding if, controlling for country-level factors, certain party-characteristics systematically explain why parties choose to politicize corruption. First, for this strategy to work, it must come from a credible source. If the voters are to 'bite' on this issue, it will most likely be aimed at political leaders in power during the current election cycle. We would therefore assume that parties outside of the government (e.g. PM party and also possibly coalition parties) would be more prone to employ this tactic. Thus parties in the opposition are hypothesized to be systematically more likely to politicize corruption than sitting parties in the government. Second, much like the campaign of Beppe Grillo's new 5-Stelle (five Star) party in the 2013 Italian election, the idea of campaigning as an 'outsider', fighting against the corrupt system with the intent of 'cleaning up politics', can be an attractive message. Moreover, as such parties have no reputation or governing record; their message might be more credible to the voters and picked up by the national media seeking stories about political scandals, giving their message more attention. Thus we would expect that new parties might be more prone to adopt politicization of corruption. Next, the ideology of a party might play a role. Right parties tend to run on more 'law and order'-type platforms than those on the left (Medinia-Ariza 2006) and since corruption is a matter of breaking the law, we might expect parties on the ideological right to be more likely to adopt this election strategy as compared with the left or center.

As regards to country-level factors, we would anticipate that the overall level of perceived country-corruption would affect the choice of a party to adopt this electoral strategy. Further, high corruption in a country creates a democratic demand within the electorate (much like high unemployment creates a demand for 'jobs plans') and we would expect parties to respond to this demand. In the context of Europe, we would thus expect that parties campaigning in countries with low corruption (e.g. Denmark, Sweden or Norway) to have much less politicization of this issue than countries with high corruption (e.g. Romania or Bulgaria). Next, we expect that the age of democracy will play a role for two reasons in the context of Europe. Long established democracies and stable party systems of the West will most likely have fewer parties politicizing corruption, as their systems are more stable (less volatile) on average than countries in the East and Central parts of Europe. Thus the age of democracy attempts to track the 'maturation' of the democratic system as well as track geographic differences across Europe, as Western Europe has a longer history than Mediterranean states like Spain, Portugal and Greece, which in turn have a longer history with democracy than the post-socialist states. As other macro-economic factors increase, such as unemployment or inflation, this might create incentives for parties to politicize corruption as corruption as an issue could be linked together with economic mismanagement.

What do Parties Get out of Politicizing Corruption?

Simply put, we are also interested in elucidating the electoral effects of parties who have politicized corruption – whether in terms of vote-share gains of losses controlling for structural factors at the country-level. In this sense, we run a parsimonious model of voting, whereby compare a party (i) in a given country (x) in election year (t) ($Party_{ixt}$) with its performance in the previous election in that country ($Party_{ixt-1}$). In addition, we test whether the party is new, opposition, right-center-left, while controlling for country factors, such as unemployment, inflation, and geographic and historical factors such as West v.s central/eastern Europe and the number of years a state has been democratic.

Data, Sample and Methods

Politicizing Corruption in European Democracies

This study employs a new dataset on politicizing corruption for over 400 parties in 32 European countries in parliamentary elections from 1981-2011. The information on politicization of corruption has been collected from election reports in mainly three political science journals: Electoral Studies (ES) 1982-2013, West European Politics (WEP) 1981-2013 and European Journal of Political Research (EJPR) 1992-2012. The ambition has been to have every election covered by at least two of these journals and in case there has been only one report available to look in additional sources, such as European Parties Elections & Referendums Network (EPERN), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and The Economist. Even though the election reports have a common structure (background, electoral system, the contending parties, the electoral campaign, the results and the outcome), the content and extent of the sections vary quite a bit. There is certainly a risk that the issue of anti-corruption has been under reported, in particular if the issue was not central in the campaign and/or advocated by peripheral parties. However, we do think that the risk of missing cases in which corruption has been a prominent feature of the campaign is rather small, i.e. the frequency of the issue is hardly overstated. The usage of several sources for each election is further diminishing that risk.

The electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party used anti-corruption rhetoric and/or corruption allegation during the election campaign. In order to capture the extent of corruption rhetoric in the election campaigns we have mainly coded only instances in which the word "corruption" has been used in the electoral reports and in cases where it is obvious that it concerns political corruption as defined above. In some instances it has been obvious that political corruption has been the issue, even though not spelled out explicitly.

The analyses use the party-election-year as the unit of analysis($Party_{ixt}$). We employ two dependent variables in the following section. First, we are interested in the factors (both party-level and country-level) that are associated with parties choosing to politicize corruption. The dependent variable for this is thus dichotomous (0/1), whether a party chooses or not in the election-year in a given country to campaign on the issue of corruption. Second, we are interested in the effects of politicizing corruption (e.g., using this

dichotomous variable as an explanatory variable). For this section, we run regressions using two dependent variables. First is simply the vote share of party 'i' in country 'x' in election-year 't'. Second, is the vote share of $Party_{ixt}$ relative to the previous election($Party_{ixt-1}$) to test whether relative gains were made by employing this strategy. A full list of countries in the sample as well as parties throughout the timeframe that have politicized corruption can be found in appendix 1.

The variables in the models we run are at both the party-level and country-level, thus we employ multi-level techniques in the regression analysis. At the party-level, we created a typology of where $Party_{ixt}$ is situated in the current political structure. For this, several mutually-exclusive, dummy variables are generated for whether or not a party is the party of the Prime Minister (PM), a coalition party in the government (Government), part of the main opposition (MainOpp), part of any other opposition party (OtherOpp), and finally, if the party is campaigning for the first time (NEW)[35]. Next, we account for ideology by coding each party 'i' in a given country-election-year as right, center or left. A more thorough description of the party-level variables and sample can be found in Appendix 5.

At the country-level, we anticipate first and foremost that the greater level of overall perceived corruption, the more likely that parties in that country will politicize corruption. *Corruption* can be problematic to measure due to its clandestine nature and is often dependent upon survey data and/or perceptions measures from experts, firms or citizens. Because of the time frame involved in our study, we employ the data available with the most years available, the 'International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which we take from the Political Risk Services. The data, which is based on annual expert assessments and perceptions, captures three highly related factors - the extent to which a country is corruption, along with the strength of the rule of law and effectiveness of the bureaucracy. The measure has been used frequently in top academic journals in both political science and economics (for example - Keefer 2007; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman 2005; Charron & Lapuente 2010). The data ranges from 0-1, with higher figures implying lower corruption, stronger rule of law, etc. and we have multiplied the data by 100 to make it more comparable with other variables[36].

Aside from corruption, we are interested in testing several other factors as to why parties would politicize corruption (a relatively new and growing political strategy) and if vote differences due to politicizing corruption are conditioned by other factors. As regards to

[35] Since many small, new parties that do not manage to win seats are unfortunately not reported in elections data, we elect to take only those new parties that did in fact win at least one seat. Thus we are aware that we are overestimating the impact of new parties broadly speaking, but we do so knowingly and thus our data allows us to interpret the effects of new parties given that they won seats, and not otherwise.

[36] Compared with other measures of corrupting such as Transparency International's 'Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), or the World Bank Governance Indicators, the ICRG variable is preferred in our case because it extends back to 1984 in most cases while the other two measures only extend as far back as 1996. In elections prior to 1984, we elect to impute the data back to 1981 using 1984 data. While this is not optimal, it does allow us more observations in the analysis, and since corruption is a rather 'sticky' variable over time, we are fairly confidence that this limited imputation still gives us an accurate picture of corruption during these years.

modelling party strategy, we elect a fairly parsimonious model because there is a very limited empirical literature on which to build (Meguid 2005). We also elect to utilize previous literature and new party emergence in selecting control variables (for example, Tavits 2007). First, the length of time in which a country has been democratic is included (*YrsDemocratic*), which serves the purpose of accounting for 'maturity of democracy'. This measure is essential a count variable that is constructed by taking the number of consecutive years a country has been ranked a '7' or higher in the Polity IV data since 1950 (Marshall and Jaggars 2002)[37]. As noted, this variable has the added advantage of essentially covering the spatial differences in the sample – with eastern and Central European states having been democratic for fewer years than democracies of Western Europe with a dummy variable for EU-15 countries. In addition, in particular in the newer democracies, we control for whether it is the *first democratic election* or not.

In several models, we account for 'barrier to entry' electoral institutions that tend to vary spatially across the sample. We believe that on average, the more permissive the electoral system, the greater the opportunity for new issues, such as corruption, to penetrate the electoral cycle and for larger swings in vote shares. First, the average *district magnitude* is taken from the database of political institutions (Beck et al. 2001), which we expect to be positively related with the success politicizing corruption in general. The values are skewed and thus we take the logged value for a better linear fit for the models. Next, whether or not political parties may obtain *public financing* and/or free *media access* can certainly have an effect on barrier to entry and/or getting out a party's platform message to voters. Both of these (which are dichotomous, 0/1), come from the International Institute for Democratic Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Several short-term macro-economic indicators are tested in the models, taken from the *World Development Indicators* database and *Eurostat.* Factors focused on here are the *unemployment rate* along with the rate of *inflation*. We expect that as macroeconomic performance is better (lower unemployment, less inflation), it will be more difficult for parties politicizing corruption to succeed, while it should be easier for parties running on corruption to succeed electorally at higher levels of inflation and unemployment. Finally, we observe that this political strategy has increased over time and thus we include a 'year count' variable in all models.

The estimation techniques are mainly two-fold. First, when employing 'politicization' as a dependent variable, a logit model is employed due to the binary nature of the data. When electoral vote percentages are used as the dependent variable (both current and relative to the previous election) we employ OLS with panel correlated standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) as the dependent variable is continuous. In both cases, the data is multilevel, with

[37] We checked the robustness of this measure by taking 6 and above along with 8 and above as well.

parties nested within countries. To account for this we run both random effects models as well as multi-level estimation[38].

Results

We begin with a general overview of the topic at hand. Politicization of corruption, here defined as the political parties' rhetoric on the issue of corruption during parliamentary election campaigns, is on the rise. During the five year period 2006-2010, parties used anti-corruption rhetoric in more than 40 percent of the parliamentary election campaigns in Europe. As shown in figure 1, the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe account to quite a great extent for both the overall increasing trend as well as the generally high level politicization of corruption. During the same period seven out of ten campaigns in that region featured parties that in one way or the other exploited the issue of anti-corruption. While not entirely exclusive to the newer democracies of Europe, in the old democracies in Western Europe by contrast, the pattern has been more uneven and anti-corruption rhetoric is only found in about one quarter of the campaigns during the last period under study.

Politicization of corruption has occurred on 108 occasions in 60 of the 220 elections analyzed, (see appendix), which means that in some elections more than one party have campaigned on that issue. Moreover, 23 parties have campaigned more than once on that issue, bringing the total number of parties which have politicized the issue of corruption down to 85 of 415 parties in our sample[39]. Regarding other characteristics such as political leanings of the parties, both the left and right, opposition and incumbents and established and new parties are represented, but the right of center, new and opposition parties are overrepresented (Bågenholm, 2009). In the next section we discuss the particularities with the issue of corruption in comparison to other issues and why certain party characteristics are assumed to be beneficial when politicizing the issue.

[38] In the case of the later, we run generalized linear latent and mixed model regression (gllamm in STATA) which explicitly models multilevel, hierarchical data. The model uses a nested structure for the country-level clusters and allows random-effects for hierarchical factors. A random intercept in the models adjusts for different levels of counts among the country-clusters. This maximum-likelihood estimation has been shown to be consistent estimator (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2009).
In addition, since several countries have no cases where any party has politicized corruption, we considered alternative estimations such as using a Heckman Selection model that would account for all parties within a country being zero for the entire sample, which we assume would be linked with the level of country-corruption. However, several 'low corruption' countries have cases of politicized corruption (Austria, Iceland, Finland for example), so this estimation is not appropriate in this case. Thus we simply control for country-level corruption in most all models.

[39] A full list is provided in the appendix

Figure 1. Politicization of corruption in election campaigns 1981-2010 (%)



Source: Election reports in Electoral Studies, West European Politics and European Journal of Political Research.

Comment: The figure shows the share of politicization of corruption in election campaigns during five year cycles. The total number of analysed cases is 219 (1981-85: 27; 1986-90: 31; 1991-95: 40; 1996-2000: 37; 2001-05: 39; 2006-10: 45). For Western Europe the total number is 156 (1981-85: 27; 1986-90: 29; 1991-95: 27; 1996-2000: 22; 2001-05: 25; 2006-10: 26). For Central and Eastern Europe the total number is 63 (1981-85: 0; 1986-90: 2; 1991-95:13; 1996-2000: 15; 2001-05: 14; 2006-10: 19).

What factors lead to parties' decision to politicize corruption? Table 1 shows the regression results of the logistic estimation reporting odds ratios for easier interpretation. In models 1-3 we model the hierarchical data directly using a multi-level model, while in models 4-6 we employ a random effects logit estimator to check the results. Model 1 includes all party-level factors along with a year-count and a control for whether the election-year was the country's first democratically held election (thus no 'opposition, 'new', etc.). Models 2 and 3 add economic, geographic and historical variables along with certain electoral instructional variables respectively. With respect to party-level factors, we find several interesting and robust results. First, and not surprisingly, when compared with the party of the sitting Prime Minister, all other parties are more likely to politicize corruption on average. However, only two types do so significantly – parties in the main opposition and new parties. The odds of the main opposition politicizing corruption are between 3.1 and 4.2 greater than the PM party, while the odds of new parties to do so are between 4.6 and 6.2 times greater according to models 1-3. Next, we find that the ideology of a party matters in politicizing corruption. While we find that compared with parties on the left, center parties are no more likely to politicize corruption, the odds of a party on the right are about 1.7 to 1.9 times greater than left parties, giving support to the idea that a right-party platform would include a 'law and order'-type issue like corruption on average.

Table 1. Explaining a Party's Choice to Politicize Corruption

	Multi-Level Logit			Random Effets Logit		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Party Level factors						
Government	1.35	1.87	1.89	1.01	1.54	1.50
	(0.66)	(1.25)	(1.21)	(0.01)	(0.79)	(0.77)
MainOpp	4.17***	3.11**	3.75***	4.07***	3.16**	3.31***
	(3.49)	(2.40)	(2.71)	(3.18)	(2.30)	(2.50)
OtherOpp	1.30	1.28	1.55	1.18	1.25	1.35
	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.93)	(0.54)	(0.44)	(0.64)
New	4.61***	5.80***	6.75***	4.96***	5.57***	5.18***
	(3.37)	(3.52)	(3.71)	(3.21)	(3.15)	(3.18)
Right	1.67**	1.88**	1.85**	1.92**	1.96*	1.97**
	(1.95)	(2.04)	(1.97)	(1.98)	(1.83)	(1.99)
Center	0.88	0.97	0.85	1.01	1.13	1.03
	(-0.29)	(-0.10)	(-0.33)	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.07)
Country Level Factors						
First Dem. Election	1.43	3.18	4.45*	1.79	3.84*	4.65*
	(0.59)	(1.54)	(1.88)	(0.82)	(1.66)	(1.90)
West		1.48	2.43		2.01	1.73
		(0.56)	(1.25)		(1.05)	(0.87)
Corruption		0.97**	0.96***		0.97**	0.97**
		(-2.38)	(-2.50)		(-2.33)	(-2.00)
YrsDemocracy		0.99	0.94***		0.96*	0.96**
		(-0.16)	(-2.95)		(-1.83)	(-2.37)

Unemployment		1.02	1.04		1.04	1.04
		(0.61)	(1.13)		(1.05)	(1.25)
Inflation		0.99	0.98		0.99	1.01
		(-0.96)	(-0.97)		(-0.94)	(0.19)
Media Finance			0.11***			0.37**
			(-4.27)			(-2.44)
Public Fianance			0.44			0.28***
			(-1.45)			(-3.52)
District Mag.			0.99*			0.99
			(-1.65)			(-0.10)
Year Count	1.09***	1.08***	1.12***	1.09***	1.10***	1.10***
	(4.93)	(2.60)	(3.99)	(5.30)	(3.51)	(3.65)
Level 2 Random effects	1.32***	1.32**	1.42**			
Sigma				1.29***	1.07***	0.69**
Rho				0.34***	0.26***	0.13*
Parties	379	310	310	379	310	310
Total Obs	1545	1144	1136	1545	1144	1136

Note: Multilevel (gllamm) and random effects (xtlogit, re) Logit models with odds ratios reported (Z-scores in parentheses). PM party and Left parties are the control groups respectively. Corruption is re-scaled from 0-100 with higher values indicating less corruption. All models run with a constant (not shown). ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

With respect to country-level effects, we also find several salient factors that systematically explain the dependent variable. The notion that a country's overall level of corruption (in terms of perception) impacts the odds of a party politicizing corruption is corroborated. Going from the minimum value (43.7, most corrupt) to the maximum value (100, least corrupt) reduces the odds that a party politicizes corruption by 70% to 125% in models 2 and 3 respectively. The years a country has been democratic, while insignificant in model 2 is significant in model 3, and provides some evidence that countries with a longer democratic history have less politicization of corruption on average. The year count shows that the odds of a party politicizing corruption increase significantly as a function of time. With respect to electoral institutions, we find that district magnitude, which is commonly associated with

greater pluralism in a party system, and thus possibly creating more opportunities for diverse campaign issues, like corruption, is weakly associated with les politicization, yet the results are not robust as seen in model 6. However, we see that the odds of parties in countries that have laws for public media financing and shared-time are about 89% less likely than countries without such laws in model 3. Public campaign financing is also negatively related with the dependent variable, yet is indistinguishable from zero. Somewhat surprisingly, the economic factors, inflation and unemployment, we not significantly related with a party's choice to politicize corruption, *ceteris paribus*. Further, we find that while the odds ratios are slightly different in models 4-6 using a random effects logit estimation, the overall results are highly robust.

In Table 2, we move to estimating the electoral effects of politicizing corruption, with the dependent variable being the vote share difference of $party_i$ from $election_{t-1}$ to $election_t$ (*VoteDiff*). Again, we model the hierarchical nature of the data explicitly by using a multi-level model, accounting for random intercepts and random slopes for parties nested within countries. Here now, instead of modeling for example why an incumbent party gets re-elected or not, we are most interested in the interaction effects between a party that politicizes corruption and other factors. As in Table 1, such factors include whether in the opposition, new or in government, ideology as well as country-wide economic or political variables that might influence the success/failure of a party that politicizes corruption on average relative to the previous election. Thus we generate a series of interactions between the main explanatory variable (PC) and others in the model.

In model 1, we present a simple baseline showing the effects of PC on *VoteDiff* from election, controlling only for whether a country had a first democratic election in a given year as well as a simple year count due to the time nature of the data. We find that on average, politicizing corruption increases a party's vote share by about 5.6% compared with the previous election. In models 2 and 3, we add interactions at the party level and country level respectively. Due to the interaction term, the coefficients for the party-level variables indicate the effects on *VoteDiff* when PC is equal to zero. Again, the reference groups are Prime Minister Party and left parties respectively. We find that all parties, regardless of politicizing corruption, tend to outperform the sitting PM party, with New and Main opposition parties fairing best. The interaction term coefficients show the effects of said party-level variables on *VoteDiff* when each type of party has politicized corruption. We find that two parties increase their relative vote share significantly when politicizing corruption – the main opposition and new parties – by about 4% and 8.7% over their expected vote gains otherwise. One noteworthy aspect about the results stems from the data - of course it is no surprise that *New parties* gain relative to the last election, as their vote share was '0'. The question of interest regarding this particular party-type is thus whether the interaction is significant – do new parties gain more by politicizing corruption than they otherwise might by *not* doing so[40].

[40] There are most likely many small parties that never won seats that also politicized corruption that our analysis does not pick up, thus the model necessarily overestimates the effect of new parties on 'voteshare.'. However,

Interestingly, there are no effects of ideology – or its interaction with PC – on vote share. Right or center parties do not receive greater or less vote share compared with the previous election when employing corruption as political campaign issue relative to parties on the left.

In model 3, country-level factors and interactions with PC are introduced. The country-level coefficients for corruption and other country-level factors represent the effects of these factors on the *VoteDiff* for parties that chose not to politicize corruption, while the interactions show the effects of PC at different levels of the country-wide factors. A few noteworthy effects are found. First, we find that the interaction term between PC and parties in the main opposition and new parties in general is robust. Somewhat surprisingly, and most likely a very costly strategy in terms of future coalition negotiations, we see that small coalition parties have used this strategy as an effective short term strategy to increase their vote share. We find that as countries with lower corruption (e.g. the Corruption variable in the model increases), the *VoteDiff* of a party that has politicized corruption decreases, showing that PC is a more effective strategy in countries with higher levels of corruption. We also see a significant interaction with the three political institutions. Politicizing corruption is less effective in cases where all parties receive public financing, yet more effective on average where parties obtain public media funds. Moreover, this strategy becomes less effective on average as a function of district magnitude (DM). One interpretation of these results could be that as DM (and public financing of parties is present) the number of parties increase, possibly leading to a 'drowning out' of certain parties messaging during the campaign, whereas guaranteed media time ensures that voter will be privy to a party's charges of corruption.

In model 4, we re-run model 3 using random effects estimation. Here we find no substantive differences in the regression estimates, with a slight exception of a somewhat significant and negative interaction between age of democracy and PC[41].

due to systematic under-reporting of small parties that fail to win seats (along with reporting on their key platform issues) this is unfortunately unavoidable; therefore the results should be interpreted cautiously.

[41] Due to the panel data we employ, we check for problems associated with authocorrelation and heteroskadasticity, For example we run correlations with the residuals of the model over both country level variables and time variables. We find no significant correlations. An example of this can be found in the appendix, showing the residuals (Y-yhat) over time from model 4 in Table 2 in the appendix.

Table 2. The Effects of Politicizing Corruption on a party's relative vote share from the Previous Election

	Multi-Level Model						Random Effects	
	1		2		3		4	
	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value	Beta	p-value
Party Level factors								
Politicize Corruption (PC)	5.66***	0.000	0.19	0.92	14.86***	0.01	15.79***	0.01
Government			2.05***	0.000	1.43**	0.02	1.37**	0.04
MainOpp			5.56***	0.000	4.72***	0.000	4.97***	0.000
OtherOpp			3.93***	0.000	3.22***	0.000	3.44***	0.000
New			9.95***	0.000	9.74***	0.000	9.92***	0.000
Right			-0.04	0.89	-0.13	0.71	-0.15	0.74
Center			0.09	0.87	0.21	0.73	0.18	0.80
PC*Government			3.35	0.15	6.95**	0.007	7.60***	0.004
PC*MainOpp			3.99**	0.04	6.24***	0.008	5.47**	0.02
PC*OtherOpp			0.95	0.63	4.06	0.11	3.98	0.11

PC*New	8.74***	0.000	11.15***	0.000	11.23***	0.000
PC*Right	1.35	0.34	1.05	0.52	1.47	0.40
PC*Center	-2.12	0.39	-0.99	0.73	-0.47	0.87
Country Level Factors						
Corruption			2.21	0.16	2.87*	0.09
YrsDemocracy			0.02	0.23	0.02	0.23
Unemployment			0.03	0.71	0.04	0.48
Inflation			0.03	0.28	0.04	0.12
District Mag. (logged)			0.31	0.11	0.28	0.20
Campaign Fianance			0.43	0.58	0.28	0.76
Media Finance			-0.02	0.97	0.19	0.71
PC*Corruption			-0.13**	0.02	-0.12**	0.03
PC*YrsDemocracy			-0.03	0.64	-0.06	0.44
PC*Unemployment			-0.19	0.23	-0.19	0.24
PC*Inflation			0.05	0.93	0.05	0.56

PC*District Mag.					-2.12***	0.004	-2.28***	0.002
PC*Campaign					-5.64**	0.03	-5.75**	0.03
PC*Media					6.70***	0.000	6.23***	0.001
First election	-1.97**	0.05	2.24**	0.03	1.78	0.21	2.23	0.13
Year Count	-0.01	0.46	-0.02	0.22	-0.01	0.75	-0.01	0.61
Constant	35.91	0.36	41.01	0.21	18.43	0.20	18.81	0.72
Level 2 Random effects (residual s.d.)	6.32	0.000	5.8	0.000	5.5	0.000		
Sigma_u							2.12	
Sigma_e							5.48	
Rho							0.13	
Parties	396		364		307		307	
Total Obs	1506		1448		1108		1108	

Note: VoteDiff is the dependent variable. Models 1-3 use multi-level estimation (xtmixed) while model 4 uses random effects estimation. Corruption is re-scaled from 0-100 with higher values indicating less corruption. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

To simplify the interpretation of some of the interaction terms in Table 2, we produce Figures 2 and 3 which show the marginal effects of politicizing corruption for main opposition and new parties, with confidence intervals around the estimates[42]. Since country-wide corruption is the most interesting variable at the second level of the model, and the interaction between country-wide corruption and PC is significant and negative, we show the effects of main opposition and new parties over a range of corruption values. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction effect of New parties and PC. The confidence intervals show that the interaction is significant throughout the range of corruption values – that new parties that politicize corruption on average tend to fair better than those than do not, irrespective of the level of corruption in country. However, in countries with less corruption, we find that the benefits of politicizing corruption in a party's first electoral campaign are clearly greatest in high-corrupt countries. In Figure 3, among parties in the main opposition, we find that the interaction is also significant for all parties competing in countries below the country-mean of corruption (82.7) – such parties that politicize corruption take in a greater relative vote share increase than main opposition parties that do not politicize corruption, *ceteris paribus*. Moreover, the predicted level of VoteDiff for main opposition parties that do not politicize corruption is indistinguishable from '0' at values of corruption below 80. However, the predictions for main opposition party gains in *VoteDiff* for parties in countries above the mean value of corruption (82.7) are negligible between parties that politicize corruption and those that do not. Thus, the model predicts that the pay-offs of politicizing corruption are greatest in higher-corrupt countries for main opposition and new parties alike, yet these pay-offs diminish as country-level corruption decreases.

Figure 2. The Marginal Effects of Politicizing Corruption over Country-Level Corruption in New Parties



[42] Graphs were produced in STATA using the 'margins' command

Note: Estimates from model 3 in Table 2. Vertical bars represent a 95% confidence interval around the estimate of the predicted levels of VoteDiff at various levels of corruption, using 'margins' in STATA. Predictions set hold ideology and other country-level variables at mean levels and other party variables at '0'.

Figure 3. The Marginal Effects of Politicizing Corruption over Country-Level Corruption in Main Opposition Parties



Note: Estimates from model 3 in Table 2. Vertical bars represent a 95% confidence interval around the estimate of the predicted levels of VoteDiff at various levels of corruption, using 'margins' in STATA. Predictions set hold ideology and other country-level variables at mean levels and other party variables at '0'.

Discussion

In this paper we have put forth several important contributions to the literature on political party behavior and election outcomes, mainly empirical in nature. First, we identify a new and rising trend in party politics within European democracies, namely the politicization of corruption as a campaign issue, which to our knowledge, has yet to be systematically researched diachronically across countries. Using novel data collected by the author for over hundreds of parties in over 200 elections in 32 European democracies from 1981-2011, we find that this issue is increasing over time in use, in particular, although not exclusively in, the newer democracies of Eastern and Central Europe and thus this topic is salient for researchers and politicians alike.

Given that this issue exists and is on the rise in Europe, we then address two central empirical questions in a parsimonious manor. First, what are the conditions under which politicizing corruption is most likely? Second, what are the electoral benefits (if any) to politicizing corruption? To address these questions, we employ hierarchical data using the party-country-election-year as the unit of analysis, nested within countries. On the first question, the analyses reveal several interesting findings, most of which confirming our prior suspicions. At the party level, where a party is situated (in government, opposition, new, etc.) plays a

significant role in determining the odds of politicizing corruption in an electoral campaign. New parties are the most likely to do so, followed by parties in the main opposition. The party of the Prime Minister is least likely to do so, and their likelihood to politicize corruption is indistinguishable from other government parties as well as minor opposition parties. This certainly speaks to the issue of a 'credible messenger', as parties outside of government, in particular new parties, outside of the elite power structure, are most likely to attempt this electoral tactic. In terms of ideology, the odds of parties on the right politicizing corruption are almost twice as great as parties on the left, corroborating our thoughts about this being a 'law and order'-type issue, which are most often taken up by right parties. Country-wide variables, like the level of overall corruption, reduce the likelihood that parties within that system will respond with politicizing corruption, which speaks to the issue of 'democratic supply and demand' to which the parties are presumably responding. Interestingly, electoral institutions such as public campaign and in particular, public media financing for parties reduces the likelihood parties in said systems employing corruption as a campaign issue.

On the second question, we find that in general, parties have benefitted electorally from politicizing corruption. We test several interactions at the party and country level with politicizing corruption and find that this strategy, compared with the relative vote share of the sitting PM party, adds significant vote share relative to the previous election when used by the main opposition parties, and new parties (and even small government parties in some models). These benefits however diminish for parties in low-corrupt countries, thus the electoral gains between parties that politicize corruption and those that do not are greatest in higher-corrupt settings. This speaks to the effectiveness of this issue, along with the credibility of its messenger in the eyes of voters. Also, the gains of politicizing corruption are also conditioned by electoral institutions, such as public financing for media, which increases attention and results in a relatively higher vote share. Finally, we find no particular benefit however for parties on the right, left or center.

The implications are that parties will observe that corruption is a successful campaign issue and that they learn from this and in turn have used it more frequently. The normative implications for democracy and satisfaction with political parties by voters remain to be seen however. Is this simply a short-term political strategy designed to grab power, or a tactic designed to help bring awareness to an issue about which parties competing for power intend to improve? In addition, how accused parties respond to their opponents politicizing corruption is another avenue for future research – does this lead to a 'vicious cycle'? Finally, we observe that this tactic is used most frequently (and rather successfully) by main opposition parties in countries with higher perceive corruption and by new parties. Are these parties employing anti-corruption politics as one of many issues or are there some that focus more or less exclusively on 'cleaning up the system', and thus can we possibly identify a new niche party system within Europe?

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Appendix

1. List of Parties that have politicized corruption

country	year	name	electoral result	difference from previous election
Austria	1986	Freedom Party of Austria	9.7	4.7
Austria	1994	Freedom Party of Austria	22.5	5.9
Austria	1995	Freedom Party of Austria	21.9	-0.6
Austria	1999	Liberal Forum	3.7	-1.8
Austria	2002	The Greens	9.5	2.1
Austria	2006	Alliance for the Future of Austria	4.1	4.1
Austria	2006	Austrian People's Party	34.3	-8
Austria	2006	Freedom Party of Austria	11	1
Austria	2006	The Greens	11.1	1.6
Belgium	1995	Flemish Interest	7.8	1.2
Belgium	1995	National Front	2.3	1.2
Belgium	2007	Reform Movement	12.5	1.1
Bulgaria	1994	Bulgarian Socialist Party	43.5	10.4
Bulgaria	1994	Movement for Rights and Freedom	5.4	-2.2
Bulgaria	1994	Union of Democratic Forces	24.2	-10.2
Bulgaria	1997	Union of Democratic Forces	52.3	28.1
Bulgaria	2001	Bulgarian Socialist Party	17.1	-5
Bulgaria	2001	National Movement for Stability and Progress	42.7	42.7
Bulgaria	2001	Union of Democratic Forces	18.2	-34.1
Bulgaria	2009	Attack	9.4	1.3
Bulgaria	2009	Blue Coalition	6.8	-7.3
Bulgaria	2009	Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	39.7	39.7
Bulgaria	2009	Order Lawfulness Justice	4.1	4.1
Croatia	2007	Croatian Democratic Center	36	2.1
Czech R	1998	Freedom Union	8.6	8.6
Czech R	2006	Civic Democratic Party	35.4	10.9
Czech R	2006	Czech Social Democratic Party	32.3	2.1
Czech R	2010	Public Affairs	10.9	10.9
Czech R	2010	TOP97	16.7	16.7
Estonia	2003	Res Publica	24.6	24.6
Finland	1983	True Finns	9.7	5.1
France	1993	Rally for the Republic	20.4	1.2
Greece	1993	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	46.9	8.3
Greece	1993	Political Spring	4.9	4.9
Greece	2004	New Democracy	45.4	2.7
Greece	2009	Coalition of Radical Left	4.6	-0.4
Greece	2009	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	43.9	5.8
Greece	1989 06	New Democracy	44.3	3.5
Greece	1989 06	Coalition of the Left and Progress	13.1	1.4
Hungary	1998	Hungarian Civic Union	29.4	22.4
Hungary	2002	Alliance of Free Democrats	5.6	-1.3

Hungary	2002	Hungarian Civic Union	41.1	8.9
Hungary	2002	Hungarian Socialists Party	42	9.1
Hungary	2006	Hungarian Democratic Forum	5	2.2
Hungary	2010	Hungarian Civic Union	52.7	10.7
Hungary	2010	Politics Can Be Different	7.5	7.5
Iceland	2009	Citizen's Movement	7.2	7.2
Ireland	1992	Progressive Democrats	4.7	-0.8
Ireland	2002	Family of the Irish (Fine Gael)	22.5	-5.4
Ireland	2002	Labour Party	10.8	0.4
Italy	1983	Radical Party	2.2	-1.3
Italy	1992	Northern League	8.7	8.2
Italy	2006	Forward Italy	23.7	-5.7
Latvia	1995	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party	4.6	3.9
Latvia	2002	New Era	24	24
Latvia	2011	Zatlers' Reform Party	20.8	20.8
Lithuania	1996	Homeland Union	31.3	10.1
Lithuania	2004	Labour Party	28.4	28.4
Lithuania	2004	Lithuanian Democratic Party	11.4	11.4
Lithuania	2004	Peasants and New Democracy Party Union	6.6	6.6
Lithuania	2008	National Revival Party	15.1	15.1
Malta	1987	Labour Party	48.9	-0.2
Malta	1987	National Party	50.9	0
Malta	1992	Labour Party	46.5	-2.4
Malta	1996	Labour Party	50.7	4.2
Malta	2003	Labour Party	47.5	0.5
Malta	2008	Labour Party	48.8	1.3
Poland	2001	Law and Justice	9.5	9.5
Poland	2005	Civic Platform	24.1	11.4
Poland	2005	Law and Justice	27	17.5
Poland	2005	League of Polish Families	8.0	0.1
Poland	2005	Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland	11.4	1.2
Poland	2007	Civic Platform	41.5	17.4
Poland	2007	Law and Justice	32.1	5.1
Poland	2007	Polish People's Party	8.9	1.9
Portugal	1985	Democratic Renewal Party	17.9	17.9
Portugal	1995	Partido Popular	9.1	4.7
Portugal	1995	Socialist Party	43.8	14.7
Romania	1996	Democratic Convention of Romania	30.2	10.2
Romania	1996	Democratic Liberal Party	12.9	2.7
Romania	1996	Social Democratic Party	21.5	-6.2
Romania	2000	Social Democratic Party	36.6	15.1
Romania	2004	Justice and Truth	32	18.1
Romania	2008	Democratic Liberal Party	32.4	18.9
Romania	2008	Greater Romania Party	3.2	-9.8
Romania	2008	National Liberal Party	18.6	0.1
Serbia	2008	Serbian Radical Party	29.5	0.9

Slovakia	2002	Alliance of New Citizen	8	8
Slovakia	2002	Direction	13.5	13.5
Slovakia	2002	Party of the Democratic Left	1.4	-13.3
Slovakia	2002	Party of the Hungarian Coalition	11.2	2.1
Slovakia	2010	Freedom and Solidarity	12.1	12.1
Slovakia	2010	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	15.4	-3
Slovenia	2004	New Slovenia - Christian People's Party	9.1	0.5
Slovenia	2004	Slovenian Democratic Party	29.1	13.1
Slovenia	2004	Slovenian National Party	6.3	1.9
Slovenia	2004	Slovenian People's Party	6.8	-2.8
Spain	1993	Partido Popular	34.8	9
Spain	1996	Partido Popular	38.8	4
Spain	2000	Partido Popular	44.5	5.7
Spain	2000	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	34.2	-3.4
Ukraine	2006	Bloc Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defense	14	-9.6
Ukraine	2006	Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko	22.3	15
Ukraine	2006	Communist Party of Ukraine	3.7	-16.3
Ukraine	2006	Party of Regions	32.1	20.3
Ukraine	2006	Socialist Party of Ukraine	5.7	-1.2
Ukraine	2007	Bloc Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defense	14.2	0.2
Ukraine	2007	Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko	30.7	8.4

2. Summary Statistics, Variable Description and Sources

Variable	Obs	mean	S.D.	min	max	Variable Type	source
Party-Level Variables							
Politicized corruption	1614	0.07	0.25	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Vote Share from previous election (VoteDiff)	1506	0.31	6.48	-44.9	42.7	Continuous	Author
PM party	1614	0.12	0.32	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Other Government Party	1614	0.17	0.38	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Main Opposition party	1614	0.13	0.33	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Other opposition party	1614	0.42	0.49	0	1	dichotomous	Author
New Party	1614	0.08	0.27	0	1	dichotomous	Author
First election	1614	0.06	0.24	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Left	1614	0.34	0.47	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Center	1614	0.12	0.32	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Right	1614	0.53	0.49	0	1	dichotomous	Author
Country-Level Variables							
Inflation (logged)	1441	1.48	1.32	-2.76	6.98	coninuous	World Development Indicators
Unemployment	1515	7.48	4.35	1.1	20.9	coninuous	World Development Indicators
public campaign financing	1614	0.93	0.24	0	1	dichotomous	IDEA
Public media support	1614	0.73	0.44	0	1	dichotomous	IDEA
Corruption	1220	82.7	15.7	43.7	100	coninuous	International Country Risk Guide
years consecutive democracy since 1950	1614	32.02	18.6	0	61	coninuous	Polity IV
District magnitue (logged)	1436	2.2	1.02	0	5.01	coninuous	DPI, Beck et al (2001)
Parliamentary system	1614	0.87	0.33	0	1	dichotomous	DPI, Beck et al (2001)

3. Party-Level Variable Description, Sample and Coding

Selection of cases

Only European countries with parliamentary or semipresidential systems, with more than 100 000 inhabitants, and that were considered free by Freedom House the year the election was held have been included.

Party characteristics

For information on the party characteristics we have mainly used the party and election website (www.parties-and-elections.eu), where election results and government compositions in all European countries since 1945 can be found.

Parties that have either left or joined the government during the election period are coded according to the amount of time in either position, with a cut-off point one year before the elections. That means that a party that spent less than the last year before an election in opposition, is coded as *incumbent*, even though it is in opposition at the time of the election and vice versa.

We code *Main governmental party* (with a few exceptions) as the party which provides the Prime Minister: *Main opposition party* (again with a few exceptions) as the largest of the opposition parties and a *new party* is defined as one which contests their first election under the name in question and is not a direct successor of a previous party or just a merger of pervious parties. However, splinter groups as well as genuinely new parties are considered as new (see Sikk, 2011). Finally, the party description has been used for the *left-center-right* coding. Conservative, Christian Democrat, Nationalist, Liberal etc. have been coded as Right; Social Liberal, Center, Green etc. have been coded as Center; and Social Democratic, Socialist, Communist etc. have been coded as left.

4. Check for residuals over time



Note: Test of Residuals over time from model 4, Table 2. Pearson bivariate correlation is 0.01 (p=0.71). Further Pearson correlation tests show the residuals to be significantly unrelated with all other explanatory variables as well.

5. Sample

	Country		Country
1	Austria	16	Lithuania
2	Belgium	17	Luxembourg
3	Bulgaria	18	Malta
4	Czech Republic	19	Netherlands
5	Denmark	20	Norway
6	Estonia	21	Poland
7	Finland	22	Portugal
8	France	23	Romania
9	Germany	24	Slovakia
10	Greece	25	Slovenia
11	Hungary	26	Spain
12	Iceland	27	Sweden
13	Ireland	28	Switzerland
14	Italy	29	United Kingdom
15	Latvia	30	Serbia
		31	Ukraine
		32	Croatia

5. Bågenholm, Andreas. 2013. "Holding Politicians Accountable? The electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in Europe 1981-2011."

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Abstract

Corrupt politicians have to a surprisingly high extent been found to go unpunished by the electorate. These findings are, however, drawn from case studies on a limited number of countries. This study, on the contrary, is based on a unique dataset from 215 parliamentary election campaigns in 32 European countries between 1981 and 2011, from which the electoral effects of corruption allegations and corruption scandals are analyzed. Information about the extent to which corruption allegations and scandals have occurred is gathered from election reports in several political science journals and the electoral effects are measured in terms of the electoral performances – the difference in the share of votes between two elections – of all parties in government as well as the main incumbent party and the extent to which the governments survive the election. The control variables are GDP growth and unemployment rate the year preceding the election, the effective number of parliamentary and electoral parties and the level of corruption. The results show that both corruption allegation and corruption scandals are significantly correlated with governmental performances on a bivariate basis, however not with governmental change. When controlling for other factors only corruption allegation has an independent effect on government performances. The study thus concludes - in line with previous research - that voters actually punish corrupt politicians, but to a quite limited extent and not so that the 'rascals' are really thrown out.

Introduction

During the last 20 years there has been an increasing attention to the problem of corruption from a number of places (see for example Heywood, 1997; Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2009: IX). The political, academic and civil society communities have all contributed to enhancing the knowledge about the spread and penetration of corruption, its causes and effects, the popular perception of it, as well as suggestions about how to curb it. There is a broad consensus about the devastating impact of corruption on all aspects of society, effectively condensed at Transparency International's homepage: "Corruption hurts everyone" (Transparency International). Moreover, scholars have recently been aware of the fact that corruption is not only a third world problem, which takes place in poor authoritarian states, but also a widespread phenomenon in established democracies in Europe and which needs to be effectively combated (Della Porta & Mény, 1997: 1-3). In almost all EU member states, moreover, a large majority of the population thinks corruption is a major problem in their countries (see Special Eurobarometer 325, 2009: 11 & 374, 2011: 12).

With this in mind, one would assume that voters would be quite sensitive to revelations about politicians being involved in corruption scandals and that they would punish them accordingly. Surprisingly enough the research done in this field has found small effects of corruption scandals on voting behaviour, leading to the general conclusion that voters do not seem to care that much whether the politicians are corrupt or not. Up until now the electoral impact of corruption allegations and scandals has only been examined in single country studies over time (Peters & Welch, 1980; Welch & Hibbing, 1997; Reed, 1999; Chang, Golden & Hill, 2010; Barberá & Fernández-Vázquez, 2012) or in single elections (Dimock & Jacobson, 1995), however. The prevailing view is that corrupt politicians are punished less frequently by the voters in mature democracies than one would expect considering the salience of the issue and the negative perceptions most people hold when it comes to elite malpractices (Klasnja, Tucker & Deegan-Krause, 2012; Special Eurobarometer 325, 2009 & 374, 2011). Holding badly performing or even criminal politicians accountable thus seems to leave a lot more to be desired.

As comparative research on this topic is still lacking, the objective of this study is to fill this gap, by analysing the electoral effects on governments' performances of corruption allegations and corruption scandals in 215 election campaigns in 32 European, democratic countries between 1981 and 2011, in order to find out to what extent the previous results hold or not. The performances of the governments are measured in terms of the sum of gains and losses between two elections for all governmental parties as well as for the main incumbent and the extent to which the governments survive.

The results show that both corruption allegation and corruption scandals are significantly correlated with governmental performances on a bivariate basis, however not with governmental change. When controlling for other factors only corruption allegation has an independent effect on government performances. The study thus concludes - in line with previous research - that voters actually punish corrupt politicians, but to a quite limited extent and not so that the 'rascals' are really thrown out. The paper is organized in four sections. In

the first section I review the previous research in this field. The second section deals with the design, data and methods of the study and in the third I present the empirical findings. The fourth section concludes.

Previous research

The research on if and why voters "throw the rascals out" is heavily dominated by the economic voting literature, which consistently shows that economic factors determine changes in support for the government (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). According to these results, voter accountability seem to work well, in the sense that bad performing governments lose support and to a higher extent are voted out of office, in comparison to governments which are more successful - or are perceived to be more successful - in handling the economy.

