



Government Favouritism in Europe

The Anticorruption Report

Volume 3

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Abbreviations

ACR	Anticorruption Report
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
ALB	Abnormally Low Bids
ANRMAP	National Authority for Regulating and Monitoring Public Procurement
ANTAC	Anti-corruption Action Centre
ANTICORRP	Anticorruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption
BCE	Corvinus University of Budapest
BDP	Bariş ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
BGN	Bulgarian Lev
BOT	Build, Operate, and Transfer
CAE	Identification Data for Contracting Authority
CCI	Commission for Conflict of Interest
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (People's Republican Party)
CPO	Central Procurement Officer
CPV	Common Procurement Vocabulary
CSD	Center for the Study of Democracy
CVM	Cooperation and Verification Mechanism
DNA	Romanian National Anticorruption Agency
DPPS	Directorate for the Public Procurement System
EC	European Commission
EFSI	European Fund for Strategic Investments
EPPP	Electronic Public Procurement Platform
EU	European Union
EUI	European University Institute
FOI	Freedom of Information
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GVA	Gross Value Added
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
HRK	The Croatian Kuna
IKS	Kosovar Stability Initiative
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LPP	Law on Public Procurement
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Movement Party)
MP	Member of Parliament
MSZP	The Hungarian Socialist Party
NABU	National Anticorruption Bureau
NAO	National Audit Office
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSI	National Statistical Institute
NSRF	National Strategic Reference Framework
NUTS	The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OC	Organised Crime
OCC	Organised Crime and Corruption
OP	Operational Programs
PFIA	Public Financial Inspection Agency

PPA	Public Procurement Agency
PPB	Public Procurement Board
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
PPL	Public Procurement Law
PPR	Public Procurement Registry
PSD	Partnership for Social Development
QOG	Quality of Government Institute
RPR	Reanimation Package of Reforms
SAO	State Audit Office
SAR	Romanian Academic Society
SCSPPP	State Commission for Supervision of Public Procurement Procedure
SEAP	Electronic Public Procurement System
SEEs	State Economic Enterprises
SICAP	Romanian Electronic System for Public Procurement
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
TCA	Turkish Court of Accounts
TED	Tenders Electronic Daily
TPC	Turkish Penal Code
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TMAC	Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs, and Communications
UNCAC	The United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USKOK	Croatia's Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime
VAT	Value Added Tax

7. Ukraine's Uncertain Reform Process

ANDREW WILSON

Ukraine has always been one of the most corrupt post-Soviet states, for two main reasons. The first is a political economy that provides just enough rent-seeking opportunities for the elite but not enough surplus for a social contract with the general population (Wilson 2013). The second is the nature of the political deal made at the time of independence in 1991: the dissident-led opposition movement wasn't strong enough to take power on its own, so struck a deal with the Soviet nomenklatura - that they could stay in power and enrich themselves, so long as the latter shifted to the national cause (Wilson 2015). Those that did so became the first generation of Ukrainian oligarchs in the 1990s; 'red directors' and businessmen-bureaucrats, exploiting the arbitrage and state subsidies of a semi-reformed economy.

That said, corruption under President Viktor Yanukovich from 2010 to 2014 reached a new meta-level entirely (Wilson 2014). Corruption is here defined 'not at the individual level – undue profit from abuse of public authority – but at the societal level, as a governance regime... which deviates significantly from the norm of ethical universalism, where similar rules apply to everyone resulting in an allocation of public resources which is partial and unfair, due to the presence of ties of a personal and particular nature between office holders and certain individuals or groups' (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). That group was the literal and metaphorical Yanukovich 'Family', which increasingly monopolised the corruption 'vertical', either dispossessing older oligarchs or sharing the spoils with a smaller number of leading oligarchic groups who bought in to and supported the system, especially the groups controlled by Dmytro Firtash and Rinat Akhmetov.

The new vertical both increased the amount of corruption, with rake-offs rising to 50%, and devised new forms, particularly in the gas sector and plundering procurement and the state budget. Energy subsidies were 7.5% of GDP (\$13 billion) in 2013, with at least a quarter of cheaper household gas diverted to industry or being resold abroad. State procurement levels exploded after open tender was abolished in July 2012, to 250 billion UAH or \$21.1 billion in the next twelve months (Åslund, A. 2013).