The literature on the extent to which voters punish corrupt politicians is less optimistic, however. Several studies have found that politicians who have been revealed to be involved in corruption scandals to a surprisingly limited extent lose votes and to a surprisingly high extent manage to get re-elected (see Barberá et al. 2012). Peters & Welch, 1980 and Welch & Hibbing, 1997, found when analysing the impact of corruption allegations on the voters' behaviour in elections to the US House of Representatives 1968-1978 and 1982-1990, that the likelihood for an incumbent to lose his/her seat increased markedly if corruption allegations were made, although the incumbents still retained their seats in 75 per cent of the cases, compared to more than 97 per cent when no corruption allegations were made (Welch & Hibbing, 1997: 233). Moreover, regardless of winning or losing the seat, a corruption charged incumbent on average lost around ten percentage points depending on the type of charges and the challenger gained on average even more. Thus, the main conclusion reached was that corruption affects a substantial share of the still quite limited congressional turnover (Welch & Hibbing, 1997: 233-38). Similar findings were made by Dimock & Jacobson (1995), when analysing the effects of one particular scandal in the 1992 Congressional elections (1157).

Other studies have found more limited effects of corruption charges. Members of the Italian parliament were damaged by being put under investigation of criminal activities, but to a surprisingly limited extent (Chang, Golden & Hill, 2010). Eggers & Fisher (2011) found that even though MPs involved in the so called expense scandal in Britain in 2009 lost support in the parliamentary elections the following year, the impact on the outcomes of the elections in the constituencies were very modest. Reed (1999) gets to the same conclusion when analysing elections in Japan (see Jiménez & Caínzos, 2006: 195, for an overview). Thus, as expected allegation of corruption and corruption scandals affect incumbents and candidates negatively, as their vote shares drop, but not as dramatically as one may think considering the graveness of the accusations and not to the extent that their re-elections are affected. Moreover, the outcomes are often found to be very diverse in the same countries, for example in the Spanish mayoral elections (Barberá et al. 2012).

Given the well-known severe negative effects of corruption on almost every indicator of human well-being, it is puzzling that voters seem to care so little about whom they support. Compared to economic decline, which may be the result of incompetence, mismanagement

and neglect, but just as well could be caused by factors beyond the influence of the government, it is hard to think of situations in which corruption just happen by accident. On the contrary, corrupt activities are intended and worse, they are almost always criminal and punishable by law (Lederman et al., 2005), which makes it very hard for politicians involved in corruption scandals to put the blame elsewhere.

Even if corrupt politicians are solely responsible for their actions, they may still get away with it and avoid the wrath of the voters. The more recent literature in this field has tried to figure out under what circumstances voters reward and punish corrupt politicians respectively. Jiménez & Caínzos (2006) discuss five conditions that need to be fulfilled if a scandal is to affect voter choice: awareness, evaluation, responsibility, saliency and alternative. Manzetti & Wilson (2007) find that in countries with strong clientelism, voters support corrupt leaders to a much higher extent, simply because they expect to be materially benefitted. Experimental research has also shown that good a good administrative record increases the chances for a corrupt politician to be re-elected (Muñoz et al. 2012).

Before moving in the direction of explaining the various and diverse outcomes in single countries, there is a need to examine whether the basic findings hold on more general level, by studying these phenomena comparatively both across countries and over time, which is the objective in this study. This study, thus fills the gap in the literature on accountability and corruption.

Data and method

One of the novelties with this study within this field of research is that it is comparative. Not only does it cover elections in 32 countries, it also does so for more than a 30-year period. All European countries that were considered *Free* by Freedom House the year the election was held, which have populations over 100 000, and which have parliamentary or semi-presidential systems are included in the dataset (see appendix for details).[43] The total number of elections is 215, of which 153 were held in the 18 West European countries and 62 in the 14 Central and East European countries. By this selection of cases a number of factors that have been considered important in the literature are held constant, such as the level of democracy and parliamentarism.

Information about the electoral campaigns has mainly been collected from the election reports in three political science journals: *Electoral Studies*, *West European Politics* and *European Journal of Political Research Yearbook*. The ambition has been to have every election

[43] The only exception is Switzerland, where the so called magic formula prescribes that the government shall be made up by the four main parties, and which in effect precludes governmental turnover. I have also omitted the first free elections in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, as there were by definition no democratically elected governments to hold accountable in those elections. In contrast, the Bulgarian, Croatian, Maltese, Romanian, Serbian and Slovenian first free elections are included since the preceding elections are considered sufficiently free and competitive. Moreover, both the Czech and Slovak Republics' first elections are compared to the results in the last Czechoslovak election in 1992. Finally, the 2006 Ukrainian election is excluded as the government for most of the preceding election period was formed under the previous presidential system.

covered by at least two of these journals and in case there has been only one report available, to supplement with other sources that publish election reports, such as the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (EPERN), which is managed by the Sussex European Institute, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which is an international organization of parliaments and finally *The Economist*. In 177 cases, reports from at least two of the three big journals have been analysed, in 32 cases only one has been available and additional sources have been used and in five cases election reports were missing for all three. In those cases, both IPU and The Economist have been used. There is only one case where less than two sources have been used – Montenegro 2009 – which only was covered by IPU.

Even though the election reports have a common structure (background, electoral system, the contending parties, the electoral campaign, the results and the outcome), the content, extent and quality of the sections vary quite a bit. There is certainly a risk that the issue of corruption has been under reported, in particular if the issue was not central in the campaign and/or advocated by peripheral parties. Likewise, minor corruption scandals may also go unnoticed. However, I do think that the risk of missing cases in which corruption has been a prominent feature of the campaign and in which major corruption scandals have occurred, is rather small. The usage of several sources for each election is further diminishing that risk. On the contrary I consider these sources as highly reliable in terms of spotting the most important issues in the campaign, if any major scandals occurred and who were involved.

From these election reports, my independent variables have been extracted, i.e. whether corruption has been an issue in the election campaign or no (yes-no) and whether any corruption scandal are mentioned in connection to the campaign (yes-no). Corruption may feature in many different ways; as allegations made by one or several parties against another parties or specific politicians, as allegations made by other actors, primarily the press against parties or candidates or as more general pledges by parties to fight corruption if elected. As this study focuses on the electoral effects on incumbents, only instances where the government, collectively or some parts of it, are targeted are coded as instances of corruption allegation. I have not made any distinction between outright allegations and more general anti-corruption pledges, as the latter implicitly also are directed against the government's inability to come to terms with the problem. Thus, all instances where the government or any incumbent party is accused of being corrupt by other party/ies or other actors or oppositional parties are promising to fight corruption, have been coded as 1 and the rest as 0.

Corruption scandals have been coded the same way. Only the instances where the government or parts of it are involved, which are the vast majority, are coded as 1. In a few cases there are old scandals that are brought up during the campaign and these instances are included and coded as 1 as well. Corruption allegations and corruption scandals do not necessarily come together. There are several instances were no party have chosen to bring up the issue despite the fact that their opponents have been involved in corruption scandals. The opposite is also common, i.e. that corruption allegations occur without the presence of any particular scandal.

Both these situations may result in voting on corrupt alternatives. In situations where corruption scandals occur without any party exploiting it, the voters may lack information

about it and hence vote unknowingly on a corrupt party. Also, if allegations are made against a party, but without any firm evidence, i.e. the presence of a corruption scandal, the voters may think that the accusations are false and politically motivated and still choose to vote for the accused party. Therefore I have constructed a third variable, which only codes instances where both factors are present as 1 and the rest as 0.

This paper is only concerned with the political corruption, i.e. not the petty corruption in which civil servants for example have to be bribed to carry out their duties nor the elite corruption in the business community. Political corruption is at hand when politicians are taking advantage of their position in order to win financial favours, either personally, for friends and relatives or seeking advantages for the party they represent (Huberts, 1995: 10). Thus, political corruption implies that the people that are supposed to represent the interest of the citizens violate the mandate given to them by furthering their own narrow interests instead.

In most cases, it is quite straightforward to code the election reports. The words "corruption" or "corruption scandals" have been the man indicator of the presence of that particular issue in the campaign. Sometimes it is obvious from the context of the reports that the corruption is an issue in the campaign even though not spelled out explicitly.

Corruption is hence close to and often mentioned together with scandals or affairs. They are not the same, however (Esaiasson & Kumlin, 2012). Whereas scandals can be about adultery or driving drunk, i.e. situations in which there is no personal gain at other's expenses (which nevertheless can be used by politicians to discredit their opponents), corruption scandals is a more narrow concept which in this paper will denote events where politicians have tried – or have been accused of trying - to gain financially in an inappropriate way and which are revealed to the public. Revelation of corruption is almost by definition always a scandal.

Although the election reports are quite extensive, they naturally have limitations, which make it difficult to code all the relevant variables. Naturally, the magnitude of the scandals may play a decisive role for the incumbents' performances. Minor scandals, which involve few people and minor values, may be discarded more easily by the voters. Even though I have not coded this systematically, the impression still is that the vast majority of corruption scandals have been serious affairs often leading to resignations of ministers and even trials. Very few can be considered as minor. Also the response from the affected party is a relevant factor. If the accused politicians are fired and perhaps even brought to trial, then the incumbents may suffer less than if they do nothing or even try to deny. Due to lack of information, this variable is impossible to code systematically. Finally the trustworthiness of the accusing party may also be relevant. If an extremist party is making allegation, the impact is assumingly less powerful than if another established party does so, but only if it has not itself been involved in corruption scandals. New parties, untainted by previous scandals, may be the ones with most credibility (see, Bågenholm, 2013). In the next step, this variable will be brought in as well.

In order to capture the electoral effects of corruption, two types of dependent variables are needed, one that measures the change in the voter support for the main incumbent party and

the government as a whole and one that measures the extent to which the government survives.

In order to do that we must first determine which parties belonging to the government and which ones that do not. This is much more complicated than it may sound, as there are several instances where not only junior partners come and go during the election period, but where the whole government is changed. If such changes occur early or late in the election period there is not so much problems, but if they take place in the middle of the period, it is very difficult to assess which one that should be counted, i.e. held accountable, in the next election. I have used a somewhat flexible cut off point around 18 months before the elections, meaning that a government that has been in office more than 18 months before the election is the one that is counted and not if the time is less than that. A few cases have been left out since they have been impossible to code accurately, e.g. Denmark in 1994. The same cut off point goes for governmental parties.

The party of the Prime Minister is coded as the Main Governmental Party (MGP). In a few cases where an electoral coalition is holding the post of Prime Minister and where that coalition splits in the next election, all parties are counted as incumbents. The performance of the government as a whole is calculated on the basis of the electoral results, i.e. the difference in share of votes between two consecutive elections, for all incumbent parties, including the MGP.

Also this calculation is sometimes very difficult, especially in countries where the party system is highly unstable, with continuously changing electoral alliances and coalitions, splinters and mergers and new parties winning representation. The main coding rule has been to compare the results for the same party, meaning that splinter parties are not considered as successor parties. Mergers are even trickier, since it sometimes is difficult to trace the support for the individual parties between two elections and it becomes impossible to calculate if one opposition and one incumbent party merge before an election. There are thus a few missing values on these two variables.

In some instances it is one of the junior coalition partners that are accused of corruption or involved in a scandal. In those cases it becomes misleading to focus on the MGP, as it is not involved itself. I have therefore constructed another variable, labelled Responsible Party, which tries to nail down the party that is most responsible for the corruption allegation or scandal. In some cases it is a junior party, but most often it is the MGP. If no specific party is mentioned, I consider the MGP has the party which is primarily responsible.

The final dependent variable is the extent of governmental change, which is measured on four grade scale as shown in table 1.

Table 1. **Governmental change coding**

Extent of change	Vote share of quitting parties (per cent)	Prime Minister's Party	Coding

Grand -Total	66,7-100	Quits	3
Large	99-66,7	Stays	2
	66,6-33,4	Quits	
Small	66,6-33,4	Stays	1
	33,3-0	Quits	
No -Minor	33,3-0	Stays	0

Comment: The No-Minor change category is coded as 0, the Small change category as 1, Large changes as 2 and Grand-Total changes as 3.

There are certainly other factors which may affect the electoral outcome, than just the party characteristics discussed above. Economic crisis and corruption or other scandals are likely to increase the likelihood of heavy losses for the governmental parties and gains for the opposition. To control for the economic performance of the governments I use GDP growth and unemployment rate the year before the election (World Bank). The level of corruption is another arguably important factor for the voters. Corruption levels are coded as high, medium or low for each country, based on their average score of Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1995-2011.[44] Finally, in order to punish corrupt incumbents, there must exist an attractive alternative to vote for. Therefore I include the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) as a control variable as well.[45] Previous research has found that majoritarian systems tend to decrease the level of corruption and increase accountability (Kunicová & Rose-Ackerman, 2005), but others have pointed to the fact that voters are less willing to punish their favourite party, if such a switch would result in a win for an opposition party, ideologically distant from the incumbent one (Jiménez & Caínzos, 2006), i.e. a situation which is common in countries with small electoral districts. In line with the latter argument I assume accountability should be facilitated under conditions where the voters have many ideologically close alternatives to choose among. Thus, the more parties there are the more the government is assumed to be punished.

Findings

The main question to be answered in this section is to what extent the electorate is holding corrupt incumbents accountable. Is it the case that people tend not to care so much about whether the politicians are honest or not, but rather let their choices be guided by other factors? Simply put, do corrupt governments survive as often and do incumbent parties doing as well electorally as their clean counterparts?

[44] Countries scoring between 8 and 10 are coded as low corrupt; countries scoring between 5 and 7,9 as medium corrupt and countries scoring below 5 as highly corrupt. The first CPI was published in 1995, which means that the figures for the first 15 years are estimated on the basis of last 15 years. As corruption is considered to be a sticky phenomenon, which changes quite modestly during a short term period, this strategy should not distort the facts in this respect.

[45] www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/

In table 2 descriptive statistics on the dependent variables are shown. It is obviously difficult for incumbents to please voters. Governmental parties tend to do much worse than opposition parties, on average losing more than seven percentage points. There are however huge variations in the sample ranging from -39 percentage points to +20. The main governmental parties are doing slightly better than their junior collaborators, losing on average about four percentage points. The same is true for Responsible parties, which is unsurprising given that most of the data is identical.

Table 2. Government performance

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev
Government performance	212	-38,6	20,4	-7,1	9,32
MGP performance	210	-34,1	20,4	-4,1	8,41
Responsible party performance	210	-34,1	20,4	-4,3	8,20

But even though the incumbents tend to lose, it is quite likely that they will remain in office. As shown in table 3, in 42 per cent of cases no or minor changes occur, whereas major or total changes happen in 38 per cent of the cases. In another eleven per cent of the cases only small changes take place. The voters thus tend to re-elect their governments, rather than throw them out.

Table 3. Change in government

	Frequency	Per cent	Cumulative Per cent
No-Minor	88	41,7	41,7
Small	24	11,4	53,1
Large	19	9,0	62,1
Major-total	80	37,9	100
Total	**211**	**100**	

The assumption is that corruption scandals and/or allegations will increase the losses for the incumbents and decrease the survival rates. Scandals (second row) have occurred in 71 of the 212 election campaigns reported in table 4, or in 33 per cent of the cases. How do the voters react when the government has been involved in corruption scandals? According to table 4 the answer is: not a whole lot. The difference between the performance of a scandal ridden and a clean government is a mere 3,4 percentage points and even less for the MGP and Responsible parties. These seemingly small differences do seem to have some more important consequences for the chances of governmental survival, however. Whereas the differences

when looking at no or minor changes are still small, the likelihood for major governmental turnover increases significantly, with about ten percentage points.

Turning to corruption allegations (third row), the voters seem to react slightly more negatively compared to when corruption scandals occurs. The differences between governments that face corruption allegations and governments that do not is still not huge but somewhat larger than when they were involved in scandals. A government loses on average around 9 percentage points when allegations are present compared to about 6 when they are not. The same is true for MGP performance, but here the differences are somewhat more pronounced. The Responsible Party variable is showing slightly larger losses, but only marginally so. As with scandals, the chances of remaining in office are considerably lower if the government are facing corruption allegations.

The most critical situation for a government is assumingly when it is both involved in corruption scandals and at the same time face corruption allegations. All figures also go in the expected direction, i.e. the losses for the government as a whole exceed 10 percentage points compared to less than 6 when the government is clean and the Responsible party loses more than 7 percentage points, compared to less than 3 when no corruption is at hand. It is moreover more likely than not that total or major governmental changes will take place.

The conclusion so far is that both corruption scandals and allegations seem to increase the losses for the incumbents and decrease their chances of survival, and particularly so when the two factors are combined. But the numbers seem rather modest and basically confirm earlier findings about limited voter accountability in relation to corruption.

Table 4. Scandals, allegations and government performance

	Government performance	**MGP performance**	**Responsible party performance**	**No-minor change**	**Major/Total change**
All	-7,1(212)	-4,1(210)	-4,3 (210)	41,7(212)	37,9(212)
Scandals	-9,1(70)	-5,6(69)	-6,3(69)	40,6(28)	47,8(33)
Allegations	-9,3(71)	-6,3(70)	-6,9(70)	37,1(26)	47,1(33)
Scandals and allegations	-10,1(47)	-6,4(46)	-7,2(46)	34,8(16)	52,2(24)
No scandal or allegation	-5,7(118)	-2,8(117)	-2,8 (117)	42,4(50)	32,2(38)

Considering the quite small differences in most of the columns, one may doubt that these are statistically significant. In order to test that I run a number of bivariate analyses, displayed in table 5. The top three row how the independent variables and the last four the control variables. Corruption allegation turns out to be the strongest of the three independent variables. It is significantly correlated with three of four dependent variable and more strongly so than the combined scandal and allegation variable, which is a bit surprising. Corruption scandal is only correlated with Government performance and Responsible party, but on the

lower significant level and less strong. Interestingly enough, none of the variables reach the significance level when it comes to government change.

Two of the control variables, level of corruption and unemployment rate, are more strongly correlated to all the dependent variables, whereas neither GDP growth and Effective Number of Electoral Parties are significant, except for the latter with Government performance. We will now turn to the multivariate regression analysis in order to find out whether the independent variables hold under control for the economic situation, level of corruption and number of available parties to choose among.

Table 5. Bivariate correlations

	Government performance	**MGP performance**	**Responsible party performance**	**Government change**	**N**
Corruption scandal	-.156*	-.122	-.167*	.091	210-212
Corruption allegation	- .168*	-.185**	-218**	.117	210-212
Scandals and allegations	-.176*	-.145*	-.188**	.120	210-211
Corruption	.268**	225**	.231**	-.257**	210-212
Unemployment	-.255**	-.275**	-278**	.187*	188-189
GDP growth	.135	.102	.115	-.093	206-207
ENEP	-.139*	.063	.048	.082	209-210

*sig. 95%-level
**sig. 99%-level

In table 6, the dependent variable is Government performance. In model 1and 4 the independent variable is Corruption allegation, in model 2 and 5 it is Corruption scandal and in model 3 and 6 it is Scandals and allegations. For each of the independent variable I first check if it holds when only controlling for unemployment and then for all four control variables.

All three independent variables remain significant when controlling for unemployment rate, though on a lower level. Only corruption allegation also remains significant in the full model (4), whereas unemployment is the only variable to hold in all models. The others are not even close at reaching any level of significance. The Scandals and allegations variable in model 6, however, is extremely close at becoming significant (.051), which leads to the conclusion that Corruption allegation and Scandals and Allegations have independent effects on how well the government as a collective performs and the effect is around a decline of about 3 percentage points, which equals about six percentage points higher unemployment. It thus takes quite a big decrease in unemployment rate to match a clean government.

Table 6. Multivariate OLS regressions: Government performance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Corruption allegation	-3,477*			-3,417*		
Corruption scandals		-3,065*			-2,499	
Scandals and allegations			-3,466*			-3,153
Unemployment	-,470**	-.502**	-,495**	-,341*	-.337*	-.335*
Corruption				1,084	1,731	1,555
GDP growth				,296	,245	,236
ENEP				-,287	-,190	-,271
Constant	-1,785	1,628	-1,933	-4,301	-6,309	-5,916
Adjusted R2	.086	.089	.080	.096	.089	.092
N	188	188	188	186	186	186

*sig. 95%-level
**sig. 99%-level

Table 7 has the same format, but the dependent variable here is Responsible Party Performance. The results are pretty much consistent with table 6, which is quite natural given the high correlation between the two dependent variables. Unemployment again stands out as the most persistent factor,, whereas in particular Corruption scandals fail to reach significance in any model, even though it is very close in model 2 (.056). Corruption allegation also again stands up to all the control variables in the full model.

Table 7. Multivariate OLS regressions: Responsible Party Performance

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Corruption allegation	-3,437**			-3,333*		
Corruption scandals		-2,396			-1,674	
Scandals and allegations			-2,947*			-2,414
Unemployment	-,459**	-.498**	-,489**	-,430**	-.421**	-.420**
Corruption				.484	1,247	1,077
GDP growth				,255	,213	,229
ENEP				-,511	-,627	-,582
Constant	,707	,695	,485	-3,507	-6,156	-5,646
Adjusted R2	.104	.085	.089	.121	.102	.107
N	188	188	188	186	186	186

*sig. 95%-level
**sig. 99%-level

In the final table the dependent variable is Government change, which is more weakly correlated with the other two dependent variables. The results are also quite different from the former two analyses. First of all, none of the three independent variables becomes significant in any of the models. Secondly, unemployment is not significant when controlling for the all the other factors. Instead it is the level of corruption, which is the only significant factor in models 4-6. Increasing the level of corruption, thus increases the likelihood that the government will fall, which is exactly what one would expect. It is also then the case that adding scandals and or allegation do not contribute further to government turnover.

Table 8. Multivariate OLS regressions: Government change

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Corruption allegation	,337			,209		
Corruption scandals		,292			,170	
Scandals and allegations			,418			,323
Unemployment	,051*	,055*	,053*	.019	.019	.020
Corruption				-.331*	-.368*	-.335*
GDP growth				-.044	-,040	-,043
ENEP				.064	.058	.065
Constant	.866**	,852**	,865**	1,643**	1,750**	1,632**
Adjusted R2	.038	.035	.042	.066	.066	.072
N	188	188	188	186	186	186

*sig. 95%-level
**sig. 99%-level

Another interesting finding which will be subject to more detailed analyses in the next stage, is the fact that there seems to be different logics of accountability in the established democracies in Western Europe compared to the more recently democratized countries in Central and Eastern Europe. When controlling for east and west, all other variables becomes insignificant. It is not included in the regressions since it is a variable which captures several features, of which some are captured by the control variables included, such as level of corruption and unemployment. These countries are also poorer and it seems quite logical that their citizens have more reasons to be more dissatisfied than their western neighbors. When analyzing the two sets of regions separately, it is obvious that the three independent variables fare a lot better in the east than in the west and in the models presented. As corruption is a big problem in almost all of those countries and arguably more systemic than in the west, it is not surprising that the electorate in the east is less tolerant towards corrupt parties and politicians. In the west by contrast, or at least in those countries with low level of corruption, it may be the case that the citizens to a higher extent consider corruption scandals and allegations as exceptions to the norm and as long as the offender is exposed, fired and possibly put on trial. These are merely speculations at this point, but well worth examining in future research. Another interesting contrast between east and west is that GDP growth is the most important factor in the west, whereas unemployment has the upper hand in the east.

Concluding remarks

This study has resulted in a number of interesting findings, which enhances the knowledge about accountability mechanisms more generally and to what extent corrupt politicians are rewarded or punished by the voters. The first and positive conclusion is that corruption in general seems to affect incumbents negatively and independent from other factors. Voters actually throw corrupt rascals out. Corruption allegations have in previous studies been found to be a very powerful weapon in electoral campaigns, especially for new parties (Bågenholm, 2013). In this study we can also see that the other side, i.e. the accused part, suffer correspondently, albeit not to the extent that the government tend to fall more often. Thus, the voters are not throwing the 'rascals' out as a consequence of corrupt behaviour. They rather send a 'warning' that they do not approve. Considering that allegations are just allegations, one would expect involvement in corruption scandal, i.e. hard evidence of corrupt activities, to have a stronger effect. But surprisingly enough, the opposite is true. It could of course depend on the data, for example that authors' of election reports presuppose that a corruption allegation is substantiated unless otherwise stated. It may also be the fact that some of the scandals are considered as minor by the voters and/or that the politicians took care of the problem in satisfactory manner.

Also the level of corruption in a country matters, but seemingly only when it comes to government change and more so in Central and Eastern Europe than in the west. That is not very surprising, but to my knowledge a neglected control factor in the economic voting literature.

A final reflection is that even though this study has found support for at least limited voter accountability on a general level, there is obviously a huge variation between elections and countries. There are evidently many elections in which the electorate has thrown out the rascals as a direct response to corruption scandals or corruption allegations, but there is also ample evidence of the contrary. The next step in this research endeavor will be to look more closely at the cases in which scandals and allegations have taken place with the objective to find out under which circumstances the voters punish the incumbents.

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Appendix

Country	Democratic[46]	No of elections[47]
Austria		9 (1983 – 2008)
Belgium		9 (1981 – 2010)
Bulgaria	1991	6 (1991 – 2009)
Croatia	2000	4 (2000 – 2011)
Czech Republic[48]	1990	5 (1996 – 2010)
Denmark		11 (1981 – 2011)
Estonia	1991	5 (1995 – 2011)
Finland		8 (1983 – 2011)
France		7 (1981 – 2007)
Germany		8 (1983 – 2009)
Greece		11 (1981 – 2009)
Hungary	1990	5 (1994 – 2010)
Iceland		8 (1983 – 2009)
Ireland		10 (1981 – 2011)
Italy		8 (1983 – 2010)
Latvia	1991	6 (1995 – 2011)
Lithuania	1991	4 (1996 – 2008)
Luxemburg		6 (1984 – 2009)
Malta	1987	6 (1987 – 2008)
Montenegro	2008	1 (2009)
Netherlands		10 (1981 – 2010)
Norway		8 (1981 – 2009)
Poland	1990	7 (1993 – 2011)
Portugal		10 (1983 – 2011)
Romania	1996	4 (1996 – 2008)
Serbia[49]	2002	3 (2003 – 2008)
Slovakia[50]	1993	5 (1994 – 2010)
Slovenia	1991	6 (1992 – 2011)
Spain		9 (1982 – 2011)
Sweden		9 (1982 – 2010)
Ukraine[51]	2005	1 (2007)

[46] A country is considered democratic when it is rated as ”Free” by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org). Years missing indicate that the countries were already considered Free from the starting point of the period under study, i.e. in 1981.

[47] The first democratic elections in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are omitted since there is no democratic government to hold accountable in those elections.

[48] The first election in the Czech Republic is compared to the last Czechoslovak election in 1992.

[49] In 2002 Yugoslavia was still in existence. It consisted of two federal subjects, Serbia and Montenegro. Between 2003 and 2005 the federation had loosed and the country was called Serbia & Montenegro. In 2006 Montenegro became independent and were rated Free in 2008.

[50] Slovakia was rated *Partly free* in 1996 and 1997 and *Free* again in 1998, when the elections were held. Slovakia has been rated as *Free* since then. The first election in Slovakia is compared to the last Czechoslovak election in 1992.

[51] The 2006 election is omitted since the government for most of the preceding election period was appointed under the previous presidential system.

United Kingdom	7 (1983 – 2010)
Total	**215**

Section 2 (UCL)

Publication list

6. Hanley, Seán and Allan Sikk. 2013. “Economy, corruption or promiscuous voters? Explaining the success of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties in Eastern Europe”. Later version published as: “Economy, corruption or floating voters? Explaining the breakthroughs of anti-establishment reform parties in eastern Europe”, in Party Politics, 2016, Vol.22(4), pp.522-533.
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8. Sikk, Allan and Philipp Köker. 2016. “Rejuvenation or renomination? Corruption and candidate turnover in Central and Eastern Europe”.

6. Hanley, Seán and Allan Sikk. 2013. "Economy, corruption or promiscuous voters? Explaining the success of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties in Eastern Europe".

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Abstract

We discuss an emerging group of successful parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that combine anti-establishment appeals with support for moderate policies of political and social reform, which we term anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs). Examples include the Simeon II National Movement (Bulgaria), Res Publica (Estonia), New Era (Latvia), Freedom and Solidarity (Slovakia), TOP09 and Public Affairs (Czech Republic) and Positive Slovenia. We carry out a comparative analysis using the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) technique to identify the conditions under which AERPs made electoral breakthroughs in the period 1997-2013. We identify five sufficient paths for AERP breakthrough representing distinct combinations of several causal conditions: high corruption, rising corruption, rising unemployment, previous success of new parties and the previous success of new parties. We conclude by reviewing the implications of our findings for further research.

In recent years fears have been expressed that the falling away of the EU accession conditionalities and the impact of the global recession is the leading rise of radical-right and illiberal populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Rupnik 2007, Bohle & Greskovits 2009). Electoral breakthroughs by groupings such as Jobbik in Hungary in 2010 are often taken as exemplars of this trend (Jordan 2010, Wolin 2011). However, without denying the importance of the growth on the radical right for European politics the nature of many new anti-establishment parties has in the region been incompletely understood.

A number of new parties in CEE – at least in their initial stages – have combined classically populist characteristics such as anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric, espousal of direct democracy, a stress on moral renewal or technocratic expertise (Schedler 1997) with *moderate* pro-market policies and a liberal (or relatively neutral) stance on socio-cultural questions. Certain such parties such as, Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria in 2001 (Barany 2002) or Res Publica in Estonia in 2003 (Taagepera 2006) enjoyed landslide electoral success and immediately became central players in new governing coalitions. Others achieved more modest success such as Public Affairs (VV) in the Czech Republic or Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia – which entered their respective parliaments in 2010 – but entered government coalitions with little difficulty. In other cases in CEE such parties have been conspicuous by their electoral marginality or absence.

The rise of such parties has potentially far-reaching consequences for party systems and democracy in CEE, as unlike more radical populist groupings, such parties can achieve spectacular overnight electoral breakthrough and, even when they do not, usually have high coalition potential. In this article we analyse the conditions under which the electoral breakthroughs of such parties, which we term *parties of anti-establishment reform* (AERPs), can occur using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).

We proceed as follows. We first define our concept of the *anti-establishment reform party* (AERP) relating it to relevant literatures on new and outsider parties, and discussing parties we classify as AERPs. We then present the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) method and briefly review its earlier use as a technique for analysing the emergence of new parties. Following that, we present our QCA analysis of conditions of breakthrough for AERPs in contemporary CEE party systems and report our findings. Finally, we reflect upon the implications of our findings and discuss how the concept of AERPs and the analytical strategy used might be extended to West European cases, where AERP-type parties have begun to break through in some states, such as Peppe Grillio's Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy and Team Stronach in Austria.

Anti-establishment reform parties

As Kevin Deegan-Krause (2010) has observed, despite their diversity, there are clear commonalities between new parties that have broken through in recent elections in CEE making it possible to speak of

> … not exactly a new party family (though in their cultural liberalism and anti-corruption emphases they share significant elements) and not exactly a new party

> type … but with strong and intersecting elements of both. Nor is it unique to Central Europe alone but elements of it have emerged also in the West.

Many authors who have noted the phenomenon have viewed such parties as expressing a sub-type of populism, speaking of 'new/centrist populism' (Pop-Eleches 2010), 'centrist populism' (Učeň et al 2005; Učeň 2007) or 'liberal populism' (Mudde 2007). Others have defined them more narrowly as based on a distinct (anti-)political appeal or issue dimension: Bågenholm & Heinö (2010), for example, term them 'anti-corruption parties, while Demker (2008) speaks of 'virtue parties' and Hartlieb (2013), stressing organisational as well as programmatic aspects, speaks of 'anti-elite cyberparties'.

We conceptualize these parties somewhat differently as *anti-establishment reform parties* (AERPs) that exhibit – to different extents – three core features: (1) a politics of *mainstream reformism* (2) usually framed in terms *anti-establishment* of appeal to voters; and (3) *genuine organizational newness* as a party.

By 'mainstream reformism' we understand two things: firstly, that programmatically a party is committed to mainstream models of liberal democracy and the market economy does not share either the inclination of radical right forces to 'illiberal democracy', illiberal ethnocentrism or social conservatism (Mudde 2007) nor the anti-capitalism of the radical left (March & Mudde 2005).[52] AERPs have an active commitment to *political reform* seeking to make major changes to the political institutions or to the way politics is conducted or to improve, modernize or unblock the working of liberal democracy or the liberal market economy. Such themes might, depending on context, take the form of appeals to fight corruption, replace corrupt or inefficient elites with energetic and competent personnel; tackle overlooked policy areas; or create new democratic structures linking citizens and politicians (sometimes extending into anti-partyism); or novelty of political style or a 'project of newness' (Sikk 2012).

We also understand such parties as *anti-establishment* parties.[53] We derive this term from Abedi's work (2004) on 'anti-political establishment parties', that is parties that perceive themselves as challengers to establishment parties and see a fundamental divide between the people and the political establishment (Abedi 2004: 12).[54]

[52] Unlike Pop-Eleches (2010) in his characterisation of 'centrist populists' we do not regard euroscepticism as a non-mainstream position, although most AERPs are not eurosceptic.

[53] We avoid the term 'populist' because we feel it is imprecise: even minimal definitions such as that of Mudde (2004:542) tend conflate anti-establishment appeal and (moralistic) anti-political appeals, which while often empirically associated are, we contend, conceptually distinct. Although for the simplicity we AERPs in this paper in a conventional dichotomous way, we are sympathetic to the view that categories such as party families and party types should be viewed configuratively as 'fuzzy sets'

[54] In our use of the term we focus on the first part of Abedi's definition: on how AERPs frame themselves in relation to established parties Many AERPs do, however, use the 'populist' construction of People vs Establishment Abedi refers to. Abedi's definition also includes a third element: that a party challenge the status quo on major policy and political system issues. For our cases parties' political reformism challenges the status quo on a major 'political system issue'. We avoid label 'anti-political establishment party' because we find it ambiguous.

The third element of our definition is that in organizational terms parties should be 'genuinely new'. In this article we apply Sikk's (2005: 399) definition of new parties as those successful in elections for the first time that are "not successor to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members" (Sikk 2005: 399; see also Sikk 2012). We thus exclude alliances and mergers between established parties, as well as parties which are products of breakaways from established parties.[55]

In defining AERPs a group of parties in this way we are *not* asserting the existence of a coherent new party type or distinct sub-type, still less suggesting the emergence of a new party family.[56] Rather we advance the term as a broad working category, whose validity will be tested by the search for common causation patterns and which may be revised in the light of empirical findings.[57] Rather we have formulated the category of *anti-establishment reform party* as an *ideal type* in the full expectation that the membership for some parties will be quite fuzzy.[58] We thus advance the term as a broad working category, which may be revised in the light of empirical findings.[59]

To identify AERPs empirically we first identified genuinely new parties and eliminated those regarded in the literature as on the radical-right or radical-left (Mudde 2007, March 2010) or whose programmes or declarations clearly placed them on the radical right or left. We then examined party programmes and statements and used our case knowledge to distinguish those new parties making anti-establishment reformist appeals from more conventional political groups. We thus excluded some successful new parties, predominantly or radical right groupings (Poland 2001, Bulgaria 2005 Hungary 2010) or Green parties (Estonia 2007, Czech Republic 2006) In all instances, the unit of analysis and scorings refer to a party *at the particular time* when a parliamentary election took place: CEE parties, both new and established, can experience considerable fluctuation and evolution in their identity and programmatic appeals .[60]

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[55] We take this to be to be parties formed where a majority of parliamentary deputies have come from a single established party. This is slightly different from Sikk (2005: 399), where the last condition excludes 'participation by prime ministers and significant portions of cabinet ministers and members of parliament'.

[56] This is one of the reasons why we remain wary of the 'centrist populist' label – efforts to clarify the once ambiguous label of 'populism' have rendered it a rigid conceptual category (Sikk 2009).

[57] The different pathways to electoral success which, we anticipate, QCA will highlight may,for example, enable us to clarify both the nature and membership of this group of parties – and, indeed, to explore the extent to which it is a coherent group.

[58] We are sympathetic to the view that many categories such as party families and party types should be viewed as 'fuzzy sets' whose different elements need not logically imply one another. However, our approach to classification is this papter close to the 'family resemblance' approach discussed by Sikk (2009), which argues that not classifying criteria need necessarily be present for a positive classification decision to be made

[59] Indeed the validity of the category will to an extent be tested by the search for shared causation patterns The different pathways to electoral success which, we anticipate, QCA will highlight may, for example, enable us to clarify both the nature and membership of this group of parties – and, indeed, to explore the extent to which it is a coherent group.

[60] Some parties such as Smer in Slovakia or Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland combine AERP features with clear conventional ideological appeals, often using the latter as subsequent consolidation and party-building strategy to transform themselves into more mainstream parties of left or right..

In parliamentary elections in CEE since 1994, we believe 21 parties can be identified as successful AERPs.[61] Strikingly, as Pop-Eleches (2010) notes in relation to 'unconventional parties' more broadly defined, AERPs as a phenomenon of CEE is mostly confined to the last 10-15 years:[62] Pop-Eleches (2010) plausibly explains this in terms of the dynamics of 'third generation' post-communist elections, when, having elected and been disappointed with the government performance of conventional parties of left and right, voters turn to unconventional new parties.[63]

We therefore investigate AERPs' performance focusing on 'third generation' elections (Pop-Eleches, 2010) to the lower house of CEE parliaments that took place between September 1997 and December 2012. We list the AERPs included in our analysis below in table 1.[64] We have excluded from our analysis Romania–where no AERPs have materialized. We contend that this may be related to the markedly low level of democratic freedoms in that country compared to other EU states (as indicated by *Freedom House* political rights and press freedom scores); for the sake of analytical clarity excluded this country from our analysis.

QCA as a tool for understanding party emergence

To examine the emergence of AERPs we employ Fuzzy Set form of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a comparative technique which seeks to formalize the logic of qualitative case-based comparison by identifying relevant configurations of causes (conditions) and effects (outcomes) using fuzzy algebra and sets (Ragin 1987, 2000; Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Rather than coding the presence or absence of conditions and outcomes dichotomously as in the original Crisp Set version of QCA (csQCA) (Ragin 1987), fsQCA codes cases in terms of their degree of set membership in outcome and causal conditions. Degree of membership in

[61] Slovakia's 1998 election would classify as a positive case because of the success of the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) (8.0 per cent). However, we do not classify this as a 'third generation' election as in marked the first time that centre-right liberal/Christian Democrat opposition gained office.

[62] Only three AERPs were successful before the 'third generation' election: the Bulgarian Business Bloc in 1994 and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) and Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) (both in Slovakia in 1998).

[63] More simply, it might be that parties and party systems in new democracies require a certain interval to become 'established' –organizationally, electorally and in the public mind – implying a certain delay before anti-establishment parties can become meaningful challengers. Other authors make broadly the same point about timing Deegan-Krause & Haughton (2009), for example, posit the gradual erosion of parties which formed and established themselves in the immediate post-transitional period, because of accumulative effect of the post-communist environment (low levels of party identification with parties; weak party organizations; high (perceived) levels of corruption).

[64] It may be objected that outset set of AERPs overlaps heavily with that of new parties and that our analysis is thus, in effect, a study of successful new parties. This is a valid empirical observation. However, as a category AERPs are a conceptually distinct subset of 'new parties' which, we contend, while relevant as measure of change and (in)stability in party systems, but lacks meaning in itself. The fact that most successful new parties in CEE have been AERPs and that – contrary to the fears of some observers - that only a small minority have emerged on radical right or radical left is striking – and we believe, underlines the importance of our research. In other regions (for example, Western Europe) we would anticipate a more diverse set of new parties.

outcomes and conditions are expressed as values ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a 'crossover value' of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5.

QCA is well suited to the cross-national comparison of the varying success of new types of party, where a relatively high number of cases and high levels of casual complexity. By causal complexity we understand the fact variables can work in distinct configurations rather than individually and the fact that there may be several causal paths producing the same outcome (equifinality). QCA is able to capture a mix both of causes common to instances of a phenomenon and those distinct to specific paths, which conventional quantitative multivariate analysis can struggle with, while allows analysis of a large number of cases, which would overwhelm conventional qualitative case study methods. It has thus been used as an analytical tool to examine the comparative success of new emerging party types across Europe, for which such causal complexity – usually the configuration of multitude of social and institutional factors – is the norm (Redding & Viterna 1999; Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011).

Selecting and operationalizing QCA conditions

In accordance with standard fsQCA practice (Schneider and Wagemann 2010), we first define the outcome condition and potential causal conditions and expressing them in fuzzy set terms. However, as discussed below, in contrast to most QCA-based studies of new party emergence, we use elections rather than countries as our unit of analysis. Each election is assigned a degree of membership in each condition ranging from 1.0 (full membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a 'crossover value' of maximum ambiguity set at 0.5. Although expressed numerically, the degrees of set membership are anchored in researchers' theoretically-based judgments, with at least three key anchor points (0, 0.5 and 1), each corresponding to a verbal description. Where raw data for conditions is continuous, set memberships are calculated following the direct calibration technique proposed by Ragin (2008: 85-105).[65]

Outcome: AERP electoral breakthrough (BREAKTHRU)

In this article, we focus on the *initial breakthrough* of AERPs. These breakthroughs are clearly identifiable events with immediate consequences for democratic governance and longer term patterns of party system change. This focus also reflects our understanding of AERPs more as a political strategy, than a party family *manqué*: unless they disintegrate, AERPs may transform themselves after initial breakthrough into more conventional programmatic parties of varying ideological hues, downplaying or dropping their anti-establishment appeals (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). Such processes of transformation and consolidation are, however, beyond the scope of this article.

[65] The calibration was conducted in R using the 'QCA' package (version 1.0-5, Duşa & Thiem 2012) .

Accordingly, we use single *elections* as our units of analysis. In crisp set analysis, the coding of breakthrough would be straightforward – whether an AERP had achieved a certain level of electoral support (1) or not (0). For fuzzy set QCA analysis, the coding is more nuanced. We first defined the outcome set as *AERP breakthrough* and specified thresholds of full membership, full non-membership and maximum ambiguity (0.5 membership) (see Table 1), above which the case is more in than out of the set and below which it is more out than in. Based on these anchors, we then used the method of direct calibration suggested by Ragin (2008: 71-108) to transform the raw data (AERPs' electoral support in an election) and calculate individual cases' membership in the outcome set.[66]

[66] Where two AERPs were successful – a very rare occurrence – we took their combined scores as our point of departure for coding. Empirically, there was only three such instance (Slovakia 2002, Czech Republic 2010 and Slovenia 2012) where we judged that the combining the electoral support of the two AERPs was meaningful.

Table 1. Electoral support for AERPs 1997-2012

Election	*Successful AERP*	*Votes %*	*Set membership in BREAKTHRU*
BGR 2001	Simenon II Movement (NDSV)	42.7	1.00
BGR 2005	–	0.0	0.00
BGR 2009	Movement for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB)	39.7	1.00
CZE 2002	–	0.0	0.00
CZE 2006	–	0.0	0.00
CZE 2010	TOP09, Public Affairs (VV)	27.6	1.00
EST 1999	–	0.0	0.00
EST 2003	Res Publica	24.6	0.99
EST 2007	–	0.0	0.00
EST 2011	–	0.0	0.00
HUN 1998	–	0.0	0.00
HUN 2002	–	0.0	0.00
HUN 2006	–	0.0	0.00
HUN 2010	Politics Can Be Different (LMP)	7.5	0.54
LTU 2000	New Union (SL)	19.6	0.98
LTU 2004	Labor Party (DP)	28.4	1.00
LTU 2008	National Resurrection Party (TPP)	15.1	0.92
LTU 2012	Way of Courage (DK)	9.8	0.70
LVA 1998	New Party (JP)	7.3	0.53
LVA 2002	New Era (JL)	24.0	0.99
LVA 2006	–	0.0	0.00
LVA 2010	–	0.0	0.00
LVA 2011	Zalters Reform Party (ZRP)	21.3	0.99
POL 1997	–	0.0	0.00
POL 2001	Law and Justice (PiS)	9.5	0.68
POL 2005	–	0.0	0.00
POL 2007	–	0.0	0.00
POL 2011	Palikot Movement (RP)	10.5	0.74
SVK 2002	SMER, Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO)	21.5	0.99
SVK 2006	–	0.0	0.00
SVK 2010	Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)	12.2	0.82
SVK 2012	Ordinary People (OLaNO)	11.4	0.79
SVN 2008	–	0.0	0.00
SVN 2011	Positive Slovenia (PS-LZJ), Virant List (DLGV)	36.9	1.00

Source: European Elections Database and websites of national electoral authorities.
Scores for parties with less than 4% were not used, resulting in formal raw score of 0.0.

How should 'electoral breakthrough' of an AERP be understood? AERPs have considerably greater vote winning potential than niche or radical parties that have been the focus of most earlier QCA studies of new party emergence (Redding & Viterna 1999; Veughlers & Magnan 2005; Hanley 2011; Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). In the elections we study, there have been two cases – Bulgaria 2001 and 2009 – where a single AERP was supported by more than a third of

the electorate and one (Slovenia 2011) where the combined vote for AERPs was above this level. We set the threshold of *fully in* the set at a level of massive electoral support (30 per cent of votes or more), when the AERP becomes the first or second biggest party and hence a major party in a coalition government or a major opposition party. We set the crossover point (0.5 set membership) at 7 per cent of the vote, which is sufficient to win parliamentary representation safely and to gain a share of seats relatively proportional to the party's vote share, with the AERP becoming a minor governing or opposition party. We deem any election where there is no AERP vote to be fully out of the set (0). Because of data limitations, we have only coded support for AERPs in cases where they entered the parliament. However, we noted empirically in all elections under study here the presence of small or tiny AERP-like parties that failed to enter the parliament. However, such parties are fairly marginal and highly ephemeral it is often hard to find reliable data on their political orientation.

Causal conditions

The study of AERPs in CEE is a new area and unlike previous QCA studies of the emergence of new parties (Redding & Viterna 1999, Veugelers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & Jiglau 2011) we cannot draw on a well-established literature to identify and operationalize favourable conditions for AERP breakthrough. Instead we are quite explicitly engaging in an exercise in theory building. In picking out such conditions we draw on a thin body of work which has so far addressed AERP-like parties directly, as well as on the literatures on the emergence of new parties and new party types, populism, and on our own specialist knowledge of key cases supplemented by secondary literature on CEE parties and elections. [67]

Although QCA is most commonly applied to *test* theories - drawing on well established literatures for its causal conditions it can serve as equally effective tool for *build* theory (Amenta & Poulsen, 1994; Rihoux & Ragin 2009; Ragin & Schneider 2011). The most important distinction between the two types of application is that researchers engaged in theory building should at the outset draw a clear distinction between analytical strategies focusing on *causal sufficiency* and strategies focusing on *causal necessity* (Ragin & Schneider 2011).

As we are dealing with diverse group of parties whose electoral success is unlikely to be covered by one or more necessary conditions in this paper we adopt 'sufficiency-centred strategy'. As Ragin & Schneider (2011) argue, if there is a conflict, a sufficiency-centred approach to theory-building will typically prefer a more detailed but more consistent solution which establishes clear connection between cause and effect for some cases to a more encompassing but less consistent solution.[68]

[67] In terms of six approaches to selecting conditions outlined by Rihoux & Ragin (2008: 124-130), our work falls between the inductive approach drawing on case knowledge and the perspective approach where a set of causal conditions representing two or three different models are tested in the same model.

[68] As Ragin & Schneider (2011) put it sufficiency-centred theory-building approaches will focus on 'emptying box 4' (eliminating cases where causes are strong, but outcome weak).

Crisis and economic hard times

One of the most prevalent explanations for the rise of new anti-establishment parties across Europe in recently elections among commentators is to view them as a response to the pressures exerted by the global economic downturn that began 2008-9 and the broader climate of austerity that resulted from it and parallel developments such as the Eurozone crisis (Bartels 2013; Cramme 2013; Krastev 2013; Van Biezen & Wallace H 2013: 294-7). Such expectations echo the political science literature, where the inability of established political actors to deliver reasonable economic conditions is widely understood as a potential driver of (anti-incumbent or anti-establishment) protest voting for new parties (see, for example Roberts 2009). This pattern has been more marked in CEE where party identification is weaker than in Western Europe and voter dealignment much higher (Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2012). We look therefore at two economic conditions that might be expected to enhance the chances of AERP breakthrough: *economic contraction* (NOGRO) and *rising unemployment* (INCUNEMP)

The global economic downturn of 2008-9 affected all states in the region, but to markedly different degrees. Some had reduced growth rates, while other experienced sharp economic contraction. There were also national variations in rates reflecting local economic experiences and the varying success of different trajectories of post-communist reform.

Economic contraction (NOGRO) has both direct effects on consumption and levels of public provision and broader socio-political effects in stoking public discontent with incumbents. Extreme levels of economic contraction also create a sense of social crisis which also serves voters to look for political alternatives. Such effects may be especially marked in CEE where governments have been expected to deliver economic growth at the levels offering a realistic perspective of catching up with richer West European members of the European Union.

To operationalise this condition, we set the threshold for full membership (being "fully in") at a 5 per cent decline in a country's GDP. The minimum threshold ("fully out") is set at economic growth of 5 per cent under because of very fast economic growth, a phenomenon empirically observed in CEE states at various points since 1989. We set the cross-over point at 0 per cent annual change in GDP, corresponding to a stagnant economy.

We argue that it is more meaningful to look at economic growth level over two previous years, as the effects of economic growth might become visible with a slight delay. We expect that a period of economic downturn, especially if very marked, may have socio-psychological impact which is felt even if the economy subsequently picks up. As with rising unemployment, we would see it as generating a wider sense of economic insecurity underlining the vulnerability of small and often weak CEE economies.

A second consequence of economic downturn is *increasing unemployment* (INCUNEMP). This directly and immediately impacts those made redundant and their families, but arguably also a far wider groups of voters who may begin to fear for their own job security.[69] Even at

[69] We do not include the level of unemployment per se as a condition. Levels of background unemployment can vary quite significantly between states and, while having undeniable social and political impacts, can quickly become socially and politically 'normalised'.

relatively low levels, sharply increasing levels of unemployment represent a favourable condition for a turn to non-establishment politics and thus perhaps an AERP breakthrough.

Hence, we incorporate a condition of *sharply increasing unemployment (INCUNEMP)* which we operationalise as the change in unemployment rates over the two years before the election. We set the maximum threshold, corresponding to full membership in the set at an increase of 3 percentage points and the lower threshold ("fully out of set") at a 3 percentage point decrease in unemployment levels. The crossover point is set at a near zero decrease of 0.5 percentage points.[70]

As illustrated in table 2, these two, somewhat different conditions relating to the economy enable us to identify four distinct socio-economic conjunctures: *economic contraction* where GDP is falling and unemployment increasing; *economic boom* where GDP is increasing and unemployment falling; *restructuring* or *reform* where the economy is growth but shedding jobs; and *recession with a social safety valve* where unemployment is falling but the economy contracting. The final scenario is empirically unlikely and would correspond to a situation where there was a mass withdrawal from the labour market due to emigration or social policies promoting early retirement (Vanhyusse 2006).

Table 2. Possible configurations of economic conditions

	Rising unemployment (INCUNEMP)	**Falling unemployment (~INCUNEMP)**
Economic contraction (NOGRO)	Recession (NOGRO*INCUNEMP)	Recession with safety valve (NOGRO*~INCUNEMP)
Economic growth (~NOGRO)	Reform and restructuring (*~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*)	Economic boom *(~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP)*

Perceived corruption and distrust

In contrast to explanations which foreground economic recession and the associated impacts of growing unemployment, some authors the rise of anti-establishment parties and movements as a *crisis of confidence in conventional democratic politics* and the honesty and competence of established elites and parties (Kaldor & Selchow 2013; Žižek 2013). In particular, the rise of AERP-like parties has been linked to levels of perceived corruption and the politicization of corruption (Deegan-Krause 2010; Bågenholm & Heinö 2010). This may be understood

[70] Some of the countries did not see any changes in unemployment levels in the election year. It is good QCA practice to avoid calibration at 0.5 set membership. We therefore set the cross-over point at a marginal improvement of unemployment situation, as it could be argued that unemployment needs to drop by more than 0.5 percentage points in order to be perceived as an improvement.

both in terms of direct concern about corruption and a focus for a more inchoate sense that political elites are self-serving, untrustworthy and unrepresentative.

To operationalise levels of perceived corruption we use Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which although often criticized as poorly reflecting "real" levels of corruption, is arguably a meaningful measure for the type of public concerns we wish to highlight. We thus define two corruption-related conditions which we expect will have a positive effect on AERP breakthrough:[71] the social *perception* of *high corruption* (HICORR) or the *substantial increase in perceived levels of corruption* (INCORR).

We hypothesize that an election is a full member of this set of *high levels of perceived corruption* (HICORR) if the CPI score for the year the election was held[72] falls below 3.5, around the worst empirically achieved levels in the region since 1999 (Romania and Bulgaria). A case is fully out of this set if CPI reaches 5.5 – a benchmark level based on the lowest levels of perceived corruption in the region since that date (achieved only by Slovenia and Estonia). The crossover point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is 4.6 reflecting a figure close to the median corruption rating for CEE across the period.

We deem a case to be fully in the set of elections where there has been s*ubstantial increase in the level of perceived corruption (INCCORR)* if CPI score decreases by 0.4 points – indicating a substantial perceived deterioration in corruption. A case is a fully out of the condition if a country's CPI score increases by 0.4 points over the preceding two years – i.e. there is a substantial improvement in the corruption situation. We set the cross-over point at a decrease in the CPI score just over zero (0.01) where there is neither improvement nor deterioration.[73]

Political conditions

In earlier iterations of this work we included a number of conditions relating to the party-electoral context: the presence of pro-market incumbents; levels of turnout the strength of radical-right or radical-left; and the previous levels of voting for new parties. In this paper we retain just one such condition: *previous levels of voting for genuinely new parties* (HGENP).

We did so largely for theoretical reasons. We have amended our conception of AERPs, which we no longer view as defined by liberal economic and social politics, but simply as having non-extreme mainstream positions on social and economic issues. The presence of discredited pro-market incumbents was thus no longer relevant to our analysis. While increased turnout is

[71] Data from the Quality of Government dataset. For three elections in 1997 and 1998, change in corruption could not be calculated as CPI scores were not available in previous years. There is evidence from World Bank global governance indicators that at the time, Poland and Hungary were experiencing substantial reductions in corruption levels (~INCCORR = 0.01) while Latvia was undergoing a modest decline in perceived corruption (0.33).

[72] Data in CPI reports is usually gathered in the year preceding the headline year it is reported (e.g. the data reported in the CPI 2010 report was predominantly gathered in 2009). We have therefore applied the CPI score for the year preceding the headline year.

[73] As in a number of cases the CPI score did not change, we follow the same logic as with unemployment change earlier. We argue that the CPI score needs to be decrease slightly before an actual improvement in corruption levels is registered among voters.

often associated with the success of new parties such as AERPs, we do not believe it is satisfactorily possible to distinguish cause and effect. Careful examination of cases also let us to reconsider our early hypothesis regarding the role radical parties as competitors AERPs.

Most electorally significant radical parties in CEE, we noted, are on the radical right, with radical left groups tending to be wholly marginal.[74] However, more significantly we observed that – contrary to the some media coverage – most radical right parties in CEE appear to be essentially niche groupings with a limited ability to expand their electoral support, whose political and electoral heyday was in 1990s.[75]

The existence of a *history of support for genuinely new parties (HGENP*) – is relevant to all party systems across the CEE region. Voters in many states with more fluid, less consolidated party systems such as have acquired a greater habit of voting for new parties as a result of weak or absent bonds with established parties or weaker expectation that established parties will remain established. However, there are uneven levels of party and party system consolidation and stability and electoral volatility across the CEE region (Powell & Tucker 2013). Therefore, we hypothesize that where there is a history of support for genuinely new parties, it reflects a presence of a significant pool of voters "available" to new parties, many of whom will perceive an emerging AERP as a credible challenger.[76]

To operationalize this condition we took the maximum support for genuinely new parties in the previous two elections.[77] A case is a full member of this condition (set membership = 1.0) if the combined support for genuinely new parties was 30 per cent or more in an election – enough to generate one new major party or a number of more minor breakthroughs. A case is fully out of this set only if no genuinely new party won votes in this period. The crossover point is set at 19 per cent –substantial support for one genuinely new parties or more modest support for a range of less successful new parties.

Empirical analysis

We analysed the outcome BREAKTHRU in terms of five socio-political conditions experienced by voters assumed to be relevant to an electoral breakthrough by an anti-establishment reform party: level and growth of perceived corruption (HICORR and

[74] The one significant exception is the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in elections in the Czech Republic, whose support is in the 15-20per cent range.

[75] The cases where radical right parties or social populists did appear as dynamic competitors – Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families in 2001; Jobbik in Hungary in 2010; the radical nationalist bloc in Latvia in 2011 and the party of former Lithuanian president Paksas – were too few in number to justify the retention of this condition. Unlike many (Western European) studies of comparative party success, we also omit any condition relating to electoral systems. There is limited electoral system variation across CEE: most states in the region use list based PR with formal national thresholds of 4-5 per cent or mixed electoral systems with a list PR element.

[76] Our measure of support for new parties broadly corresponds to what others term Type B or Extra-System volatility (Mainwaring et al 2009; Powell and Tucker 2013).

[77] We use the definition of genuinely new parties proposed by Sikk (2005). We were able to collect sufficient data to count all genuinely new parties with at least 0.5 per cent of electoral support.

INCCORR); growth in unemployment (INCUNEMP); economic contraction (NOGRO)and the previous success of new parties (HGENP).[78]

In line with good practice in fsQCA (Schneider & Wagemann 2010), we first tested all conditions to see if any of them (or any combination of them) could be regarded as a necessary cause, which would be required for any as BREAKTHRU to occur. In line with expectations, we found that none of the conditions could be regarded as such. The two conditions which came closest to being necessary were rising corruption (INCORR) and rising unemployment (INCUNEMP). However, their consistency scores of 0.721 and 0.622 respectively place them far below what is required for causal necessity.[79]

This highlights that none of the (implicitly) mono-causal explanations advanced by commentators for the breakthroughs of AERP-type parties are satisfactory. Even when look simply for causal *necessity* rather than causal *sufficiency* – that is we allow that some additional factors are required for such breakthroughs – such blanket explanations are weak. AERPs thus cannot be adequately accounted by encompassing narratives typically used to frame them: popular reactions to economic hard times or the bubbling up of anti-political, anti-corruption sentiments and the crisis of democratic governance.

Seeking sufficient paths to AERP breakthrough

We then generated a 'truth table' which shows the extent to which cases of AERPs breakthrough are consistent with each of 32 possible combinations of conditions (see Appendix). Cases are listed in the causal combination with which they are most consistent. Rows where no empirical cases are listed are 'logical remainders': counter-factual cases which can be partially incorporated into some fsQCA solutions (see discussion below).

As is clear from visual examination of the truth table, there is a large natural gap between cases of breakthrough - the least consistent of which has a consistency score of 0.707 - and cases where there was no AERP breakthrough.[80] None of these negative cases had a set membership of more than 0.444 in any of the possible causal combinations (Czech Republic 2006).[81]

These set memberships in causal combinations were logically minimized using the R QCA package to produce a reduced number of causal pathway. In line with normal fsQCA practice we generated three variant solutions: a *conservative (complex) solution* produced using only

[78] For all QCA analysis we used the R module QCA (Dusa & Thiem, A. 2012).

[79] Schneider & Wagemann (2012: 330) define a condition as causally necessary if across all cases set membership in it is greater than or equal to each case's membership in the outcome. A consistency score of 0.9 is widely seen as minimum level at which a condition might plausibly be regarded as necessary.

[80] The PRI (proportional reduction of inconsistency) is additional measure intended to address the issue of rows that might be consistent with both the outcome *and* its negation (Schneider & Wagemann (2012: 242-44). There is no agreed approach for addressing this issue in fsQCA. However, our calculation of the so-called PRODUCT using PRI and consistency score suggest that given the consistency cut-offs we have used none of the outcomes was mis-specified.

[81] There is poorly fitting cases AERP breakthrough (Poland 2011) has a low consistency. We discuss this case more fully in our discussion of the logically minimized solutions.

empirically-occurring cases; a *parsimonious solution* incorporating all logical remainders; and an *intermediate solution*, which incorporates some but not all logical remainders into the analysis, choosing only 'easy counterfactuals' on the basis of clearly assumptions about the directional effects that conditions would have in counter-factual cases.

To determine which causal configurations should be classified as leading to BREAKTHRU we set a consistency cut-off at 0.78 to reflecting the natural gap in the distribution of cases. This is slightly below the widely used cut-off of 0.8, but comfortably above the 0.75 minimum recommended in the literature (Rihoux & Ragin 2009: 87-112; Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 279)

Minimising only the empirically existing cases of AERP breakthrough and non-breakthrough we generated a conservative solution with a high level of consistency (0.85) with a relatively broad coverage (0.79). This solution identified five sufficient causal paths for AERP breakthrough. Expressed in fsQCA notation, the paths and the cases they cover appear as follows:

~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP +	C1: BGR09 LTU04 LTU08 LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 SVK12
~NOGRO* INCCORR *~INCUNEMP*~HICORR +	C2 : EST03, LTU04, LTU12
~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*~HGENP +	C3 : BGR01 LTU00 POL01 SVK02
NOGRO* INCCORR * ~HGENP * INCUNEMP* ~HICORR	C4 : CZE10, HUN10, SLN11
NOGRO *INCCORR * ~HGENP *~INCUNEMP *HICORR +	C5 : LVA11
→ BREAKTHRU	

As often occurs in fsQCA some cases have membership in more than one path, suggesting that in these elections overlapping causal processes were at work.

Expressed in more natural language, the paths state that AERP breakthrough takes place in five sets of circumstances, three of which (paths C1-C3) [82] entail relatively good economic times (*~NOGRO*),two of which occur during periods of economic contraction (*NOGRO*).

In untroubled economic times, AERP breakthroughs occur when there is increasing corruption and a relatively unstable party system (path C1); when there low but increasing corruption and declining unemployment (path C2); or when unemployment rises in the context of high corruption (path C3).

[82] Letter "C" in path numbers indicates that these are paths from the conservative solution. Below we use the same notation for intermediate (I) and parsimonious (P) solutions as well as the parsimonious solution for negation (PN). The full outputs for all solutions can be found in the appendix to this paper.

In periods of economic contraction, AERPs will break through when there is a *stable* party system combined with low but increasing corruption and increasing unemployment (path C4) or high and increasing corruption, but falling unemployment (path C5).

Conservative solutions are often quite complex and difficult to interpret. However, a number of patterns are immediately striking: first, contrary to the view of AERPs as 'crisis parties' in CEE *AERPs are not purely – or even mainly – products of economic contraction*. Three of the five paths to AERP breakthrough, covering 12 cases (combined unique coverage 0.362), take place in a context of economic growth. Conversely, paths C4 and C5 which feature elections taking place against a backdrop of economic contraction –cover only four cases (combined unique coverage 0.19).

Second, there to be at least *one distinct sub-regional path*. Path C4 features only elections in three recession-hit Visegrad states with previously stable party systems: Hungary in 2010, the Czech Republic in 2010 and Slovenia in 2011. Paths C1-C3, by contrast, cover the Baltic states, Slovakia and Bulgaria where AERP-type parties were first identified (Účen 2007; Sikk 2006).

Path 5 covers only in 2011 in *Latvia, which appears to a special case* given its unusual combination of economic conditions: falling unemployment against a backdrop of economic contraction (NOGRO*~INCUNEMP). This reflects Latvia's distinct experience of an exceptionally deep and sudden recession followed by rapid recovery[83] and a very high level of exit from the labour force, mainly due to emigration.[84]

Third, it appears that *both party system stability and party system instability can contribute to AERP breakthrough* in different economic and social contexts. This runs contrary to much literature on party and party system, which usually suggest in a somewhat undifferentiated way that, once established, stability tends to endure 'locking in' through processes of institutionalisation (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).

Crafting an intermediate solution

Before attempting to draw firmer specific conclusions, however, it is necessary to refine our solution by, if we can, identifying simpler consistent paths sufficient for AERP breakthrough. fsQCA allows us to do this by incorporating counter-factual cases (logically possible combinations of conditions with no matching real life case) into our analysis. We can do so either by including all such 'logical remainders' in the minimisation process (creating a highly parsimonious solution) or by incorporating only 'logical remainders' which appear to be 'good counterfactuals' that are (a) empirically possible, (b) do not contradict assumptions made elsewhere in the process of analysis and (c) are theoretically justified (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 168-175,199).[85] Such 'intermediate solutions' are often the preferred focus

[83] At the time of the election, growth had resumed

[84] Paul Krugman 'Latvia and the Romney Record', New York Times, 11 June 2012. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2012/06/11/latvia-and-the-romney-record/ (accessed 11 July 2013).

[85] The first two are relevant for both intermediate and parsimonious solutions, theoretically justified directional expectations are only used for intermediate solutions.

for fsQCA researchers as they are typically simpler and more elegant than conservative solutions without being reliant on large numbers of counterfactuals.

We argue that no combination of conditions included in the analysis is impossible; recession coupled with decreasing unemployment is perhaps unlikely, but we contend that it can occur (see discussion on *recession with a social safety valve*) does not qualify as the proverbial "pregnant man" situation (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 207-9).

Finally, contradictions between conditions of necessity and sufficiency are also not possible as we did not previously detect any necessary conditions. We identified three 'contradictory assumptions' – combinations of conditions which in standard analysis would have produced both the positive outcome (BREAKTHRU) and its negation (~BREAKTRHU). Thereafter, we explicitly specified whether they should lead to BREAKTHRU or ~BREAKTHRU.[86]

Researchers' decisions about the 'directionality' are often guided by findings in the established literature. However, for theory-building in the absence of a large literature, such expectations must be derived from case knowledge and close examination of the conservative solutions.

Examining the conservative solution, we were struck by the fact that only one condition, increasing corruption (INCORR), was present in only positive form. All the others appear in different paths in both positive and negative form – that is they appear to work differently in different context. Were these simply artefacts resulting from the limited number of cases examined in the conservative solution or could they plausibly be explained in theoretical terms?

After reflection we concluded that all four conditions other than INCORR could plausibly be interpreted as contributing to AERP breakthroughs in either positive or negative form depending on the wider configuration of causes. Thus while unstable party systems might provide opportunities to for new parties, stable party systems might in some contexts do the same so if they had become rigid, unresponsive or oligarchical.

Rising unemployment and economic contraction might, as we initially anticipated, drive electoral discontent with establishment parties. However, turning to the cases in path C2 (Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2008, Lithuania 2012) we judged that it might be plausible in some contexts that falling unemployment and a buoyant economy could provide a cue for voters to turn away from economic issues and focus on questions of corruption or governance – thus opening up opportunities for AERPs.

High corruption might understandably favour new anti-establishment parties in many contexts. However, low corruption too we concluded could plausibly be interpreted as sometimes combining to create circumstances favour AERP breakthrough. Rapidly increasing

[86] Using the technique proposed by Duşa & Thiem (2013: 77-78) in R, we found three CSAs:
~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*~INCCORR*HGENP (truth table row 14),
NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP (row 17),
NOGRO*INCUNEMP*~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP (row 25). All solutions reported here are calculated with CSAs eliminated (outcome manually recoded in the truth table in R), based on expectation that the first combination leads to an AERP breakthrough the last two no breakthrough.

perceived corruption in a relatively low corruption environment – a configuration (INCCORR *~HICORR) which appears in two of our paths (C2, C4) - might have an especially shocking and mobilisatory effect.

The intermediate solution generated produced five sufficient paths.

~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR	I1: BGR01, BGR09,LTU00, POL01, SVK02, SVK10, SVK12
~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP	I2: BGR09,LTU04, LTU08, LTU12,LVA02, SVK10, SVK12
~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*INCCORR	I3 : EST03, LTU04, LTU12
NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*~HGENP	I4 : CZE10, HUN10, SVN11
NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*~HGENP	I5 : LVA11

→ BREAKTHRU

These broadly resemble those of the conservative solution above confirming the validity of the general insights noted above.[87] However, examined more closely they also enable us to identify five distinct contexts favourable to AERP breakthrough:

*I1. Corrupt socially painful growth (~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR)*

This scenario sees rising unemployment (INCUNEMP) combine with economic growth (~NOGRO) and a background of high perceived corruption (HICORR). This corresponds to a context of apparently successful economic reform or restructuring, whose costs and benefits are, nevertheless, perceived as unjustly distributed both because of the (inevitably) disproportionate impact of unemployment and high levels of perceived corruption. It an experience largely characteristic of phase of post-communist reform for some states shortly before the EU accession in 2000-2 (Lithuania 2000, Poland 2001, Slovakia 2002) as well as of Slovakia in 2010 and 2012 as it recovered from 2008-9 recession.

*I2. Growth but increasing corruption in an unstable party system (~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP)*

This path shows that a context of economic growth (~NOGRO) increasing corruption combined with an unstable party system (a history of successful new parties)

[87] Running an analysis which set positive directional expectations for all conditions - in line with our initial expectations - produced two intermediate solutions. As can be seen in the appendix, one was identical to intermediate solution reported over and the second was very similar. The main difference was that it grouped most Central European cases together in a row containing the INCUNEMP condition.

(INCCORR*HGENP) will favour AERP breakthrough. The configuration suggests that even where the economy is growing if corruption is also increasing voters will turn to AERPs in large numbers when there is already a tradition voting for new parties – or, as it may also be interpreted, where previously established parties have been weakened by earlier episodes of new party success.

I3. Low and rising corruption in economic good times (~NOGRO~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*INCCORR)*

Like the first intermediate path (I1), the third intermediate path, which covers three elections in Baltic states (Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2012) also highlights the way in which corruption can interact with a seemingly benign socio-economic climate. In these cases a favourable context for AERP breakthrough is created by rising levels of corruption in the context of low overall corruption and a buoyant economy with both growth and falling unemployment (~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP). Increases in perceived corruption in a relatively low corruption environment have a galvanising effect, while improvement in the economy allows (some) voters to refocus on issues of corruption and governance.

*I4. Recession and rising corruption in rigid party systems (NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*~HGENP)*

The stable Czech, Hungarian and Slovene party systems were generally resistant to AERP breakthroughs until the first elections following the 2008-9 recession. At this point, a configuration of recession (NOGRO*INCUNEMP), rising perceived corruption (INCCORR) and the previous stability of the established party system (~HGENP) combined to create favourably conditions for AERP breakthrough. In all three cases the inability of (some or all) long established parties credibly to respond to economic crisis and their de-legitimation by growing concerns with corruption and dishonesty prepared the ground for an AERP breakthrough.[88] Strikingly, in this configuration in a context of recession it is party *stability* rather than party system fluidity that contributed to AERP breakthrough: [89] long established parties appeared ossified, corrupt, out-of-touch and an obstacle to the solution both of urgent social and economic problems and longer term modernisation (Batory 2010; Haughton, Novotná & Deegan-Krause 2011; Haughton & Krašovec 2011).[90]

*I5. Latvia's way? NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*~HGENP*

As in our initial, conservative solution the breakthrough of the Zatlers Reform Party in Latvia's 2011 election appears unique case represented by its own a distinct causal path, albeit

[88] In Hungary 2010 the far-right party Jobbik also made a breakthrough, although we do not classify this grouping as an AERP because of its traditional radical-right politics.

[89] Indeed as our below of analysis of paths leading to the non-occurrence of AERP breakthrough (the negation of the solution) below suggest, stable party systems do little to prevent AERP breakthrough.

[90] In these three elections, Hungary's Fidesz was the only established party to make major gains.

one close to in some ways to the *recession and rising corruption in rigid party systems* path experienced by some Visegrad states (path I4). Economic contraction (NOGRO) was combined with an increasingly stable, but oligarchical party establishment. In Latvia in 2011, however, the economic context was characterised only a background of economic contraction (NOGRO) without rising unemployment, given an unusually sharp and deep recession and mass emigration. Latvia's path to AERP breakthrough is also characterised by high and increasing perceived corruption (HICORR*INCORR), rather than merely increasing corruption as in path I4.

Discussion

Economics versus corruption?

Overall, however, the solution shows high levels of consistency (0.85) and coverage (0.81) and the paths can be interpreted in ways which plausibly fit with case knowledge. The solution also demonstrates that there are multiple paths to the electoral breakthrough of new anti-establishment reformers in CEE, each of which combines economic, social and party-political conditions in different way. Blanket, mono-causal assumptions about the impacts of economic contraction (or growth); low and high levels of corruption; or previous party system (in)stability therefore need to be set aside.

The solution can – and should - however be interpreted further. In keeping with much recent commentary about the role of austerity in bringing to a head the crisis of European party democracy (Krastev 2013; Van Biezen & Wallace 2013), we have framed our analysis in terms of sets of contrasting socio-economic conditions qualified by different patterns of corruption. This has yielded valuable insights, mostly notably the counter-intuitive finding that more AERPs in CEE broke through in conditions of economic *growth* than of economic contraction.

However, the sufficient five paths of our intermediate solution can be viewed somewhat differently: given that rising corruption (INCORR) is present in four of the five paths, the solution can simplified as:



This presents a somewhat different story about the broad and deleterious effects of *rising corruption* as the most common driver of AERP breakthrough, albeit one which is refracted

through varying sets of economic and party-political circumstances. This emerges most clearly if we turn to the most minimised *parsimonious* form of the solution:



The importance of INCORR – and the presence in all paths of at least one condition relating to corruption – lends qualified support to perspectives which stress the importance of governance structures and citizen-politician relationships. However it leaves open the question of just how they matter. The pattern uncovered could be interpreted as suggesting that AERP breakthroughs will be confined to regions with weak, corrupt or corruptible institutions such as Eastern or Southern Europe. If, however, we see changes in *perceived* corruption as relatively independent of the performance of institutions and elites – perhaps as an expression of anti-political sentiments rooted in a deeper malaise of representative democracy (Mair 2006) – then AERPs may potentially become a more widespread phenomenon.

The parsimonious solution also sharply poses a number of questions about how we should understand parties and party systems. Stable party systems appear a somewhat mercurial phenomenon that can in certain circumstances 'tip' into contributing to its own demise: when established parties fail to deliver growth *and* perceptions of corruption, many voters who may previously have tolerated their failings turn against them as oligarchical 'dinosaurs'. This should prompt to ask if, and under what circumstances, stable party system help block the emergence of AERPs - a point we return to below in the discussion on negation of the solution.

Spirals of instability? The sequencing of AERP breakthroughs

fsQCA is not highly attuned to temporal patterns (Rihoux & Ragin 2009). However, our use of individual elections as cases allows not only to compare across contexts and countries, but also to look across the paths to detect possible patterns of sequencing. Arguments about the unfolding of party system dynamics across time are coming to play an important role in debates about the development of party-based democracy in CEE (see, for example Pop-Eleches 2010 or Mair & Casal Bértoa 2012).

Kevin Deegan-Krause (2007; see also Deegan Krause & Haughton 2010) has argued that CEE party systems will experience repeated breakthroughs by new anti-establishment parties using anti-corruption issues to mobilise voters. The initial breakthrough of a new party, he

suggests, creates favourable conditions for subsequent (bigger) breakthroughs by other, newer anti-establishment parties. Successful (but usually short-lived) new anti-establishment parties not only weaken their establishment competitors, but coalition government weaker and less effective, preparing the ground for new anti-establishment parties to take the field. This raises the prospect that (some) CEE democracies are entering an accelerating spiral of protest, instability and weak governance.

In our work on AERPs we find some confirmation for this thesis, albeit to a very limited degree. Many states in the region do not experience successive or repeated AERP breakthroughs, but some do. The pattern suggested by Deegan-Krause suggested appears most clear in the case of Lithuania, which experienced AERP breakthroughs in every 'third generation' election in our sample. Latvia (1998, 2002) and Slovakia (2010, 2012) also saw AERP breakthroughs at successive elections, while Bulgaria had two quite closely AERP breakthroughs (2001 and 2009). There is, however, limited evidence of any process of 'increasing returns' of the type envisaged by Deegan-Krause.[91] There are two very major AERP breakthroughs in Bulgaria, which can be linked: the collapse of the Simeon II Movement, which disrupted the established party system by breaking through in 2001, arguably prepared the ground for the emergence of GERB in 2009. However, breakthroughs by AERPs in Lithuania have become more limited over time, while the 2012 breakthrough by Ordinary People (OLaNO) in Slovakia was on a similar small scale to that of Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in 2010.

Moreover, our (intermediate) solution suggests a potential insight into the sequencing of the *paths* to leading to repeated AERP breakthroughs. Most instances of multiple AERP breakthroughs in the same state are covered by two of the five paths: path I1 and path I2. The two partly overlap, covering Bulgaria 2009, Slovakia 2010 and Slovakia 2012.) - where converging causal processes appear to have been at work. However, *initial* AERP breakthroughs in such states (Lithuania 2000, Bulgaria 2001, Poland 2001, Slovakia 2002) are covered by only one path, I1 *corrupt socially painful growth*.

By contrast, all of the cases covered by path I2 - *growth with increasing corruption in an unstable party system* – are repeat AERP breakthroughs.[92] This suggests that *corrupt socially painful growth* provides a context for initial AERP breakthrough while rising corruption regardless of changes in unemployment in the (now) unstable party system provides the context for further episodes. This pattern is especially marked in Lithuania where initial AERP breakthrough (by the New Union in 2000) is covered only by the first path (1), while all subsequent breakthroughs in Lithuania are covered by path the second (I2).[93] One potential causal mechanism that may be at work in path I2 (and I3) is that, faced with high levels of instability and uncertainty in a context of growth, incumbents may paradoxically have an

[91] Deegan-Krause, it should be stressed, does not hypothesise a direct election-to-election spiral, but suggests that the mean and/or median age of parties (weighed for representation) will tend to decrease over time.

[92] Latvia 2002 appears an exception because, as discussed below, the minor breakthrough of the New Party in Latvia in 1998 is one of two cases that none of our five paths can account for.

[93] Lithuania 2004 and 2012 are also covered by path I3, but have higher membership in path I2.

incentive to pursue unaccountable (corrupt) policies, setting the scene for the emergence of new anti-corruption parties (for a parallel argument see Sikk 2006: 154-55).

As might be expected when the neat social science logic meets noisy empirical data, there are some of unexplained or incompletely explained cases. The cases of AERP breakthrough which appear in the lower half of the top right quadrant of figure 1 were much more limited than the highly favourable conditions would imply. The cases in question (Poland 2001, Hungary 2010, Slovakia 2012, Lithuania 2012), which are members of thee different causal pathways, will require following up more fully in post-QCA case comparison (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 305-310). However, as an initial point of departure we would note that both in Poland 2001 and Hungary 2010 the presence of strong new, social populist and/or radical right parties appears to have dampened AERP success.[94]

Figure 1. Membership in BREAKTRHU plotted against membership of intermediate solution



There are two cases of AERP breakthrough that are not explained by our solution set. The most prominent of these is the breakthrough of the Palikot Movement (RP) which polled 10 per cent in Poland's 2011 election. Although clearly an AERP of mainly 'new faces' with an anti-establishment message including a strong agenda for political reform, the configuration of conditions in Poland in 2011 (~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP) –growing unemployment, but economic growth and low and falling corruption – should have relegated the RP to marginality.[95] Indeed, the Polish context 2011 falls squarely into one the distinct paths otherwise leading to the failure of AERP breakthrough: the so-called negation of the solution.

[94] In Poland 2001 Self-Defence (SO0 (10.2%) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) (7.9%), in Hungary 2010 Jobbik (16.1%). As noted above, in earlier iterations of this analysis, we considered the inclusion of a further condition RADICAL.

[95] The success of the RP may be attributed to exceptional strength of secular-religious divisions and 'culture wars' in Poland, which were strongly exploited by the anti-clerical, socially liberal RP in its election campaign (Szczerbiak 2011). The (more limited) success of the New Party in Latvia in 1998 cannot be explained by any of the five sufficient causal paths.

Paths to AERP non-breakthrough - the negation of the solution

It is axiomatic in QCA that the causal paths leading to the *absence* of the outcome condition – in this study the absence of an AERP breakthrough – will almost never be simply the inverse of causal path leading to the outcome. Such causal asymmetry, as it is termed, makes it good practice to run separate analysis of this absence, the negation) of the outcome. In our research there are, moreover, potentially strong normative and/or policy-related reasons for taking an interest in the negation of the solution: the eruption of AERPs is widely seen as negative phenomenon, which threatens the functionality and effectiveness of democratic and risks to creation of a spiral of ungovernability.[96] Asking which socio-economic and political pathways lead AERPs *not* to break through in effect asks under what conditions established parties in CEE can endure (and potentially renew themselves)

Accordingly, we ran fsQCA analyses on the negation of the solution (~BREAKTHRU) producing conservative, intermediate and parsimonious solutions.[97] Unsurprisingly, given the negative nature of the outcome which corresponds empirically to the success of a diverse range of non-AERP parties, the conservative and intermediate solutions for the negation, were complex. Although consistency levels are similar, for the same reason levels of coverage for negative solutions are also lower. In interpreting the paths blocking AERP breakthrough, we therefore focus on the parsimonious solution which offers are limited number of key causal configuration and somewhat higher coverage.[98]

The parsimonious solution generated (based on consistency cut-off of 0.77 in the truth table; solution consistency 0.86, coverage 0.71) can be summarised algebraically as follows:

~INCORR	~HICORR	PN1	EST99, HU98, HU06, POL97, POL11, SLN08, HUN02, EE07
*{	~INCUNEMP * HGENP	PN2	BLG05, EST07, LVA06, SLK06
NOGRO * HGENP		PN3	EST11, LVA10
→ ~AERP			

Expressed in more naturally language, the solutions state that AERPs fail to breakthrough in three contexts: *low and falling perceived corruption* (P1); or *falling perceived corruption and decreasing unemployment in an unstable party system* (P2); or *economic contraction in an unstable party system* (P3).

PN1 which covers elections in Central European cases and Estonia, confirms the importance of corruption to the AERP phenomenon, suggesting that where corruption is seen as low and reducing established parties often face no strong AERP challenge. PN2 which combines falling corruption (~INCORR) and decreasing unemployment (~INCUNEMP) tells a broadly

[96] We do not ourselves adopt any normative position on the issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

[97] When crafting the negative intermediate solution, paralleling our assumptions for the positive solutions, we included directional for only condition: that decreasing corruption (~INCORR) would lead to the failure of AERP breakthrough (~BREAKTHRU). Contradictory simplifying assumptions were resolved as outlined above.

[98] Both conservative and intermediate solutions for negation are reproduced in the appendix.

similar story, but also includes the condition HGENP (a history of new party success). This can be explained as *AERP fatigue*. All four cases on path PN" were preceded by a significant AERP breakthrough in the previous election, which saw the successful assume government office (Res Public in Estonia. New Era in Latvia. the Simeon II Movement in Bulgaria; and the Alliance of the New Citizen in Slovakia). Overall PN2 suggests improving employment and corruption conditions combine with *AERP fatigue* to promote a turn (back) to more established parties.[99]

It is tempting therefore to conclude that established politicians in CEE seeking to counter the rise of AERPs should focus on managing perceptions of corruption- if they can picking their moment to coincide with good employment conditions or the problems successful anti-establishment parties may experience in office. However, it should be noted, many cases of AERP non-breakthrough cannot be consistently explained by our solution for negation. These include elections in Poland in 2005, in the Czech Republic in 2002 and 2006, in Poland in 2007 .

The third path (PN3) *economic contraction in an unstable party system* (NOGRO*HGENP), which covers Latvia in 2010 and Estonia in 2011, presents more difficulties of interpretation. However, it could read as showing that voters in unstable party systems lose a taste for political novelty in or shortly after economic contraction.

Although in fsQCA solutions for the negation should not simply be regarded as the inverse of positive solution, in this instance it is striking that path (PN3) mirrors our earlier findings that one route to AERP breakthrough was characterised by *economic contraction in a stable party system*. Moreover, party system stability (~HGENP) does not appear in any of the pathways of the intermediate or parsimonious solutions for negation.[100] Taken together this raises the possibility that the stability of even apparently more institutionalised, 'closed' party systems in CEE was the product of a conjuncture of economic and governance (corruption) conditions, rather than the self-sustaining process of institutional anchoring sometimes envisaged in literature. Such question, however, fall outside the main empirical issues addressed by this paper.

Conclusions

Our findings in this study provide a broadly consistent explanation for the political breakthroughs achieved in Central and Eastern Europe since 1999 by a group of parties that we term anti-establishment reform parties and others call 'centrist populist'. This suggests that – at least in broad terms – that *the grouping has a degree of coherence and should be regarded as more than ragbag, residual category of otherwise hard-to-label protest parties.*

[99] This interpretation holds partially for the election in Slovakia in 2006, where the largest gains were made by SMER. Although we classify SMER as an AERP in 2002, we view it has having transformed into a more conventional centre-left social-democratic party by 2006. The far-right also (re)gained support.

[100] It does, however, appear in one of the four paths of the conservative solution for negation (Bulgaria 2005, Latvia, Slovakia 2006, Estonia 2007) See appendix for details.

Our study clearly suggests that further comparative and conceptual work on this group of parties is justified.

At the same time our work suggests that any attempt to find broad mono-causal explanations for the rise of new anti-establishment parties in CEE – and by extension in Europe generally – is misconceived. We identify five sufficient causal paths which, although sometimes overlapping, are generally distinct and suggest some *clear patterns of cross-national and cross-temporal variation*. Our findings also suggest that early debates (implicitly) framing the rise of new anti-establishment parties as reflecting *either* a crisis of politics and dysfunctional/corrupt governance *or* the impact of recession, austerity and hard times are misplaced. We find that paths to AERP breakthrough are invariably characterised by *combinations of conditions relating to corruption, economics and party system dynamics*. Debates we suggest therefore need to be explicitly re-framed in terms of configurations of causes centring on the *relationship(s)* between economics, corruption and governance and party systems.

Finally, our research highlights such relationships can often be counter-intuitive: in CEE anti-establishment reform parties more often *broken through in economic good times* than bad; *party system stability is many circumstances to be more favourable for AERP breakthrough* than party system fluidity; *changes in perceived corruption often matter more than levels* of perceived corruption, with rising corruption in a low corruption environment notably effective in mobilizing voters behind anti-establishment reformers.