1. Euromaidan and After

Corruption, and the predation that fed it, was one of the driving forces of the three months of 'Euromaidan' protests that culminated with the flight of Yanukovich in February 2014. Despite the hopes of the protestors, there has been slow progress in tackling corruption since. Ukraine was largely distracted from urgent tasks of domestic reform between the Russian coup d'état in Crimea in March 2014 and the parliamentary elections the following October. A new government was formed by December 2014, though its reviews were mixed. According to Anders Åslund, this is Ukraine's 'first serious, able government in years' (Åslund 2015). Others see the same old faces and complacent inaction (Herszenhorn 2015).

The truth, not surprisingly, is in between. But there is no single ideology or group guiding the putative reform process. There is no guiding elite comparable to Mikheil Saakashvili's first term as President of Georgia, from 2004 to 2008. Ukraine is anyway bigger and more diverse, and reform cannot simply be imposed top-down – the more balanced constitution of 2004 having been restored after February 2014. There is a coalition of forces pushing for reform: including the EU, International Financial Institutions, the 'foreigners' parachuted into several government ministries, NGOs, and some of the new MPs (236 out of 423 MPs in the parliament elected in October 2014, that is 56%, were new).¹ But the various groups do not necessarily interconnect and reinforce one another. Which also means there is little in terms of reserve strength; there is no backbone to rely on when the going gets tough. Arguably, at least, a patchwork process is better than the Russian model of change by trauma, using events like the Khodorkovsky arrest in 2003 to reshape relations between the state and the oligarchs; but this remains to be proven.

The strongest of these forces is the reform coalition among civil society, journalists and NGOs. According to Daria Kaleniuk of the Anti-Corruption Action Centre (ANTAC, see antac.org.ua), the biggest change since 2014 has been that 'journalists and civil society have more tools for exposing corruption'.² These include NGOs like ANTAC itself and the Re-animation Package of Reforms (RPR, see rpr.org.ua), and a network of honest journalists at papers like *Dzerkalo tyzhnia* (dt.ua) and sites like *Ukrainska Pravda* (pravda.com.ua) and *Nashi Grosbi* ('Our Money', see nashigrosbi.org), who are not involved in *komproamat* (spreading 'compromising materials' disguised as journalism). They helped push for new transparency laws passed in October 2014 that serve as a further 'tool' for their work; including a Public Registry of Property and a Law on Beneficial Owners (i.e. transparency in business ownership). A National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption was supposed to launch in July 2015, tasked with monitoring the income and asset declarations of politicians and bureaucrats. Its eight member board was supposed to be split evenly between representatives of NGOs and of state ministries.

According to Kaleniuk, 'Ukraine is turning into a haven for investigative journalists'.³ The exposure risks for corrupt politicians are high. Many were forced to resign in 2014-15, although legal processes were much less likely, given the failings of judicial reform (see below). Nataliia Gumeniuk, head of Hromadske TV (int.hromadske.tv), agreed: 'scandals have gone underground'. The risk of exposure is too high. Though there are 'resignations, but no legal redress'. Arguably, the constant talk about corruption in the media even 'makes people think corruption is worse than it is'.⁴ Although free media like Hromadske TV exists alongside oligarch-controlled media, especially the main TV Channels; which are still used as channels of *komproamat*.

2. The Anti-Corruption Bureau

Groups like ANTAC and RPR were also instrumental in setting up the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU), due to launch in October 2015, though EU conditionality in funding support also helped. NABU's designers also tried to avoid many of the pitfalls of the Moldovan

¹ See the figures at http://chesno.org/media/gallery/2014/10/30/parl_results.jpg

² Interview with Daria Kaleniuk, 30 July 2015.

³ Interview with Daria Kaleniuk, 30 July 2015.

⁴ Interview with Nataliia Gumeniuk, 27 July 2015.

example, where the National Anti-Corruption Centre set up in 2002 itself became an instrument of corruption, given its control over information gathering and prosecutions. A better model is Romania's Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA); but in any case the Ukrainians were well aware from more than twenty years of their own experience of the dangers of the politicisation and corruption of investigative processes and 'put safeguards in place' to try and prevent Ukraine following the Moldovan example.⁵ These included an open selection process for the new Director, overseen by a nine-person Selection Commission, whose meetings were broadcast live on the internet; the open recruitment of new detectives for NABU; a Council of Civil Control, elected online; and an annual External International Audit. Salaries are high, with an eventual staff of 700 planned. The vote for the Council members became an event in itself. The process had to be repeated after rumours of multiple voting; the second attempt was a triumph for activists from ANTAC, *Nashi Groshi*, Transparency International, *Svidomo* (the bureau of investigative journalism) and others.⁶

Nevertheless, there has been an ongoing struggle with old guard forces over the future direction of the NABU. The President had the final say over the appointment of the NABU Director, Artem Sytnyk, from a law firm 'Legal Guarantees' with some alleged links to old-guard business interests. As also with the NAPC, where there were attempts to manipulate the four government representatives. When the NABU begins operations as 'Ukraine's FBI' (Gorchinskaya 2015), the temperature around it will undoubtedly heat up (if not, it will not be doing its job). One proposal is to give it greater external protection. There is already the idea to set up a joint EU-Ukraine investigative body to monitor how EU funds are spent. It could easily be attached to the NABU.

3. Missing Legal Reform

Despite increased transparency and the threat of exposure, Ukraine has not taken the logical next step of proper legal reform. According to Kaleniuk, 'the law enforcement system is still captured' by corrupt insider interests.⁷ Little has been done to reverse Yanukovich's highly damaging legal 'reform' of 2010 which effectively snuffed out all vestiges of judicial independence, establishing executive control over judicial appointments and salaries, and deepening the notorious system of 'telephone justice' (secret executive instructions to judges).

A Judiciary Reform Council was set up in the autumn of 2014. A December 2014 Law on the Status of Judges and a February 2015 Law on the Right to a Just Court brought about some marginal improvements, but were not the Big Bang reform needed. The same was true of the damp squib Procuracy reform in October 2014, which introduced some competitive appointments and took away the function of overseeing the application of the law, but did not dismantle the all-powerful neo-Soviet institution in the way reformers were demanding (the Chief Procurator is appointed by the President; the office he controls investigates crime, decides on and organises prosecutions, and conducts them in court – functions that are normally separate).

Nevertheless, there were important personnel changes to the still all-powerful Procuracy in February 2015. The new Chief Prosecutor Viktor Shokin was an establishment figure, but he appointed genuine reformers like Vitalii Kasko and Davit Sakvarelidze, who held the same

⁵ Interview with Daria Kaleniuk, 30 July 2015.

⁶ See the voting at <http://nabu.gov.ua/index.php?id=16>

⁷ Interview with Daria Kaleniuk, 30 July 2015.

post in Georgia under Saakashvili from 2009-12, as his deputies. They promptly began investigations of corruption in the Procuracy itself. When they uncovered \$500,000 and 65 diamonds in one of their colleagues' flats, a war of kompromat ensued, with an attempt to dismiss the reformers. But they held firm with strong civil society support, and it was their colleague Volodymyr Huzyr who was forced to resign in July 2015.

4. The Oligarchs

Much of the corruption in the Yanukovych era was *ad hominem*. Once he and his 'Family' departed, many schemes ended. But far from all: much of the 'Family's' business empire was surprisingly extant, and all was by definition corrupt or corruptly-established monopolies. The notorious Ukrainian Development Bank, which laundered the profits from other businesses of Yanukovych's elder son Oleksandr and helped finance the rebels in the Donbas, continued operating until December 2014. Donbasenergo, a corruptly-privatised cash-cow for the Yanukovych family, continued to receive payments during the whole of 2014. The 'Family's' front men find it even easier to operate. One example is Unison Bank linked to Oleksander Klymenko, who was the main organiser of tax avoidance when he was Revenues and Duties Minister under Yanukovych. Another is Serhiy Kurchenko, a pseudo-oligarch and front man for the 'Family', who still runs Ukrainian Media Holding.