Our work in this paper adds to a small but growing body of work on the new phenomenon of reformist anti-establishment parties, rather than parties of the radical right or radical/libertarian, which have dominated the literature on new parties and 'populist' phenomena in European politics. It represents, we believe, one of the most systematic and robust comparisons of the topic so far undertaken. We would, however, stress that we see our findings as an early contribution to an emerging field with much scope for further development and refinement.[101]

[101] For example, through post-QCA case study comparison of the type recommended by Schneider and Wagemann (2012:) 305-12

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Appendix: QCA Analysis

Set memberships for the five conditions and outcome (BREAKTHRU)

Election	NOGRO	INCUNEMP	HICORR	INCCORR	HGENP	BREAKTHRU
BGR01	0.005	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.019	1.000
BGR09	0.000	0.688	1.000	0.999	1.000	1.000
SVN11	0.990	0.996	0.000	0.996	0.010	1.000
LTU04	0.000	0.035	0.348	0.875	0.920	0.998
CZE10	0.726	0.999	0.132	0.996	0.021	0.998
EST03	0.000	0.035	0.002	0.875	0.038	0.995
LVA02	0.000	0.201	1.000	0.544	0.666	0.994
SVK02	0.034	0.644	0.999	0.544	0.048	0.987
LVA11	1.000	0.035	0.909	1.000	0.005	0.987
LTU00	0.011	0.995	0.998	0.066	0.258	0.978
LTU08	0.000	0.799	0.222	0.544	0.997	0.919
SVK10	0.362	1.000	0.683	0.999	0.999	0.824
SVK12	0.005	0.549	0.990	1.000	0.996	0.790
POL11	0.022	0.977	0.012	0.000	0.002	0.739
LTU12	0.007	0.000	0.222	0.875	0.997	0.699
POL01	0.002	1.000	0.979	1.000	0.004	0.679
HUN10	0.983	1.000	0.042	0.976	0.002	0.536
LVA98	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.330	0.207	0.526
BGR05	0.000	0.000	0.979	0.180	1.000	0.001
CZE02	0.006	0.059	0.995	1.000	0.010	0.001
CZE06	0.000	0.126	0.909	0.001	0.009	0.001
EST07	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.979	0.001
EST11	0.999	0.099	0.000	0.875	0.979	0.001
EST99	0.000	0.966	0.001	0.000	0.038	0.001
HUN02	0.004	0.431	0.012	0.180	0.014	0.001
HUN06	0.002	0.977	0.075	0.039	0.007	0.001
HUN98	0.094	0.012	0.026	0.001	0.014	0.001
LVA06	0.000	0.001	0.956	0.001	0.993	0.001
LVA10	1.000	1.000	0.683	0.996	0.993	0.001
POL05	0.002	0.020	1.000	1.000	0.416	0.001
POL07	0.001	0.000	0.999	0.039	0.416	0.001
POL97	0.000	0.012	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001
SVK06	0.000	0.000	0.909	0.000	0.999	0.001
SVN08	0.000	0.046	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.001

Necessity for BREAKTHRU

		Consistency	PRI	cov.r
1	INCCORR	0.721	0.582	0.667
2	INCUNEMP	0.622	0.516	0.663

Necessity for ~BREAKTHRU

		Consistency	PRI	cov.r
1	inccorr	0.693	0.628	0.744
2	incunemp	0.730	0.663	0.693
3	nogro*inccorr	0.680	0.617	0.742
4	nogro*incunemp	0.675	0.610	0.714

Truth table (outcome: BREAKTHRU)

	NOGRO	INCUNEMP	HICORR	INCCORR	HGENP	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
23	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0.989**	**0.988**	**LVA11**
16	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**0.982**	**0.977**	**BGR09,SVK10,SVK12**
12	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0.977**	**0.968**	**LTU08**
14	***0***	***1***	***1***	***0***	***1***	***1***	***0***	***0.955***	***0.946***	
31	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**?**	**0**	**0.940**	**0.910**	
4	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**0.929**	**0.907**	**LTU04,LTU12**
13	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**0.917**	**0.914**	**BGR01,LTU00**
10	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**?**	**0**	**0.865**	**0.838**	
24	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**?**	**0**	**0.857**	**0.663**	
29	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**?**	**0**	**0.838**	**0.604**	
27	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**3**	**0.834**	**0.798**	**CZE10,HUN10,SVN11**
3	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**0.827**	**0.822**	**EST03**
19	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**?**	**0**	**0.801**	**0.741**	
15	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**2**	**0.798**	**0.752**	**POL01,SVK02**
8	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0.781**	**0.707**	**LVA02**
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	0.775	0.605	
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	0.762	0.554	
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	0.676	0.421	
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	0.651	0.610	
25	*1*	*1*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0.622*	*0.139*	
28	1	1	0	1	1	?	0	0.469	0.288	
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.444	0.325	CZE06,LVA98,POL07
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.414	0.320	CZE02,POL05
32	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.393	0.246	LVA10
2	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.297	0.187	EST07
6	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0.274	0.189	BGR05,LVA06,SVK06
17	*1*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0.252*	*0.032*	
9	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0.239	0.168	EST99,HUN06,POL11
26	1	1	0	0	1	?	0	0.163	0.052	
18	1	0	0	0	1	?	0	0.146	0.027	
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0.066	0.053	HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08
20	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.037	0.004	EST11

Truth table (outcome: ~BREAKTHRU)

	NOGRO	INCUNEMP	HICORR	INCCORR	HGENP	OUT	n	incl	PRI	cases
20	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0.996**	**0.996**	**EST11**
18	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**?**	**0**	**0.976**	**0.973**	
17	***1***	***0***	***0***	***0***	***0***	***1***	***0***	***0.975***	***0.968***	
26	**1**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**?**	**0**	**0.954**	**0.948**	
1	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**4**	**0.947**	**0.947**	**HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08**
25	***1***	***1***	***0***	***0***	***0***	***1***	***0***	***0.939***	***0.861***	
2	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0.838**	**0.813**	**EST07**
6	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**0.831**	**0.811**	**BGR05,LVA06,SVK06**
32	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**0.802**	**0.754**	**LVA10**
28	**1**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**1**	**?**	**0**	**0.786**	**0.712**	
9	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**3**	**0.779**	**0.759**	**EST99,HUN06,POL11**
21	1	0	1	0	0	?	0	0.764	0.579	
29	1	1	1	0	0	?	0	0.752	0.396	
7	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.725	0.680	CZE02,POL05
24	1	0	1	1	1	?	0	0.718	0.337	
22	1	0	1	0	1	?	0	0.704	0.446	
5	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.684	0.617	CZE06,LVA98,POL07
30	1	1	1	0	1	?	0	0.655	0.395	
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0.471	0.293	LVA02
11	0	1	0	1	0	?	0	0.454	0.390	
19	1	0	0	1	0	?	0	0.429	0.259	
31	1	1	1	1	0	?	0	0.394	0.090	
12	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0.312	0.032	LTU08
10	0	1	0	0	1	?	0	0.303	0.162	
4	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.263	0.033	LTU04,LTU12
15	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	0.249	0.074	POL01,SVK02
16	0	1	1	1	1	0	3	0.227	0.023	BGR09,SVK10,SVK12
14	*0*	*1*	*1*	*0*	*1*	*0*	*0*	*0.211*	*0.054*	
3	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.199	0.178	EST03
27	1	1	0	1	0	0	3	0.193	0.015	CZE10,HUN10,SVN11
13	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0.115	0.086	BGR01,LTU00
23	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.059	0.012	LVA11

Notes: bold – rows above consistency cut-off (threshold); italics – rows examined because of contradictory simplifying assumptions.

CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION (BREAKTHRU)

Number of multiple-covered cases: 2
S1: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR*hgenp + nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR +
NOGRO*incunemp*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp + NOGRO*INCUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	nogro*INCCORR*HGENP	0.841	0.810	0.351	0.225	BGR09 LTU04 LTU08 LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 SVK12
2	nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR*hgenp	0.852	0.836	0.221	0.188	BGR01 LTU00 POL01 SVK02
3	nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR	0.889	0.870	0.157	0.053	EST03 LTU04 LTU12
4	NOGRO*incunemp*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp	0.989	0.988	0.062	0.056	LVA11
5	NOGRO*INCUNEMP*hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp	0.834	0.798	0.147	0.134	CZE10,HUN10,SVN11
	S1	0.849	0.827	0.792		

CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION (~BREAKTHRU)

Number of multiple-covered cases: 0
S1: nogro*hicorr*inccorr*hgenp + nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP +
NOGRO*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	nogro*hicorr*inccorr*hgenp	0.867	0.861	0.328	0.320	HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08; EST99,HUN06,POL11
2	nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP	0.861	0.848	0.259	0.250	EST07; BGR05,LVA06,SVK06
3	NOGRO*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR*HGENP	0.996	0.996	0.050	0.048	EST11
4	NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP	0.802	0.754	0.050	0.047	LVA10
	S1	0.875	0.866	0.675		

PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION (BREAKTHRU)
Number of multiple-covered cases: 4
S1: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + (hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp)
S2: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + (nogro*hicorr*INCCORR)

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	(S1)	(S2)	cases
1	nogro*INCCORR*HGENP	0.841	0.810	0.351	0.085	0.186	0.085	BGR09, LTU04, LTU08, LTU12, SVK10, SVK12 BGR09 LTU04 LTU08 LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 SVK12
2	NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp	0.872	0.851	0.211	0.057	0.057	0.188	CZE10, HUN10, LVA11, SVN11,
3	nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR	0.905	0.890	0.370	0.203	0.203	0.203	BGR01, BGR09, LTU00, POL01, SVK02, SVK10, SVK12
4	hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp	0.839	0.815	0.222	0.009	0.063		CZE10, EST03, HUN10, SVN11
5	nogro*hicorr*INCCORR	0.914	0.897	0.219	0.000		0.053	EST03, LTU04, LTU08, LTU12
	S1	0.851	0.831	0.822				
	S2	0.850	0.829	0.813				

PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION (~BREAKTHRU)
Number of multiple-covered cases: 1
S1: hicorr*inccorr + NOGRO*HGENP + incunemp*inccorr*HGENP

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	hicorr*inccorr	0.849	0.840	0.414	0.328	EST99, EST07, HUN98,HUN02,HUN06,POL97,SVN08, POL11
2	NOGRO*HGENP	0.902	0.892	0.121	0.111	EST11; LVA10
3	incunemp*inccorr*HGENP	0.864	0.852	0.266	0.179	BGR05, EST07, LVA06, SVK06
	S1	0.863	0.854	0.706		

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION (BREAKTHRU)

p.sol: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + NOGRO*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + hicorr*INCCORR*hgenp
S1: nogro*INCCORR*HGENP + nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR + NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp +
NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*hgenp + nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	nogro*INCCORR*HGENP	0.841	0.810	0.351	0.105	BGR09,LTU04, LTU08, LTU12,LVA02, SVK10, SVK12
2	nogro*INCUNEMP*HICORR	0.905	0.890	0.370	0.204	BGR01, BGR09,LTU00, POL01, SVK02, SVK10, SVK12
3	NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*hgenp	0.985	0.984	0.073	0.056	LVA11
4	nogro*incunemp*hicorr*INCCORR	0.889	0.870	0.157	0.053	EST03, LTU04, LTU12
5	NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*hgenp	0.831	0.793	0.150	0.132	CZE10, HUN10, SVN11
	S1	0.850	0.828	0.808		

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION (~BREAKTHRU)

p.sol: hicorr*inccorr + NOGRO*HGENP + incunemp*inccorr*HGENP

S1: hicorr*inccorr*hgenp + NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP + nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP +
NOGRO*incunemp*INCCORR*HGENP

		incl	PRI	cov.r	cov.u	cases
1	hicorr*inccorr*hgenp	0.868	0.862	0.334	0.325	EST99, HUN98, HUN02, HUN06, POL97, POL11, SVN08
2	NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*HGENP	0.803	0.754	0.050	0.047	LVA10
3	nogro*incunemp*inccorr*HGENP	0.861	0.848	0.259	0.250	BGR05, EST07, LVA06, SVK06
4	NOGRO*incunemp*INCCORR*HGENP	0.974	0.972	0.051	0.047	EST11
	S1	0.875	0.866	0.679		

Plots


CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION
breakthru
COMBINED SOLUTION
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LVA02
LTU08
SVK07
CZE10
SVK10
LVA11
SVK12
LTU12
POL01
HUN10
POL11
LVA98
POL05
CZE06


PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
breakthru
COMBINED SOLUTION
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LVA02
LTU08
SVK07
SVK10
SVK12
LTU12
POL01
HUN10
POL11
LVA98
POL05
CZE06


INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
breakthru
COMBINED SOLUTION
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
LVA02
LTU08
SVK07
CZE10
SVK10
LVA11
SVK12
LTU12
POL01
HUN10
POL11
LVA98
POL05
CZE06

CONSERVATIVE SOLUTION (NEGATION



PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION (NEGATION



INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION (NEGATION)



7. Sikk, Allan and Philipp Köker. 2015. "Candidate Turnover and Party System Change in Central and Eastern Europe".

Abstract

This paper looks at an important but understudied indicator of party change – the turnover of electoral candidates. We analyse 170,000 candidates in 55 elections in Central and Eastern Europe – a region with volatile political parties and party systems. We develop a measure of weighted candidate novelty (WCN) that takes into account the list placement of candidates and party size. There are significant differences in the levels of WCN between countries but at best limited evidence of more stability over time. In the second part of the paper, we contrast the findings on electoral candidate turnover to volatility scores used in previous studies. WCN is correlated to electoral volatility, but there are significant outliers. We contend that these are produced by parties that are: (a) new, but only moderately novel in terms of candidates, (b) old but have experienced significant internal change, resulting in high candidate turnover, and (c) neither genuinely old nor genuinely new. The last category of partially novel parties poses most problems for indices of party system change that assume parties that are either stationary or perfectly new.

How unstable are political parties and party systems? The most widely used indicator of party system change is the Pedersen's electoral volatility index, as it is intuitive and easy to calculate.[102] However, it was much easier to apply in Pedersen's early work on West European party systems characterized by high levels of organizational continuity among parties than it has been in the last couple of decades – particularly in new democracies that have seen very high degrees of organizational innovation among political parties. Perhaps the most important problem facing investigators when calculating volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE, the region that we focus on in this paper) is that calculation of volatility has nearly always been based on dichotomously distinguishing between new and old parties and, in case of splits and mergers, identifying a singular successor or predecessor. This paper is primarily motivated by our desire to explore levels of novelty within parties using an interval scale – an approach that would allow for a more nuanced and adequate approach to the calculation of volatility that takes into account patterns of novelty and continuation among parties (outlined in Sikk and Köker 2015). Party novelty has several dimensions – including splits, mergers, leadership, names, programmatic profiles etc – but in this paper we focus on perhaps the most neglected aspect of electoral candidate change.[103]

We start our analysis of candidate novelty and the related phenomenon of candidate dropout by looking at overall trends over time in individual countries. The region has experienced varying and on the aggregate there has at best been a mild overall trend of declining candidate turnover. The second section of this paper explores the relationship between levels of candidate novelty/dropout and electoral volatility – specifically by comparing our indices to the volatility scores calculated by Powell and Tucker (2014). We discover a clear relationship between the two and find that novelty could be more clearly linked to suggested determinants of party system change (e.g. economic growth) than volatility. For some elections, we find a high discrepancy between novelty and volatility measures that, we believe, is related to debatable coding decisions relating to new parties and, more generally, to the impossibility of "correctly" coding parties dichotomously as new and old.

In the final section, we look in more detail at candidate novelty in individual parties. We discover that two groups of large parties – genuinely new parties and established parties – can be distinguished easily based on candidate novelty. However, problems are posed by electoral coalitions and partially novel parties. Electoral coalitions – which are common and often very successful in CEE – often have low levels of candidate novelty, yet have not always been linked to predecessors in volatility calculations.[104] Partially novel parties present even more problems. On the one hand, they are genuinely novel (e.g. in terms of leadership or name) yet, on the other hand, may field many candidates who have previously run on other parties'

[102] Pedersen 1979, for applications see Drummond 2006; Lane and Ersson 2007; S. Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Scott Mainwaring, España, and Gervasoni 2009; Powell and Tucker 2014; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005, 2008. Still, it does suffer from problems – particularly as it does not necessarily reflect individual level changes, even if it seems to aggregate them (see Dejaeghere and Dassonneville n.d.).

[103] Recent studies that problematize the dichotomous notion of party novelty either do not look at candidates (Litton 2013) or do so only in the passing (Barnea and Rahat 2011).

[104] In some cases, such coalitions draw candidates from several previously existing parties yet are linked to a singular predecessor in volatility calculations.

tickets. Once again, it is impossible to dichotomously "correctly" code such electons – to use a joint name for party lists and electoral coalitions (proposed in Sikk and Köker 2015a). However, given their often high levels of success, such coding decisions can lead to very different estimates of party system change. We finish the paper with a discussion of broader implications of our research on the study of political parties and party change.

Candidate turnover in CEE

Out analysis is based on a dataset of over 170,000 electoral candidates in 55 elections CEE elections between 1993 and 2014. Most of the data has been collected from public sources, primarily those available online. The dataset includes all current EU member states from the region, excluding Croatia and Romania, for which data has been more difficult to analyse or obtain, respectively.[105] Table 2 shows an overview of the data.

Table 2. Elections included in the study

Election number	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LT	LV	PL	SI	SK
1			1992	1990			1991		
2			1995	1994	1996	1995	1993		
3	1994 *	1996	1999	1998	2000	1998	1997		1994
4	1997 *	1998	2003	2002	2004	2002	2001		1998
5	2001	2002	2007	2006	2008	2006	2005	2004	2002
6	2005	2006	2011	2010	2012	2010	2007	2008	2006
7	2009	2010		2014		2011	2011	2011	2010
8	2013	2013				2014		2014	2012
9	2014								

* Only data for parties which entered parliament.

Using an elaborate R script, we matched candidates in an election with those in previous election using names and, where impossible due to duplicate names using party labels, party codes in MRG dataset (Volkens et al. 2014) and information about the movement of other candidates between parties, assuming that an unmatched candidate is more likely to have followed others rather than gone their own way.[106] We checked the accuracy of these matches

[105] We plan to include these as well as some of the missing earlier elections in future.

[106] We also checked for "fuzzy" matches between names that allows for minor spelling mistakes and identified some candidates who might have changed surnames (usually after marriage). Hence, we manually coded a small number of high-ranking candidates from major parties to improve the accuracy of our novelty and drop-out scores.

in a small number of cases and it provides reasonably robust results with no more than 1-3 percent of incorrect codings – certainly not worse than typical levels of mis-reporting and data entry errors in survey data.

Most of the candidates represent small and hence insignificant parties. Likewise, top ranking candidates are obviously more important than those lower down the list as they stand a better chance of being elected and are also more visible to the voters – particularly in open list systems used in most elections under study. Therefore, in the initial analysis we only include parties that won at least five percent of the vote and focus in on top 25 percent of the candidates in electoral districts (national lists in Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary 2014).[107]

Figure 1 shows that candidate novelty has generally not decreased across the region. Only Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania have maintained a solid decreasing trend in the last three elections under study, with respectively 32, 29 and 20 percent of new candidates in the last election. On the other hand, some countries have seen marked increases in novelty (e.g. the Czech Republic) or retain high levels of candidate novelty (e.g. Slovenia). The trend across the region has been mildly decreasing at best. Still, the most notable feature of Figure 1 are the significant fluctuations in candidate novelty. This is usually caused by breakthroughs of genuinely new parties that bring in more new candidates than established parties (see below). The other reason for some downward spikes is pre-term elections – such as those in Poland 2007, Latvia 2011, Slovakia 2012 and Bulgaria 2014.

Figure 1. Candidate novelty by countries



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF1

Note: top 25% of candidates, parties with at least 5% of votes. Black solid line shows lowess trend.

A mentioned above, all parties are not equal and not all candidates are equal. Candidates of a party that wins 35 percent of seats should have a stronger impact on aggregate candidate

[107] In some elections (particularly in Estonia 1995), some parties ran oversized lists, with the number of candidates more than twice the number of seats in the parliament. To correct for such situations, top 25 percent and "full lists" are defined by district magnitude (i.e. 0.25M and M, respectively), or total number of seats, where national lists were used.

novelty than candidates of a party with five percent of support, let alone one with 0.1 percent. Furthermore, the importance of candidates at list positions varies between parties. For example, imagine two candidates ranked 25 out of 100 (i.e. just included makes in top 25 percent). If one of the parties is likely to win 30 of the mandates and the other one only 4 mandates, the candidate of the bigger party has a real chance of winning a seat and is obviously more significant than the candidate of the smaller party who is bound to be an also-run. Hence, our initial threshold of 25 percent needs to be adjusted by party support.

An alternative approach to adopting strict cut-off points is weighting candidates so that those at the top contribute more and those at the bottom less to the index of candidate novelty.[108] A negative linear progression of weights – e.g. (1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0) for M=5 – would be most straightforward. However, this gives too much weight to all low-ranking candidates bar the last very one.

Weights that follow a logistic or sigmoid function are more appropriate, as they allow for small decline in the weights at the top, a more significant drop in candidate importance in the middle and smooth dying off at the end. The weights are based on the well-known formula of the sigmoid function:

$$f(x) = \frac{L}{1+e^{-k(x-x_0)}} \quad (1)$$

where x0 is the sigmoid's mid-point, L the maximum value and k the steepness of the curve. For weighted candidate novelty (WCN) we modify the formula:

- the values of original logistic equation range from 0 to 1, but as the weights must run from 1 to 0, we subtract the equation from 1 and set L at 1;
- x0 varies between parties so that the midpoint is always at the party's total vote share – e.g. at the 25 percent list position for a party that won 25 percent of votes;[109]
- K is set at 0.25 as this produces a curve with suitable smoothness;
- the weights for a party in each district must to add up to 1 – therefore, we divide the weighted value for a candidate with a rank of x by the sum of initial weights for all candidates

Thus, we can calculate the weighted candidate novelty (WCN) of party p in district d:

$$WCN_{p,d} = \sum NEW \cdot \frac{1-\frac{1}{1+e^{-25(r-v_p)}}}{\sum 1-\frac{1}{1+e^{-25(r-v_p)}}} \quad (2)$$

where NEW is a dummy for candidates who did not run in previous election and r the relative list position of a candidate r = (rank – 1)/(M – 1).[110] Figure 2 illustrates the standardized

[108] We disregard candidates with list placements in excess of M.

[109] We use the national vote share as our dataset currently does not hold information about constituency level support for parties.

[110] I.e. for fourth ranked candidate under M=10, r = (4-1)/(10-1) = 3/9 = 0.33. The calculations were implemented in R using the sigmoid function in pracma package.

weights for candidates. It shows that for largest parties, more candidates have substantial weight as more stand a reasonable chance of winning a seat. The smaller the party, the higher the weight of the candidates at the top of the list as few others stand a reasonable chance of winning a seat. We assume that when fielding candidates, parties have some information about the likely number of seats they are going to win and we use the actual share of votes as a proxy for that.[111]

Figure 2. Weights for candidates for selected parties



Notes: Relative list placement = (rank – 1)/(M – 1). Note that areas under all curves add up to 1 that is the total of candidate weights in a district.

The novelty scores by district parties can be added up across the country, but need to be weighted by the size of districts relative to the total number of seats in all districts:[112]

$$\mathrm{WCN}_{\mathrm{p}} = \sum \frac{\mathrm{M}}{\sum \mathrm{M}} \mathrm{WCN}_{\mathrm{p,d}} \qquad (3)$$

Finally, the aggregate weighted candidate novelty in an election is calculated by adding together the party scores, weighted by their vote shares (vp):

$$\mathrm{WCN} = \sum \mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{p}} \sum \frac{\mathrm{M}}{\sum \mathrm{M}} \mathrm{WCN}_{\mathrm{p,d}} \qquad (4)$$

All of the formulas can be easily interpreted as they range from 0 (no new candidates) to 1 (all candidates are new).

[111] We also considered weights based on a logarithmic function of candidate's distance from the bottom of the list (so that the top candidate has the highest weight, e.g. 1, 0.95, 0.90, 0.85, 0.78, 0.70) and based on declining in geometric progression (e.g. 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/16 etc). However, the first gives too much weight to very low ranking candidates and the second introduces excessive gaps between top candidates if the tails of lists were to have very small weights.

[112] Total number of seats in the parliament (S) would be more straightforward, but in multi-tier systems we only look at one of the tiers.

Figure 3. Weighted candidate novelty by countries



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF3

Note: The fine black line show loess trend.

Figure 3 shows the weighted candidate novelty scores for the elections under study. On average, the scores are fairly similar to those in Figure 1 (top candidates of parties above five percent of the vote). However, there are some interesting differences. Firstly, elections with highly successful genuinely new parties – Bulgaria 2000, 2009, Latvia 1998, 2002, Slovakia 2002 and Slovenia 2014 – are much more visible. Secondly, the slight trend towards lower candidate novelty in Figure 1 all but disappears.[113]

Figure 4 shows the extent of candidate novelty among established parties – defined here as those who did not run in the preceding election in the Manifesto Project dataset (Volkens et al. 2014).[114] The levels of candidate novelty are, unsurprisingly, lower for established parties than all parties. In all elections, weighted candidate novelty score remained below 0.5 and was below 0.3 in most cases. Hence, parties that already contested the previous election, typically list fewer than 30 percent of "significant" candidates. The largest differences between overall weighted candidate novelty and that among established parties in elections with remarkable new party breakthroughs (LT 2000, 2004; BG 2001, 2009; SI 2014; EE 2003; LV 2002; CZ 2010; see Appendix 1 for detail on individual parties). We find a slightly clearer negative trend, with average candidate novelty among established parties decreasing from around 50 percent in early 1990s to around 30 percent in the most recent elections. Established party candidate novelty has generally decreased or remained low in some countries – particularly in Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania where in the last three elections only one in four candidates did not run in previous election. However, the trend is far from uniform and some countries have experienced high or increasing candidate novelty even among established parties.

[113] The higher novelty in early 1990s in Figure 1 was caused by more new candidates among top 25 percent in parties that won less than 25 percent of the vote.

[114] The following parties (mostly coalitions or parties after the break-up of coalitions) had a novel code in Volkens et al 2014, but were manually coded as old,: DL (BG 1997), ODS (BG 1997), KZB (BG 2001), KZB (BG 2013), IL (EE 1999), BSDA (LT 2000), UdL (LT 2004), TS-LKD (LT 2008), DP (LT 2012), PCTVL (LV 2002), AWS (PL 1997), SLD-UP (PL 2001), SDK (SK 1998), SDKU (SK 2002).

Figure 4. Weighted candidate novelty by countries (established parties only)



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF4

Note: Only parties that were not coded as new in Volkens et al. 2014. The black line show loess trend.

Figure 5. Weighted candidate dropout by countries



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF5

Note: For consistency with novelty scores, the horizontal axis shows years when the candidates that ran in the previous election dropped out. The black line show loess trend.

Finally, weighted candidate dropout levels – i.e. the share of candidates in previous election that did not contest the more recent one – follow broadly similar trends. There are, however, interesting individual parties which have shown remarkable degrees of candidate dropouts that has not always been matched by candidate novelty (see Appendix 2 for detail on individual parties). The two can diverge as the weights assigned to particular candidates can be different in two subsequent elections if their list placement changes. It is hypothetically possible that all high-ranking candidates drop out in the next election (e.g. because of scandals) but are replaced by candidates who had been lower down the list in the previous election.

Candidate turnover and volatility

What is the relationship between candidate change and electoral change? As noted above, candidate novelty has been particularly high in elections with very successful genuinely new parties. Also, established political parties tend to have a significantly lower candidate novelty than new political parties. Hence, we would expect some, although imperfect relationship between candidate and electoral change (as measured by volatility).[115]

Figure 6. Total volatility and weighted candidate novelty



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF6

Note: Black line for equality of WCN and total volatility. Source: Total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013)

As expected, the overall candidate novelty is positively correlated to volatility (based on data from Powell and Tucker 2014, see Figure 6). However, the relationship is far from perfect. Notably, some countries seem to have consistently higher than expected levels of volatility (Lithuania) compared to candidate novelty, while others have consistently relatively lower levels of volatility (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary). This might be related to cross-country variation in the levels of typical candidate novelty, but is more likely to be the result of coding decisions regarding new parties, coalitions and mergers.[116] Electon continuity might be more accurately taken into account when calculating the volatility index in the countries with lower than expected volatility, while major coalitions or partially novel electons might have been coded as new in Lithuania (see discussion on partially novel electons and Lithuania below).

To what extent is candidate replacement related to new party entry and old party exit? Figure 7 shows the relationship between the mean of candidate novelty and dropout, and Type A volatility – i.e. volatility caused by the entry and exit of parties form the political system (Powell and Tucker 2014, 124). The relationship is surprisingly weak. Some of the cases

[115] We should not expect the relationship to be perfect as volatility has two sources: (a) voters moving from old (and disappeared) parties to new parties and (b) voters moving between existing political parties (see Powell and Tucker 2014).

[116] The first argument is undermined by the fact that Hungary and Lithuania are both countries with low aggregate and old parties' WCN.

emphasize that the extent of political elite turnover may not always be fully reflected in Type A volatility. The 1997 election in Bulgaria and 2005 election Poland saw many new candidates join and many old candidates leave tops of party lists, yet this is not fully reflected in the Type A volatility scores. Both elections were characterized by the collapse of parties that had been the overwhelming winners of the previous election (Democratic Left in both countries). However, as the parties retained representation in the parliament, Type A volatility score was only average.

Type A volatility for Lithuania 2004 is strikingly high given the medium candidate turnover (see Figure 8 and Figure 9 for details on individual parties). The election did see breakthroughs of an important new electons: (a) the genuinely new Labour Party (DP), the newness of which is corroborated by candidate novelty data (WCN = 0.91), (b) two partially new formations, "For Order & Justice" (UTT) of the impeached president Rolandas Paksas (WCN = 0.44) and Liberal & Centre Union (LICS, WCN = 0.49). Two major parties also disappeared: the Liberal Union (LLS) and the New Union (NS). However, their candidate dropout was rather low at 0.27 and 0.38, respectively – fairly typical level for established parties. Most of their candidates found a place on the lists of one of the new parties or the Working for Lithuania (UdL, in fact a coalition of Social Democratic Party and New Union). UdL had the lowest level of candidate novelty (0.16) among main parties,[117] but is coded as a new electon in Powell & Tucker dataset. Coding elections with that extent of party transformation is extremely challenging and actually impossible to do "correctly" using a dichotomous scheme (more detailed discussion below).

Figure 7. Type A (exit/entry) volatility, and mean of candidate novelty & dropout



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF7

Note: Black line for candidate turnover = Type A volatility. Source: volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013)

[117] Tied with Homeland Union (TS), to be more precise.

Figure 8. Weighted candidate novelty by parties, Lithuania (V > 10%)



Note: label size shows party size.

Figure 9. Weighted candidate dropout by parties, Lithuania (V > 10%)



Note: Label size shows party size. For consistency with novelty scores, the horizontal axis shows years when the candidates that ran in the previous election dropped out.

Type B volatility (i.e. volatility between existing parties) and candidate novelty among established parties (Figure 10) are again correlated mildly. There seems to be a general trend that increased candidate novelty leads to increased volatility or, alternatively, existing parties rejuvenate their candidate lists if they anticipate changes in electoral support. In particular, parties that are expected to do poorly may recruit new top candidate, possibly to replace former dignitaries that have left party politics anticipating downfall. However, volatility can obviously come about for different reasons than internal candidate change and rejuvenation of electoral lists can turn the waning tide for parties in decline.

Figure 10. Type B volatility and candidate novelty among established parties



Data: bit.ly/SKECPRGCF10

Note: Black line for OLS fit between WCN and Type B volatility. Source: total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013)

Powell & Tucker (2014, 126) argued in a conclusion to their study of volatility in Eastern Europe that " know little about what causes swings in votes between existing political parties". Replication of the fully specified regression models (using elections included in Powell & Tucker and our datasets) returns no statistically significant coefficients. However, it is notable that a much simpler model that includes GDP change from previous election[118] alongside country fixed effects (see Table 3) shows that improvement in economic conditions does lead to increased total volatility and lower candidate turnover. The effect on novelty is robust both among established and all parties with a sluggish 10 percent growth over an electoral term leading to 3 percent fewer new candidates among established parties or 25 percent growth (median in cases included) to almost 8 percent fewer new candidates. Hungary and the Czech Republic tend to have lower than average levels of candidate novelty that is in line with literature arguing early consolidation of these two party systems, but has been challenged by recent high levels of candidate novelty. (Powell & Tucker data finishes with 2009).[119] Admittedly, our range of variables is very limited and not all elections are included in the analysis, but the results are essentially encouraging. To paraphrase Powell & Tucker – we know little about determinants of candidate change, but with can argue with some confidence that GDP change does have an impact.[120] There is evidence that West European voters increasingly respond to economic downturns by switching parties (Dassonneville and Hooghe 2015) and at the very least we have evidence that electoral politics is not completely insensitive to that in CEE either.

[118] GDP change was one of the variables that Powell & Tucker identified as having a statistically significant impact on volatility. However, it has been since shown that the effect was an artefact solely resulting from lack of quality data for Bosnia & Herzegovina (Crabtree and Golder 2015).

[119] Note that the model fit and magnitude of GDP's effect is higher when WCN is used – in earlier models looking at top 25% of lists among parties with at least 5 percent of votes only had slightly poorer fits.

[120] Corruption is another potentially important determinant – see our study with a somewhat different purpose and focus (Sikk and Köker 2015b).

Table 3. Effect of GDP change on volatility, candidate novelty and dropout

	Volatility			Candidate novelty		
	Total	Type A	Type B	All parties	Established parties	Candidate dropout
(Intercept)	79.81 (18.51)***	50.12 (24.36)*	29.69 (11.66)**	91.30 (13.93)***	75.20 (9.98)***	65.11 (8.98)***
GDPt/GDPt-1	-27.53 (15.07)*	-18.85 (19.82)	-8.68 (9.49)	-29.91 (11.34)**	-28.57 (8.12)***	-13.27 (7.31)*
CZ	-31.13 (9.69)***	-21.41 (12.75)	-9.73 (6.10)	-27.59 (7.29)***	-17.11 (5.23)***	-17.15 (4.70)***
EE	1.11 (9.04)	3.06 (11.90)	-1.95 (5.69)	-18.96 (6.81)**	-15.51 (4.88)***	-19.47 (4.39)***
HU	-22.43 (8.97)**	-16.07 (11.80)	-6.36 (5.65)	-32.53 (6.75)***	-20.07 (4.84)***	-18.72 (4.35)***
LT	25.29 (10.11)**	31.03 (13.30)**	-5.74 (6.37)	-10.87 (7.61)	-20.54 (5.45)***	-14.01 (4.91)***
LV	6.42 (10.12)	9.58 (13.32)	-3.17 (6.37)	-3.24 (7.62)	1.97 (5.46)	-8.37 (4.91)
PL	-1.29 (8.51)	-0.25 (11.19)	-1.05 (5.36)	-18.17 (6.40)**	-8.68 (4.59)*	-7.19 (4.13)*
SI	0.17 (14.66)	-4.38 (19.29)	4.55 (9.23)	-5.87 (11.03)	5.94 (7.91)	-8.39 (7.11)
SK	11.72 (9.84)	18.78 (12.95)	-7.08 (6.20)	-12.32 (7.41)	-6.66 (5.31)	-5.16 (4.78)
R2	0.66	0.51	0.24	0.64	0.73	0.66
Adj. R2	0.51	0.29	-0.11	0.48	0.61	0.51
Num. obs.	30	30	30	30	30	30

Notes: BG is the reference category for countries, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Party novelty and partial novelty

We now turn to candidate novelty in individual parties. How many of the parties are genuinely new and how many qualify as old in terms of their candidate lists? Looking at all parties, regardless of their levels of support (the black area on Figure 11), highly new parties dominate – new candidates form a majority in most parties that contest elections. Levels of novelty decrease when we move to progressively more popular parties. The bulk of parties that entered the parliament – roughly corresponding to the two lightest areas on Figure 11 – have a weighted novelty score clearly below 0.50. Among the parties that won more than 10 percent of votes, those with WCN between 0.1 and 0.4 dominate. However, novelty does not entirely tail off among large parties. A considerable portion of parties with more than 10 percent of the vote had more than 50 percent of new top candidates. Most intriguingly, there is another peak in the distribution at close to perfect novelty – that stands for genuinely new parties (Sikk and Köker 2015a; Sikk 2005). Also notably, a slightly smaller number of parties still falls between the two peaks. The parties with WCN between 0.5 and 0.8 are particularly problematic for the purposes of volatility calculation as they are partially novel parties (see Sikk and Köker 2015a).

Figure 11. Candidate novelty by vote%



Note: Kernel density curves: black (all parties), dark red (V>1%), red (V>2.5%), orange (V>5%), yellow (V>10%).

What are these highly successful parties with high levels of candidate novelty? Table 4 shows that all countries except for Hungary have seen breakthroughs of such genuinely new parties with more than 10 percent of votes and WCN above 0.8. At the bottom of the table we find mostly electoral coalitions (or mergers, in italics) that are somewhat novel by the virtue of having a new organization, but are often below the mean level of candidate novelty in our dataset (0.57 percent; indicated by the dashed line). Some of the others are post-electoral coalition electons; notable, fewer are splinters from a previously existing proper party. Finally, a number of parties with candidate novelty between 0.4 and 0.80 are not straightforward cases of coalitions, splinters or mergers. These are mostly formations with novel names and organizational structures, yet include a significant number of candidate at

the top of their lists who had been running for other parties previously. In many cases, they have a complex organizational history and can only meaningfully classified as partially novel parties. In such cases, the line between continuations and new parties is very blurred. However, as some of the parties won elections, coding them as new or old parties can decisively influence volatility scores. Indeed, we elsewhere we have called for a more nuanced approach to volatility, that incorporates candidate novelty measured on an interval scale (Sikk and Köker 2015a).

Interestingly, sometimes parties which do not undergo any significant organizational (or name) changes, see high levels of candidate turnover (see Table 5). Whether such parties should be seen as genuine continuations is debatable.

Table 4. Candidate novelty in new parties (following party codes in Manifesto Data Collection)

party	country	year	WCN	Vote %
JL New Era	LV	2002	0.965	24.0
RP Palikot's Movement	PL	2011	0.960	10.0
Smer Direction-Social Democracy	SK	2002	0.953	13.5
SaS Freedom and Solidarity	SK	2010	0.947	12.1
SMC Party of Miro Cerar	SI	2014	0.936	34.5
GERB Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	BG	2009	0.928	39.7
NDSV National Movement Simeon the Second	BG	2001	0.924	42.7
DP Labour Party	LT	2004	0.914	28.4
TPP National Resurrection Party	LT	2008	0.911	15.1
RP Union for the Republic	EE	2003	0.886	24.6
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic	PL	2001	0.856	10.2
VV Public Affairs	CZ	2010	0.824	10.9
NS New Union (Social Liberals)	LT	2000	0.814	19.6
Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	HU	2010	0.741	16.7
TP People’s Party	LV	1998	0.716	21.3
PO Civic Platform	PL	2001	0.698	12.7
LLS Lithuanian Liberal Union	LT	2000	0.688	17.3

PS Zoran Jankovic's List - Positive Slovenia	SI	2011	0.687	28.5
TOP09 Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09	CZ	2010	0.626	16.7
KMÜ Coalition Party and Rural Union	EE	1995	0.583	32.2
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia	LV	2002	0.547	19.1
ODS United Democratic Forces	BG	1997	0.500	52.2
KzB Coalition for Bulgaria	BG	2001	0.492	17.1
LSDA Latvian Social Democratic Alliance	LV	1998	0.470	12.9
ER Estonian Reform Party	EE	1995	0.461	16.2
UTT Coalition of Rolandas Paksas ‘For Order and Justice'	LT	2004	0.442	11.4
DL Democratic Left	BG	1997	0.430	22.1
SDKÚ Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	SK	2002	0.424	15.1
BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party	BG	2013	0.423	26.6
ERL Estonian People’s Union	EE	2003	0.412	13.0
AWS Electoral Action ‘Solidarity'	PL	1997	0.399	33.8
SDL' Party of the Democratic Left	SK	1998	0.397	14.7
SNS Slovak National Party	SK	2006	0.373	11.7
IL Pro Patria Union	EE	1999	0.333	16.1
SLD-UP Coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour	PL	2001	0.308	41.0
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP Alliance	HU	200	0.30	42.5

		6	2	
LiD Left and Democrats	PL	2007	0.291	13.2
SLD Democratic Left Alliance	PL	2005	0.245	11.3
DP Labour Party	LT	2012	0.233	20.7
UW Freedom Union	PL	1997	0.219	13.4
K Estonian Center Party	EE	1995	0.201	14.2
KDU-CSL Coalition of KDU-ČSL and US-DEU	CZ	2002	0.178	14.3
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition	SK	1998	0.170	26.3
UdL Working for Lithuania	LT	2004	0.158	20.6
TB-LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom National Independence Movement	LV	1998	0.147	14.7
TS-LKD Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats	LT	2008	0.144	19.7
BSDK A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition	LT	2000	0.137	31.1
LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	LT	2008	0.129	11.7
PTT Order and Justice	LT	2008	0.123	12.7
FiDeSz-MPP-MDF FiDeSz-MPP-MDF-Alliance	HU	2002	0.060	41.1

Table 5. Old parties with candidate novelty over 0.5

party	country	year	WCN	Vote %
FKgP Independent Smallholders' Party	HU	1994	0.754	8.8
DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom	BG	2001	0.695	7.5
Desus Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	SI	2011	0.670	7.0
ATAKA National Union Attack	BG	2009	0.667	9.4
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia	LV	2006	0.598	6.0
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic	PL	2005	0.583	11.4
SNS - Slovenian People's Party and Youth Party of Slovenia	SI	2008	0.571	5.4
LDS - Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	SI	2008	0.562	5.2
DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom	BG	2005	0.551	12.8
Desus Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia	SI	2008	0.540	7.4
HZD - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	SK	2002	0.519	19.5

Note: as defined in Manifesto Research Group dataset

Discussion and conclusion

This paper has analysed candidate novelty in Central and Eastern Europe. We saw at best a limited overall trend towards stabilization of candidate lists, with candidate novelty decreasing in some countries more consistently than in others. The trends in candidate novelty generally correspond to what we know about dynamics of individual party systems. In particular, we see a very clear pattern of disrupted consolidation in the Czech Republic and Hungary, and steady consolidation in Estonia. The index of weighted candidate novelty is correlated to volatility scores as calculated by Powell & Tucker (2014), but the relationship is less than perfect. Indeed, looking at candidate novelty scores has indicated issues with the coding of party entry and exit. However, we argue more fundamentally that electoral volatility scores that rely on dichotomous coding of new and old parties, splits, mergers and electoral coalitions are bound to be misleading due to prominent partially novel parties in terms of their candidates (but potentially also other aspects). Such electons – to use a joint term for parties and coalitions – are pervasive in CEE, but they are also present elsewhere – e.g. Israel (Barnea and Rahat 2011) and Denmark (Sikk and Köker 2015a). We do not argue that electoral landscape stays intact if, say, two parties form an electoral coalition that exclusively draws on candidates of these parties (and hence has zero novelty). Certainly, other dimensions

of electon change need to be accounted for. However, we do argue that such a coalition is not a totally new electon and should contribute less to electoral volatility scores than a genuinely new party with only new candidates.

More fundamentally, we also call for a refined conceptualization of what a political party is. With simplification, we can distinguish between two different approaches to political parties. Some of the literature analyses political parties from the perspective of political organizations with internal structures, members, leaders, political ideas etc. Other literature mostly sees political parties through a prism of elections. Much of the literature on party system change and new political parties belongs to the second type, but sometimes struggles with non-partisan political actors (such as electoral coalitions) and partially new parties.[121] We believe that focussing on electoral candidates does not only provide a wealth of highly nuanced data to contribute to a continuous scale of party change, but also offers an excellent link between the two approaches. On the one hand, candidates are the apex of party organization and selected using organizational procedures. On the other hand, they are intrinsically linked to elections. The analysis of candidate turnover also offers to our knowledge the best way to conceptualize political parties as a fluid phenomenon that are seldom perfectly new or old, but can rejuvenate or stagnate to different extent, merge and split, and form and disband temporary alliances. Such party fluidity is particularly common in CEE, but can also be found in at least some Western European countries. As we have shown above and as can be seen by looking at candidate novelty and dropout in Appendices, candidate turnover captures the extent of party change rather well.

Even more fundamentally, we would even suggest that parties as such have received excessive attention in studies on electoral and political change. Much of political science literature assumes almost teleological development of party systems and individual parties towards a specific (West European-like) form of consolidation (the alternative being bust), where parties are reasonably stable and new parties seldom surface. It is also often an implicit or explicit assumption that it would be in the interest of many or most socio-economic and political actors. Given the amount of transformation that political parties can undergo, it might be more instructive to think about them as useful "vessels" for various social actors, such as political entrepreneurs who set up parties, interests, elites, voters or even ideology. Perhaps these actors could be seen as "selfish genes"[122] that use political parties as carriers in their interest. It is conceivable that political parties (or any organizations) hardly have any interests of their own, apart from those of its leaders, members, supporters and voters. If so, party transformations, rather than stability at all costs, may serve the interests of these constituencies; in some situations, continued party success or even survival might be less than

[121] The "parties as organizations" school provides a much better perspective on the latter but is not particularly concerned with the former.

[122] To borrow a notion from Richard Dawkins, 2006 who has suggested that evolution ultimately serves the "interests" of genes rather than individuals or organisms.

optimal; party "death" is certainly much less regrettable than that of an individual.123 We suggest that electoral candidates are one possible way to look beneath the surface of political parties – they can be conceptualized as a sort of "political DNA" or a genetic marker that operates inside political parties and makes them what they are.

The fact that such transformations are – or, perhaps more accurately, "were" – rare in Western Europe is beside the point. Lack of dynamism in West European party systems was the result of particular historical circumstances until a couple of decades ago. Today, there are signs of increasing dynamism in many West European parties and party systems. Evolution of political parties in CEE has been conditioned by other factors and has taken a different path, where the "political genes"– or the relatively more dominant ones – can be better served by some fluidity and transformation. There are, of course, strong reasons to believe that democratic stability is better served by strongly consolidated parties and party systems, but this option might as well be off the menu in contemporary societies.

123 "Party death" and perhaps also "birth" are somewhat unfortunate anthropomorphic terms that we suggest be avoided. They both proscribe to political parties human instincts, such as survival. Under certain circumstances, the dissolution of a party may well serve the interests of the "genes".

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Appendix 1. Weighted novelty among individual parties (V > 10%)








Novelty: Hungary
weighted candidate novelty
year
JOBBIK
FKGP
MSZP
FIDESZ
SZDSZ
MSZP
FIDESZ
MSZP
MSZP
MSZP
FIDESZ
MSZP
JOBBIK
FIDESZ


Novelty: Lithuania
weighted candidate novelty
year
DP
TPP
NS
LLS
UTT
DP
BSDA
LSDP


Novelty: Latvia
weighted candidate novelty
year
JL
ZRS
TP
PCTVL
SC
Vienotiba
SC
ZZS
TSP
ZZS
JL
PVL
Vienotiba
SC
TP
TP
TB
SC
ZZS


Novelty: Poland
weighted candidate novelty
year
RUCHP
SRP
PO
SRP
PSL
PIS
PO
AWS
SLD
SLD
PIS
PO
SLD
PO
PIS


Novelty: Slovenia
weighted candidate novelty
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
SMC
PS
SD
SDS
SD
SDS
SDS
DeSuS
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
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2011
2012
2013
2014
year


Novelty: Slovakia
weighted candidate novelty
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
Smer
SaS
HZDS
SNS
SDKU
SDL
SDKU
HZDS
SMK
Smer
SDKU
SMK
Smer
SDK
Smer
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
year

Appendix 2. Weighted dropout among individual parties (V > 10%)

Note: horizontal scales refer to years when the candidates were dropped. Font size (corresponds to V% and party weights) are based on their electoral performance in previous election.








Dropout: Hungary
weighted candidate dropout
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
FKGP
FKGP
MDF
SZDSZ
MSZP
MSZP
SZDSZ
MSZP
FIDESZ
MSZP
MSZP
JOBBIK
FIDESZ
FIDESZ
FIDESZ
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
year


Dropout: Lithuania
weighted candidate dropout
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
TS
LLS
BSDA
LDDP
LKDP
UTT
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TS
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
year


Dropout: Latvia
weighted candidate dropout
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
DPS
LC
LSDA
PCTVL
TSP
TUB
TKL
SC
ZRS
Vienotiba
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
year


Dropout: Poland
weighted candidate dropout
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
SLD
LID
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UW
AWS
PSL
SLD
SLD
PO
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year


Dropout: Slovenia
weighted candidate dropout
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
LDS
SD
SDS
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SD
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2005
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2014
year


Dropout: Slovakia
weighted candidate dropout
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
SV
SDK
HZDS
SDL
HZDS
HZDS
SNS
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SDKU
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SMK
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8. Sikk, Allan and Philipp Köker. 2016. "Rejuvenation or renomination? Corruption and candidate turnover in Central and Eastern Europe".

Abstract

Recent studies have analysed the electoral impact of political corruption and effectiveness of elections in holding implicated politicians to account. However, high levels of corruption or publicised cases of political malfeasance also influence parties' strategies before elections. While some studies argue that political scandals decrease candidate renomination rates and electoral fortunes of incumbents, others suggest that parties stick to established candidates when corruption increases. We put these contrasting arguments to the test by studying candidate turnover on party lists in nine Central and Eastern European countries. Based on related literature on electoral effects of corruption, we formulate two competing hypotheses on the impact of corruption (perception) on candidate turnover: 1) rejuvenation, under which parties renew their candidate lists in response to corruption, and 2) renomination, under which corruption leads to renomination of old candidates and stagnation of the candidate pool. Our analysis is based on a new data set covering nearly 200,000 candidates in most elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. We find more support for the rejuvenation hypothesis – deteriorating corruption situation leads to increased candidate turnover, but only among governing parties. Additionally, we find that turnover is lower among larger parties, parties with increasing electoral support and under economic growth.

Regular elections are one the most important accountability mechanisms in a modern representative democracy. Electoral contests allow the public to evaluate their representatives and governing personnel, voters can reward parties and candidates for satisfactory performance or punish them if they fall short of their expectations (Kriesi 2012). Punishment can be motivated by a multitude of reasons including failure to implement campaign or manifesto promises (McDonald and Budge 2005), underperformance on economic issues (Ecker et al. 2015; Hernández and Kriesi 2016) but also by scandals or revelations about political malfeasance and corruption (Bågenholm 2013b). Over the last two decades, a growing number of studies has investigated the determinants, working mechanisms and effects of political corruption (see e.g. Heywood 1997; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2011). One stream of literature has devoted particular attention to the electoral impact of political corruption and the effectiveness of elections as mechanisms of vertical accountability (Banducci and Karp 1994; Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Costas-Pérez, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2012; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Kauder and Potrafke 2014; Pattie and Johnston 2012; Peters and Welch 1980). Most studies thereby investigate to what extent voters actually punish corrupt parties or individual politicians and 'throw out the rascals' (Bågenholm 2013b). Overwhelmingly, authors find that almost irrespective of national context or level of government voters do so considerably less severely or much less frequently than expected. Still, there are very few comparative large-N studies on the topic (Bågenholm 2013b remains an exception) and research has also failed to systematically address the influence of corruption on party strategies before they face voters at the polls.

Parties' pre-election strategies encompass numerous activities, including programmatic adjustments and planning of the campaign. One of parties' most important activities among these – arguably one of the most important functions of political parties in general – is the selection and presentation of candidates for public office (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010). Candidates are not only important because they implement policies once elected, but also because they are the literal 'face' of a party and constitute a link between voters and the state. Candidate selection mechanisms as well as the effect of quotas and other legal regulations have been researched both theoretically and empirically (e.g. Hazan and Rahat 2010; Lundell 2004; Rahat 2007). However, the determinants of candidate turnover and have hitherto received little scholarly attention. The effect of corruption on candidate turnover presents an ideal starting point for exploring these mechanisms. Voters' perception of corruption in political parties is an important factor in determining party support and voting decisions (Deegan-Krause, Klasnja and Tucker 2011; Ecker et al. 2015; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012). Furthermore, high and increasing levels of perceived corruption are crucial for the break-through of new, anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2016). The abovementioned studies all suggest that corruption (or lack thereof) could create specific opportunities and incentives for parties to change their candidate line-up. However, their findings suggest two contrasting working mechanisms with diametrically opposed effects. While some studies argue that political scandals can decrease renomination rates and hamper incumbent's electoral fortunes,

others suggest that parties will stick to established candidates rather than replacing them with new faces when corruption increases.

The aim of this paper is to test the two competing notions by studying the effect of corruption perception on candidate turnover on party lists in 61 elections since 1990 in Central and East European (CEE). We formulate two different responses of political parties to increasing corruption perception: (1) *rejuvenation,* under which parties renew their slates in response to corruption, and (2) *renomination,* under which corruption leads to the stagnation of the candidate pool and keeping of old candidates. We find significant support for the rejuvenation hypothesis as increased levels of corruption lead to an increase in candidate turnover. However, the effect is limited to *governing parties*. Turnover among *all parties* is affected by further factors. First, larger parties *ceteris paribus* tend to experience lower levels of candidate turnover. Secondly, candidate turnover increases when parties lose electoral support and decreases when parties increase their vote shares. Thirdly, economic growth limits candidate turnover while a drop in unemployment levels has (puzzlingly) the opposite effect.

Mechanisms of candidate turnover

Regular turnover of parliamentary elites is a defining characteristic of and a necessity for any democracy (Goodin and Lepora 2015; Petracca 1996; Putnam 1976). Legislative turnover rates are determined by factors ranging from the electoral system to parties' performance in elections. They naturally also depend on how many members of parliament run again and who parties decide to nominate (Matland and Studlar 2004; Rahat 2007). However, the turnover of candidates themselves is so far a largely understudied subject. Existing scholarship mostly focusses on the renomination (and deselection) of incumbents and candidate selection in general (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010). Alternatively, they focus on pairs of election in countries with single mandate districts or very small multi-mandate districts (e.g. U.S., the UK and Italy) rather than elections in list-based electoral systems.[124] Lack of adequate comparative data, too, has contributed to this gap in the literature. However, parties regularly nominate more candidates than they could reasonably get into office so that incumbents usually only occupy a fraction of places on party lists. Thus, there is considerable scope for candidate turnover in want of study and explanation – even if we assume that most incumbents are renominated (a trend visible in most Western democracies; see also discussion below).

There are generally two types of candidate turnover, which are similar to those identified by Matland and Studlar (2004) in their study of legislative turnover. Candidate turnover can be due to *voluntary* resignation of candidates, i.e. the decision not to run again for personal reasons (e.g. age, family, general dissatisfaction with

[124] Exceptions are Kreuzer and Pettai (1999; 2003) and Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) who look at several countries and elections, yet even they are eventually mostly concerned with inter-party mobility of incumbents between elections.

party/office, or to pursue a career outside of politics).[125] Although some factors – such as redrawing of constituency borders and the introduction/phasing out of more beneficial retirement options – have been shown to increase the rate at which incumbents retire from office (Banducci and Karp 1994), party list turnover should be significantly less affected by this. Such (dis)incentives almost only relate to incumbents and legislative turnover otherwise tends to be comparatively stable (albeit on country-specific levels; Matland and Studlar 2004).

On the other hand, party list turnover can also be caused by the *involuntary* removal of candidates from party lists. Thereby, a candidate is either deselected by the party or is forced to give up their list place. Although it is not always obvious whether incumbents resign of their own accord or are (informally) pressured into doing so, the impetus for involuntary removal should lie in their inability to win elections or adverse effect of the candidacy on the party as a whole. Health issues or death present another form of involuntary removal from party lists. As mentioned above, comparative studies of candidate list turnover are rare so that providing a preliminary analysis of wider patterns of candidate turnover is part of the rationale of this paper.

Studies of candidate selection in Western Europe and the United States have shown that most incumbents seek renomination by their party and tend to be renominated without problems (see chapters in Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Matland and Studlar 2004). At the same time, targeted deselection of incumbents – denial of renomination or forced retirement – appears to be uncommon. Yet as Matland and Studlar (2004) suggest, it may only appear rare as 'incumbents who face a serious danger of being deselected [by the party leadership or through intra-party defeat] may opt for "voluntary" retirement instead' (ibid. 97). This is backed up by most studies, prominently those on the UK expenses scandal in 2009 (Eggers and Fisher 2011; Larcinese and Sinclair 2013; Pattie and Johnston 2012) and corruption scandals affecting members of United States Congress (Basinger 2013; Banducci and Karp 1994). However, in each case other factors were also shown to have significantly contributed to increased levels of retirement and findings from similar studies on Italian deputies (Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Asquer 2013; 2014) are mixed.

In any case, some natural baseline level of candidate turnover in all parties can be expected as a number of candidates resign voluntarily and are replaced with new aspirants for political office. Nevertheless, it is yet unclear to what extent the above findings can be applied to explaining variations in candidate turnover. Studies have so far focussed almost exclusively on plurality voting systems with comparatively decentralised systems of candidate selection. List-based electoral systems tend to be more centralised and exclusive, giving more power to central party organisations or regional leaders in the selection process (Hazan and Rahat 2010). In addition,

[125] Party-specific voluntary list turnover can also be caused by political tourism, i.e. candidates' deliberate decision to run for another party in the next election. Nevertheless, this has no effect on general levels of candidate turnover.

incumbent candidates seeking re-nomination and 'ordinary' candidates differ in so far as the cost of removing the former is far greater. As Larcinese and Sinclair (2013) show, parties do not remove MPs whose voting behaviour frequently deviates from the party line due to their ability to win elections. Ordinary list candidates on the other hand are considerably less costly to remove and their replacement might even be beneficial for the party. Incumbents implicated in scandals might thus simply be banished to an unwinnable place on the party list rather than being de-selected while 'ordinary' candidates are removed. Nevertheless, there is so far only some anecdotal news reporting of cases in which political malfeasance also affected 'ordinary' parliamentary candidates (e.g. Lalani 2015). Furthermore, ordinary candidates might themselves be considerably less interested in running again than incumbents given costs of campaigning and uncertainty about the outcome.

Finally, note that in addition to being a potentially important indicator of political corruption, candidate turnover is also a relevant variable for the study of other issues. For example, Kreuzer and Pettai (1999) argue that decreasing levels of candidate turnover can be seen as an indicator of parties' institutionalisation and development of effective recruitment channels (which favour stability). In a similar vein, Sikk (2013) and Barnea and Rahat (2011) use it as an indicator of party novelty, the use of which could improve our understanding of party system dynamics, promising more reliable electoral volatility indices.

Candidate turnover and corruption: rejuvenation vs. renomination

Until now, candidate turnover and its determinants remain understudied and findings on legislative turnover are not fully applicable. Such problems notwithstanding, in this paper we offer a first step towards explaining candidate turnover by considering the relationship between candidate turnover and corruption. Studies on the impact of corruption on electoral outcomes and political recruitment often address the issue of candidate (de-)selection and turnover, although rarely in much depth. Interestingly, the existing literature suggests two mechanisms of effect which lead to diametrically opposed outcomes. One the one hand, corruption can be linked to an increase in candidate turnover as implicated candidates resign or are involuntarily removed by parties trying to increase their electoral appeal. On the other hand, corruption can also be associated with a rise and strengthening of clientelist structures which hinder turnover and decrease the pool of potential candidates. Thus, studying the relationship between corruption and candidate turnover not only offers a promising avenue in explaining wider patterns of elite rotation but also presents the opportunity to solve an intriguing theoretical puzzle. In the following, we review both arguments and formulate two competing hypotheses. These are then tested on a novel data set of candidate turnover in 61 elections in nine Central and East European democracies.

Relegation, de-selection and strategic newness: The case for rejuvenation

Corruption plays an important role in voters' decision-making before elections. Although other factors naturally play an equally substantial role, corruption significantly affects citizens' inclination to vote for a particular party (Deegan-Krause, Klasnja and Tucker 2011; Slomczynski and Shabad 2012; Ecker et al. 2015). Voters are overall more likely to vote for parties and candidates who they perceive as less corrupt (or not corrupt at all).[126] It is thus in parties' best interest to appear as 'clean' as they can. There are a multitude of measures parties might employ to this end and prevent losses on election day (or maybe even increase their vote share), ranging from programmatic reorientation to structural changes (including splits and mergers with other parties to obscure their past). Yet, the most straightforward way to disassociate themselves with a corrupt image is to 'throw out the rascals'. Despite some mixed findings in the case of Italian members of parliament (Asquer 2013; 2014; Chang, Golden and Hill 2010) and state legislators in Bavaria (Kauder and Potrafke 2014), this notion is supported by a great number of studies, most prominently those of the UK expenses scandal in 2009 (Eggers and Fisher 2011; Larcinese and Sinclair 2013; Pattie and Johnston 2012) and corruption scandals affecting members of Congress (Banducci and Karp 1994; Basinger 2013). Voters tend to see individual politicians rather than political parties as such as corrupt (Slomczynski and Shabad 2011), so that replacing old and ostensibly corrupt candidates would appear to be an effective way for a party to distance itself from the wrongdoings of previous representatives.

Offering a novel set of candidates untainted by political scandals has been linked the success of new anti-corruption parties in Europe (Bågenholm 2013a). Furthermore, 'newness' can also present a general strategy for parties to break into the electoral market or to increase their vote share (Sikk 2012). Thus, even if a party or its candidates have not been involved in any scandals, voters' perceptions of rising levels of corruption (and increased awareness of the potential for malfeasance by established politicians) still present incentives for parties to change their line-up. Party lists are rejuvenated in order to increase electoral appeal. Thereby, party leaders can either elevate relatively unknown (and previously unsuccessful) candidates to higher and more promising list places or they recruit genuinely new candidates, without any political experience and/or with specific appeal to their electorate,[127] from outside the party. Incumbents and previous top candidates on the other hand can either be relegated to 'unwinnable' list places or districts or they are entirely purged from the lists, respectively. From this follows our *rejuvenation* hypothesis:

Increasing corruption is associated with greater candidate turnover as parties try to anticipate punishment by the electorate and/or increase their electoral appeal by rejuvenating their candidate lists.

[126] Nevertheless, this mechanism can be mitigated by individual party loyalty or overall political leaning.
[127] Examples of this would be labour union activists running on social-democratic/socialist party lists or representatives of employer organisations on the lists of economically liberal parties. This might also happen, albeit to a lesser degree, if corruption is absent or declining.

Clientelist structures and recruitment problems: The case for renomination

Places on electoral lists – particularly those with a reasonable chance to get the respective candidate into parliament – are pricy goods. Political hopefuls usually have to proof their loyalty by long-standing commitment to the party, by engaging in grass-roots activism, canvassing and committee work, if they want to ascend in the party hierarchy and land one of these coveted positions (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Manow 2013; Matichescu and Protsyk 2011; Norris 1997; Protsyk and Matichescu 2011). The further parties institutionalise, they also develop more stable and effective recruitment channels (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2013; Kreuzer and Pettai 1999). Thus, one's political pedigree becomes more important for recruitment into 'winnable' list places, although it should not be prohibitive to recruitment of genuinely new candidates. While these arguments are still compatible with the *rejuvenation* hypothesis presented above, it can also be argued that a rise in corruption will change the incentive structure governing parties' recruitment strategies to the effect that *less* rather than more new candidates are recruited. This effect is amplified by a lack of potential new candidates, leading to a stagnation and decrease in candidate turnover.

Political corruption is often associated with the existence and rise in clientelist structures and practices in the electoral arena. In the context of candidate selection, a rise in clientelist practices means that regular channels of meritocratic recruitment – which would still allow for the recruitment of party outsiders whose merits stem from a different field – become less permeable. As Protsyk and Matichescu (2011) show, parties will trade high-ranking/safe list places for potential financial contributions to parties' budgets and recruit specifically with the aim of increasing their revenue (Matichescu and Protsyk 2011; Protsyk and Matichescu 2011). Potential candidates who do not possess sufficient material or immaterial resources are at a disadvantage compared to others who can use their wealth and influence to fill the party coffers. Candidates who already competed for a party in the previous election (not only incumbents) are particularly advantaged as they are even more likely to command resources for the benefit of the party and its networks. Yet there are further reasons why increasing corruption should decrease parties' incentives to replace old candidates. While a new set of candidates may be appealing to voters, studies of the UK expenses scandal have shown that even incumbents who have been implicated in will almost always achieve a better than entirely new candidates due to name recognition and track record of getting elected/the incumbency effect (Larcinese and Sircar 2013). At the same time, removing old candidates from candidate lists amid a climate of increasing occurrence of corrupt practices, might equal an 'admission of guilt' on behalf of the party, highlighting the practices and deterring voters. Highly publicised cases of political malfeasance also tend to be rather individualised and are therefore unlikely to account for large variations in overall candidate turnover. Furthermore, the more wide-spread clientelist practices are, the more likely it is that parties will try to protect their top candidates from prosecution

by keeping them in high (and secure) list places (Protsyk and Matichescu 2011; Matichescu and Protsyk 2011).[128]

A last point is that even if the value of 'newness' would outweigh the disincentives described above, parties will likely have difficulties to find new and politically 'clean' candidates to replace any dropouts when corruption increases. Indeed, it is likely that new candidates may also not necessarily want to join lists of governing parties if corruption perception is increasing. Parties may have to stick to the candidates that they have as they *cannot* (rather than will not) rejuvenate when they stagnate under increasing corruption. From this follows our *renomination* hypothesis:

Increasing corruption leads to a decrease in candidate turnover because parties prefer to protect established candidates, previous candidates are able to offer more benefits to the party, and because the pool of 'clean' candidates is limited.

The role of party leadership and government participation

Irrespective of which of the two competing hypothesis proves true, the role of party leadership and government participation by political parties should remain equal. All electoral systems for parliamentary elections in Central and East European democracies are based on party lists or at least have a strong list-based component (i.e. under mixed systems in Hungary, Lithuania). In such systems, candidate selection tends to be more centralized, thus giving party leaders more influence over candidate (de-)selection (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Matichescu and Protsyk 2011; Protsyk and Matichescu 2011). Candidate selection is further concentrated in the hands of party leadership in newer and less institutionalised democracies, which is of particular interest here as our data stems from CEE. Here, the lack of established party structures which could otherwise restrict leadership autonomy and the strategic complexity produced by the high number of competitors strengthens party leaders and should lead to more centralized selection procedures (Field and Siavelis 2008, 630-32). In case parties choose *rejuvenation* as a strategy, this leverage would give party leaders the possibility to rid the party of old candidates and politicians associated with corruption. Should corruption rather lead to *renomination*, party leaders would be able to prevent the de-selection of ostensibly corrupt candidates and protect them by giving them the most promising list places, leaving significantly less scope for turnover. This makes both *rejuvenation* and *renomination* not only plausible but also feasible party strategies.

Parties' participation in government, too, should amplify the effect of rising levels of corruption irrespective of its outcome. Parties who hold responsibility in government have the easiest access to public goods and determine their mode of distribution. On the one hand, representatives of these parties could be more likely to be involved in clientelistic exchanges where these goods are diverted from their intended use, thus strengthening corrupt networks and favouring *renomination* over *rejuvenation*. On the

[128] Members of all parliaments included in this study enjoy immunity from prosecution for the duration of their mandate which can only be lifted by a parliamentary majority.

other hand, government parties should also be under greater pressure to renew their candidate lists if corruption is increasing. As argued by Ecker et al. (2015), voters evaluate government parties not only on the basis of economic performance (economy, unemployment rate etc.) but also on the existence and level of corruption. This should particularly be true in the countries of CEE where corruption tends to be among the most important issues for voters (ibid., Singer et al 2011).

Irrespective of corruption scandals among other (opposition) parties, governing parties will be under particular pressure to renominate or to rejuvenate. Governing parties not only have access to public goods but also the power to prevent its misuse for private gain. High or increasing levels of corruption will put greater pressure on these parties either to rejuvenate their candidates lists in a bid to anticipate punishment by the electorate[129] or to renominate previous candidates to benefit from their resources and shield them from prosecution.

Data and variable coding

We employ a new data set on electoral candidates and party lists from nine Central and East European democracies and 61 elections between and 1996 and 2015, i.e. all current EU member states in the region with the exception of Croatia and Romania and a handful of early elections where the data has been more difficult to analyse or obtain, respectively (see Table 1).[130] Candidate lists and electoral results were obtained from public sources, primarily those available online (e.g. the websites of national electoral commissions, parliaments and ministries). As far as available, we incorporated data from the 'Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe' database at the University of Essex. Data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, the *Political Science Data Yearbook* and the ParlGov data base (Döring and Manow 2016) were used to complement the data set and code government participation, electoral performance and party change. Overall our data set records nearly 200,000 candidacies. To calculate candidate turnover between elections, we developed an automatized matching function in R which compares candidates between pairs of subsequent elections.[131]

[129] Admittedly, this mechanism of punishment is likely mediated by individual voters' political/party preferences (Eckert et al 2015; see also Anderson and Tverkova 2003).

[130] In the actual analysis, we generally do not use data from before 1997 due to lack of data on corruption perception. We have already obtained further data and will include these countries as well as some of the earlier elections in the future.

[131] The function also includes comprehensive tools to deal with complicate situations such as duplicate names, multi-district candidacies, misspellings and different ways of recording names in different elections.

Table 1. Elections included in the data set and current analysis

Election number	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LT	LV	PL	SI	SK
1			1992	1990	1992		1991*		
2		1992	1995	1994	1996	1995	1993		
3	1994*	1996	1999	1998	2000	1998	1997		1994
4	1997*	1998	2003	2002	2004	2002	2001	2000	1998
5	2001	2002	2007	2006	2008	2006	2005	2004	2002
6	2005	2006	2011	2010	2012	2010	2007	2008	2006
7	2009	2010	2015	2014	-	2011	2011	2011	2010
8	2013	2013	-	-	-	2014	2015	2014	2012
9	2014	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2016

** Only parties that entered parliament.*

Dependent variable: Candidate turnover

Candidate turnover can be approached in two ways – the percentage of new candidates who did not compete in the previous election (candidate novelty) or the percentage of candidates who failed to run again (candidate dropout). Although similar, the two measures reflect different processes – namely the recruitment of new candidates on the one hand and the removal of old candidates on the other – which do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, particularly if parties remain unstable. Novelty and dropout would be equivalent only if no parties disappeared and no new parties emerged. Furthermore, it would require that parties ran list of equal length in each election and candidates in all list positions were of equal interest. That is not the case and instead we focus on top ranks in candidate lists and use indices of weighted candidate novelty and dropout (see the discussion below). Therefore, we analyse both indicators and compare the results; even though our hypotheses should equally apply to both indicators, there are important and interesting discrepancies in results. For our analysis, we introduced adjustments to the raw percentages of candidate novelty and dropout that are outlined in more detail below.

Independent variables

Corruption/clientelism. We use Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI) to operationalize corruption. Although the index does not reflect actual or 'real' levels of corruption or clientelism, it can be argued to a meaningful indicator of the persistence of such exchanges in a society, including among political parties. We analyse both the level and change in CPI. For change, we look at the development of the index over the first three years of a legislative term[132] without taking into account most recent changes that may not yet have had tangible impact (especially if elections are held early in the year). Our rationale is that a trend should represent the public relevance and

[132] For simplicity we assume a four-year term for all elections, but exclude from analysis very early elections (less than two years after previous), see discussion below.

pressure for political parties better than the average CPI score over the parliamentary term (cf. Eckert et al. 2015). Following Hanley and Sikk (2016), we also include the level of CPI for the year before the election – given that data is collected in the year preceding the headline year, this is more appropriate than taking the CPI score of the election year; particularly as some of the elections took place in the first half of the year.

Government participation. According to our hypotheses, government participation should be associated with either greater or lower rates of candidate turnover. However, particularly in the early years of democratisation, the new democracies in CEE often experienced several governments that included different parties during a single parliamentary term. Thus, cabinet participation cannot adequately be captured using simple dummy variables of government membership. Even more qualified approaches that only include parties most recently participating in government (see Bågenholm 2013b) fail to capture this complexity by leaving out important governing parties. Therefore, we coded the governing and prime ministerial status for all parties using data from the ParlGov data base (Doering and Manow 2016). Furthermore, we added data on portfolio allocation for each government from the Political Science Data Yearbook, Blondel and Mueller-Rommel (2001), and Ismayr (2010). Based on that, we constructed the measure of *weighted cabinet participation* that ranges from 0 (no portfolios held during the electoral term) to 1 (the party held all portfolios during the electoral term). We classify all parties for which the weighted cabinet membership was 0.1 or higher as governing parties. This includes all large or long-term cabinet parties, but excludes some marginal governing parties, those whose membership was short-lived or limited to early part of an electoral term.[133] Further details on the index are presented in the appendix.

Party size. We operationalise party size as its vote share. Thereby, we expect the same effect of party size on candidate turnover irrespective of the applicability renomination and rejuvenation hypotheses. Under a *renomination* scenario, larger parties (those with a larger voter base) will have wider and stronger networks and are therefore able to provide more goods for their voters in exchange for their support. They are also more likely to be part of the government, granting them access to even more potential for patronage. Even in the face of allegations of corruption, these parties are under less pressure to deselect their candidates. Slomczynski and Shabad (2011) and Ecker et al. (2015) find that party supporters are less likely to see their preferred party as corrupt, so that parties with a larger voter base can count on their supporters' votes regardless of any scandals. Larger parties also tend to be associated with larger organisational structures (or more complicated ones in the case of alliances). Under a *rejuvenation* scenario, the larger party organisation thus helps parties to reach out to people outside their existing structures and offer an attractive and relatively low-risk opportunity to run for parliament (higher chances of election means that associated costs of candidacies can be recuperated – through state party financing – more easily). We enter

[133] 10 from the analysis of candidate novelty and 37 from the analysis of dropout below.

the variable as its logarithm to the base of 10 to ensure that the relative differences in party sizes are reflected more accurately.[134]

Vote change. Tracing political parties and their vote changes in CEE is a thankless and nigh impossible task because of the amount of changes political parties have experienced in the region (see Ibenskas & Sikk forthcoming; Marinova 2015). Our variable of vote change is based on a somewhat experimental approach suggested elsewhere (Sikk 2013). The vote share for parties in the preceding (resp. following) election is imputed based on successor (resp. predecessor) parties that were identified using overlap (or congruence, to use our preferred term) of candidates in consecutive elections. Where mergers or splits or coalitions occurred, the imputed vote is based on split votes for congruent parties according to the degree of congruence (see Sikk 2013 for additional detail on the method).[135] Note that we exclude from all models new parties – i.e. parties for which predecessors cannot easily be determined.[136] Almost by definition, they have very high levels of candidate novelty and mixing them with existing and more established parties would conceptually blur the picture. Still, we note that new parties have often benefitted from rising perceptions of corruption (Hanley & Sikk 2016).

Unemployment and GDP per capita change. Finally, we include the change in the unemployment rate and GDP per capita levels in the three years preceding the election year. Hanley and Sikk (2016) show that socio-economic developments affect chances of new political party breakthroughs. Even though those factors are not the main focus of this study, we tentatively expect them to impact candidate turnover and include unemployment and GDP per capita change in our models as control variables. Due to the great variation in the rate across countries and the fact that even high levels of unemployment can quickly become accepted as the norm (ibid.), we include the change rather than the absolute level of unemployment as our indicator.

Candidate turnover in CEE

As comparative large-scale data on candidate turnover has not previously been presented, we begin with an overview of overall levels and trends of candidate turnover

[134] For example, the logarithm ensures that a party with 20% of votes is equidistant from parties with 10 and 40 percent of votes, rather than 0% and 40% or 10% and 30% of votes. 20% is substantively closer to 40% than 0% and 30% is substantively closer to 20% than 10%.

[135] Whether we can talk about party continuity under such circumstances is debatable, but the method does give an indication of the trend in the support for parties that field a certain set of candidates. Still, the imputed vote shares gave a good indication of trends in support for parties that had experienced such organisational changes. The exclusion of the imputed vote change variable does not substantively change other effects in the models.

[136] As a starting point for identifying continuing parties, we used repeated party codes in consecutive elections from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al 2014). Some of the established parties – particularly electoral alliances often with low candidate novelty – are assigned a different party code there. Manually added list of continuing parties is available in Appendix.

in CEE. Figure 1 shows general trends in turnover by country, plotting the share of new candidates (those who did not contest the previous election) for each election year. Graph (a) shows that overall candidate novelty remains consistently high in most countries – only Estonia has experienced a nearly constant downward trend since early 1990s. Candidate novelty has usually fluctuated sharply when countries have held early elections (Bulgaria 2014, Czech Republic 1998, Latvia 2011, Poland 2007). When elections are held early, fewer candidates need to be replaced after retiring and fewer new parties are created with (often) predominantly new candidates. Remarkably, early elections do not reduce candidate dropout – i.e. the share of candidates running in previous election who do not run again (Figure 1b).

Figure 1. Overall candidate turnover by countries over time



Figure 2. Candidate turnover by countries over time (top 25%, parties with V > 5%)



Such overall trends alone can be misleading as it is great extent based on numerous extra-parliamentary parties, which have limited political relevance. More established parties can be expected to show significantly lower degrees of candidate novelty. Figure 2 focusses on candidate turnover in parties which received at least 5% of votes in the respective election (roughly the typical electoral threshold in the region). Furthermore,

we restrict our analysis here to the most important candidates by only looking at top 25% of party lists. Hence, the top quartile of a party's candidates in districts are contrasted to full candidate lists in the previous election.[137] Thus, new candidate percentage in Figure 2a refers to the share of candidates among top 25% who did not contest the *preceding* election. Dropped candidate percentage (Figure 2b) refers to the percentage among the top 25% of candidates who contested only the *preceding* election. We defined top 25% based on initial list placements or preference votes, where open lists used.[138]

Among the top candidates in larger parties, turnover has very slightly decreased over time, yet there are strong country-specific variations. Some of the sharp drops are caused by *early elections* which restricted parties' ability to recruit new candidates, while sharp increases can generally be traced back to the breakthrough of genuinely new parties which fielded almost exclusively new candidates (see Sikk 2005). Note that candidate novelty and dropout can diverge as we are comparing the *top quartile* of a candidate list in one election to *full* lists in another. Even if all top candidates were to drop out (e.g. due to scandals), many of them would be likely replaced with experienced candidates from lower down the lists rather than completely new candidates. Among established political parties (for definition see footnote 136 above), candidate novelty is generally lower with the aggregate novelty score clearly below 50% in most of the elections (see Figure 3). Still, there is no clear trend towards fewer new candidates (detectable in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Hungary), even if we exclude significant new parties from analysis. Also, significant variation remains within and between countries.

Figure 3. New candidates in established parties by country (top 25%)



[137] To remedy the fact that parties ran overlong lists (up to twice as many candidates as seats in parliament; e.g. Estonia 1995), we constrain 'full lists' above and 'top 25 per cent' to district magnitude or the total number of seats (with national tiers). Note that candidate lists in t are compared to list of any parties in t-1 – i.e. we do not consider party switching here.

[138] For more details and our approach to single-mandate district candidates under mixed systems in Hungary and Lithuania, see Appendix.

Note: only parties that were not coded as new in Volkens et al. 2014 that received at least 5% of votes.

Figure 4. Aggregate weighted candidate turnover by country over time



Note: For details on weighted candidate turnover see Appendix. Aggregate turnover scores weighted by party vote share.

Finally, instead of adopting a strict thresholds in terms of list placements and parties' vote shares, we suggest looking at the aggregate score based on weighting individual candidates' novelty using their list placement and their parties' vote shares. The same approach will be used below for analysing individual parties. Weighted candidate turnover is calculated based on candidate's relative list placement r that ranges from 0 (top candidate) to 1 (bottom candidate).[139] The relative list placement of a candidate can be interpreted as the proportion of her party's candidates in a district with a higher list position. The formula further takes into account overall party vote shares (v) based on the assumption that candidates for whom $r > v$ are more serious or feasible than those for whom $r < v$. Further details on the calculation of weighted turnover are given in Appendix.

Figure 4 shows trends in weighted candidate novelty (a) and dropout (b). Again, there is little evidence that overall political parties have become more stable in terms of their candidate, but as said before, any aggregate scores can mask variation among individual political parties.

Governing status and candidate turnover

Governing parties tend to include fewer new candidates in their electoral lists than opposition parties. The overall mean weighted candidate novelty for the former was 29.6% and for previously existing non-governing parties above 5% of votes it was 36.1%. Weighted dropout was also lower for governing parties than for opposition parties, even though the difference was less pronounced (mean weighted dropout

[139] Assuming no overlong lists where the number of candidates is higher than district magnitude.

34.8% and 39.8%, respectively).[140] Most of the countries followed this general pattern of lower candidate turnover among governing parties, with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovenia where governing parties generally experienced higher dropout rates (see Figure 5b, slightly higher novelty in the Czech Republic, see Figure 5a).

Figure 5. Distribution of weighted turnover by country and governing status



Note: violin plots show density estimates of weighted turnover; black dots show overall means for countries

Candidate turnover and corruption

We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between candidate turnover and perception of corruption. Before proceeding with multivariate models, it needs to be noted that our analysis looks at parties that contested pairs of consecutive elections and where it was reasonably straightforward to code party continuity. We separate our statistical analysis in two ways. Firstly, we model separately weighted candidate novelty and weighted candidate dropout. We analyse the indices for individual parties, in contrast to Figure 4 above that shows aggregate figures for elections. Secondly, as the dynamics of candidate turnover in governing and non-governing parties differ, we run models separately for the two groups of parties, including pooled models for reference.[141] To avoid our data being contaminated by numerous tiny extra-parliamentary parties, we only include those that won at least 5% of votes.

[140] Governing parties defined here as all that had the weighted cabinet seat share above 0.1. The difference in means did not decrease if the threshold was increased.

[141] As parties in the region have not been stable, the models differ in the number of observations. For the analysis of novelty, we only include continuing non-governing parties as otherwise the models would be "contaminated" by genuinely new parties with (by definition) very high levels of candidate novelty. For the analysis of dropout, we can include all parties – including those that disappeared almost completely (though not in a single case did all candidates drop out).

In preliminary analyses we discovered that candidate novelty is strongly dependent on other variables, particularly party size that we need to add as control variables.[142] We also discovered a clear relationship between candidate change and time between elections with early elections producing more limited candidate change than elections held after full term. The models could in principle account for the difference in electoral terms by dividing candidate turnover by the time between elections, as there seems to be a roughly linear relationship between the two. However, we chose to exclude elections that took place less than two years before the previous one from our analysis. In particular, we could have not used the same lags for change in corruption and socio-economic variables as for full terms elections. Shorter lags would have been problematic because they have a more constrained scale and do not necessarily capture overall trends as well. Furthermore, voters might not attribute responsibility for changing corruption or economic situation to parties that have only been in government for a short while.

When looking at bivariate relationships between the change in corruption perception and candidate turnover (Figure 6), it only appears to affect candidate dropout among governing parties (Figure 6b) with no discernible effects on candidate novelty or dropout when considering all continuing parties. Furthermore, only *increase* in corruption perception seems to increase candidate dropout among governing parties while improved corruption perceptions do not seem to affect candidate dropout.[143] Interestingly, the outliers among governing parties which saw high candidate dropout despite no worsening of corruption perception – Gregor Virant's Civic List (LGV) in Slovenia, Public Affairs (VV) in the Czech Republic and Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) in Slovakia – were new formations that disintegrated soon after the election. Even more interestingly, VV and ANO campaigned on anti-corruption ticket yet become mired in corruption scandals themselves after joining the governments.[144]

[142] In pairs of elections, the vote share refers to vote share in the later election for novelty analysis and to the vote share in the earlier election for the dropout analysis (i.e. when the candidates who dropped out did run). In many ways it would be more appealing to look at the effect of vote share in the more recent election, but determining these vote shares is almost impossible given the changing nature of the CEE party systems. We do, however, include the variable of imputed vote change that attempts to measure trends in party support taking into account splits, mergers and electoral coalitions (for details see p. 13).
[143] Admittedly, already when change in corruption perception is zero, the average dropout levels off to fairly low levels – potentially close to "natural" baseline levels of candidate replacement.
[144] This show limitations of CPI as a measure – it captures the overall perception in the direction in corruption, but does not reflect corruption scandals more specific to individual parties.

Figure 6. Weighted candidate turnover and change in corruption perception



Note: black lines show loess fits

Deteriorating corruption perception (i.e. declining CPI change in Table 2) increases governing party candidate dropout, but affects neither their candidate novelty nor non-governing parties. A ten point decrease in CPI during electoral term – close to the minimum in the dataset – increases dropout by 10%. The effect would be present in a bivariate model (not displayed), but persists when controlling for other variables that potentially affect candidate turnover included in our model (socio-economic trends, party size and party vote change, see below). This finding leads support for our *rejuvenation hypothesis* whereby governing parties respond to increased perceptions of corruption by replacing the candidates or the candidates leave the parties. Note that the effect is independent of party fortunes, as we are controlling for the impact of party size and change in vote share in Table 2. The effect would be slightly stronger without the controls (not shown); adding an interaction term for CPI change and vote change would not change the effect.

Table 2. Electoral candidate turnover[145]

	Dependent variable:							
	Weighted novelty				Weighted dropout			
	all parties	governing parties		non-governing parties	all parties	governing parties		non-governing parties
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CPI change	-0.28	-0.01	-0.11	-0.47	-0.62***	-1.03***	-1.03***	-0.12
	(0.29)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.23)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.31)
CPI	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.01	-0.14	0.02	0.02	-0.39**
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.18)
GDP change	-0.41*	-0.76**	-0.69**	-0.02	-0.69***	-0.84***	-0.84***	-0.49*
	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)
unemployment change	-0.47	-0.72	-0.62	-0.27	-1.47***	-1.87**	-1.87**	-0.91
	(0.48)	(0.71)	(0.71)	(0.69)	(0.47)	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.62)
log_{10}*vote*	-15.73***	-12.93*	-0.37	-18.94**	-24.70***	-21.45***	-20.84**	-25.67***
	(4.73)	(6.60)	(10.52)	(7.24)	(4.55)	(6.89)	(10.00)	(6.44)
imputed vote change	0.54***	0.34	0.04	0.71**	-0.60***	-0.53**	-0.53**	-0.74***
	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)
weighted cabinet share			-17.46				-0.88	
			(11.47)				(10.47)	
constant	56.02***	52.82***	44.89***	55.87***	76.86***	65.39***	65.01***	89.05***
	(9.58)	(13.74)	(14.56)	(14.13)	(8.69)	(13.03)	(13.88)	(12.10)
N	138	69	69	69	185	91	91	94
R^2	0.16	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.26	0.29	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R^2	0.12	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.25

Note: OLS regression estimates; standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

As shown above on Figure 6b, it is only the extent of perceived deterioration in corruption situation that seems to impact candidate dropout among governing parties. If we replaced the CPI change variable with a constrained variable where any improvements were set to 0, the model fit would improve (adjusted $R^2 = 0.3$) and strengthen the effect of CPI change as well as GDP change (discussed in more detail below).

In contrast to CPI change, *the level of CPI* has negligible impact on candidate turnover. We detect a minor effect on dropout among non-governing parties only, where ten points difference in CPI (roughly its standard deviation) leads to nearly 4% lower dropout. However, this finding is difficult to interpret. We can tentatively argue that when corruption is high, opposition politicians may be targeted by the government and can either drop out because they are involved in a scandal (or even arrested) or to escape the attention of the government or prosecution services. The level rather than

[145] OLS estimation. The models satisfy standard tests of linear regression. None of the models suffers from multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity or observations with very high leverage.

trend of CPI could matter for such government tactics as they are more likely to appear in environments where corruption in engrained in the system rather than where CPI has only just increased. This finding again on balance supports the rejuvenation hypothesis even though the dynamics here are quite different from those involved in the effect of CPI change on governing parties.

Of the *socio-economic variables*, increased per capita GDP reduces both candidate dropout among both governing and non-governing parties and novelty among governing parties. Economic growth of 10% over electoral period (well within the range of the variable) compared to standstill would reduce candidate novelty among governing parties by around 7% (depending on model specification) and dropout by more than 8%. Hence, governing party candidates remain more stable in good economic times and change more during poor economic performance. The effect of GDP change on the candidate dropout among non-governing parties is more subdued – 10% growth compared to no growth decreases dropout by 5% (but the standard error is rather high). Interestingly, change in the unemployment level only affects candidate dropout (does not affect novelty) – a 10% increase in unemployment levels (just within the range in data) reduces dropout considerably (by about 18%), but the standard error of the estimate is high.[146]

Larger parties – be they in government or not – experience less candidate turnover compared to smaller parties.[147] The effect is more pronounced for candidate dropout and for non-governing parties that keep 26% more of their candidates as party size increases tenfold[148] while doubling would reduce dropouts by about 8%. Even though larger parties may have a larger pool of potential candidates – possibly increasing dropouts as they can be more easily replaced – they often also have a stronger party organisation and hierarchy. These in in turn favour the nomination of party elites or their control over the process. This can benefit existing candidates as people stay in leadership positions longer than in small, less structured and more volatile parties.