But that still leaves the other oligarchs. There has been some excited press talk in 2015 of 'de-oligarchisation' and a 'war against the oligarchs' (Garton Ash 2015). Ukraine's three major oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoisky and Dmytro Firtash, have all for different reasons had their wings clipped. But the West is looking for the wrong thing. According to leading political commentator Oleksii Haran, "There is no 'war on the oligarchs'. There are attempts to gradually reduce their influence and introduce more civilised rules of the game. But no more. And it's not possible to do this in a hurried way: it would destabilise the situation".⁸

In 2014 many were making the opposite argument, that Ukraine's oligarchs had emerged from the events on the Maidan and in Crimea and the Donbas only the stronger (Leshchenko 2014). There has been no campaign, but there has been adjustment over the medium-term, brought about by three factors. First, war and the threat from Russia have led to a dramatic diminution in the importance of the gas trade – hitherto Ukraine's number one source of corruption. Second has been the desperate need to bring rudimentary order to the national budget, with the state facing economic collapse. Third, the war in the east has disrupted and divided the economic empire of Ukraine's leading oligarch Rinat Akhmetov in particular.

The oligarchs are not as rich as they were. According to the 'rich list' of the Ukrainian magazine Fokus, the top five Ukrainian oligarchs (Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoisky, Hennadii Boholiubov, Viktor Pinchuk, and Vadim Novinskii) saw their total wealth decline in 2014 by 46%, from \$28 billion to \$15 billion (Fokus 2015). Though most of this was due to the collapsing economy - GDP fell by 6.8% in 2014 and by 17.6% in the first quarter of 2015.

But none of the main groups has dislodged any of the others, though the pro-Russian Novinskii may be dispensable. On the other hand, new players or promoted players like Kostiantyn Grigorishin are being used as proxies, in this case allegedly by circles close to President Poroshenko, to take over assets secured from rivals, much like the role played by Dmytro Firtash under Presidents Yushchenko (2005-10) and Yanukovych (2010-14) (Oleksiyenko 2015a).

⁸ Interview with Oleksiy Haran, 30 April 2015.

The three main centres of oligarchic power are now Akhmetov, Firtash and Ihor Kolomoiskyi, whose power and wealth has vastly increased during the war, as his home base Dnipropetrovsk is the front line after the Donbas and vital to Ukraine's survival as a state. They balance each other and the two main post Maidan political groups – the Poroshenko Block backing the new President and the People's Front backing Prime Minister Arseniuk - in between. All have exploited changing politics since February 2014, as much as coming under pressure because of it. Kolomoiskyi, most famously, exploited his role as defender of Dnipropetrovsk and the sponsor of battalions in the east. Firtash has had to invest heavily in other political groups after facing, and facing down, the threat of extradition to the USA from Austria. He is allowed back, so long as he reduces his financing of opposition groups. Akhmetov has also invested in other forces like Yatseniuk, and is allowed to remain a key player so long as he limits his dangerous double game playing both sides in the Donbas.

According to Forbes, Rinat Akhmetov has taken the biggest hit; his wealth diminished in 2014 from \$12.5 billion to \$7.2 billion (Musaieva-Borovik and Denkov 2015). He now has to pay more for coke freight; the 'green tariff' for his wind energy business was halved; and he lost his monopoly on electricity exports. There is discussion of reviewing his gains of the Yanukovich era, via the possible revision of the privatisations of the national phone company Ukrtelekom, and the big regional power companies Dniproenergo and Donbasenergo. There have been some attempts to clip his company DTEK's monopoly of the coal market in Ukraine (70% of the total), but the state still needs his coal. Protests by miners in Kyiv in April 2015 were allegedly covertly backed by DTEK.

Dmytro Firtash now has to pay for gas transport, not the state. In April 2015 as he escaped extradition to the USA, the state seized 500 million m³ of gas from his company Ostchem - a presumed warning shot as to his future operations. In 2014 Firtash lost Nadra Bank and control over the titanium deposits he acquired under Yanukovich. His controlling stake in Zaporizhzhia Titanium and Mining Combine was transferred to a state enterprise, making him further removed from control of the Vilnohirska and Irshansk mining and metallurgical plants. There is also talk of an investigation of his 2013 purchase of Inter TV, Ukraine's leading channel with his partner Serhii L'ovochkin. But so long as gas liberalisation has not yet spread to the regions, where Firtash still controls 70% of gas distribution, his main business is intact.