When party *vote increases*, candidate dropouts become less common. For each added 10% of votes, dropout rate decreases by some 5% for governing and 7% for non-governing parties; alternatively, this can be seen as candidates dropping out if their parties lose support. Interestingly, candidate *novelty* increases as party vote shares increase – parties on the rise attract new candidates or new faces attract additional voter support. Vice versa, declining parties fail to enlist new candidates. However, the effect is weaker compared to dropout and only limited to non-governing parties. One possible explanation of the effect is that opposition parties on the rise could be more open in accepting new candidates and could be more appealing to new faces. On the one

[146] This is again a finding that requires further analysis. We speculate that unemployment might be a delayed effect of GDP change that the parties first react to. Also, established candidates could be more eager to keep their places under poor labour market conditions.

[147] Note that parties less than 5% of vote are excluded from analysis. The average weighted candidate dropout for parties under 5% of the vote is much higher (73%) than for those above 5% (37%).

[148] We use log to the base of 10 to ease interpretation.

hand, party ideology might be more in flux at the time of increasing popularity and new entrants may hope to have more say in shaping it. On the other hand, opposition parties on the rise are increasingly likely to enter the cabinet after elections, providing opportunities of jobs and power. It is also perfectly explicable that declining opposition parties are not particularly attractive to new candidates.

The weighted *share of cabinet seats* has no discernible effect on candidate turnover – possibly because we are controlling for party size that is related to cabinet seat shares.[149] If candidate turnover reflects anticipated electoral backlashes, this could indicate that in multi-party systems voters do not necessarily attribute responsibility for policies correctly – and all parties that have been part of the government are affected to similar extent.

Conclusion

The finding of this paper – that increasing perception of corruption leads to higher candidate dropout among governing parties – broadly supports the rejuvenation hypothesis.[150] Still, we believe that both tendencies can exist simultaneously whereby parties engage both in renomination and rejuvenation (even in the same election). Our evidence suggests that rejuvenation has been the dominant tendency in the countries under study, but the relative extent of each tendency needs further scrutiny. Furthermore, determining which governing parties should be 'blamed' for increasing corruption is far from clear in countries with multi-party cabinets (most of our cases) – an issue covered by the 'clarity of responsibility' discussion in the literature on economic voting (see Andreson 2000, Hobolt et al 2013, Royed et al 2002 and Whitten & Palmer 1999; also see Tavits 2007 on the impact of clarity of responsibility on corruption).

These limitations notwithstanding, this paper has presented one of the first large-scale analyses of candidate turnover in modern democracies. We believe that focussing on electoral candidates not only provides a way to study political parties' responses to corruption but it also has the potential for understanding political parties and party system change more broadly. The selection and presentation of candidates is one of the essential functions of political parties. Furthermore, candidates are a key part of a parties' organisational structures and are invariably linked to elections. Candidate turnover helps to capture the fluidity and development in electoral and party systems which is particularly pronounced in CEE, but is also on the ascent in many Western European countries.

[149] But less so to weighted cabinet membership as the index also takes into account temporal distance of cabinets from elections and some sizable parties may have been out of cabinet for some of the electoral term.

[150] This is in contrast to our earlier models (see Sikk & Köker 2015) that relied on less sophisticated measures of candidate turnover and overly restrictive definition of governing parties.

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Appendix

Weighted candidate novelty and dropout

All candidates are not equal. Those in higher list positions carry more weight as potential MPs than those at the bottom of the list.[151] The most straightforward way to weight candidates– so that those at the top contribute more and those at the bottom less to the index of novelty – would be a negative linear progression of weights – e.g. (1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0) for M=5.[152] However, this clearly gives too much weight to all low-ranking candidates bar the last very one. The importance list positions also varies between parties. For example, imagine two candidates ranked 25 out of 100. If one of the parties is likely to win 30 of the mandates and the other one only 4 mandates, the candidate of the bigger party has a real chance of winning a seat and is obviously more significant than the candidate of the smaller party.

Hence, weights that decline mildly at the top, more significantly in the middle and smoothly taper off at the end are more appropriate. Out weights are based on the well-known formula of the logistic function:

$$w(r, v) = 1 - \frac{1}{1+e^{-k(r-v)}} \qquad (1)$$

where v the party's overall vote share.[153] Candidate's relative list placement r = (rank – 1)/(M – 1).[154] Finally, k is a constant affecting the steepness of the curve that is set at 0.25 as this produces suitable curves for our purposes. The weights for each party must to add up to 1 – therefore, we divide the weights by the sum of weights for all candidates

Thus, we can calculate the weighted candidate novelty (WCN) of party p:

$$WCN_p = \sum NEW \cdot \frac{w(r,v)}{\sum w(r,v)} \qquad (2)$$

where NEW is a dummy for candidates who did not run in previous election. Figure 7 illustrates the standardized weights for candidates. It shows that for largest parties, more candidates carry significant weight as more stand a reasonable chance of success. The smaller the party, the higher the weight of the candidates at the top of the list as few others stand a reasonable chance of winning a seat.[155] The interpretation of WCN_p is straightforward as it ranges from 0 (no new candidates) to 1 (all candidates are new).

[151] Hungary and Lithuania employ mixed systems. Winning candidates in single mandate district and those with a reasonable chance are more important than also-runs far behind the top competitors.

[152] We disregard candidates with list placements in excess of M.

[153] We use the national vote share as our dataset currently does not hold information about constituency level support for parties.

[154] I.e. for fourth ranked candidate under M=10, r = (4-1)/(10-1) = 3/9 = 0.33.

[155] We assume that when fielding candidates, parties have some information about the likely number of seats they are going to win and we use the actual share of votes as a proxy for expected vote shares.

Figure 7. Candidate's standardised weight for selected party sizes



Note: Relative list placement r = (rank-1)/(M-1). Areas under the curve add up to 1.

The calculation of relative list placements is complicated by the use of different electoral systems. Firstly, in nearly all elections, the eventual list placement of candidates was fully or partly based on preference votes. For open list systems, we used the highest of original and preference-vote based list placements.[156] Secondly, candidate weight in single mandate districts (under mixed systems in Hungary and Lithuania) is based on the following formula:

$$w(x) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-x}} \qquad (3)$$

for top candidates: $x = \log_{1.5} \frac{v_1}{v_2}$ for all other candidates: $x = \log_{1.5} \frac{v_i}{v_1}$

where v_i is the number of votes cast for the i-th ranking candidate. This ensures higher weights for candidate who win by a large margin (compared to those with smaller winning margins) and higher weights to competitors narrowly behind the top candidate (compared to those more behind). [157]

Finally, for multi-tier systems (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania), we use the highest weight[158] across the tiers.

Weighted candidate dropout is calculated exactly in the same fashion, except that in equation 2 the dummy for novelty is replaced by whether the candidate ran again subsequent election.

[156] Often, parties place some of the most important candidates at the bottom of the list who move considerably up in preference-based rankings.

[157] For example, in a two-way race with v1 = .7 and v2 = .3 the corresponding weights for the candidates are .89 and .11; if v1 = .55 and v2 = .45, the corresponding weights are .62 and .38. Log to the base of 1.5 is used as other bases (2, natural logarithm or 10) would result in too low weights for top candidates with safe winning margins and too high weights for runner ups.

[158] Before standardisation.

Index of weighted cabinet participation

The index of *weighted cabinet participation* (WCP) that takes into account the length of the electoral term (T), party's share of ministerial portfolios (m), the duration of the cabinet where it was included (d) and the time until election (t) from the middle of the cabinet term. For party i WCP over an electoral term is the sum of its weighted cabinet memberships in all governments during an electoral term:

$$WCP_i = \sum m_i \cdot 2 \cdot \frac{d}{T} \cdot \frac{T-t}{T} \quad (4)$$

For a party that held all ministerial portfolios during an electoral term WCP = 1. For a party that held all seats in the cabinet but only during the first half of a four-year electoral term WCP = 0.25. For a party that held all portfolios during the second half of the electoral term $m_i = 1$, $d/T = 0.5$ and $(T–t)/T = 0.75$ → WCP = 0.75. For a party that held half of the portfolios during the second half of the electoral term $m_i = 0.5$, $d/T = 0.5$ and $(T–t)/T = 0.75$ → WCP = 0.38.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables

Novelty analysis	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Weighted candidate novelty	138	31.55	14.75	4.32	75.04
CPI change	138	2.05	5.16	-9.80	12.00
CPI	138	49.52	10.04	34.00	69.00
GDP per capita change	138	7.71	9.55	-15.17	22.68
Unemployment change	138	0.02	3.87	-6.10	11.40
$\log_{10}$vote	138	1.16	0.27	0.71	1.72
Imputed vote change	138	0.04	8.01	-30.07	22.05
Weighted share of ministers[1]	69	0.39	0.25	0.10	1.00
Dropout analysis					
Weighted candidate dropout	185	36.68	17.59	1.10	92.44
CPI change	185	1.57	6.02	-9.80	13.06
CPI	185	48.86	9.52	34.00	69.00
GDP per capita change	185	7.51	9.21	-15.17	22.68
Unemployment change	185	0.13	4.13	-6.70	11.40
$\log_{10}$vote	185	1.14	0.26	0.72	1.72
Imputed vote change	185	-2.28	7.56	-25.83	20.28
Weighted share of ministers[1]	91	0.36	0.24	0.10	1.00

[1] *only included in models for governing parties*

Table 4. Parties coded as previously existing (additions to Volkens et al 2014)

country	year	abbreviation	party/coalition	votes %
BG	1997	DL	Democratic Left	22.1
BG	1997	ODS	United Democratic Forces	52.2
BG	2001	KZB	Coalition for Bulgaria	17.1
BG	2013	KZB	Bulgarian Socialist Party	26.6
BG	2014	RBLOK	Reforming Block	8.9
EE	1999	IL	Pro Patria Union	16.1
HU	2006	FIDESZ-KDNP	FIDESZ, Hungarian Civic Union, Christian Democratic People's Party	42.5
HU	2014	MSZP-EGYUTT-DK-PM-MLP	Unity	26.0
LT	2000	BSDA	BSDK A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition	31.1
LT	2004	UdL	Working for Lithuania	20.6
LT	2008	TS-LKD	Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats	19.7
LT	2012	DP	Labour Party	20.7
LV	2002	PCTVL	For Human Rights in a United Latvia	19.1
LV	2006	LLP-LC	Electoral Association of Latvia's First Party and Latvia's Way	8.6
LV	2006	SC	Harmony's Centre	14.4
LV	2010	PLL	For a Good Latvia	7.7
LV	2014	Vienotiba	Unity	21.9
PL	1993	PC	Centre Agreement	4.4
PL	1997	AWS	Electoral Action ‘Solidarity'	33.8
PL	2001	SLD-UP	Coalion of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour	41.0
SK	1998	SDK	Slovak Democratic Coalition	26.3
SK	2002	SDKU	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	15.1

Section 3 (SNS)

Publication list

9. Della Porta, D., and A. Mattoni (2013). Civil society actors fighting against political corruption in Italy. A pilot study on 'Senza la Corruzione... Riparte il Futuro'. Paper presented at the 8th European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference. University of Bordeaux, 4-7 September.
10. Della Porta, D., and A. Mattoni (2013). Societal accountability in fighting corruption. Some insights from social movement studies. Paper presented at the ANTICORRP WP11 Workshop, University College London, 18-19 November.
11. Della Porta, D., A. Mattoni, A.L.P. Pirro, and L. Caruso (2016). The political and symbolic dimensions of societal accountability in the grassroots struggle against corruption: A comparative assessment. Paper presented at the 3rd ANTICORRP Consortium Meeting, Athens, 9-11 May.
12. Della Porta, D., A. Mattoni, and A.L.P. Pirro (2016). The political context and framing mechanisms of anti-corruption struggles in Hungary and Italy. Paper presented at the 10th ECPR General Conference, Charles University in Prague, 7-10 September.
13. Anti-corruption from below: Social movements and societal accountability. Special Issue for Partecipazione & Conflitto (PACO), Volume 10, Issue 3. Guest Editors: Donatella della Porta, Loris Caruso, and Andrea L. P. Pirro.

9-13. Della Porta, Donatella, Alice Mattoni, Andrea L.P. Pirro and Loris Caruso. 2017. "Anti-Corruption Activism in Hungary, Italy, And Spain".

Anti-corruption activism: an introduction

The issue of corruption can be legitimately interpreted as an emerging cleavage in contemporary politics and societies. This can be equally attributed to the spread of corruptive practices as well as the complex relationship subtending political and societal actors affected by/involved in the struggle against corruption. With our study, we set out to delve deeper into the context within which anti-corruption activists operate, and the discursive and strategic configurations of their struggles. We believe that this represents a novel and timely development in social scientific inquiry, as research on corruption – rich in interpretive models and empirical data – has often focused on the more institutionalized portion of the struggle against this phenomenon. Conversely, we seem to know very little about anti-corruption activism taking place – or, at least originating – outside the institutional arena, especially in those countries that have taken a liberal-democratic route and subscribed to free market competition over time.

The potential contribution coming from social movements and civil society in the anti-corruption struggle did not go unnoticed; the OECD already acknowledged the role of these actors in fighting corruption – a theme that has indeed acquired crucial status in the anti-corruption debate (OECD 2003). Similarly, collective anti-corruption actors have been conceptualized as societal actors that concretely contribute to make politics and public administrations accountable (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, p. 9). Notwithstanding the central role attributed to grassroots activism and civil society in the struggle against corruption (e.g. Johnston 2005), the social scientific literature has paid little attention to mobilizations outside the institutional arena – with case studies targeted for specialized audiences often taking the lion's share of similar graft. Only a minimal portion of anti-corruption research has genuinely placed collective action at the heart of inquiry (e.g. Torsello 2012; Beyerle 2014; Johnston 2014; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).

Yet another question pertains the same domain of anti-corruption research; studies focusing on ways to counter corruptive practices have often taken a 'top-down' and 'elite-driven' approach, mainly tailored for solutions to be implemented at the administrative level. Anti-corruption and societal accountability 'from below' did not factor into the equation (Beyerle 2014, p. 26). In light of these premises, anti-corruption has been appraised as a matter of good governance, whose provisions maintained a highly technical content, and were mainly directed at authorities or organizations meant to implement them 'from above'. The subscription to neoliberal principles has commanded cuts in public spending and deregulation as a means to stem corruptive practices; therefore, privatization and liberalization had been commonly perceived as remedies to corruption.

With the advent of 'post-democracy' accompanying the consolidation of neoliberal policies (Crouch 2004), anti-corruption has squarely fit into those societal issues to be tackled from above. However, those top-down strategies of NGOs and international organizations achieved

only limited success, not least due to the fact that similar interventions were made possible by external donors – i.e. actors that tended to have very little legitimization from, and understanding of, the local context. Anti-corruption programs implemented from above have frequently lacked the insight capable of elevating these efforts to long-term and successful practices (Disch et al. 2009, p. 10). Moreover, those initiatives promoted by transnational actors have often worked on the misleading assumption that market competition and a leaner state could halt corruption.

Unlike top-down initiatives, grassroots activists and members of civil society have recently linked the problem of corruption to one of social justice, reinstating the importance of addressing the issue also by means of contextual knowledge. This becomes apparent with the recent mobilizations of the *Indignados* in Spain or the *#ДАНСwithme* protests in Bulgaria, which have brought attention to the issue of corruption while bridging it to other central issues and claims (della Porta 2017c). Anti-corruption activists target the corruption of democracy stemming from the growing collusion between political and financial elites; in open contrast with neoliberal paradigms, they perceive privatization, deregulation, and liberalization as part of the problem (della Porta 2015).

We contend that renewed attention should be paid to these forms of activism at the national, regional, and local levels, in order to unravel the workings of anti-corruption from below and its ability to attain various forms of societal accountability. We embark in this endeavor by bridging disciplines that have only occasionally crossed paths, in particular research on corruption and social movement studies. While both have investigated non-institutional ways to affect public decision-making, the first has looked at the hidden relations between business and politics, and the second to protest and other forms of contestation. Also, theories deployed to understand the two phenomena varied substantially; studies on corruption have predominantly used rational choice and game theory, while social movement studies focused on political processes, cultural as well as symbolic dimensions, and resource mobilization. In particular, within the former, the focus of attention rested on the micro and macro levels; within the latter, mainly on meso-level forms of aggregation. Finally, social movements and corruption normatively represent two opposite poles of politics, with the first representing its good and altruistic side, and the latter its dark and greedy side. In spite of these differences, both disciplines pay attention to the less institutionalized aspects of politics; both engage with at least some theoretical eclecticism and methodological pluralism (e.g. della Porta and Keating 2008); and both are normatively concerned with the goal of clean politics and greater accountability.

The concept of societal accountability offers a fertile terrain to reconcile the two fields of inquiry, for it presents us with a non-electoral mechanism of control, resting on the activities of a wide array of actors (i.e. citizens, movements, and the media), and that are primarily responsible for denouncing misconducts and raising public awareness (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000, p. 150). In fact, participation through collective action seeking to hold politics accountable lies at the very heart of social movement studies. There has been, however, little dialogue between students of societal accountability and social movement

scholars. With our inquiry, we suggest that social movement theory can significantly further research on (anti-)corruption and societal accountability, paving the way to a more systematic dialogue between disciplines.

In particular, we explore the question of societal accountability from a social movement perspective: on the one hand, elaborating on an analytical framework that should help clarify at least some of the elements underlying anti-corruption mobilizations; on the other, defining the intrinsic meaning of this struggle for activists across different countries. In doing so, we explore features such as the political context (i.e. the *political opportunity structure*), the symbolic portion of the anti-corruption struggle (i.e. *collective action frames*), and the strategies of activists (i.e. *repertoires of contention*) – factors that can be reasonably expected to affect the aspired goal of societal accountability. Our research explores anti-corruption activism in three European countries – Hungary, Italy, and Spain. In what follows, we elaborate on the theoretical starting points of our research and relate them to the question of societal accountability from below; we present the research design and the methods employed; and then use the evidence at hand to analyze the opportunities for, as well as the frames and strategies of, anti-corruption activists in the three countries. We finally draw comparative conclusions on the main results attained by these actors and discuss prospects for anti-corruption struggles from below.

Bridging social movement studies and research on anti-corruption

Corruption refers to the violation of legal and social standards coming from the abuse of public office or resources, and intended for private benefit (Johnston 1996). As one of the direst problems of contemporary societies, corruption negatively affects market competition, government spending, investments, tax collection, funding, and employment (e.g. Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). The consequences for society as a whole thus prompt to delve deeper into the different contexts and forms that the fight against corruption takes across countries.

Civil society, social movements, and activists of different sorts are naturally able to combine grievances and exert checks within the polity; hence, they are key actors in sanctioning wrongdoings and promoting law enforcement (see Schedler 1999). Activities such as monitoring, protesting, and raising awareness require coordination and cooperation among multiple actors, bringing our attention to meso-level forms of aggregation. Concomitantly, it is worth noting that many of these activities bear a reactive component, aimed at bringing specific abuses to an end (Grimes 2013). Developments at the meso level directly follow the spread of corruptive practices in contemporary societies, and the emergence of 'business politicians' whose collusive behavior appears ever more difficult to monitor and prevent (della Porta and Pizzorno 1996, p. 75). Despite the deterioration in the quality of democracy caused by corruption and cronyism (e.g. della Porta and Vannucci 2012), the interaction between the political and symbolic dimensions of the anti-corruption struggle surge to critical relevance in redressing these problems. The importance of anti-corruption activism acquires additional leverage in democratic contexts in which political and economic liberalization did not necessarily help eradicate corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1996).

Grassroots activism has been indeed interpreted as one of the possible remedies to these malpractices, especially when state-level and public sector corruption lie at the heart of the issue (Rose-Ackerman 2004; Gret and Sintomer 2005; Deininger and Mpuga 2005; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016). Collective actors engaged in the anti-corruption struggle can pressure for the introduction of particular policies and reforms (e.g. Johnston 2005; Hough 2013), while crucially contributing to expose corruptive behaviors. Research conducted within the framework of ANTICORRP has indeed indicated a direct relationship between institutional corruption control and civil society anti-corruption actors, additionally suggesting that the most successful activities aimed at curbing corruptive practices unfold without the support of external donors (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).

Other interesting developments have occurred with regard to anti-corruption discourses. It has been indeed observed that corruption hardly serves mobilizing purposes independent from other contentious issues. Several instances of anti-corruption discourses within the framework of environmentalist mobilizations were reported upon in recent years (Torsello 2012), and the economic and financial crisis that broke out in 2008 seem to have provided activists with a whole set of 'anti-austerity' and 'anti-establishment' ammunitions (della Porta 2015). A portion of our research endeavor precisely rests in unveiling these discursive mechanisms in mobilizations in Southern and East-Central Europe.

We devote specific attention to the political context, framing, and strategies of anti-corruption activists. Moving beyond narrow procedural assessments of policy impact, we are interested in attaining a refined understanding of the subjective perceptions of accountability developed by activists themselves (e.g. Tarrow 1994). The protest arena, and the particular setting of the contentious politics of anti-corruption, is a forum where continuous feedback processes occur; any model willing to account for societal accountability from below should then consider interactions between activists and the environment in which they are immersed. Social movement theory comes in our help with concepts such as the political opportunity structure, collective action frames, and repertoires of contention.

With the first, we refer to the political context within which collective anti-corruption action takes place; the context indeed defines the favorable/unfavorable elements encouraging/discouraging grassroots mobilization (Tarrow 1996, p. 32). Usually conceptualized as a set of key contextual conditions to explain the success/failure of collective mobilization efforts, the political opportunity structure refers to five elements in particular: the type of political system, the policing of protest activities, the prevailing strategies of political parties, the shifting of political alignments, and the constellation of allies and opponents at the institutional level (e.g. della Porta and Diani 2006). Institutions infected with corruption may exponentially favor collusive practices and, therefore, hinder opportunities for grassroots activism. However, the spread of collusion may give increasing relevance of the corruption/anti-corruption cleavage, and open windows of opportunity for anti-corruption activists to mobilize. In one way or the other, the rise of anti-corruption activism depends on its context, as this provides mobilizations with opportunities and constraints. Among favorable elements, we may include pluralistic democratic systems, open

political competition, transparent and accessible decision-making processes as well as the formal and informal recognition of civil society organizations (della Porta 2016). In our research, we noted the effect of political opportunities on the forms that anti-corruption campaigns took and on their resonance.

Still, we should not neglect the agentic component of this struggle, in particular, how activists contribute to define the symbolic and strategic component of their anti-corruption activities. At the symbolic level, activists are continuously engaged in the creation and attribution of new meanings to their struggles, at times defining alternative norms and discourses (Melucci 1996; Snow and Benford 1992). This indicates that the political opportunity structure is liable of interpretation and redefinition (Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Tarrow 1993). Frames are those symbolic devices that activists use to make sense of their surrounding reality (Bateson 1972). Social movement theory has made extensive use of the concept of frames to understand the engagement in protest activities, the construction of collective identities as well as alternative systems of meaning (Snow et al. 1986; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Hunt and Benford 1994; Benford and Snow 2000). In the case of corruption, the moral framing of the issues emerges as particularly relevant (della Porta 2015). The literature on framing has indeed developed expectations on how political opportunities affect the symbolic portion of mobilizations and, vice versa, how activists strategically frame their claims to take advantage of particular opportunities offered by their contexts. In what follows, we shall observe how opportunities are filtered through activists' long-term political constraints and how short-term trajectories can, in turn, affect the framing of corruption.

We then look at another agentic feature, the repertoires of contention of these collective actors, by which we refer to the array of contentious performances that activists deploy when they mobilize (Tilly 1995; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). The repertoire of contention includes a wide – though situated and finite – range of contentious performances that activists select to render visible their demands and proposals. At the empirical level, what is observable is not the repertoire of contentious repertoire as such, but rather those performances that are actually used in a given protest context by political actors (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, p. 11). Collective actors have traditionally developed a different mix of insider and outsider strategies, as they have tried to achieve influence through lobbying and/or protesting in the streets. In general, open political opportunities have favored insider strategies, and vice versa; closed opportunities have encouraged outsider strategies. Among the latter performances, degrees of disruptiveness have varied according to the preferred logic of action. In anti-corruption activities, campaigns aiming at raising awareness in public opinion, as well as spreading knowledge about corrupt practices have been prominent forms of societal accountability. More disruptive forms of protests instead tend to develop when corruption is bridged with other issues, within broader waves of protest (della Porta 2015).

Case selection, data, and methodology

While also including references to other cases of anti-corruption from below, our research has focused on Hungary, Italy, and Spain – three cases that we considered having a high heuristic value given their mix of similarities and differences. In the selection of our cases, we were in fact partly motivated by the varying opportunities offered by individual contexts, yet also by the presence of corruptive phenomena against which activists could – and indeed did – mobilize.

Over the course of the past decade, all cases surveyed have consistently reported the highest level in the perceptions of corruption among EU member states (e.g. Transparency International 2015). Despite the growing number of indices developed to measure corruption (e.g. Mungiu-Pippidi 2016), we feel that the question of *perceived* corruption preserves its own standing in the assessment of grassroots mobilizations. First of all, it is still relatively difficult to measure corruption objectively and extensively; second, as perceptions refer to the intuitive understanding and insight of national publics, the mobilizing potential of anti-corruption frames inevitably rests on subjective assessments of a country's extent of corruption; third, and related to the previous point, our enquiry into societal accountability maintains an intrinsically subjective component. The public reading of this phenomenon is then related to the expectations and collective actions of key actors in the anti-corruption struggle. If we additionally consider that each of these countries has experienced cases of mobilization against corruption and organized crime in the past few years, this presents us with a whole range of (seemingly idiosyncratic) collective action frames and repertoires of contention, which are worthy of study in their own right.

As far as similarities are concerned, we could also note that the contentious politics of anti-corruption could be partially located within a wave of moral outrage that has shaken respective societies as of late. In particular, we have chosen cases located in the European peripheries, where the impact of the recent economic and financial crisis has been higher. If democracy and the free market do not necessarily solve the problems related to corruption (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1994), it is important to acknowledge that the unfolding of neoliberal paradigms may have affected the modality, timing, and reach of (anti-)corruption.

Anti-corruption practices linked to societal accountability unfolded differently across the three countries: within a weak civic society in Hungary; within the context of traditional left-wing movements in Italy; and as part of a disruptive wave of protests in Spain. In order to account for these differences, we have started with the different timing and trajectories of democratization. In Italy, post-war democratization consolidated a system later dubbed as '*partitocrazia*', which was however undermined by the corruption scandals of the 1990s (della Porta and Vannucci 2007). In Spain, as in other South European countries that have transitioned to democracy in the mid-1970s, the stage of mass party has been 'leap-frogged', with relevant effects on political opportunities for grassroots mobilizations (della Porta 2017a, 2017b). In post-communist countries, corruption has preserved a central role in collective imageries due to the spread of similar practices during the transition process; political elites and cronies had then easily accessed considerable wealth due to insider information and

personal links (e.g. Ramet and Wagner 2010). These differences have, in turn, affected the development of civil society, characterized by different degrees of strength and autonomy; with a more autonomous and thriving civil society in Spain, a strong but traditionally subordinate one in Italy, and a weaker and dependent one in Hungary (della Porta 2016).

In order to investigate societal accountability through civil society mobilization in the three countries, we set out to reconstruct the context of collective anti-corruption actors by means of historical analysis and in-depth knowledge of the cases at hand. A crucial contribution of our project lied in the systematic collection of primary data to define the frames and strategies of anti-corruption activism in Hungary, Italy, and Spain. We directly asked political activists about their roles in the anti-corruption struggle, their perceptions of corruption, and the strategies they adopted. Targeted interviewees included prominent or leading figures of collective anti-corruption actors (e.g. civil society, social movements, movement parties, or the non-profit sector) committed to fighting corruption and attaining greater societal accountability. The strategy bore at least two substantial advantages. On the one hand, it helped us validate the definition of anti-corruption frames and the reconstruction of mobilization strategies, thanks to the commitment and efforts of these activists. On the other hand, the questionnaires guiding our semi-structured interviews tapped into the dimensions of impact and societal accountability, hence in line with our inquiry into the subjective perceptions of anti-corruption activists.

The frame analysis additionally relied on official material released by collective anti-corruption actors (e.g. programmatic documents and statements). These sources maintain an outward direction and, thus, satisfy the public function typical of collective action frames. In addition to these, we also gathered material presented in the official websites of collective actors, precisely because these platforms often include introductory information (e.g. 'about' sections) as well as references to the main dimensions of collective action frames.

As the entire galaxy of anti-corruption actors cannot be determined conclusively, and the organizational, discursive, and strategic unfolding of the anti-corruption struggle remains very much fluid, no representative sample can be drawn from collective actors in the field of anti-corruption. While we aimed at including and analyzing all groups involved in the struggle against corruption, we had to confront some limitations in the availability of our targeted partners. We were nevertheless able to cover the most relevant collective anti-corruption actors in each country.

The sampling strategy in Hungary was by and large dictated by the fragmented and variegated nature of the anti-corruption struggle in the country. While Hungary indeed presents a handful of collective actors consistently and systematically engaged in fighting corruption, their organizational and strategic configurations do not subscribe to a single pattern. As a result, we were able to identify a composite array of anti-corruption activists operating, among others, within the framework of social movements that have transitioned towards the party form (Kitschelt 2006), non-profit organizations, and investigative journalism teams. These actors have clearly identified themselves as part of the anti-corruption struggle and actively engaged

in disseminating knowledge about corruptive practices in their country. The number of in-depth semi-structured interviews with anti-corruption activists totaled six.

In the Italian case, we gathered data through a structured questionnaire administered online, which targeted collective actors involved in the struggle against organized crime and corruption. We also relied on the information included in the 'about' sections of collective actors' websites. In order to track down relevant collective actors, we relied on a threefold snowball sampling technique, which initially conveyed a list of 140 organizations: we then contacted these actors to participate to our online survey. The final dataset included the responses provided by 45 participants as well as the analysis of 77 websites. Additionally, we conducted six in-depth interviews with activists involved in the campaign *Senza Corruzione… Riparte il Futuro* ('Without Corruption… the Future Starts Again'; hereinafter, FSA), which took off in 2013, and represents the first systematic attempt to fight corruption from below on a national scale. The Italian interviewees and surveyed activists asked to remain anonymous.

More in detail, the FSA campaign was officially launched in January 2013, about two months ahead of the Italian general elections. An official website, a Facebook and a Twitter profile were contextually launched. The ultimate goal of the campaign was to change the article 416ter of the Italian Penal Code. As it stands, the article in question punishes the exchange of votes for money. The campaign demanded, instead, to consider a crime also the exchange of votes for other utilities. The campaign aimed at engaging two different, but interlaced, constituencies that could work as strong allies to reach its goals: on the one hand, the political candidates; on the other, the general electorate. Political candidates were asked to commit to the objectives of the campaign publicly. It was not enough, indeed, for a candidate to endorse the campaign: apart from declaring the willingness to work towards the modification of the article 416ter, each candidate was asked to disclose the following information on the FSA website: their curriculum vitae, income declaration, conflicts of interests, and judicial record. Candidates were asked to be as transparent as possible in their commitment. To further support the campaign, activists asked citizens in the general electorate to sign an online petition managed through the web platform *Change.org*, and to show their support by sending a picture and a short explanation about the reasons why they decided to sign the petition.

To examine the Spanish case, we gathered data from the websites of the main collective actors involved in recent anti-corruption activities. We additionally drew on secondary literature for the analysis of discourses and frames by the *Indignados* movement during the year 2011. Finally, we conducted nine in-depth interviews with activists involved in social movement and civic organizations, and with a former judge elected as an independent with the movement party *Podemos*. We analyzed 19 public speeches of the main leader of *Podemos* across three electoral campaigns: the 2014 European Parliament elections (five speeches), the 2015 regional elections (six speeches), and the 2015 national elections in 2015 (eight speeches). Additionally, we analyzed the speeches of the leader, Pablo Iglesias, at Puerta del Sol in January 2015, at the end of the first national demonstration of *Podemos*.

Despite the acknowledged limits on the generalizability of our findings, this research project genuinely comes across as one of the first attempts to address anti-corruption activism from a

social movement perspective and deploy primary data in the attainment of our research objectives. Precisely for this reason, we expect to provide some valuable points for discussion on the discourses and strategies lying at the heart of anti-corruption activism.

Hungary

Looking at the political context, it is possible to argue that the Hungarian party system has delivered remarkable stability in its first two decades of post-authoritarian rule. Between 1989 and 2010, the principal actors contesting elections have upheld representation in parliament, and representatives of the two main political camps alternated in power with a certain degree of regularity (Casal Bértoa 2014). Hungary had been unequivocally appraised as a virtuous example in its trajectory of democratic consolidation and economic liberalization (e.g. Ágh 2001).

The 2010 elections went to challenge the political equilibriums that had set the country apart from other – more volatile – post-communist party systems (e.g. Enyedi and Benoit 2011). Parties that had been represented in the Hungarian parliament until 2010, such as the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the center-right Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), receded from view and swiftly dissolved. The rise of 'anti-establishment' actors, such as the far-right Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) and the green/libertarian Politics Can Be Different (LMP), clearly testified a change in party dynamics and voter preferences. With a landslide victory, the national conservative coalition, comprising Fidesz and its satellite Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), secured a two-thirds majority that set the country on a track of extensive legislative reform and the introduction of a new constitution (e.g. Bánkuti et al. 2012). As a result, commentators went to raise numerous concerns about the retrenchment of liberal democratic principles and checks and balances (e.g. Rupnik 2012). The new mandate attributed to the Fidesz-KDNP coalition in 2014 confirmed the narrowing down of political opportunities for critical forces, while at the same time reinstating Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's drifting away from democratic values. Within this context, the illiberal trajectory was accompanied by instances of large-scale state corruption affecting, among other things, commercial activities and competition (Freedom House 2016).

The political reshuffling witnessed in 2010 had been, however, largely anticipated. The 2006-2010 mandate was punctuated by a series of scandals that challenged the credibility of the Socialist Party (MSZP), sealing the fate of the Hungarian traditional left for years to come. In September 2006, the recording of a private speech by PM Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked; in the speech, Gyurcsány admitted to have lied about the economic state of the country in order to win the elections held in April. This led to upheavals and full-blown riots demanding resignation of the Socialist government; these practically put the wind in the sails of ultranationalist and anti-establishment forces that vocally denounced governmental corruption. In many respects, the 2006 protests represented a critical turning point in the post-authoritarian politics of Hungary; opposition to the political establishment and government corruption rose to prominent themes in the public debate. Though dictated by the violent unfolding of events, the Budapest riots prompted a strict policing of (anti-government)

protests. Other contentious performances and protest events, also centering on anti-corruption, had otherwise taken place in a relatively peaceful manner.

Neither parties of the mainstream left nor the mainstream right have proven receptive towards anti-corruption stances, let alone grassroots pleas for societal accountability. While some (unsuccessful) attempts have been made to introduce stricter anti-corruption measures under the last Socialist government (Bozóki 2012), the Fidesz-KDNP coalition has strayed a long way from discussing similar policies under its administration. Judging from the frequency of corruption cases reported, and the cronies involved in these scandals, the Orbán government seemed to have no incentive to legislate on the issue. Especially in light of recent political developments, it is possible to interpret the political as neatly divided into two different camps when reference is made to the issue of corruption. On the one hand, there would be the old parties of the Hungarian establishment (i.e. Fidesz-KDNP and the Hungarian Socialist Party) ideally opposing the attainment of additional anti-corruption legislation; on the other, we would have new anti-establishment 'movement parties' (i.e. LMP and its splinter Dialogue for Hungary [PM], as well as Jobbik) pushing for anti-corruption measures (Pirro 2015, pp. 142-143). Despite the acknowledged reluctance by old parties to legislate on corruption, it is ostensibly the same novelty of the other organizations lending them the credibility necessary to advocate anti-corruption.

The closure coming from the political mainstream has clearly constrained opportunities for anti-corruption activism in Hungary. This notwithstanding, the party-political arena has at least served as a field of discussion of related issues, precisely due to the rise of new parties originating from social movements (i.e. Jobbik, LMP, and PM). These movement parties list among the first collective actors to elaborate on anti-corruption stances, both within and outside the institutional arena. It should not surprise if the ever more relevant Jobbik ended up posing the biggest (ideological and electoral) threat to Orbán's party – not least due to the accusations of corruption that they have moved to the entire political establishment. On the whole, it may be easier for anti-corruption activists to receive the endorsement of leftist and outsider parties in their struggle.

Frames and strategies

As articulated above, the landslide victory of Fidesz-KDNP of 2010 introduced an authoritarian style into Hungarian politics, *de facto* hollowing out a number of democratic practices (Jensen 2015). On the whole, the potential for grassroots mobilization has been equally affected by the traditional weakness of civil society in post-communist Europe (e.g. Lomax 1997; for a reassessment, see Foa and Ekiert 2016) and the broader shifts in political allegiances (Tilly 2007). Though activists have at times mobilized against the governments of the day, and to demonstrate their disenchantment with the malfunctioning of representative institutions, protests solely focusing on the contentious issue of corruption have been limited.

The ecologist movements and associations – most of which later transitioned to the party form with the establishment of LMP – were critical players in mobilization attempts ahead of Fidesz's rise to power in 2010. The young and the educated were overrepresented among these collective actors; their concerns ranged from social and political accountability to participation (Tóth 2015) – issues translated into the platform of LMP, and later taken up also by PM (PM n.d.). In line with its movement party profile, LMP applied 'the organizational and strategic practices of social movements in the arena of party competition' (Kitschelt 2006, p. 280), while at the same time remaining true to its outsider profile. For instance, LMP lawmakers had gained significant media coverage after election to parliament by chaining themselves in front of the Hungarian Assembly on 23 December 2011, when the Orbán government was set to adopt key laws on elections, taxation, and the Central Bank (BBC 2011).

Another significant experience that helped sustain collective mobilization in Hungary was *Milla*, or 'One Million for the Freedom of Press in Hungary'. The collective actor has been responsible for the organization of different demonstrations between 2011 and 2012; initially mobilized in opposition to the introduction of a law that significantly limited freedom of press, *Milla* advocated democratic values and participation, also denouncing widespread cases of corruption and cronyism in the political activities of the mainstream parties of the left and right (Petőcz 2015). The aura of outsider voice in the struggle against corruption – and the broader political establishment – was however crushed upon the decision of one of its leaders, Péter Juhász, to join the coalition of the left for the following 2014 elections.

With the traditional left internally divided and the lack of progressive alternatives, Fidesz easily managed to win another mandate in the elections held in April 2014. Activists therefore continued to see little opportunities coming from their political context. This notwithstanding, the newly-elected government set to introduce a contentious law on the taxation of internet usage, which immediately sparked public resentment. An exceptional number of people took the streets to demonstrate against the introduction of the Internet Tax. The principal catalyst for these mobilizations can be detected in the setting up of a Facebook page called '100,000 against the Internet Tax', managed by economic student and activist Balász Gulyás – a page that went on to serve the main coordination purposes of all protest events that shortly followed. The event launched online successfully mobilized the targeted number of participants in Budapest, on 28 October 2014 (Reuters 2014). The main purpose of the demonstration was to withdraw the law proposal at a time of great popular dissatisfaction; although present, the anti-corruption issue bore a subordinate role within this context, as also confirmed by the main organizer of the event:

> Corruption was just one of the issues we dealt with. … Even if we had a general critical opinion of the government … we knew that it was very important for the people to win at least one issue [i.e. the Internet Tax]. … My impression is that in Hungary corruption, as an issue, doesn't motivate people that much. … The Internet Tax was able to reach people who are usually not interested in politics. …

> After the Internet Tax proposal was dropped, we set out to focus on two issues – wide-scale corruption and bad governance. (Interview HU2)

The scale of participation as well as the peaceful and transversal character set a precedent within the context of grassroots mobilization in Hungary. Assuming that the string of protests could be placed within a broader anti-corruption – and, most definitely, anti-government – framework, these mobilizations achieved their goal and made the Orbán government backtrack on its proposal.

Demonstrations focusing on the contentious issue of corruption did not come to a halt, though received comparatively less attention and attracted fewer participants. Among the most prominent activists in the field of anti-corruption is Gábor Vágó, defined 'the man behind Hungary's anti-corruption movement' by the news portal Budapest Beacon, due to the attention devoted to the Kishantos and the Hungarian Tax and Duty Authority (NAV) cases. An MP for LMP between 2010 and 2014, he is currently a journalist for the investigative team *Atlatszo.hu*. The investigative journalist team has been at the forefront of monitoring activities, and easily represents the most active organization in the field of anti-corruption in Hungary. Their reporting and dissemination activities have been, at the same time, target of governmental ostracizing and recipient of international recognition; in 2014, *Atlatszo.hu* was included in the government's NGO blacklist, but won the 2015 Index on Censorship Freedom of Expression Award for Digital Activism. Beside his activities with the investigative journalist team, Vágó organized a number of demonstrations on the NAV case that broke out in 2014. The scandal was prompted by the allegations made by András Horváth, a former tax inspector, who claimed that the NAV had systematically favored multinationals and other companies with good political connections (Budapest Beacon 2014). As a result of this scandal, the US banned six people from entering the country over alleged corruption, including the head of NAV, Ildikó Vida (Wall Street Journal 2014).

Péter Juhász (*Milla*, Together) has also been a central figure in the struggle against government corruption. Already active in a number of human rights campaigns (see also above), he was elected as mayor of Belváros-Lipótváros – Budapest's fifth district – in 2014, where he accessed a number of documents and launched a series of demonstrations related to the illicit sale of roughly one-third of municipality-owned properties occurred under the mayoralty of Antal Rogán (Fidesz). According to the activist-politician, real estate properties were sold to cronies for prices below market value, and exempt from VAT (e.g. Budapest Beacon 2015).[159]

The framing process by anti-corruption activists very much relates to the retrenchment of liberal democratic values and practices observed in Hungary. Corruption is indeed perceived as a consequence of the personalist handling of public affairs – what could be otherwise interpreted as a form of state capture by the government. It should not surprise if activists almost unanimously subscribe to a similar reading; "institutionalized" (Interview HU5), "high-level" (Interview HU6), "state" (Interview HU4) forms of corruption are identified as

[159] Detailed claims available here: www.facebook.com/Juhi.JuhaszPeter/posts/798995716839580.

the root cause of declining trust and honesty in society. The simple notion of "breaking the rules with taxpayers' money" (Interview HU4) reinforces a widespread sense of injustice. These practices, emblem of the selfishness and greed of few individuals, ostensibly subscribe to feudal mechanisms so as to favor government cronies (Interview HU5).

In line with this view, anti-corruption activists do not consider corruption as a post-communist issue, but as a phenomenon that pre-dates communism. Corruption and cronyism did not emerge overnight as a result of the transition process, but have been present – in different forms and to different extents – throughout Hungarian history (e.g. Interviews HU1, HU4, HU5). Similar agreement is found among activists with regard to the role of the EU. Corruptive practices have been perceived to be on the rise, not least due to the structural funds coming from the EU. Activists deem these funds as lying at the core of corruptive exchanges, frauds, and other unlawful practices. Precisely in light of the origin of these funds, the EU bears its own share of responsibility, and is called on to rectify these abuses and ensure that involved parties are finally held accountable (e.g. Interview HU3).

Many arguments are deployed to motivate people to take action; these pleas point at the negative consequences affecting the social, political, and economic life of the country.

> We have to make sure that [taxpayers'] money is not spent on the cronies of the government and Viktor Orbán's family, at the expense of the wealth of the Hungarian people, healthcare, and education. (Interview HU6)

Just as corruption is interpreted as one of the direst problems affecting Hungarian society, activists have to confront themselves with a progressive numbing of the Hungarian public when it comes to mobilizing on the issue. Evidence coming from recent public opinion surveys indeed suggests that other concerns (i.e. poverty, unemployment, health, education, and the refugee crisis) have overshadowed corruption (Publicus 2016), admittedly limiting prospects for successful grassroots anti-corruption mobilizations.

Although public disenchantment with prospects of change may in part explain the anti-corruption movement's difficulty to attain a certain degree of coherence and cohesion, it surely contributes to appreciate the nature and strategies of collective action in the country. On the one hand, we should primarily consider the contribution of anti-corruption activists in terms of knowledge dissemination and awareness raising. With the higher goal of societal accountability practically constrained by the configuration of the institutional context, anti-corruption activists invest their efforts in exposing unlawful practices and communicating to the broader public the implications of corruption in Hungary. On the other hand, anti-corruption activism outside the protest arena seems to be set on a better footing. The activities of watchdogs, activist-journalists, and activist-politicians have gained significant traction during the past few years, and these actors are now at the forefront of the anti-corruption struggle from below. They collect relevant information, investigate cases of corruption out of their own initiative (often making available their findings to the international public by means of devoted web pages, reports, and news items in English), make information easily accessible to users, while also seeking greater involvement of the public. This holds true for

collective actors of different kind. *K-Monitor*, a grassroots watchdog set to monitor corruption in Hungary, operates open data websites, conducts research, and advocates for legal reform. The watchdog regularly discloses the different connections emerging from their monitoring activities, and launches public campaigns to challenge and overcome social indifference to corruption (Interview HU1).

Ákos Hadházy, a Fidesz councilor in Szekszárd between 2006 and 2014 and, since then, member of the movement party LMP, has been one of the most prominent figures in the anti-corruption struggle of recent years. Hadházy quit Fidesz in abhorrence after the contentious tobacco-selling licenses allocation launched in 2013. He denounced, among others, corruption cases in relation to EU funding and the misspending in the 'Bridge to Employment' project involving the National Roma Self-Government (ORÖ). Upon András Schiffer's retirement from politics in May 2016, the 'anti-corruption crusader' (Budapest Beacon) has stepped in as co-chairman of the LMP. Actively engaged in exposing mismanagement of funds and other forms of corruption, he has committed to providing evidence of these on a weekly basis, by means of press conferences. These press conferences, held on Thursdays (as opposed to governmental ones, held on Fridays), have so far served the purpose of calling attention to shady deals, allocation of tenders, and misuse of EU funds. According to Hadházy, this strategy has proven more effective than the disruptive practices deployed by other LMP members over the course of the years (Interview HU3; see above).

All things considered, the Hungarian political establishment has strayed a long way from elaborating on anti-corruption discourses and policies. As a result, anti-corruption does not quite qualify as a mass-mobilizing issue able to attain the societal accountability goal that activists set for themselves and their graft. On the contrary, opposition to the establishment and the government of the day bear a much greater mobilizing potential. The massive participation to the '100,000 against the Internet Tax' protests is, in this respect, exemplary; while upholding an anti-corruption character, the organizers of the demonstrations were able to channel popular dissatisfaction against governmental activity amid recurring scandals. As corruption can be also attributed to the lack of democratic values (Interview HU4), it should not surprise if the illiberal character of the Orbán government has given way to an interpenetration of anti-government and anti-corruption discourses on the part of activists. It is also worth noting that, although collective anti-corruption actors have been very critical of Fidesz-KDNP's governmental activity, they have been no less wary of the previous Socialist government. This partly explains why most of these activists have upheld a *civic* profile, in the attempt of mobilizing people of different ideological persuasions under the common banner of anti-corruption.

Italy

In the past few years, the overall political and institutional context in Italy has been quite favorable to anti-corruption activism and the related collective actions against organized crime. Similar to what happened with the *Tangentopoli* scandals in the early 1990s (della Porta and Vannucci 2007), many left- and right-wing politicians have been recently tainted by corruption scandals such as the illicit use of electoral reimbursements, misspending of public

funds, and outright cases of corruption (Mosca 2014). The investigations on these activities ascertained the existence of a capillary system of corruption, which also included strong ties with organized crime; this, in turn, increased the distrust of citizens in institutional political actors, bringing about a crisis of political party-voter alignments (e.g. Garzia 2013). In other words, the political context has possibly become more open towards the participation of outsiders to institutionalized politics, while at the same time the center-left PD has tended to move out of the anti-corruption camp. The constellation of (potential) allies at the political level has indeed changed in the past few years. The anti-establishment 5 Star Movement (M5S) constructed its public profile on a strong opposition to the corrupt political elites of the country, including both right- and left-wing parties. The M5S was able to gain recognition in administrative elections and then representation to the Italian Parliament with over 25 per cent of votes in 2013 (Conti and Memoli 2015). On top of this, it should be added that police forces usually hold a rather favorable attitude towards activists, who often also collaborate with the judiciary system to contrast corruption and organized crime. This friendly relationship is quite an exception in the Italian political and institutional context, that is usually characterized by hostile interactions between police forces and activists mobilized on other contentious issues.

Anti-corruption activists are well aware of the favorable political and institutional context in which they act, and they regularly attempt to use the opportunities that it presents so as to advance their struggle against corruption and organize crime, both at the local and national level. At the local level, political institutions seem particularly open towards the collaboration between activists, their organizations, and public administrations. In line with this, many technical committees against organized crime established by local and regional institutions include experts that are also involved in grassroots activism. Moreover, such committees regularly organize public events and working tables to which civil society actors are also invited as relevant speakers. Another form of collaboration consists in public administration granting access to material resources to activists and their organizations, like meeting rooms or whole headquarters in which to organize their activities. In this way, public administrations act as allies providing the logistic support, which activists plan their activities. The presence of such channels of collaborations at the local level is consistent with activists' deployment of localized strategies to counter corruption and organized crime. As it will be discussed below, in Italy activists tend to mobilize mostly at the local level, while national campaigns remain limited in numbers.

That said, the national level is also a relevant political terrain for activists. Both right-wing and left-wing governments usually have a positive inclination toward activists' initiatives; in other words, at the national level, the presence of a favorable political and institutional contexts translates into the cooptation of grassroots efforts to fight corruption and organized crime. Activists are aware of this and they might tactically decide to participate in the cooptation process to reach their objectives. An emblematic example in this sense is the FSA campaign, that took advantage of the 2013 general elections, considering it as a propitious moment to push the anti-corruption issue into the political agenda. At the same time, the FSA campaign shows how changes in the political context could hamper mobilization efforts,

especially in the short run. For a long time before the 2013 general political elections, it seemed that a new electoral law had to be introduced, so as to allow citizens to express their preference for the candidates they intended to vote, instead of relying on closed party lists. Activists tailored the FSA campaign around citizens' opportunity to vote for the candidates they valued the most – especially those committed to transparency and anti-corruption. Despite many pressures, however, the electoral law was not introduced and the campaigners had to shift the frame of the campaign to transparency of information and clean politics. Moreover, the election resulted in a lack of a clear majority able to govern the country: the situation of stall brought further political uncertainty, which practically closed any windows of opportunity and curbed the hopes of campaigners, who originally aimed at amending the article 416ter of the penal code within 100 days from the elections.

The FSA campaign shows that a thin organizational structure is key to adapt to sudden changes at the level of political context. Activists were indeed able to quickly exploit changes in the political situation as opportunities to provide further visibility to the campaign and claim its success in obtaining some change at the institutional level. This happened when the newly (re-)elected President of the Republic appointed a special commission of ten experts, who were responsible for outlining the priorities of the new government. FSA campaigners adjusted their communication strategy: they switched their target from political candidates (before the elections) to elected MPs (after the elections). Due to the situation of stall, activists considered the establishment of the special commission as an opportunity to revamp the campaign. They asked each of the ten nominated experts to include the struggle against corruption in their report. The ten experts' report eventually mentioned anti-corruption measures as an important priority, and FSA activists considered and advertised this as a success of their campaign. Additionally, activists themselves also created windows of opportunity through promotional strategies and by exerting pressure on elected candidates. On 7 May 2013, FSA organized a national meeting in the Senate of the Republic, with the help of its President, Pietro Grasso, who also committed to the staples of the campaign before the elections. The meeting proved a good opportunity to give visibility to the campaign and remind the elected candidates about their pledges. In a few days, an inter-parliamentary group was formed to work on a joint law proposal to amend the article 416ter – which was eventually amended on 16 April 2014.

Frames and strategies

The majority of interviewees for the Italian case considered themselves and their organizations, not only as part of a broader anti-mafia movement, but also as part of the anti-corruption movement. The two contentious issues are then related also from the activists' perspective: for Italian grassroots actors, fighting organized crime – and mafias in particular – also means opposing corruption. Unsurprisingly, two of the largest Italian associations fighting the mafia (*Libera* and *Avviso Pubblico*) started making explicit anti-corruption appeals in 2011 with their national *Corrotti* (Corrupts) campaign. Later, *Libera* was among the principal promoters of the national anti-corruption FSA campaign during the 2013 general election. *Libera*'s diagnosis is generally that:

> Corruption pollutes the processes of politics, threatens the standing and the credibility of institutions, pollutes and seriously distorts the economy, drains resources destined for the good of the community, corrodes civic responsibility and democratic culture itself. (in della Porta et al. 2015, p. 75)

According to our analysis, four main problems linked to organized crime are particularly relevant for activists. First, the presence of corrupt politics and, second, the lack of information about the mafias: according to activists, deviations at the level of political and media spheres, but also the dysfunctional connection between the two, support the presence of mafias and their illegal activities in Italy. A third problem would be represented by racket as a coercive means employed by the mafias and, fourth, the environmental risks linked to the illegal activities of organized crime (e.g. waste management and land consumption). Especially in the two latter cases, activists single out material damages directly inflicted on the citizenry by the presence of organized crime. Activists also make an implicit differentiation between societal problems linked to the presence of organized crime and corruptive behaviors in Italy. There are problems that might be considered factors reinforcing the presence of organized crime and corruption, such as the existence of a culture of silence and the lack of information about mafias play a role in the survival of criminality:

> The invisibility problem forces us to reflect on the fact that the real strength of the mafia is to be located outside the mafia. Hence, in an acquiescent society, in a corrupt and compromised politics, in the press that tells lies and omits facts. (Quotation 43:11)

At the same time, there are problems that seem to stem from the presence of organized crime and corruption in the country: environmental problems belong to this category, but also others deriving from the development of mafia activities (e.g. the development of a polluted economy or the lack of legality and security).

> [The presence of organized crime] restrains the normal development of commercial and entrepreneurial activities, undermining citizens' security and contributing to create a habitus of illegality among new generations [of citizens]. (Quotation 74:4)

Activists tend to focus more on what they perceive as the issues contributing to reinforce illegal activities. On the contrary, the consequences of these illegal activities seem to play a secondary role. While these issues dominate collective action frames (the analysis returned 11 issues mentioned 57 times in the documents), the consequences of corruption and organized crime are less central (the analysis returned eight issues mentioned 25 times in the documents). Moreover, our analysis shows that the activists frequently link corruption and organized crime with other societal problems, hence linking different types of causes, such as environmentalism, pacifism, or battles for labor and migrants.

The analysis of the FSA campaign illustrates that the public reading of anti-corruption requires significant efforts on the part of activists. Especially at the policy level, the anti-

corruption struggle is usually imbued with technical jargon that might be difficult to grasp by the general public. Campaigners then worked to make some of the concepts and mechanisms related to corruption accessible (Interview ITA1). Overall, the material released online presents us with an injustice element, which should trigger moral indignation towards corruption: the same name and slogan of the FSA campaign places emphasis on a future in which Italy would be able to start again and overcome the stall in which is confined due to corruption. One of the activists involved in the campaign claims that one of the targets had been a clearer communication strategy revolving around positive emotions, such as the willingness to work for a better future (Interview ITA2). In this regard, the campaign attempted to go beyond the common narrative of anti-corruption in Italy; instead of focusing on corruption *ex post facto*, the campaign aimed at supporting the construction of social trust between candidates and their electorate, based on transparency and integrity (Interview ITA1).

Activism against corruption and organized crime in Italy subscribes to peaceful strategies. First, activists direct their collective efforts towards the local territories, with collective actions that are mainly regional, when not local, in their scope. While some efforts to counter corruption also take the national level as a space of contention, anti-corruption at the grassroots strategically orients its collective actions towards more limited geopolitical areas, such as cities, provinces, and regions. While recognizing the intertwining of corruption, organized crime, and the political sphere also at the level of national governance, activists also look at first-hand consequences that such criminal phenomena have for the local territories in which they often mobilize. This interpretation is consistent with many of the interviewees' strong conviction that the only effective way to counter corruption and organized crime in Italy is to develop collective actions that target the very culture that nurtures corruption and organized crime in the country. In order to reach this objective, they consider important to develop and spread critical knowledge on what such criminal phenomena are, what they do to societies, and which actions citizens can take to overcome corruption and organized crime. In other words, the challenge for activists against corruption is a mainly a cultural challenge to be faced at the local level. National campaigns are indeed rare in Italy, while there are numerous instances of collective action limited in their geographical scope.

Second, as shown in Figure 1, interviews with activists singled out three types of collective action that activists use to oppose corruption and organize crime.

Figure 1. Main strategies of collective action against corruption and organize crime



Overall, the array of collective actions that activists use to oppose corruption and organize crime is particularly moderate: the most common type of collective actions includes book presentations, public debates, and conferences organized to raise citizens' awareness of corruptive phenomena, their connections with organized crime, and their consequences in the realm of politics, economics, and society at large. A second relevant type of collective action aims at constructing concrete alternatives to the network of relations that sustain corruptive behavior and organized crime. An example is the work of the anti-racket associations, particularly based in the South of the country, which support local entrepreneurs who want to denounce the mafia infiltrations in the business and economic sector. The third type of collective action is more contentious and includes various instances of public protest, such as demonstrations and direct actions. An example is offered the environmental struggles against the high-speed train (TAV) to be constructed in Val di Susa, also known as the 'No-TAV' movement, or the protests against the construction of incinerator in the so-called 'Terra dei Fuochi' (Land of Fires), in the metropolitan area of Naples. In both cases activists were opposing the construction of infrastructures that they deemed unsustainable. At the same time, though, protest organizers and participants shared a strong anti-corruption stance, framing corruption as one of the mechanisms that sustained the development of such infrastructural projects.

The limited use of public protest is consistent with two relevant characteristics of the grassroots opposition to corruption and organized crime today in Italy. First, there are inherent ambiguities with the use of public protest in the particular context of struggles against corruption and organized crime. On the one hand, criminal organizations might infiltrate demonstrations and similar forms of collective actions. An example is the case of the opposition to the reopening of the landfill in Pianura, a peripheral neighborhood of Naples; the *Camorra* sustained the protests that occurred between December 2007 and January 2008 (Biase 2015). Since the dump was entirely controlled by the mafia, the criminal organizations endorsed the protests to regain control of the territory (Biase 2015; Petrillo 2009). On the

other hand, mainstream media and institutional actors allegedly speak about the presence of organized crime infiltrations to discredit otherwise successful demonstrations in which organized crime does not play a role. This happened in another protest related to the 'waste emergency' that hit Naples and many of its peripheral neighborhoods between 2007 and 2008. Amongst other areas of the city, many protests erupted in Chiaiano turned violent due to rough confrontations between protesters and the police. Also for this reason, the demonstrations were able to get some mainstream media coverage, even at the national level "but centre-right and moderate left parties tended to stigmatize them as violent and infiltrated by the Camorra" (Piazza 2011, p. 336).

Second, the use of public protest was often the result of collective emotional trauma, such as the one caused by the violence of the mafia (Renda 1993); a prime example would include the large mobilizations that followed the murders of judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992. To be sure, anti-mafia demonstrations still take place, as demonstrated by the case of the murder of Francesco Fortugno in Calabria, occurred on 16 October 2005; numerous protests followed, brought together by the slogan 'And now kill us all' (Fierro 2007). Still, collective actions against corruption and organized crime tend to follow a more proactive logic of mobilization. Among them, the most frequent seem to be those strategies that aim at developing different systems of relationships in the social, political, and economic spheres, based on solidarity and legality, and hence opposing the system of relations that organized crime nurtures and expands, i.e. based on violence, intimidation, and illicit actions.

A relevant example is Addio Pizzo, a campaign that began on the night of 28 June 2004 as a "campaign of low-intensity guerrilla communication [to] erode the consensus enjoyed by the mafia in the extensive 'grey area' of our society" (Addio Pizzo 2013). After the first stage, however, activists transformed the campaign, urging Sicilian citizens to counter the mafia through their power as consumers. Hence, they asked citizens of Palermo to shop only in those shops that refused to pay protection money to the mafia (Addio Pizzo 2013). Following a proactive logic, activists involved in Addio Pizzo employed political consumerism strategies (Micheletti 2003), according to which citizens use their power as consumers to pressure companies, but also shop owners as in the case of such a campaign (Forno and Gunnarson 2010). The example of Addio Pizzo is a story of success; today the campaign involves about 1,022 shop owners and companies that refuse to pay protection money to the mafia and about 13,000 consumers that are actively involved in the campaign (Addio Pizzo 2016).

Finally, our research also considered activists' inclusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in their collective actions, as a strategic means of mobilization. ICTs played a pivotal role in some of the most important protests across the world. This notwithstanding, ICTs do not seem central in the case of Italian activism against corruption and organized crime; activists use ICTs to organize their collective actions, but these tools do not change substantially the strategies that activists deploy to mobilize against corruption and organized crime. That said, the FSA campaign represented a relevant exception to this rule as it heavily revolved around the strategic use of ICTs. Beside a professional website that functioned as a hub for the whole campaign, activists also relied on *Change.org*, an online

petition platform that promoted the information about, and the participation in, the campaign. On the one hand, the platform allowed activists to post news about the campaign, sending out updates on its progress over time. On the other hand, the platform allowed citizens to engage directly with the campaign by signing the online petition that asked political candidates to keep their promise to fight corruption once elected in the parliament. The online petition reached about 150,000 signatures by the election day, on 24 February, almost two months after it was launched. After the campaign, it continued to gather signatures, reaching about 220,000 of them on 7 May, when the first assembly of elected candidates that joined the campaign took place in the parliament. The number rose to 280,000 by early August 2013. The *Change.org* platform also collected the data of citizens that signed the online petition, so that activists were able to tailor their email messages to the location of their supporters. The use of ICTs has also posed some challenges to FSA activists, especially when it came to combine online and offline signatures. The online petition platform required a unique email address associated to each signature, but local volunteers had also gathered signatures of many citizens that did not have an email address, hence causing a relevant loss of signatures for the petition.

Spain

The political context in Spain has hardly been favorable to grassroots struggles against corruption: the two main political parties that governed the country since 1982, the center-right PP and the center-left PSOE, had a strong alignment of interests that prevented the opening of opportunities for grassroots struggles against corruption. What is more, citizens did not seem to recognize political change with regard to corruption as possible, and they did not employ the most obvious windows of opportunity – i.e. administrative and political elections – to make a difference. This changed in the last few years. Two elements, in particular, seemed to be relevant in this change of attitude.

A first relevant aspect is the growth and spread, in Spanish society, of a long-lasting wave of anti-austerity protests that blamed the country's political elites, not only for being unable to manage the economic crisis, but also for being co-responsible of Spain's financial and economic collapse. Such mobilizations, generally known as the *Indignados*, or the *15-M*, rose to attention on 15 May 2011 with initial demonstrations in about 58 cities across the country, and followed by the occupation of Puerta del Sol in Madrid and Placa Catalunya in Barcelona. The anti-austerity protests continued in the following years with the *Mareas*, protests against the reduction of public funding to the health and education sectors, and with the Platform of People Affected by Mortgage (PAH), an anti-eviction movement founded in Barcelona in 2009 that rapidly spread across the country.

Surveys and interviews with citizens taking part in the mobilization singled out political corruption as one of the main problems that brought them into the streets (Calvo et al. 2011). Between 2009 and 2011, the unfolding of corruption scandals led to a dramatic increase in the perception of corruption as being a widespread practice among political leaders (Anduiza et al. 2014); the political class was additionally considered incapable of dealing with the economic crisis. The two elements combined functioned as a catalyst for mobilization. Anti-

corruption was indeed one of the relevant issues in the agenda of this protest wave, and it became a central concern also for institutional political actors who rose from the anti-austerity protests (Lobera 2015; Subirats 2015).

Indeed, the electoralization of protest is a phenomenon specific to the Spanish political context. Activists founded *Podemos* in January 2014, a new outsider and anti-establishment political party; at the regional level, in 2015, different coalitions of grassroots political actors gave birth to new left-wing political coalitions such as *En Marea* in Galicia and *En Comù Podem* in Catalunya, that participated with *Podemos* to the 2015 regional elections. Finally, at the municipal level, activists created dozens of new political movements between 2013 and 2015, around which they built successful electoral coalitions with *Podemos*, and that lead to the election of mayors and hundreds of municipal councilors in cities such as Madrid and Barcelona.

A second relevant aspect was the emergence of several important corruption scandals. Due to these scandals, since 2010 corruption became a central issue of contention in the Spanish public sphere. The Luis Bárcena case erupted in 2013. Luis Bárcena was the treasurer of the right-wing PP from 1990 to 2009: according to the documents leaked by *El País*, the treasurer had kept a parallel and secret accounting system to record illegal cash donations, worth 8 million euros, then used to pay illegal bonuses to the leading figures of the party (El País 2015). Other corruption scandals erupted due to the activities of judiciary authorities. The judicial inquiry *Operacion Punica* began in 2015 and led to the arrest of 51 people for a corruption plot regarding the allocation of 250 million euros in real estate and infrastructural works. Among others, the PP leader in Madrid was arrested. Since 2011, moreover, police forces have also investigated members of the Royal family within the context of the *Operacion Babel* investigation: the *Infanta* Cristina and her husband were charged with the illegal appropriation of funds – about 6 million euros – through the Noos Institute, a non-profit charity. In 2011, Caja Madrid, one of the major Spanish banks, created with other banking groups Bankia – a new bank that was immediately listed on the stock market. To make this possible, the budget was falsified and the national government had to financially support the new institute.

These political corruption scandals regularly hit the news in Spanish mainstream media, which covered them extensively. Although political corruption scandals were widespread also before these cases, Spanish public opinion seemed to react differently: corruption, indeed, came to be perceived as one of the main social problems in Spain. While in 2013 roughly 40 per cent of Spanish citizens were concerned about corruption in their country, two years later the percentage grew to 65 per cent, a rapid increase without precedents in the country. The economic crisis, which hit Spain already in 2008, was at its peak when the political corruption scandals erupted in the media; Spanish citizens were already losing trust in the political elites due to the decline of their material living conditions (Albertos et al. 2015).

Frames and strategies

The framing of corruption as a threat to social justice and democracy characterized the mobilizations of the *Indignados* in Spain. Claims formulated at Puerta del Sol in Madrid included free and secular education, democratization of educational structures, proportional representation, 'fight against corruption through norms aiming at establishing a total political transparency', the 'creation of a mechanism of citizens control to claim a real political responsibility', and effective separation of powers (Nez 2011). Activists in fact blamed the corruption of representative institutions; the slogan 'we are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers' was linked to the denunciation of the corruption of representative democracy. Political corruption is related to other contentious issues linked to the economic crisis: while Spanish citizens suffer from the economic crisis, the Spanish government would the banks and the rich, hence supporting capitalist greed (Perugorría and Tejerina 2014). As the 15M manifesto stresses, activists perceive a strong injustice in this situation: 'We fail to understand why we should have to pay the price of the crisis, while its instigators continue to gain record profits. We're sick and tired of one injustice after another' (Take the Square 2011).

The connections between corrupted politicians and corrupting bankers were at the center of the collective action frames emerged during the anti-austerity protests:

> Within the 15M, we have analyzed corruption as an economic and social phenomenon. Of course, we have also shown great adversity towards political parties, but we especially stressed that corruption is linked to all the major economic and social problems of Spain: the role of banks, real estate, and land speculation (and thus, indirectly, the housing and evictions crises, linked precisely to the speculation of real estate companies and banks), the Spanish development model, and the relations between parties and economic centers of power. (Interview ES8)

In 2011, the 15M activists created a thematic group concerning transparency and corruption. This group gathered information on the main national corruption scandals, giving for granted that the mainstream media, directly linked to political and financial powers, would not have the freedom and support to delve into these issues. Within this thematic group, the sub-group '15MpaRato' was launched to investigate the Bankia issue and the role of Caja Madrid's former president, Rodrigo Rato, in the scandal. In Spain, common citizens and groups can initiate juridical inquiries, even if not directly affected by the denounced facts. The juridical device that makes these initiatives possible is called *querella*. 15MpaRato resorted to this tool, denouncing Rodrigo Rato to public authorities.

As it becomes clear from the following public statement, the collective action frames of the 15MpaRato linked bankers to corrupt politicians, and created a strong opposition between the political-financial elites and the common people affected by the economic crisis:

> Banks are going on getting richer with our money, our work, our efforts.
>
> No one of those who has been governing us will demand Rato accountable for his responsibilities, for the dispossessions he committed, while at the same time there are people in jail just for having tried to escape from a life of slavery.
>
> But now we, the people, can demand for responsibility, we now have the instruments online to uncover their bank accounts, their dirty clothes, to discredit and chase them until they have no more places to hide.
>
> The ones responsible for this crisis, who want us to pay for them with our lives, have names and surnames, and must pay for their actions.
>
> In the war between those who live at the bottom and those who live at the top, fear has changed side. Now we point the targets.[160]

Economic and social crisis, real estate bubbles, deregulation in urban planning, collusion between politics and business, opposition between a minority holding privileges and the majority living with difficulties; all these issues are related to corruption in the framing of the 15MpaRato.

The most important organization within the 15MpaRato group, and in several other anti-corruption actions throughout Spain, is X-Net, an association based in Barcelona. Broad participation, transversality, and the organization of actions directly carried out by ordinary citizens are the main aspects that characterize their collective action frame, which is consistent with those collective action frames emerging in the anti-austerity protests – including the *Indignados*, *Mareas*, and the PAH (Lobera 2015). All these mobilizations aimed at mobilizing public opinion and building a wider consensus, trying not to be simplistically associated to party politics. Activists indeed considered that framing protest and political action in an ideological way would prevent them from taking advantage of the deep changes fostered in public opinion by corruption scandals and the economic crisis, which made large sectors of the Spanish society (not only left-wing) sensitive to the movements' inclusive claims and discourses. The search for broad and inclusive collective action frames is therefore a key feature of all these experiences.

However, we must distinguish between the anti-corruption frames elaborated in social movement contexts and those elaborated by other civil society organizations working in the field of anti-corruption and transparency, such as NGOs and foundations. Among the latter, the most active in Spain are *Mas Democracia* (More Democracy), *Fundaciòn Civio*, *Fundacion Hay Derecho* (Foundation There is Law), and Transparency International. Although the anti-corruption discourse of social movements and organizations may partly overlap, in the latter the link between corruption, economic, and social issues is absent, or is weakly developed. A manager of *Fundación Civio*, entrepreneur and former activist of 15-M in Madrid, summarizes this difference:

[160] Public note published on 15 May 2012. Available at: https://15mparato.wordpress.com.

> In Spain, I would say that there are basically two frames related to the analysis of corruption. The first might be called the 'left-wing from below approach', like that of 15-M or *Podemos*. This kind of discourse insists a lot on the issue of inequality and tends to define corruption as a mechanism that comes from the fact that political power is subservient to economic power. I do not share this kind of analysis. The other approach could be defined as liberal, as it identifies the problem in a mixture of political parties and public administration – in other words, the insufficient separation of powers and the distortions of market competition. According to this analysis, corruption can be opposed through public administration reforms, a greater separation between administration and political parties, the liberalization of economic processes and the increase in competition between private actors. (Intervew ES3)

> According to a manager of *Fundación Hay Derecho*:

> In Spain, the main source of corruption is the patronage of traditional parties, with all the economic distortions that it causes, and the plots between parties and firms for the assignment of public works and infrastructures. Political parties, and particularly the two major parties of Spain, the PP and the PSOE, are the central problem of corruption. (Interview ES4)

There are, then, two essential aspects to define these different anti-corruption discourses. The first is the extent to which the phenomenon is analyzed, namely whether it is connected or not to economic and social dynamics. The second is the attribution of responsibility for corruptive processes. The prevailing interpretation by social movements and *Podemos* is that there is a close relationship between corruption and social inequality, and the relationship between economy and politics – considering the power of the private sphere on politics the primary cause of corruption. Conversely, the more liberal frame limits itself to the legal-juridical dimension of corruption, and attributes corruption to political, more than economic, elites. These aspects can be detected among the new parties that gained electoral support since 2014 and also presented themselves as anti-corruption forces wanting to regenerate Spanish democracy. The first type of frame was taken up by *Podemos*, while the liberal one by *Ciudadanos*.

Another important point to make relates to the absence of anti-political and anti-party rhetoric: political parties are hardly opposed as such, and the political problems identified are never defined in terms of the economic costs of democratic institutions and processes, or by opposing the existence of political professionalism.

Along with other social and economic issues, corruption also plays a major role in the political discourse of *Podemos*. More precisely, the collective action frames, retrieved from the analysis of the campaign speeches of 2014 and 2015, revolve around two main basic juxtapositions – the bottom versus the top and the people versus the privileged minority – thus, surpassing the usual left-versus-right rhetoric. These juxtapositions are connected to the

corruption issue. Moreover, *Podemos* aims at challenging the cultural hegemony that the PP and PSOE established around the concepts of 'homeland' and 'democracy' (Martin 2015). *Podemos* wants to attribute a new meaning to these words, by linking them to social rights and transparency. In other words, according to *Podemos*, it is possible to talk about homeland and democracy only if social rights are ensured to the whole population and the elites manage public policy with transparency (Torreblanca 2015). All those elites that break this social pact would not qualify as democratic, and can be defined as corrupt. *Podemos* also targets elites outside the political arena. They single out social, and especially economic, elites – the caste, as they often refer to them – as having a preeminent role in corruption:

> This is the problem of our country: an economic caste governing without participating in the elections. Corruption is this, it is a form of government, it doesn't deal with single bad apples. (Pablo Iglesias, public speech in Almeria, 17 May 2014)

According to *Podemos*, the role that economic elites have in governing the country, hence exerting an excessive power on the political sphere, is already a corruptive behavior. Despite *Podemos*' effort to disclose cases of corruption in Spain, its collective action frames are constructed around the idea that corruption is to be intended as a whole system of government that does not refer just to the legal dimension, but to the relationship between economy and politics itself, also when it does not strictly qualify as illegal behavior:

> Corruption is stealing the institutions from the people, corruption is the fact that the 1 per cent holds as much as the 70 per cent of the population. Since the beginning of the crisis, there is an additional 27 per cent of rich people, that is the same percentage of the Spanish population on the brink of poverty, as well as the increase in the number of people resorting to the Caritas is the same of the increase in the rate of sale of luxury cars: this is corruption. (Pablo Iglesias, public speech in Madrid, 31 January 2015)

In the August 2016 speech delivered by Pablo Iglesias in Parliament during the failed process of investiture of Marano Rajoy as PM, he stated: a) 'We won't vote for you not because you won't fight corruption, and you will not fight it because you are corruption'; b) 'we won't vote for you because while thousands of people dropped out of the middle class because of your neoliberal politics, others became rich'; c) 'We are not voting for you because Ibex 35[161] governs through you'; d) 'You speak of sovereignty, but you have handed over to Merkel and the financial powers the right to decide'.[162] These four points are closely interconnected, as if they were the consequence of one another.

Hence, corruption, democracy, and inequality come together in the discourse of *Podemos*. The corrupted politicians, the corrupters bankers, financiers, rentiers, entrepreneurs, the rich people investing their money in tax havens: all are fostering inequalities and blamed by

[161] Ibex 35 is the stock market index of Spanish companies with the highest capitalization.
[162] Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMHodFJgK7Q.

Podemos as anti-patriots, while patriots are all the people that do not count on big money to live. Consequently, the main anti-corruption proposals by *Podemos* do not simply concern the legal dimension and the reform of political parties internal functioning and funding, but the whole relationship between the institutions and society, as well as a deep change in the economic and social policies, as established in the manifesto that *Podemos* presented at the 2015 and 2016 national elections.

Spanish anti-corruption movements and organizations resort to a wide range of repertoires and strategies: investigative reports, studies on single corruption episodes, or on the phenomenon of corruption at the national level; their diffusion through traditional and digital media, also by creating personal relationships within the media system; the support – from a juridical, communication, and strategic point of view – to single citizens and local groups denouncing corruption cases; the direct launching of juridical inquiries; and the interaction with left-wing local and regional governments to implement anti-corruption policies.

Organizations such as X-Net, the Catalonia's Citizen Group against Corruption (coordinated itself by X-Net), and *Civio*, aim at representing a point of reference for local groups and organizations in the anti-corruption struggle:

> Our model is a self-dense and self-determination model of action. We aim to break the taboos about corruption as a fatality, and the power of politicians and bankers. We create different initiatives, but the main process is carried out by citizens themselves. Therefore, the point is the change in public opinion prompted by 15-M. It has completely changed Spanish attitudes. (Interview ES1)

> We want to make sure that institutions are transparent for citizens; we want to be intermediaries between citizens and institutions, giving more power to citizens to obtain information on public activities, and denounce without fear what is not working. Up to this moment, we have acted mainly as an information channel, requesting that certain information and processes become transparent to citizens, but now we also want to begin pursuing direct legal initiatives such as *querellas*. (Interview ES4)

These organizations deploy different forms of communication with citizens, so that the demands and complaints of the latter can be addressed to the media and institutions, thus acting as agents in public opinion campaigns and as a medium between citizens and institutions.

> During the last three years, we have collected 1,800 complaints by citizens, on the basis of which we have addressed the competent institutions: these were requests for information related in particular to specific public actions – above all, calls for tenders and public announcements – to the quality and correctness of public communication, and to the relationship between public powers and private firms. (Interview ES4)

As stated by a newly elected MP, these strategies are also made possible by the growing receptiveness to the issue of corruption after 2011:

> There are many organizations in Spain working on the issue of corruption. But this fact is much more transversal. The phenomenon affects many citizens in general, because corruption is still the central theme in Spanish politics, and citizens may take action alone or in small groups to make complaints, initiatives, or to report cases of corruption that happen in their local context. (Interview ES6)

Besides participation, these organizations seek effectiveness:

> Street demonstrations do not work unless we are at least 100,000, otherwise you show weakness. The enemy must think that we are millions, because we are millions. So there are more effective empowerment actions, the use of the Internet and the media, the legal actions and the ability to act on political contradictions between parties and state structures. For example, in the campaign for the charging of the *Infanta* Cristina, we went to all the parties, we asked them if they would follow us, and if not we would unleash a strong campaign against them, using social networks and trying to get to the media. (Interview ES1)

From the juridical point of view, organizations such as X-Net, through the system of *querellas*, succeeded in getting several politicians and bankers investigated. In addition to the legal work, working with the media is considered a priority by all of these organizations, which through their professional contacts with individual journalists are sharing their documentation and work on local and national media. Oftentimes, it is journalists who look out for activists, considering them as reliable sources of sensitive information on corruption – hence, producers of knowledge.

Anti-corruption activists have also built relationships with public institutions and parties. Collective actors such as X-Net and 15MpaRato tend to favor relations with new parties and movements born after the 2011-2013 protest cycle, as well as with local institutions guided by these new political forces. Foundations, instead, reach out for all political parties and mainly act at a national level, defining themselves as interest groups pressurizing politicians, and advancing legislative proposals on transparency and corruption.

As for the relationship with local institutions, anti-corruption activists directly participate to the formulation of public policies on corruption and transparency by means of coordination between civil society organizations and institutional representatives. The most interesting case is the Barcelona administration. In 2015, a leftist coalition constituted by *Podemos* and Catalan political movements won the local elections; the coalition was led by the former spokeswoman of the PAH, Ada Colau, who became mayor of the city. The new administration established a specific taskforce to work on corruption and transparency, which cooperates with all the major institutional structures in the city. It opened a direct communication channel with citizens, trains public officials on these issues, is responsible for the transparent management of calls for tenders and public announcements, and created a

register of all private companies working with the administration. As part of this administrative structure, it set up a Consulting Council for Transparency, including representatives of institutions and civil society organizations, and develops law proposals for the administration.

Anti-corruption activists consider themselves responsible for a deep change in public awareness; the effects of such change can be detected at the local, regional, and national levels. Some anti-corruption activists are critical towards these new political parties and fear they may limit the movements' autonomy. This notwithstanding, many former activists turned into party members, and have been elected in city councils, regional parliaments, and the National Congress.

Comparative conclusions

The literature on anti-corruption from below is still in its infancy. Despite a number of recent contributions elaborating on the role of civil society in their struggle against corruption (e.g. Grimes 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015), very little attention has been devoted to grassroots activism – and practically none from the perspective of social movement studies. Besides its theoretical value, our research set out to use elements drawn from social movement theory to assess questions that generally fall outside the remit of research on corruption – that is, the context within which collective anti-corruption actors operate, their discourses, and the strategies that they deploy. We particularly elaborated on recent developments in three EU countries – Hungary, Italy, and Spain – that have reported high perceptions of corruption over the past decade. From a normative point of view, and in light of the beneficial role attributed to collective actors, these are countries where anti-corruption mobilizations would be commended. For each of them, we delved into the opportunities available to anti-corruption activists, and examined the way they carry out their struggle, always subscribing to the tenets of methodological pluralism, and by deploying and combining evidence deriving from more than one method or type of data.

In our research endeavor, we ascertained recurring elements as well as variation across cases. For what it concerns the opportunities available to activists, Italy and Spain traditionally offered few favorable elements for the mobilization of civil society and social movement actors in their struggle against corruption within the institutional political arena; this should be primarily attributed to the monopolization of political competition by the mainstream parties of the left and right. With the disclosure of a number of corruption scandals in recent years, both countries have however witnessed the rise and consolidation of anti-establishment organizations (e.g. M5S in Italy or *Podemos* in Spain) that notably transposed concerns for greater accountability from the civic to the party-political arena. Unlike the Italian case, however, the anti-corruption struggle in Spain maintained a pronounced grassroots component (i.e. street-based activism). While also Hungary experienced a substantial degree of political stability, followed by the recent emergence of anti-establishment movement parties (i.e. Jobbik, LMP, and later PM), here the political context underwent further closure. Especially after 2010, the Hungarian government has taken an 'illiberal turn', practically limiting prospects of successful mobilizations for critical collective actors. Amid ongoing

restructuring, political opportunities seem today more open towards anti-corruption activities in Italy and Spain than Hungary.

The different configurations of the opportunities available to anti-corruption activists seem to have influenced their discourses as much as their strategies. If we were to reason in terms of institutionalization of the anti-corruption dimension of conflict, we would probably have to place Spain on one end and Hungary on the other, with Italy sitting somewhere in between. In Spain, the struggle against corruption has been successfully channeled into the party-political arena and it is currently impossible to dissociate the role of *Podemos* from the articulation of anti-corruption stances. Indeed, part of *Podemos*' own success and *raison d'être* rests on its staunch opposition to corrupt politicians and bankers as well as on its promotion of a 'true' democracy based on grassroots participation of citizens to democratic processes. An aspect, the latter, that shows the strong link between *Podemos* and the massive anti-austerity protests that preceded its formation.

Italy has experienced political developments comparable to Spain, and the breakout of the M5S – with its aversion to the 'caste' – is certainly suggestive in this regard. Despite the M5S's role in raising attention to the issue, the anti-corruption struggle in Italy is still in the making, while largely lying at the margins of institutionalized politics. It should not surprise, then, if the principal advocates of anti-corruption remain organizations active in fighting the mafias (e.g. *Libera* and *Gruppo Abele*), while grassroots activism is confined to a subaltern role. It follows that corruption in Italy is framed as one of the side effects of organized criminality, and often linked to other contentious issues. Unlike Spain, though, the anti-corruption and anti-mafia discourses are only marginally connected to those of participatory democracy and social justice. The difference may be attributed to the presence (in Spain) and the absence (in Italy) of massive anti-austerity mobilizations able to link corruption with alternative discourses on the economic and financial crisis.

In Hungary, where anti-establishment organizations have partly contributed to bring attention to the corruption issue, anti-corruption activism is still limited in material and symbolic resources. Collective anti-corruption actors here have to confront the traditional reluctance to grassroots mobilizations, and the numbing effect deriving by the constant exposure to cases of corruption. Anti-corruption cannot be considered a self-standing mobilizing factor and indeed receives greater resonance when linked to anti-establishment critiques. As a result, anti-corruption activism has proven most successful through the activities of activist-journalists and activist-politicians.

The picture outlined above inevitably affects the broader question of societal accountability. The Spanish anti-corruption struggle, through its recent institutionalization, aspires to bring about changes in the legal dimension, reform political parties, and thoroughly remold the workings of institutions, society, and the economy. Considering the little time and political resources available (*Podemos* has entered the Spanish parliament in December 2015), and apart from the usual constraints deriving from parliamentary affairs, the struggle for greater accountability has barely started in Spain. In Italy, FSA activists claimed their campaign successful; while the FSA's concerns have been eventually addressed and accomplished, the

attention devoted to the issue has however decreased over time. Finally, in light of the limited opportunities at hand, Hungarian actors have primarily engaged in disseminating knowledge and raising awareness of the issue; accountability in this case should be understood as an incremental process waiting for more propitious conditions to unfold.

Anti-corruption activism then comes across as a composite phenomenon, undergoing different developmental stages, though presenting a number of similarities in the way collective actors make sense of their context and work towards the aspired goal of societal accountability. This research offered numerous insights into the workings of anti-corruption activism, using concepts of social movement theory to tackle one of the direst problems affecting contemporary societies. As much as our work has highlighted the potential for dialogue between social scientific disciplines, it has also reinstated the necessity of greater exchange between institutional and non-institutional actors. Those institutional actors genuinely committed to contrast corruptive practices have often struggled to attain their goals. A reason often cited to explain the limited success of similar policies is the unawareness of the dynamics – i.e. the capillarity and reach – of corruption within the social texture. As institutional actors have often proven out of touch with similar realities, turning to anti-corruption activists seems, at the same time, compelling and desirable. Their knowledge of the context and the best practices to adopt significantly adds to that of institutionalized practitioners active in the field. What has otherwise proven a fight punctuated by limited successes, could turn into a positive story by boosting cooperation and creating synergies between institutional and non-institutional actors.

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Appendix

List of interviews

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- HU1: Sándor Léderer, director, *K-Monitor*
- HU2: Gulyás Balász, organizer, *100,000 against the Internet Tax*
- HU3: Ákos Hadházy, co-chairman, *Politics Can Be Different*
- HU4: Gergő Sáling, co-editor, *Direkt36*
- HU5: Gábor Vágó, journalist, *Atlatszo.hu*; former *Politics Can Be Different* MP
- HU6: Tímea Szabó, co-chairman, *Dialogue for Hungary*

Spain

- ES1: Founder of *X-Net*
- ES2: *X-Net* activist
- ES3: Manager of *Fundación Ciudadana Civio*
- ES4: Manager of *Fundación Hay Derecho*
- ES5: Director of Juridical Services and Transparency, Barcelona administration
- ES6: *Podemos* MP, former judge
- ES7: *Podemos*, Member of the Regional Parliament in Valencia
- ES8: *Podemos*, Member of the Regional Parliament in Madrid, former activist in *15MpaRato*
- ES9: Activist of the Catalan Citizen Group against Corruption

Section 4 (UNOTT)

Publication list

14. Zúñiga, Nieves and Paul M. Heywood. 2017. “Making anti-corruption policies work: compliance and values in Bolivia”.

14. Zúñiga, Nieves and Paul M. Heywood. 2017. "Making anti-corruption policies work: compliance and values in Bolivia".

Introduction

On being elected president of Bolivia in December 2005, Evo Morales committed his governing party, the Movement for Socialism (*Movimiento al Socialismo*, MAS), to implementing a policy of 'zero tolerance towards corruption'. This anti-corruption policy formed part of a much wider political mission: nothing less than the decolonization of the state and the establishment of a new social contract between state and society. According to Morales, corruption in Bolivia was a consequence of colonization, neoliberalism, and the monopoly hold on power of the white elites who had governed the country up until his election. Against these factors, he claimed that Bolivia's indigenous cultures represented 'the moral reserve of humanity' and, as such, were free of corruption. Addressing the problem of corruption in Bolivia would therefore require both a process of 'mental decolonization' and the (re-)incorporation of traditional values into the country's national consciousness.