The third main oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyi has seen the most ups and downs since February 2014. He actually expanded his power too much in 2014, and was seen by many as the de facto second president and supreme power in his home region of Dnipropetrovsk, dubbed 'Dniprokolomoisk'. He overstepped the mark by using paramilitaries to defend his business interests against state investigations in March 2015. He was removed as governor of Dnipropetrovsk, though a protégé replaced him; while another protégé Ihor Palytsia was removed from the governorship of Odesa, where he had long looked after Kolomoiskyi's business interests. Parliament voted to remove his minority control of Ukrnafta. But these moves were sweetened by retrospective dividend payments for Ukrnafta of \$1.5 billion for 2011-13 (Kolomoiskyi's share being \$700 million) and agreement that there would be no audit checks on another of his companies Ukrtransnafta; plus a 800 million UAH stabilisation credit to the Kolomoiskyi-controlled Privatbank, Ukraine's largest, in March.

All the oligarchs have had their subsidies rimmed, but they are not threatened with dis-possession. Politics and the mainstream parties are still financed by the oligarchs behind the scenes. The main TV channels are still oligarch-controlled. But their access to government is less secure. Just as with investigative journalists and NGOs, change has been led by changes in personnel. According to one former activist turned bureaucrat Olena Tregub, 'A new type of

people got access to government, to decision-making. But it's not yet a big number of people'.⁹ This varies vastly from one ministry to another. And where there is change at the top it does not necessarily have immediate effect; given the importance of the 'mid-level mafia' (Tregub 2014). The key interface between oligarchs and ministries was not even ministers or deputy ministers, 'but heads of departments, who had been in the same jobs for decades'. 'It took six months to get rid of them' at the Ministry of the Economy. 'Reforms only started when there was change at this level'.¹⁰

5. Procurement

Abuse of public procurement was one of the worst forms of corruption in the Yanukovich era. An online e-procurement system for sub-threshold items was launched in February 2015, dubbed ProZorro,¹¹ alongside the information site tender.me.gov.ua. In March it was supplemented by a Law on the Transparency of Public Finances. Again the system was devised by a leading civic activist Kseniia Liapina. Transparency international oversaw its introduction and the introduction of three online trading venues for end-users to choose between: prom.ua, SmartTender.biz and e-tender.biz

Oleksii Shalaiskyi, head of *Nashi Groshi*, claims that corruption in state tenders has already noticeably decreased. The premium over market prices has fallen to 10-15% from 30-40%. Plus, 'dozens of [old] corruption schemes have [simply] disappeared (Ianitskyi 2015). Dmytro Shymkiv, the former CEO of Microsoft Ukraine appointed as Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in July 2014, estimated the system would save 20% (Shavakyuk 2015). Overall procurement spending fell from 464 billion UAH in 2012 to 203 billion in 2013 and 125 billion in 2014.

6. Public Services

Much less has been done in terms of e-government in general. Until 2015 Ukraine had actually been falling in the UN's rankings of e-government provision, to a global 87th position (Sheremeta). There has not been much change at the sharp end of citizens' access to public services. Ukraine's top traffic cop Oleksandr Yershov was forced to resign in May 2015, after revelations about his opulent life-style. A high-profile reform of the Kyiv police was launched in July 2015, with new recruits in new uniforms and new manners.

Deregulation has also been limited. The number of supervisory bodies was supposed to be cut from 56 to 28, but that it still 28. The number of permits needed to start a business is still 85, albeit down from 143. The World Bank shows Ukraine rising only slowly in Ease of Doing Business, from 112th in 2014 to 96th in 2015.¹²

7. Sectoral Reform

Ukraine also needs to clean up the most corrupt parts of its economy, particularly the energy sector. Here, domestic institutions remain weak, particularly the Anti-Monopoly Commit-

⁹ Interview with Olena Tregub, formerly of Reform Watch, now Director, International Technical Assistance Coordination and Cooperation with IFIs, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 28 July 2015.

¹⁰ Interview with Olena Tregub, 28 July 2015.