The commitment to fighting corruption led in 2009 to the Department for Institutional Transparency and the Fight Against Corruption (*Viceministerio de Transparencia Institucional y Lucha contra la Corrupción*) being upgraded to a full government ministry with the same, somewhat unwieldy, title (Ministerio de Transparencia Institucional y Lucha contra la Corrupción, 2009). The new Ministry identified four strategic objectives: to prevent

corruption by promoting transparency and ethical values; to modernise public administration by introducing appropriate standards, applicable to both public and private spheres; to take stronger action against corruption to recover state assets and reduce impunity; and to develop the technical capacity of public officials to provide a responsive and high quality service. In order to support the new Ministry's operation, key legal reform measures have been introduced, notably: the 2010 Law 'Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz' against corruption and illicit enrichment (Asamblea Legislativa, 2012); the 2013 Law on Social Participation and Control (Asamblea Legislativa, 2013), designed to involve civil society in the fight against corruption; and the self-explanatory 2013 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers and Witnesses (Ministerio de Transparencia Institucional, 2013).

However, despite this governmental commitment to fighting corruption, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in 2006 indicated that 64.5% of respondents perceived corruption to be a widespread phenomenon in political institutions. That percentage increased in 2008 and 2010 reaching 71.8% and 74.2% respectively, and then slightly decreased to 68% in 2012 and 2014. According to the 2010/2011 Global Corruption Barometer, 70% of respondents thought corruption had either stayed the same or increased over the previous three years, whilst in 2013 the corresponding figure in relation to the previous two years was 84%, including 37% who thought it had increased a lot (Transparency International, 2010/11). Surveys in Bolivia thus indicate that there has been an *increase* in negative perceptions of corruption that almost precisely coincided with the implementation of

institutional and legal reforms. The survey data inevitably raise questions about the real impact of Bolivia's anti-corruption policy and why there is such an apparent mismatch between official policy and popular perception. We argue that a significant part of the reason is that the government has placed greater emphasis on the use of regulatory codes and other compliance measures to combat corruption, at the expense of promoting the promised change in values and ethical behaviour. Indeed, the lack of progress in changing social attitudes towards corruption, or in increasing citizens' trust in the government, represents a clear policy failure.

Three reasons underpin our focus on values, attitudes and trust when analysing the impact of anti-corruption efforts in systematically corrupt societies. First, as is well recognised, it is near impossible to develop precise empirical and objective measures of actual corruption, not least because we are dealing with an activity that deliberately seeks to avoid detection. Second, in settings where corruption is deeply embedded, social attitudes may reflect an acceptance of, or tolerance towards, activities that are regarded by citizens as normal: even if it is publically condemned, corruption may none the less be accepted in practice. Third, the reality of corruption and rent-seeking behaviour by officials means that the state in such societies is often seen as failing to protect the interests of society. In turn, citizens feel ignored or unprotected, further fuelling feelings of distrust towards the ruling bodies and reinforcing a readiness to find alternative ways of securing their needs – including through corruption.

Our analysis is therefore framed within the debate between the relative merits of, and appropriate balance between, values-based and compliance-based approaches to reducing corruption and promoting integrity in public institutions. The values-based approach places particular emphasis on fostering appropriate ethical values amongst public officials, seeking to ensure that they do the right thing because it is the right thing to do, whereas the compliance-based approach reflects the belief that officials do the right thing primarily because there will be sanctions if they do not (Foster Back 2006: 8; Heywood & Rose 2015). Values-based approaches work at the level of ethical commitment and prevention; those that are compliance-based focus on deterrence and punishment. The tendency over recent years in public management reforms in general, and in anti-corruption efforts in particular, has been to place greater emphasis on compliance measures than on promoting ethical values, but there is limited evidence that such an approach yields positive results. Although it is widely accepted that there needs to be some balance between compliance and values, it is not clear what that balance should be, how it should operate in practice, nor how it should be maintained in the face of concrete corruption challenges. Moreover, we contend that, in addition to exploring how a government's formal processes for combating corruption and promoting integrity operate, we need also to focus on the broader values and beliefs embedded within society and in particular how they influence and interact with formal mechanisms.

The research for this article used a process-tracing approach[163] to explore the links between the prioritization of compliance and control measures to fight corruption and the apparent ineffectiveness of Bolivia's anti-corruption policy in changing social attitudes towards corruption or in building trust between citizens, public officials and the government. Bolivia's experience is highly relevant for the following reasons: first, the government's anti-corruption policy explicitly references both values-based and compliance-based measures, as outlined in the Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz Law, and this provides scope to explore the practical challenges of seeking an effective balance between both approaches; second, the country is routinely regarded as being systemically corrupt, so provides a test case for addressing corruption in a context where it is both experienced and accepted as normal practice (Wickberg 2012: 2) [164]; third, the multicultural composition of the Bolivian population and the explicit commitment by President Morales to recognise and promote ethnic diversity may offer insight into the debate around cultural specificity versus institutional universalism in promoting integrity (Heywood and Johnson 2017).

The article proceeds as follows. In the first part we present the theoretical framework, and discuss the design of Bolivia's anti-corruption policies within the context of the debate over the relationship between values and compliance. In the following two sections we analyse the respective weight given to values and compliance in the actual implementation of these policies, looking in particular at how the prioritization of compliance measures has influenced the response of public officials towards certain anti-corruption mechanisms, and how it has affected public perceptions of corruption. Finally, in the conclusion, we draw lessons from the Bolivian case and reflect on the appropriate balance between values and compliance in combating corruption. The analysis is based on original data collected in Bolivia in late 2014. The primary sources are interviews conducted with public officials, including the Minister for Institutional Transparency and the Fight Against Corruption, the judiciary, the police, the mass media, social movements, business people, and several meetings held with NGOs, international organizations, and local experts in La Paz, Sucre and Santa Cruz; in addition, we have consulted official documents as well as secondary sources.

Values and compliance in the fight against corruption

Mainstream approaches to combating corruption over recent decades have often linked reforms to a notion of 'good governance' that reflects a view of corruption being essentially a rent-seeking activity that stands in the way of economic development. Accordingly, states need 'a stronger regulatory capacity as a precondition for liberal markets, since deregulation

[163] Process-tracing 'refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest' (Bennet and Checkel 2015: 6). With this purpose it 'attempts to identify the intervening causal process –the causal chain and casual mechanism- between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable' (George and Bennett 2005: 206). Process-tracing entails within-case analysis and draws casual relations from the use of interview transcripts, archival documents, histories and other sources.

[164] According to the report *Cultura Política de la Democracia en Bolivia 2014* (Ciudadanía and LAPOP 2014: 14), in 2014 corruption perception was 68 over 100, which indicates that people in Bolivia thinks that corruption is a generalized phenomenon.

in the absence of frameworks like competition policy may risk power transfer from state to private sector oligarchies' (Andersson & Heywood 2009: 750). From a good governance perspective, therefore, the best way to tackle corruption is to promote competition via markets and the private sector, improve political accountability, impose institutional restraints on power, strengthen civil society, and reform public sector management (Andersson & Heywood 2009: 751). This approach is based on the belief that there is a causal relationship between particular institutional configurations and lower levels of corruption. According to the World Bank (2004), 'corruption prevails where there is ample opportunity for corruption at little cost'. Therefore, anticorruption measures should increase the expected cost of being corrupt by, for example, increasing the risk of being caught and establishing severe punishment mechanisms. Essentially, the approach assumes that corruption is due to an institutional design problem and that by improving the efficacy of scrutiny and compliance mechanisms public officials will have fewer incentives to commit acts of corruption. However, such an approach ignores the complexity and forces that underlie politics in the real world (Philp 2006, Andersson & Heywood 2009), as well as the fact that not only does human behaviour not always respond as expected to incentives, but different people also respond differently to the same incentives (Dahlström and Lapuente 2010, Frant 1996) .

The 'good governance' approach to addressing corruption has been reflected in standard technocratic measures to confront the problem wherever it occurs. The application of 'tool-kit' measures tends to address consequences rather than causes, which is problematic when it comes to designing effective anti-corruption policies. The situation becomes even more challenging when we consider that even though corruption may be almost universally acknowledged as wrong and undesirable, in some contexts – especially in developing countries – it is none the less often an accepted norm (Marquette and Peiffer 2015, Miller et al. 2001). Corruption can be simultaneously condemned in principle and accepted at the level of practice, reflecting a collective action problem (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). In turn, this suggests that we need to understand better under what circumstances particular types and forms of corruption are tolerated or rejected by citizens, a question that goes to the core of the causes of corruption. In short, the values and beliefs that lie behind social attitudes are an important component of how any anti-corruption policy will operate in practice. It may be that if institutional reforms and the creation of laws can be helpful to curb corruption in the short term, more profound changes in values and ethical standards are essential for any long term solution.

Debates about the balance between compliance and values in the public sector has been influenced by the widespread trend since the 1980s of adopting private sector managerial practices, commonly known as New Public Management (NPM), with the objective of increasing efficiency and effectiveness. The use of practices drawn from private sector to manage public officials has prompted concerns about unintended and undesirable effects in regard to public integrity. In essence, what underpins this debate is a question of how intrinsic motivations operate: put crudely, in the private sector, these are seen as being about self-interest and material rewards, whereas in the public sector they are about collective interest and the social good. Of course in practice the picture is inevitably much more complex than

such a reductionist schema suggests, but none the less some analysts have detected a broad shift in values away from the public service ethos that had traditionally characterised bureaucracy in democratic polities towards a growing emphasis target-driven performance management and efficiency. This shift has, in turn, altered incentive structure in such a way as to increase the risk of malfeasance or corruption (Huberts and De Graaf 2014: 155, Frederickson 1996).

Compliance-based models founded on formalized rules and procedures reduce the personal discretion available to public officials, increase administrative burdens, and do not teach or instill integrity (Heywood and Rose 2015). Paradoxically, therefore, whereas the ideas that underpin NPM approaches would suggest a liberal, laissez-faire approach to regulation, the parallel policy design in relation to public officials has moved in the opposite direction, with a top-down approach encompassing ever tighter rules (Van Deth and Scarbrough 2003, Anechiarico & Jacobs 1996). The key concept to explain that paradox is trust. In their study on the effectiveness of public service ethics in European Union countries, Demmke and Moilanen (2012: 1) show that the lower the level of public trust in state officials, the more rules are needed. Similarly, the widely accepted view of bureaucratic corruption resulting from 'monopoly control plus discretion minus accountability' (Klitgaard, 1988: 75) has sometimes been interpreted as a justification for implementing more rules to manage public officials. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the tendency towards increasing regulation in order to address misbehaviour in the public sector has contributed to an ongoing debate about the relationship between compliance and values in protecting public integrity (Huberts, Anechiarico, Six & Van Der Veer 2008; Heywood 2012; Chapman 1998).

Empirical studies suggest that an emphasis on regulation and control measures may have a negative impact on the levels of corruption and integrity violations in public institutions. In their classic analysis of the 'zero tolerance' approach to corruption amongst public officials in New York City, Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) argue that the more severe and bureaucratic the controls that are put in place, the less effective they are. They showed how New York's anti-corruption project was 'committed to forms of disciplinary control that nurture and exacerbate bureaucratic pathologies and make fundamental public administration reform all but impossible' (1996: xvii). Studies on The Netherlands similarly suggest that administrative reforms based on control, rules and centralization may not necessarily be successful in reducing corruption and integrity violations (Kolthoff et. al 2007). Indeed, it is instructive, in light of the concern about bureaucratic discretion in the absence of accountability, that a secret manual called 'Simple Sabotage', produced in 1944 by the US Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor of the CIA), effectively called for extreme obedience to rules as an effective means of lowering morale and wreaking havoc in workplaces in occupied Europe. Included in the advice was to 'insist on doing everything through "channels"' (OSS, 1944: 28).

Clearly, in any effective system of integrity management, there needs to be some form of balance or relationship between compliance and values, and that in turn means allowing public officials some degree of discretion. However, the challenge lies in identifying what that

balance should look like, as well as how it can be both established and maintained. The Bolivian experience provides a further contextual element to add to the mix, in that we are dealing with a country in which corruption is both widespread and deeply embedded, posing a particular challenge for any form of anti-corruption initiative.

Values in Bolivia's anti-corruption policy

For the MAS government, the problem of corruption reflects a degradation of values that started with Bolivia's colonization and continued under the governments run by white elites after independence, further compounded by the influence of neoliberalism and the West. In an interview with Nardi Suxó, Minister for Institutional Transparency and the Fight against Corruption until January 2015, she stated: 'our ancestors had three basic values: *ama sua* (do not steal), *ama llulla* (do not lie), *ama quella* (do not be lazy). If we had maintained those values we would not have the problem of corruption. But now those values have been distorted because of colonization'.[165]

The government's proposed solution to this problem is a process of 'mental decolonization' and the incorporation of indigenous values into national consciousness. Hence, Article 8 of the 2009 Constitution adopts and promotes the following indigenous principles: *ama qhilla, ama llulla, ama suwa, suma qamaña* (live well), *ñandereko* (harmonious life), *teko kavi* (good life), *ivi maraei* (land without evil), *qhapaj ñan* (noble path or life) . That discourse took material shape in the 2011 *National Policy for the Decolonization of Public Ethics and Revolution in the Conduct of Civil Servants* (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2011). The main objective of this policy was to reorient the conduct of civil servants, based on the exercise of ethical and moral principles enshrined in the Constitution and motivated by the motto 'to serve well to live well'. Thus, the reform should promote a commitment to serve the Bolivian people in line with these principles. Moreover, the government is committed to spreading these values throughout society. In its official discourse, responsibility for corruption lies not just with those who engage in it, but also with those who allow it to happen, and the fight against corruption is the responsibility of all citizens. In the words of Suxó, 'A corrupt person is not only the one who pays [a bribe] but also the one who receives it. It is easier to pay to avoid the queue than queuing, and that is corruption.'[166]

The acknowledgement of the weakness of ethical values in society as part of the problem of corruption led the government, with the support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDC), to develop educational campaigns and an awareness-raising programme to prevent corruption, aimed in particular at building a culture of transparency amongst young people. To this end they organised 'transparency and anti-corruption caravans' traveling to different municipalities and organising fayres focused on educating the young about corruption and transparency (around 75 fayres to December 2015). In February 2014 the Ministry of Education agreed to include lessons on ethics, transparency and anti-corruption as part of the school curriculum. At the time of writing this has yet to be implemented but the

[165] Interview held in La Paz, 18/11/2014.
[166] Interview held in La Paz, 18/11/2014.

teaching materials have been completed (Ministry for Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption 2015). During 2015, the Ministry, under Suxó's successor, Lenny Valdivia Bautista, developed new technologies and released seven free-to-download virtual games aimed at promoting honesty, integrity and transparency (2015). This youth-focused work has been strengthened with the creation of a 'Young People for Transparency Network' composed of 67 branches and more than 2,000 young people undertaking activities to promote a culture of transparency and integrity (2015). The Ministry has also been working on a pilot programme for the socialization of the public ethic among civil servants (2015).

The Bolivian government's official discourse on corruption thus appears to favour a values-based approach to tackling corruption and promoting integrity. However, despite isolated initiatives such as the caravans, actual work on promoting ethical values remains in its early stages and has been subject to an internal debate within the Ministry about the usefulness of having codes of ethics. Former Minister Suxó did not subscribe to ethical codes because 'ethics cannot be established by regulations, ethics are within you. So I don't think you need to regulate what you feel. It would be as if you had to regulate love, whether you love someone or not'.[167] Despite this, some institutions, such as the Development Planning Ministry or the Police, do have codes of ethics, but in most cases they are in the process of being reformulated to adapt them to the new Constitution, or they are waiting to be formally approved.

Another indication of how the promotion of values can appear more rhetorical than real in Bolivia's anti-corruption policy lies in its efforts to ensure accountability, transparency and access to information. All state institutions are legally obliged to hold two public accountability hearings per year about their organisation and management.[168] However, according to the Ministry for Transparency and Fight against Corruption, one of the challenges it faced initially was to convince authorities that public accountability is not merely a good will gesture, but an obligation and a right.[169] Another challenge relates to how information is delivered. Despite the law stating that institutional reports on activity should be made available to civil society organizations (CSOs) at least fifteen days in advance, this does not always happen. An additional problem is the language in which the information is provided, often too technical to be understood by an audience with mixed backgrounds and levels of education. This issue raises the question of how technically competent an audience should be in order to exercise effective social control and what institutions can do to ensure that such control can be properly exercised.

From the perspective of some CSOs, there are several issues that turn public accountability exercises into little more than 'a salute to the flag'. The main obstacle is the tension between CSOs that are closely allied to the government and those that are not. It is only the former that

[167] Interview held in La Paz, 18/11/2014.

[168] At the national level, in the first hearing authorities and social organizations agree on what information about the management of that public institution they want to know. In the second hearing, the authority provides the information about what has been done in that regard.

[169] Interview held in La Paz, 18/11/2014.

are able to exercise any form of social control at the national level. The national and neighbourhood committees in La Paz and the Association for Strengthening Social Control in Santa Cruz (*Asociación para el Fortalecimiento de los Controles Sociales del Departamento de Santa Cruz* - ACOVICRUZ) agree that those CSOs not allied to the government are faced with impediments, for instance finding it difficult to make their voice heard in meetings, since if they disagree with or question officials, they are faced with booing and abuse by those loyal to the government.[170] Indeed, the co-optation of certain CSOs by the government, reflecting a loss of their independence, is one of the biggest threats to the effective implementation of accountability mechanisms. The response from the Ministry to this issue is that, although public accountability has been more successful in some institutions than in others, the law is not designed to address such issues, which are instead more to do with the maturity of CSO representatives. However, according to ACOVICRUZ, 'now public accountability is more formal than before. It is more about complying with the rules rather than creating a space for reflexion and co-responsibility with citizens regarding public investment'. The logic behind it, they continued, is to say that 'we [the people] are the government so we do not need to be monitored'.[171]

In regard to the right to information, the government approved the first part of a Bill on transparency and access to public information in August 2013, but it had still not entered legislation by the end of 2016 (Leyes y Decretos en Bolivia, 2016). The Bill generated opposition especially from within the media, since many journalists believed that it would actually hinder, rather than facilitate, access to information.[172] Indeed, the deteriorating relationship between the government and the mass media is noteworthy: at the start of his presidency, Morales said that 80% of the media were amongst the government's main opponents. According to Juan Carlos Salazar, editor of the newspaper *Pagina 7*, the government describes as 'opponents' anyone who is not fully supportive of it, or any independent or critical thinkers, even if they are not actually opposing the government.[173] Today, the government says that only 10% of the media form part of its opposition. This change is explained by the government's acquisition of leading newspapers, TV and radio stations, either by buying them through businessmen friends or through state investment via advertising to reward a supportive editorial line (*El Día* 2015; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, n.d.). For those elements of the media that have retained their independence from the government, there is a cost: financially, they are excluded from any official advertising, a particularly significant source of revenue; politically, their direct access to governmental information sources is made more difficult. According to Salazar, 'the government not only denies us advertising but refuses to grant us interviews.' According to Lupe Cajías, president of the Association of Journalists in La Paz, 'it is dangerous to report on corruption in specific cases. There isn't censorship, but there is a sense of threat. The media cannot work with the freedom they had before'.[174] It might strike some as ironic to compare the difficulties faced by

[170] Interview held in La Paz, 18/11/2014.
[171] Interview held in Santa Cruz, 12/12/2014.
[172] Interview with the National Press Association held in La Paz, 25/11/2014.
[173] Interview held in La Paz, 28/11/2014.
[174] Interview held in La Paz, 19/11/2014.

the independent mass media when trying to hold the government to account with the provisions of the 2013 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers and Witnesses that was designed to encourage citizens to complain about corruption.

Tightening the law

As outlined above, the legal framework for combating corruption in Bolivia was established through the 2010 'Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz' Law that was designed to end impunity, enhance anti-corruption measures, and recover stolen state assets. This would be achieved by making the penalties for corruption harsher, as well as creating new criminal offences, such as the misuse of public goods and services, illicit enrichment, active and passive transnational bribery, obstructing justice, and falsely declaring assets and income (Art. 25) (Asamblea Legislativa 2010). As confirmed in an interview with the Minister of Transparency, the decision to increase penalties for corrupt activity has been a policy priority for the government from the outset.[175] However, the political use of the law against opponents, known locally as 'witch hunts',[176] has generated extensive criticism.[177] Several sources[178] claim that the law is rarely applied in cases that would implicate members of the MAS;[179] and when it has been, the MAS members in question are mainly middle or low ranking public officials.[180] According to the Unidad Demócrata (UD) parliamentary deputy, Jimena Costa, the political use of the law follows two patterns: one is to accuse someone of corruption and thereby bring about their 'civil death'; the other is to engage in extortion whilst delaying the prosecution of defendants. Several investigations against local mayors have been open for up to five or six years.[181] The potential to use the Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz law as a means of political persecution is given additional force, although with questionable legal justification, through its retroactive character, which permits the prosecution of actions that are currently defined as criminal even if when they were committed they were not considered as such.[182]

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[175] Interview held in La Paz, 18/11/2014.

[176] According to *The Quality of Democracy in Bolivia in 2013* report, in Bolivia there has been an increase in the political discrimination from 33.7% in 2012 to 41.6% in 2013 (Asociación Boliviana de Ciencia Política 2014: 65).

[177] Interviews with Transparencia Bolivia, Red Justicia y Paz, ABCP, among others. La Paz, November-December 2014.

[178] Interviews with Red Participación y Justicia, and Transparencia Bolivia. Unidad Nacional, *La verdad sobre la corrupción de Evo* (report, no date).

[179] An exception is the case of the former president, and MAS' leader, of the public company YPFB (Bolivian Fiscal Oilfields) Santos Ramírez, accused for 12 corruption crimes and inmate in jail: http://www1.ypfb.gob.bo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1943:12-procesos-por-corrupcion-implican-a-santos-ramirez-valverde-&catid=121:agencia-de-noticias&Itemid=196

[180] According to a report on human rights in Bolivia published in 2014 by the US Department of State, the majority of corrupt civil servants behaved with impunity and rarely processes against pro-government civil servants were completed. The former Minister for Transparency Nardi Suxó stated in September 2014 that her Ministry was investigating 388 complaints against public officials. Following the report, there were 97 convictions by this Ministry since 2006. /

[181] Interview held in La Paz, 30/11/2014.

[182] This law is constitutional according to Art. 123 but it arguably violates the international law. According to international law, any criminal law can only be applied by a court created before the occurrence of the acts

A further dimension to the political instrumentalisation of Bolivia's anti-corruption policy is the lack of independence granted to the institutions in charge of combating corruption. The Ministry for Institutional Transparency and the Fight Against Corruption, as well as other institutions with monitoring roles, such as the Public Prosecutor's Office and the National Audit Office, are all appointed by and accountable to the Executive. At a lower level, the Transparency Units within each government ministry are answerable directly to the minister in charge (Morales, 2009: Article 125). This naturally makes it somewhat less likely that these units will receive internal allegations of corruption that can be followed up and investigated accordingly. A representative of the transparency unit in the *Escuela de Jueces del Estado*, responsible for training judges, put it as follows: for the first two months everything works perfectly with the authority, but as soon as you start actually monitoring the institution 'you turn into the most hated person.'[183]

The lack of resources devoted to those units also makes it difficult for them to fulfil their purpose. In an interview held at the National Police Transparency Unit, that was visibly poorly equipped, a representative reported that they had insufficient funds even to advertise their role within the institution via posters and brochures: 'we are not talking about salaries [already low], but about economic support for the process of transparency.'[184] Insufficient means to do the job is also reflected in low staff numbers, usually no more than one or two people in each transparency unit. The lack of resources devoted to one of the government's supposedly flagship initiatives could be interpreted as an absence of genuine institutional commitment to anti-corruption, but could also reflect an overall shortage of funding to support any government initiative at all.[185] Against such an argument, however, Bolivia has been experiencing a period of significant prosperity in recent years characterised, according to some observers, by high levels of wasteful expenditure. One example of this was the purchase of luxury presents, as well as eight Harley Davidson motorbikes for police outriders, at the G-77 Summit that took place in Bolivia in June 2014 (*Página Siete* 2014).

There are two contextual factors that may help explain the Bolivian government's political instrumentalisation of its anti-corruption law. First, the aim of MAS to have as much control as possible of all branches of the state, hardly an unusual aspiration in politics, needs to be understood in the context of the political struggle between the highlands and the lowlands. The Santa Cruz Department, located in the lowlands and the largest of Bolivia's nine constituent departments, has been the site of demands for independence led by the right-wing *Podemos* grouping in opposition to the central government based in La Paz, in the highlands. That tension is not only political, but also social, reflected in discriminatory disputes between the lowland *cambas*, mainly of white origin, and the highland *kollas*, mainly of indigenous

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alleged, and provided the principle of legality, which requires that any criminal fact intended to be punished, has previously been very clearly defined in law.

[183] Interview held in Sucre, 9/12/2014.

[184] Interview held in La Paz, 20/11/2014.

[185] International institutions such as The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Embassy of Sweden support the Bolivian government in its anti-corruption efforts.

origin. The 'threat' of separatist demands and the tensions between both regions helped establish a radical tone within Bolivia's political discourse.

A second factor is the way President Morales has contrasted the 'bad' values represented by neoliberalism, colonialism, and previous political elites, with the 'good' values associated with the indigenous and peasant groups represented by the MAS government. Pitching the contrast in such terms has allowed the government, from their own moral point of view, significant licence in their political ambitions. This moral discourse is especially relevant in the case of corruption since, as outlined above, corruption is seen as an inheritance of the colonial past and alien to indigenous cultures. In practice, however, these 'immanent' morals have been used less as a basis to promote an inclusive, values-based approach to promoting integrity than as a justification to impose a legally framed compliance-based approach towards combating corruption. In short, despite the rhetorical acknowledgement of a need to reincorporate traditional, non-corrupt values into national consciousness, the way the government's anti-corruption agenda has been pursued responds primarily to a political agenda of securing social control.

Reactions to the anti-corruption policy amongst public officials

In order to explore the impact of Bolivia's anti-corruption policy within public institutions we focused on the responses of state officials to the new mechanisms that have been put in place since Morales assumed power.[186] As noted above, a key element of those mechanisms has been the creation of Transparency Units in all ministries, as well as in other state institutions such as the judiciary and the police.[187] These Units were expected to receive and then investigate complaints about corruption from within, but sometimes, as has been the case with the Constitutional Court,[188] a majority of referrals come from people outside the institutions in question. In part, this reflects the difficulty of reporting one's own colleagues – often on account of either friendship or a sense of loyalty according to one member of the Transparency Unit in the Constitutional Court.[189] Underlying such feelings is a fear of reprisals, despite the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers and Complainants.[190]

[186] This analysis is mainly based on observations from the interviews conducted in Bolivia in 2014. The Ministry for Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption undertook in 2015 a process of validation of the Plurinational Plan of Public Ethics and it did a survey on ethics with public servants from the Transparency Units. However, the results have not been released (Ministry for Institutional Transparency and the Fight against Corruption 2015).

[187] Their work is based on five pillars: to fight corruption by receiving and processing allegations for corruption; the organization of public hearings; to guarantee the access to information (there is a bill about it pending to be approved); to facilitate the social participation and monitoring; and to transform the ethic of public servants. By 2015 there was a total of 318 Transparency Units; only in 2015, 22 new Transparency Units were created (Ministry for Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption 2015).

[188] Interview held in Sucre, 9/12/2014.

[189] *Ibidem.*

[190] In June 2015, the Implementation Review Group of the United Nations Convention against Corruption in its report on Bolivia recommended that the Bolivian state should provide better protection of witnesses. https://www.unodc.org/bolivia/es/mecanismo_evaluacion.html

The way hierarchy and authority are understood as being closely linked with the risk of reprisal reflects the predominance of a compliance approach to anti-corruption. In order to move away from a code of ethics that had historically been based on sanctions, between 1999 and 2007, Guillermo Pou, founder and president of Transparencia Bolivia, developed a project with funding from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank that aimed to establish a genuinely participative approach to promoting ethical values in public institutions. The main purpose of the programme was 'to build the self', providing public officials with the tools to differentiate appropriately between right and wrong. The idea was to foster reflexive skills among public officials, so they would prioritize values and reflection over formal codes or rules when facing ethical dilemmas. However, the project was cut short in 2008 by the MAS government, which accused it of being neoliberal and westernized. According to Pou, the interruption of the program has seen a return to old mind-sets, reinforced by the indigenous disciplinary precepts against unwanted behaviours promoted by the government (do not steal, do not lie, do not be lazy) which in turn perpetuates a rules-based sanctioning mentality.[191]

Despite the emphasis on rules, compliance and sanctions, fear of punishment does not always appear particularly effective as a deterrent to corruption amongst public officials. According to representatives of the Exporters' Chamber of Commerce in Santa Cruz (CADEX), 'It is very common to see cases of civil servants who take advantage of their position: they gather as much money as they can, they are prosecuted, they go to prison for no more than three years, often with alternative provisions, and when they are released they enjoy the money they collected as a civil servant. So, the cost of being in prison is less than the benefit of having a lot of money to live from when they are released'.[192] Along similar lines, Jorge Isaac Von Borries Méndez, former president of the Bolivian Supreme Court, argues against the effectiveness of punitive laws. In his opinion, increasing penalties makes little sense because people do not think of the potential punishment at the point when they are committing a crime, as opposed to thinking about how to hide their misdemeanour in order to avoid being punished at all.[193]

In fact, it is impossible to know how much the fear of potential punishment acts as a deterrent that prevents civils servants acting on the temptation to accept bribes or engage in other misbehaviour, since such acts could equally be influenced by other factors like labour conditions and internal connections. In the words of a CADEX representative, 'often civil servants have a low level of education, a low level of commitment to the institution, a lack of negative values against corruption, plus very low salaries, all of which induces them to take advantage of being in public office to engage in corruption and increase their income'.[194] What this therefore suggests is that a policy based on instilling fear of sanctions is failing to tackle the deficiency in guidance and training for ethical decision-making amongst public

[191] Conversation held in La Paz, 14/11/2014.
[192] Interview held in Santa Cruz, 12/12/2014.
[193] Interview held in Sucre, 8/12/2014.
[194] Interview held in Santa Cruz, 12/12/2014.

officials, highlighted by Gullermo Pou. It is also failing to address public distrust in the government that allows brazen abuse of office to continue.

Public responses to the anti-corruption policy

It is clear that, in general, people in Bolivia tend to think that the problem of corruption in their country is bad and has been getting worse. A survey conducted by Mercados y Muestras for the Bolivian newspaper *Página Siete* showed that 44% of the respondents believe that corruption and influence peddling are the main problems of the Morales government (*Página Siete* 2016). According to surveys conducted by LAPOP, between 1998 and 2010 the perception of corruption as a widespread phenomenon in public institutions steadily increased from 63% to 74% (see Graph 1). Figures from 2014 indicate a slight reversal in the trend, although the number remained high at 68% (Ciudadanía and LAPOP 2014). It is none the less striking that the survey results suggest a marked turn for the worse at precisely the moment when the Morales administration started to place emphasis on its anti-corruption policy.[195] One potential explanation is that any mention of corruption at all, including whether it is in the context of an anti-corruption drive by the authorities, increases public perceptions of there being a problem with corruption (Peiffer, forthcoming).

Perhaps more strikingly, LAPOP's surveys also shows a negative correlation between increasing perceptions of corruption and decreasing corruption victimization[196] over the years (see Graph 1). People's direct experiences of corruption fell progressively from 51% in 2000 to 32.3% in 2010; yet, as perceptions of corruption started to decline, so victimization figures increased; in 2012, when perceptions fell to 68%, victimization increased to 45% (Ciudadanía and LAPOP 2014). Just as perceptions of corruption may increase with any mention of the issue at all as opposed to being based on objective evidence or personal experience, so they may also reflect both the way corruption is understood in society and also the assessment of government performance more generally at any given moment.

[195] Nevertheless, there are inconsistencies in the data. For example, according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), by Transparency International, the perception of Bolivia as cleaner country has, in average, increased progressively since 2001 from 20 (in 0-100 scale being 0 highly corrupt and 100 very clean) to 34 in 2015. The most significant change during those fourteen years took place in 2012 when the score moved from 28 to 34. On this positive note, Latinobarómetro's figures show an increase in the number of respondents that thought that the progress in reducing corruption was getting bigger (from 26% in 2005 to 50% in 2009). That percentage dropped to 37% in 2010 though, coinciding with the bigger acknowledgement of corruption as a widespread problem that same year shown by LAPOP.

[196] Corruption victimization reflects (direct and indirect) experience of corruption. It is obtained by asking questions such as if the person has been asked to pay a bribe, has observed a bribe being paid, or has paid a bribe. For more on corruption victimization, see Seligson 2006.



Perceptions of corruption could also be a manifestation of a broader sense that all politicians are no good. There is evidence to suggest that citizens in countries that are perceived to be more corrupt are less likely to exhibit trust in government or to believe in the legitimacy of institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, Canache and Allison 2005, Seligson 2002).[197] A 2012 study conducted by LAPOP (Ciudadanía and LAPOP 2012: 96) on democratic political culture in Bolivia gave a score of 47.2 for trust in the government on a scale of 0 (very little trust) to 100 (complete trust). The same study found that during the period when the government's anti-corruption policy attained maximum profile and visibility through legislative reforms, between 2010 and 2012, the perceived level of legitimacy of political institutions in Bolivia decreased from 47.9 to 41.1 (LAPOP 2012: 97).

It would therefore seem that Bolivia's anti-corruption policy has not been able to change the way people think about governmental probity. Indeed, at least two political practices by the MAS government may have contributed to reinforcing concerns about the abuse of power by the government. One relates to the allowing of legal exceptions, especially in relation to public procurement. The Morales administration approved Decree 29190 (July 2007) and the Decree 29576 (May 2008) that allow 'strategic public companies' – among them those dealing with natural resources, such as the hydrocarbon industry (YPFB), and customs – to engage in direct contracting, instead of having to tender through standard public procurement mechanisms. In 2012 the government spent 70% of its public investment expenditure (USD 2.4bn) on direct contracting.[198] Among the projects contracted in this way have been the

[197] Sometimes that lack of trust in corrupt governments is understood in the literature as contradicting the argument in favour of the acceptance of corruption in certain countries as a way to overcome inefficient bureaucracies (Seligson 2002). However the case of Bolivia shows that even if there is not trust towards a government because of corruption, this does not necessarily imply that the society is not going to re-elect that government. The third election of Morales as president of the country in October 2014 is proof of that. This example indicates that there are other reasons to keep supporting a corrupt government, and in Bolivia one of those reasons is the economic performance of the government positively perceived by the society (Ciudadanía and LAPOP 2014).

[198] http://www.hidrocarburosbolivia.com/noticias-archivadas/408-ypfb-petroleras-archivado/ypfb-petroleras-01-07-2012-01-01-2013/54444-se-gastan-us-24089-millones-en-ocho-contrataciones-directas.html

building of a chemical plant specialising in urea,[199] the construction of the funicular cable railway in La Paz, the installation of liquid separator plants, and the construction of roads, among others. A report by the political party Unidad Nacional (no date) highlights another legal exception known as '*fideicomiso*' (trust system). This consists of giving large injections of government funding to politically privileged companies and projects, which are then managed outside the SIGMA (Integrated Management and Administrative Modernization System) framework that is compulsory for other companies. According to the Unidad Nacional report, *fideicomiso* operates as a form of political clientelism. These legal exceptions have also contributed to a lack of transparency and information about scandals involving state-run projects – for example, the government purchase from a Chinese company at a cost of USD 28mn of sixteen barges and two bulldozers that never actually reached Bolivia (*Página Siete* 2015).

The second practice is the politicization of public appointments. Whilst this is hardly unusual, under the MAS administration it has reached new levels, prompted by the desire to include members of discriminated groups such as indigenous peoples and peasants in public office. However, the implementation of the policy reflects this primarily political agenda and has resulted in some people being appointed without any appropriate training or experience. A good example relates to the short-lived policy on the popular election of judges, whereby instead of being selected according to professional criteria and merits, they were to be elected by popular vote. The measure provoked strong criticisms because some candidates lacked the requisite knowledge and expertise in the field and, equally significant, some candidates were 'pre-selected' by the government on the basis of their political affiliation. It also demonstrated that the executive was prepared to intervene directly in the judiciary, calling into question the separation of powers in Bolivia. The whole episode discredited the government, which was forced to recognize publically that the election of judges had been a mistake.[200]

In his study of corruption victimization in Bolivia, Gingerich (2009: 6) has shown that the institutional affiliation of the perpetrators of corruption is crucial in understanding how citizens are likely to react. Those asked to pay bribes by officials who secured their jobs on the basis of political patronage will likely hold the government directly responsible; whereas if the officials work for institutions that are not seen as subject to patronage hires, then citizens will be likely to attribute any victimization to the low moral standards of individual officials. Moreover, the lack of professionalization of the state bureaucracy inevitably affects the quality of the service provided, further reducing the level of trust and belief by citizens in public officials and the institutions they work in. Indeed, Bolivian bureaucracy is a main arena for bribery. With few exceptions, such as the privatisation of the ID card and passport application system, citizens feel there have been insufficient efforts by the government to bring about reforms, further deepening doubts about how genuine is its commitment to fighting corruption. Until the burdens imposed by a slow and inefficient bureaucracy have been addressed, the space will remain for irregular transactions and bribery to bypass

[199] Urea is a chemical used as a solvent or fertilizer.

[200] 'Gobierno reconoce error en la elección de jueces', Ansalatina.com, 1/10/2014: https://www.ansa.it/ansalatina/notizie/notiziari/bolivia/20141001001235711694.html

obstacles. As explained by a CADEX representative, 'if you export bananas, for example, you cannot wait eight days [the average time to export a product if everything goes smoothly] to have the activity approved.'[201]

In regard to Bolivia's judicial system, inefficiency again serves as a driver of corruption.[202] Fully 81% of prisoners are being held as a preventive measure and have never faced a trial. They can stay in prison for up to six years if they do not have the money to pay for a court case. But being in prison is not cheap either. According to a report published in *Pagina Siete* (2014), prisoners have to pay to have a place to sleep. If they have a hearing in court, they have to pay 200 bolivianos to be accompanied by a policeman as the law requires, 200 bolivianos to rent the car, and 100 bolivianos for the secretary in the prison to turn on the computer. Even if the accusation has been withdrawn, if they do not have money to pay to receive a release order, they stay in prison. Relatives and friends also have to pay to visit them. Thus, many people are in prison not because of what they have done, but because they do not have enough money to leave. According to the Ombudsman, Rolando Villena, 'the cumulative caseload, the insufficient number of courts, the complexity of procedures, the culture of pseudo-dispute, and the dehumanization of justice, has generated a huge, chaotic and uncontrollable system that directly affects the citizen and becomes a retardation that at this point seems to have no solution' (*Pagina Siete*, 2014). Jorge Isaac Von Borries Méndez, former president of the Supreme Court, suggests that a main reason for these issues is a lack of capacity of the judicial system to cope with its workload. On the one hand, there are not enough judges: 'When I was president of the Supreme Court in 2010-2011 we had 300 cases in litigation. Now we have 1200 cases, four times more than before.'[203] On the other hand, the fact that just nine judges have to review all the cases and that everything is still done on paper, considerably slows things down.[204]

Conclusion: in search of the right balance between compliance and values

There are two necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for an anti-corruption policy to be potentially effective: a clear commitment by the government and other relevant authorities to its implementation, backed up by appropriate levels of resource. In this article, we have shown that in Bolivia neither of those conditions has been properly fulfilled. Moreover, we have further argued that even if there were a rigorous commitment to implementing anti-corruption measures, supported by sufficient means, the prioritization of compliance-focused measures would still generate difficulties. The emphasis on compliance and regulatory frameworks is likely to perpetuate already existing behavioural patterns, since it relies on fear rather than the promotion of alternative values. In practice, that fear is not necessarily just of punishment for being corrupt, but – in a context in which bribes are a 'normalized' practice

[201] Interview held in Santa Cruz, 12/12/2014.

[202] According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 76% of Bolivians consider the judiciary to be the second most corrupt institution, behind the police (86%) (Transparency International 2013).

[203] Interview held in Sucre, 8/12/2014.

[204] The Legislative Assembly passed in October 2014 the Law 586 of decongestion and effectiveness of the criminal procedural system.

among public officials – it may equally derive from not wishing to stand out by disrupting standard patterns of behaviour within a corrupt network.

A further negative impact of prioritising compliance is that it makes it more difficult to develop alternative, values-based, responses to ethical dilemmas. In systematically corrupt countries, those who engage in corruption often do so because not only is it standard practice, but also it provides a means of resolving everyday problems around securing access to resources. Without a credible alternative, nor a sense that individuals who denounce corruption will be protected, self-interest rather than the collective interest is likely to remain at the forefront of citizen responses. In the case of Bolivia, the prioritization of compliance has arguably helped to reinforce the very behavioural patterns that were at the origin of the existence of corruption. In other words, an anti-corruption policy that prioritizes compliance focuses on the symptoms of corruption in terms of its manifestation in particular behaviours, but does not tackle the root causes that promote corrupt behaviour in the first place.

Relying on a fear of sanctions might help to suppress certain behaviours, and arguably that is a necessary first step in addressing situations of endemic corruption, but it will not on its own motivate and encourage public officials to work for an environment of integrity and honesty that reduces the space for corruption. We therefore need to focus as well on values, not just in the design of an anti-corruption policy, but also in promoting an alternative vision of how public service should operate. One of the problems in Bolivia is that the activities to promote ethical values, such as the caravans, have been sporadic and temporary in contrast to the continuous emphasis on compliance based legal approaches.

However, Bolivia also provides an example of how compliance and values can be aligned successfully in an anti-corruption initiative. The experience of the municipal government of Juan del Granado in the city of La Paz, where corruption has been much reduced over the last fifteen years, underlines the importance of transforming the relationship of public officials with the institution they work for by generating a sense of belonging, as well as emphasizing their dignity, responsibility and potential (Zúñiga and Heywood 2015). They achieved that in part through the explicit acknowledgement of good practice by public officials, and by emphasising their role as agents of public transformation with an important role in helping society. A key goal of the del Granado approach was to regain the trust of citizens by emphasising their joint responsibility with that of public officials to work together to improve live in La Paz. By the same token, this more balanced relationship also helped shift public officials' understanding of ethical values from being just some abstract aspiration to being something that generated a positive social response. The experience in La Paz suggests that, even in situations of deeply ingrained corruption, it is necessary to seek an appropriate balance between compliance-based and values-based measures to tackle corruption.

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Project profile

ANTICORRP is a large-scale research project funded by the European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme. The full name of the project is "Anti-corruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption". The project started in March 2012 and will last for five years. The research is conducted by 20 research groups in fifteen countries.

The fundamental purpose of ANTICORRP is to investigate and explain the factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruption policies and impartial government institutions. A central issue is how policy responses can be tailored to deal effectively with various forms of corruption. Through this approach ANTICORRP seeks to advance the knowledge on how corruption can be curbed in Europe and elsewhere. Special emphasis is laid on the agency of different state and non-state actors to contribute to building good governance.

Project acronym: ANTICORRP
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