¹¹ From the Ukrainian for 'transparent', see prozorro.org/en

¹² World Bank Group *Doing Business 2015* data for Ukraine <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreconomies/ukraine>

tee, which has long been captured by oligarchs, despite receiving a new Chair, Yuri Terentiev, in May 2015. However, the EU Third Energy Directive has had an effect from outside, particularly in the gas market. A major reform in May 2015 sought to unbundle the gas sector and reform the notoriously corrupt and inefficient domestic monopoly *Naftohaz Ukrainy* ('Oil and Gas of Ukraine'). In February parliament finally caved in to IMF pressure to raise household gas prices, previously held down at only 12% of production cost. The point being the reduction, though not complete elimination of arbitrage potential (community cogeneration still has a lower price), which generated the massive corruption previously involved in diverting cheap household gas to industry at the expense of the state subsidy. *Naftohaz Ukrainy's* deficit has been cut from \$8 billion in 2014 to a forecast \$3 billion to \$4 billion in 2015 – which is a good proxy measure for reduced rent-seeking in the gas sector.

The electricity market awaits a similar reform, and still has a big difference between industrial and household prices. Coal market reform has been partial, but has been delayed by the war in the east, the loss of control over many of Ukraine's mines (only 35 out of 95 mines are free from rebel hands in the Donbas) and the fears of more unemployment in an already volatile region.

8. Public Opinion

One problem has been the divergence between elite and popular understandings of 'reform' – and the lack of a Georgian-style elite to drive reform regardless (Tregub 2015). Public opinion surveys show that public opinion cared less for deregulation and e-government, but wanted the Maidan 'Revolution' to deliver on social goods and punish the elite. In answer to the question, 'What are the reforms to you?', the most popular answers were abolishing MPs' immunity (58%) and raising pensions and salaries (51%).¹³ The public's most pressing concerns are the largely un-reformed public services, where corruption is still rife. In another poll, the most pressing reform was not deemed to be to the military or to politics, but to healthcare (43.6%).¹⁴

Another problem is unwillingness to take the pains inevitably caused by reforms. One poll taken at the end of 2014 showed that 33.5% of Ukrainians were prepared to make sacrifices for 'no more than a year' in the name of reform, and 10.3% for 'as long as is necessary'.¹⁵ That was actually an increase – but still only half of the population was prepared to tighten their belts. The breakdown by region was also noticeable: 56.2% in the west of Ukraine, and 47.7% in the centre, but not much more than 10% in the east (Olekseienko 2015b).

Conclusions

Ukraine's anti-corruption policy is led by two factors: economic necessity and the NGO-journalist sector. Economic recession has arguably done the most to reduce corruption rents in 2014-15; more than any political measure. Civic initiative is a good way to help ensure reform bed down in the long-term, but is no substitute for political will at the top in the short-term. Moreover, the two forces might not be the toughest or most durable pro-reform coalition.

¹³ Poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 4–19 December 2014, published by *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, available at <http://opros2014.zn.ua/reforms>

¹⁴ 'People and Reforms', Poll held 4-19 December 2014, published by *Dzerkalo tyzhnia*, <http://opros2014.zn.ua/reforms>

¹⁵ 'Public Opinion: Conclusions of 2014'; www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2014_polls/jjorjojpkpkpkpk.htm

EU conditionality has given the domestic reformers greater power, creating a ‘sandwich’ either side of the domestic elite. In 2014-15 EU pressure helped secure the package of much-needed new legislation; the EU should therefore keep as wary an eye on implementation and delivery. The EU should also press hard on the key missing piece in the jigsaw: without proper legal reform there will be only limited progress on combating corruption, and most other changes, from cleaner politics to an effective military response to Russia, are also dependent on the introduction of a proper rule of law.

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The fundamental purpose of ANTICORRP is to investigate and explain the factors that promote or hinder the development of effective anti-corruption policies and impartial government institutions. A central issue is how policy responses can be tailored to deal effectively with various forms of corruption. Through this approach ANTICORRP seeks to advance the knowledge on how corruption can be curbed in Europe and elsewhere. Special emphasis is laid on the agency of different state and non-state actors to contribute to building good governance.

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